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ABSTRACT 
The Israel Labour Party and its forerunner Mapai dominated both the pre-state 
Jewish organisations in Palestine and the early years of the state of Israel prior to 
1977. This thesis covers the period between 1977 and 1992 which saw the party's 
first electoral defeat (1977) and its eventual return to power (1992). It will argue that 
during this period the Labour Party was transformed from a dominant party with 
power (prior to 1977) to a dominant party without power (1977-1981). The years 
between 1981 and 1992 witnessed the development a more competitive party 
system in Israel with the Labour Party's status being transformed to that of a non-
dominant party either without power (1981-1984 and 1990-1992) or with a share of 
power during the National Unity Goverment years (1984-1990). 
A central theme of the thesis is the continuing "conditioning effects" of the 
period of dominance in shaping the Labour Party's development, even after it was 
no longer considered to be a dominant party. This was also in part related to the 
problem of defining political power in Israel as the Labour Party after its defeat in 
the parliamentary election in 1977 continued to enjoy a high degree of penetration 
into the everyday life of the population through its continued control of key 
institutions in Israel. 
The thesis is divided into two parts. The first part deals with the period prior to 
1977 and examines the development of the labour movement within the dynamic 
Israeli society as well as the Labour's Party's (Mapai's) relationship with the Israeli 
political system. In addition, it analyses the existing frameworks for explaining the 
decline of the Labour Party which was illustrated by its election defeat in 1977. The 
second part examines the developments of the party between 1977 and 1992 and 
is divided into historical periods which cover the various changes of government. 
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GLOSSARY 
Agudat Israel. A non-Zionist ultra-orthodox religious party. 
Ahdut Ha'avodah. (a) Founded in 1919 and dominant in the pre-state Yishuv. Also 
(b) a left wing party which tog~ther which along with Mapai and Rafi formed 
the Israel Labour Party in 1968. 
Alignment. Name used for the electoral list of Mapai and Mapam between 1969 and 
1984. Also electoral name used by the Israel Labour Party in 1988. 
Aliyah. Wave of Jewish immigration to Israel. 
Ashkenazim. Jews whose background is generally from Europe. 
Basic Law. The collection of Basic laws forms the Israeli constitution. 
Civil Rights Movement (RA TZ sometimes known as RATS). Left wing party 
founded and led by Ms. Shulamit Aloni. Currently a component of Meretz. 
Democratic Movement for Change (DASH). Party founded in 1977 and led by Mr. 
Yadlin. Won 15 seats in the 1977 Knesset elections but disbanded before the 
1981 election. 
Gahal. Acronym for the Herut-Liberal block which was established in 1965. it 
expanded in 1973 and became known as the Likud. 
General Zionists. Bourgeois party which joined the Progressives between 1961 
and 1965 and was then known as the Liberal party. 
Greater Israel. Notion of a Jewish state on both sides of the River Jordan. 
Gush Emunim (Block of the faithful). Settlement movement which has been highly 
active in the territories since the Six Day War in 1967. Opposed to any form 
of territorial compromise. 
Haganah. The defence force of the pre-state Yishuv. 
Herut. A political party with a nationalist ideology. Forerunner to the Likud. 
Histadrut. General Federation of Labour important in both the pre-state Yishuv and 
in Israel. 
IOF. Israeli Defence Force. 
Independent Liberals. Formerly the Progressive party. Since 1984 part of the 
Alignment. 
X 
lrgun. A pre-independence military organisation associated with the Revisionists. 
Israel Labour Party. Formed in 1968 by Mapai, Ahdut Ha'avodah and Rafi. 
Jewish Agency. An agency which concentrates on developing Israel using funds 
from world Jewry. Since 1971 it has worked in partnership with the World 
Zionist Organisation. 
Kach. Extreme nationalist party which called for the forceful transfer of Arabs. 
Founded by Rabbi Meir Kahane. 
Kibbutz. A communal settlement in which consumption and production is shared. 
Knesset. Israel parliament which has 120 members and is elected every four years. 
Law of Return. A law passed in 1950 which gives every Jew in the right to emigrate 
to Israel. 
Liberal party. Formerly the General Zionists. A middle class party which is a 
member of the Likud. 
Likud. Joint list consisting of Herut, Liberal party and others formed in 1973. 
Mapai. Acronym for Israel Workers party. 
Mapam. Acronym for United Workers party. Currently a component of Meretz. 
Moledet List led by Mr. Ze'evi which calls for the voluntary transfer of Arabs from 
Israel. 
Moshav. A co-operative settlement in which the production is communal but 
consumption is not. 
National Religious Party (NRP). One of Israel's most powerful religious parties and 
former coalition partner of the Labour Party. 
Peace Now. Formed in 1973 but came to prominence during the Lebanon war 
where it organised mass demonstrations against Israel's participation and 
conduct of the war. 
Progressive List for Peace (PLP). A joint Arab-Jewish list which supports the 
creation of a Palestinian state alongside Israel. 
Rafi. Party formed by ex-Mapai leader Mr. Ben-Gurion which won 10 seats in the 
1965 Knesset election. Most of the members of Rafi helped form the Israel 
Labour Party in 1968. Mr. Ben-Gurion refused to rejoin and formed the State 
List. 
Rakah. Acronym for the New Communist Party which appeals to Arab nationalist 
feelings. 
xi 
Sephardim. Jews whose background is generally from the countries of Asia and 
Africa. 
Shas. Split from Agudat Israel in 1984. Ultra-orthodox party which appeals to the 
Sephardim. 
Shiniu (Change). Centre party which was part of DASH in 1977. Currently is a 
component of Meretz. 
Tehiya. Extreme right-wing party whose members rejected the Camp David Accords 
of 1977 and thus formed this party. Did not pass the electoral threshold in the 
1992 elections. 
Tsomet. A right wing party established by ex-Chief of Staff Mr. Eitan in 1988. In 
1992 it won 8 seats in the Knesset. 
World Zionist Organisation. Founded by Mr. Theodor Herzl in 1897 to promote 
plans for Jewish nationalism. 
Yahad. List established in 1984 by Mr. Weizman and by the 1988 elections it had 
merged with the Labour Party. 
Yishuv. Jewish settlement and organisations in the pre-state period. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Israel Labour Party in its various forms has been at the centre of the 
development of Israel prior to and since the creation of the state in 1948. The labour 
movement (in which the Labour Party played the dominant role) is viewed as the 
movement which translated the Zionist dream of a Jewish state in Palestine into the 
reality of the state in lsraeJ1. As a result of its dual role as both a state-builder and a 
political party the Labour Party enjoyed a level of penetration into the everyday life 
of the Israeli population which went far beyond that of a normal political party 
operating within a democratic system. This influence was compounded by the fact 
that Israel is an immigrant society where many of the newly arriving immigrants were 
extremely dependent on the Labour controlled institutions for their initial basic 
requirements. 
As a result of its dual role the Labour Party even after its electoral defeat in 
1977 continued to have a degree of influence and power which went far beyond the 
norms of a traditional opposition party. Consequently, an examination of the 
development of the Labour Party in Israel represents not only a study of a political 
party but also of the developing Israeli state and society. 
Israel itself has been at the centre of the conflict in the Middle East since its 
creation in 1948. In the past 47 years there have been four wars between Israel and 
its Arab neighbours (1948, 1956, 1967 and 1982), the last three of which threatened 
to develop into wider global conflicts involving the two Superpowers of the United 
1 Mapai was the forerunner to the Labour Party and was the single dominant force 
in both the pre-state and early years of the state. Mapai formed the Labour Party in 
1968 by merging with two smaller parties Ahdut Ha'avodah and Rafi. In the 
introduction the term Labour Party has been used to avoid referring to various 
different names. 
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States and the Soviet Union. Even during the periods between wars, the Arab-
Israeli conflict has represented a constant source of tension in the region and has to 
a large degree dominated the politics of Middle East since 1948. Consequently, a 
study of the Israeli Labour Party represents not only an important step in 
understanding the internal developments in Israel itself but is also of relevance to 
understanding the past and present developments in the Middle East. 
The literature which is currently available on the Labour Party can be 
categorised into two groups: works which deal directly with the party (its institutions 
and organisation), and those which deal with other elements of Israeli politics 
(foreign policy, Israeli society and political economy) but which with the centrality of 
the party to developments in Israeli politics also examine the Labour Party. In the 
first category there are three major works all of which cover different periods in the 
development of the party. Shapiro's, The Formative Years of the Labour Party, 
concentrates on the pre-state period of the Yishuv and examines how the labour 
movement and subsequently Mapai came to occupy a dominant position in the 
Yishuv and early years of the state. Medding's, Mapai in Israel. represents a study 
of the structures and organisation of the party and in particular its relationship with 
the developing dynamic Israeli society. The study finishes with the formation of 
Israel Labour Party in 1968 which is the principal starting point of Aronoffs, Power 
and Ritual in the Israel Labour Party. Aronoffs work examines the decline in the 
importance of ideology within the party which he argues has been replaced by 
power oriented politics which in tum has increased the party's estrangement from 
elements of Israeli society. Aronoffs work although recently updated primarily 
covers the period up to the 1977 election defeat. 
In addition to the above there are various works in Journals which cover 
specific aspects of the party's development. Beilin's, A Dominant Party in 
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Opposition2, is of particular relevance to this thesis as is the later work of Hadar, 
Israel Labour Party: Peacemaker or Likud Two3, both of which deal with a perceived 
lack of change in the attitudes of the Labour Party . Mendilow's, Israel's Labour 
Alignment in the 1984 Elections: Catch All Tactics in a Divided Societ0, provides an 
examination of the failure of the party's electoral strategy. Of the more general 
works Eisentadt's, Israeli Society and The Transformation of Israeli Society, provide 
accounts of the development of Israeli society as does Shalev's. Labour and the 
Political Economy in Israel, of the political economy of Israel. The wide range of 
works listed in the bibliography are a reflection of the centrality of the Labour Party 
in all aspects of political life in Israel. 
This thesis in attempting to add to the established works examines the 
development of the Labour Party within the Israeli party system. It argues that the 
party was transformed by its election defeat in 1977 from a dominant party with 
power to a dominant party without power and then at later elections to a non-
dominant party without or with a share of power operating in a competitive party 
system. Finally the 1992 election victory marked the return to government for the 
Labour Party not as a dominant party but as a non-dominant party with power 
operating in a maturing competitive party system. Illustration (a) summarises these 
changes. 
2Published in Middle East Review, Summer 1985. 
3 Published in Journal of Palestine Studies, Summer 1992. 
4 Published in Comparitive Politics, July 1988. 
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Illustration (a): Central Theme of the Thesis. 
Development of the Labour Party in Israeli Party System. 





1981-1992: Non-Dominant party .,_/_-I 
without or with a share of Power ' 
1948-1977: Dominant party 
with Power 
I 
1977-1981: Dominant party 
without Power 
The key question concerns the 1992 election in that does the Labour party's 
victory represent a return to its pre-1977 dominant position or does it mark 
a return to power for the first time as a non-dominant party operating in a 
competitive party system ? . This thesis will argue that it represents the latter. 
It will argue that what are termed as 'conditioning effects' from the party's 
extended period of dominance continued to affect the party's actions even after it 
lost its perceived dominant party status. These need to be taken in association with 
similar effects caused by the Israeli electoral system (the party list system) which 
encourages the importance of intra-party politics and centralised elite control over 
the party organs and appointments (see 2.3). In simple terms the extended period of 
dominance led to the development of party functionaries who were dependent on 
the party for their livelihood. The fact that the party controlled many aspects of the 
state allowed it enormous powers of patronage to offer its clients. As a result of this 
intra-party concerns became in many ways more important than inter.party conflict 
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with the functionaries or party clients prior to 1977 more concerned about their intra-
party standing than how many votes the party won in elections. 
The second directly related 'conditioning factor' was the leadership's need to 
be in a position to deliver on patronage promises to its various groups of clients. In 
order to do this the leadership needed to secure at least a share in government and 
it was this factor which was the principal determining factor in the actions of the 
leadership and in particular the leader Mr. Peres during the period of this study. In 
short, the organisation and actions of the party between 1977 and 1992 were still 
influenced by its period as a dominant party even though after its second election 
defeat in 1981 it realised that it was no longer a dominant party. 
The Labour Party's participation in a competitive party system makes it 
necessary also to examine the actions and motivations of the various Ukud 
governments and how they affected the internal dynamics of the Labour Party and 
Israeli political life. It should be stressed that in the 15 year period of study of this 
thesis, the Likud was continuously either in government or in a National Unity 
Government. 
The research for this thesis was carried out in two stages. The first stage 
involved an examination of all the secondary sources available including Israeli 
newspapers and journals. The second stage took place in Israel where the 
researcher was based for 9 months conducting interviews with the leading figures 
from across the political spectrum in Israel. In addition, for much of the time the 
researcher was based in the Knesset where he interviewed all the leading political 
personalities relevant to the thesis. Part of the time was also spent in Labour Party 
Headquarters in Tel Aviv interviewing party workers and travelling throughout Israel 
to the local branches of the party to interview local party workers. The researcher 
also attended Central Committee meetings of the Labour Party, the Likud and 
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Mapam (Meretz) where he observed at first hand the workings or non-workings of 
the parties. 
As well as active observations and interviewing there was an examination of 
Labour Party protocols at its archive centre in Beit Berl and in the office of the 
Secretary General of the party in Tel Aviv. In using interviews, observations and 
party protocols the researcher has tried to avoid the criticisms levelled against 
Madding's and Aronoff's research methodology. Madding concentrated on party 
protocols and Aronoff used solely observations and interviews. 
In organisational terms the thesis is divided into two parts. Part One (Chapters 
One to Three) deals with history of the labour movement and in particular Mapai, the 
forerunner to the Labour Party. Chapter One itself chronicles the history of the 
labour movement in Israel and the arrival of the various Jewish waves of 
immigration (Aiiyah). Chapter Two examines the reasons for the Labour Party's 
early period of dominance and existing approaches to the concept of a dominant 
party together with an examination the effects of the electoral system and the rise of 
intra-party politics. The 1977 election saw the Labour Party lose power for the first 
time and the election and its consequences are examined in Chapter Three along 
with a literature review of existing works on the decline of the Labour Party. 
Part Two of the thesis covers the period from the Labour Party's election 
defeat in 1977 up to an including its return to power in 1992. Chapter Four explores 
the challenges facing the Labour Party as it went into opposition for the first time 
and assesses the party's performance in response to the actions of the first Likud-
led government. It's basic argument concerns the fact that the Labour Party 
continued to be seen as a dominant party even though it was no longer in power. 
Chapter Five covers the period from the 1981 Knesset election until1984. It 
assesses the impact of the Labour Party's second election defeat and the 
consequences of this on the party. In addition it stresses the more radical nature of 
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the second Likud-led government which transformed the political agenda in Israel 
and examines the effect of this on the Labour Party. The Chapter argues that the 
Labour Party's election defeat in 1981 led to it no longer considering itself as a 
dominant party but as a non- dominant party without power. 
Chapter Six starts with the tied Knesset election of 1984 and examines the 
motivations of the Labour Party for joining a National Unity Government (NUG) as 
well as the consequences for the party and the left in general of this decision. In 
assessing the performance of the NUG it examines the major issues of the day and 
the role of the Likud. 
Chapters Seven and Eight both cover the period between the party's election 
defeat in 1988 up to its decision to leave the second NUG of the 1980's in 1990. 
Chapter Seven examines the party's performance in the election and its motives for 
joining the government as a junior partner. It also explores the problems of the NUG 
and the motivates behind key parts of the Labour Party wishing to maintain the 
government. Chapter Eight examines the internal dynamic development of the 
Labour Party during this period which to some extent was dictated by the events in 
Chapter Seven. It stresses that this period saw the start to some extent of changes 
in both the Labour Party's ideological and internal organisation along with a 
generational challenge form the young guard of the party. 
Chapter Nine covers the period form the Labour Party's departure from the 
NUG in 1990 and the formation of the Likud-led radical right wing government up to 
the 1992 Knesset election. It covers both the frustrations and opportunities that the 
Labour Party's status as a non-dominant party without power in a competitive party 
system presented the party with. 
Chapter Ten is a detailed study of the 1992 election and its significance to 
both the Labour Party and Israeli politics. Its fundamental argument is that the 
election victory represented only a technical victory for the Labour Party. Importantly 
xix 
it argues that it did not represent return to pre-1977 dominant position for the 
Labour Party but rather a maturing of the Israeli competitive party system. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF THE ISRAEL LABOUR PARTY PRIOR TO 
1977 
Many of the challenges and problems which the Labour Party faced from 
1977 onwards were the direct result of events and developments which had taken 
place in the period prior to that covered by the thesis. This Chapter therefore aims 
to provide an historical account of the development of the labour movement in 
Palestine and subsequently Israel prior to 1977. 
Throughout its history the labour movement has experienced a series of 
mergers and splits, in which various groups have been incorporated into the party or 
have broken off, due to ideological differences, generational challenges, personality 
clashes or a combination of the three. Some of these breakaway groups have 
fonned independent parties, others have merged with additional parties, and many 
of them rejoined the Labour Party at a later date. The subject of this thesis, the 
Israel Labour Party, was fonned in 1968 as a result of the merger between three 
parties: Mapai, Ahdut Ha'avodah and Rafi. In providing an understanding of the 
historical development of the labour movement in Israel it is necessary to examine 
two related aspects of this development: first, the splits and mergers of the labour 
parties themselves; and second the periods of Jewish immigration (Aiiyah's) and 
their effects on the labour politics of the Yishuv and the state of Israel. The history 
of the labour movement prior to the period covered by this thesis itself can be 
divided into four distinct periods: first, the early years (1900-1948); second, the 
development of the state (1948-1967); third what Aronoff tenns as immobilism 
(1967-1973); and fourth, the crisis of confidence following the Yom Kippur war to 
the party's first electoral defeat in 1977 (1973-1977)1. 
1(a): SPLITS AND MERGERS IN THE LABOUR MOVEMENT. 
Left Po'alei Zion (1919) 
Non-Partisan Workers + Po'alei Zion = Ahdut Ha'avoda (1919) 
Mapai (1930) 
Ahdut Ha'avodah (Siah B 1944 
Hashomer Hatzair Mapam 
hdut Ha'avodah 
. I Alignment 
Alignment (1969-1984) 
La our (1988) 
Straight lines indicate mergers and angled lines show splits. 
Source: Updated from Aronoff, Power and Ritual in the Israel Labour Party. 
M.E.Sharpe,London,1993,p22. 
1 Aronoff, "The Decline in the Israel Labour Party: Causes and Significance", in 
Penniman, H. (ed), Israel at the Polls 1977, American Enterprise Institute, 1979. 
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1.1: The Early Years: 1900-1948. 
Illustration 1 (a) chronicles the history of these splits and mergers starting with 
Po'alei Zion (Workers of Zion) and Hapoel Hatzair (Young Workers), which via 
Ahdut Ha'avodah (Unity of Labour) formed Mapai (Party of Eretz Israel Workers). 
Mapai proved to be not only the single dominant political force in the labour 
movement in Israel, but in the whole pre-state Yishuv (Jewish community in 
Palestine), as well as in the early years of the State of Israel up to the formation of 
the Israel Labour Party in 1968. Po'alei Zion was established in Palestine in 1906 by 
members of the Second Aliyah (immigration wave) who had belonged to its 
movement in Eastern Europe. Among its founders were Mr. David Ben-Gurion and 
Mr. Yitzhak Tabenkin, the first of whom became the leader of Po'alei Zion and was 
responsible for its independent development in Palestine2. In ideological terms 
Po'alei Zion was committed to the establishment of a Socialist Jewish state by 
means of class warfare. In 1919 it, together with other non partisan groups, set up 
Ahdut Ha'avodah, and at its 5th Conference in 1920 the party split into factions A 
(left) and B (right). 
Ahdut Ha'avodah (Unity of Labour) rejected the previously held ideology of 
Marxist class war in favour of social democracy (hence the split in Po'alei Zion in 
1919 with a splinter group forming Maki, the Israel Communist Party). This split was 
critical because it led to the birth of the two ideological streams of the labour 
movement, namely social democracy and Marxism. This ideological division became 
the central divisive issue in the historical development of the labour movemenP. 
2 Mr. Ben-Gurion went on to become the leader of Mapai and the first Prime Minister 
of the state of Israel. He is widely seen as the single most important personality in 
the development of the labour movement in Israel. 
Mr. Tabenkin was one of the founders of both the Histadrut and Mapai. 
3 The centrality of this division was stressed in several interviews conducted by the 
researcher, including: 
3 
Ahdut Ha'avodah advocated unity within the Jewish labour movement and an 
activist defence policy. The party was active in all aspects of the Yishuv. As well as 
the previously mentioned leaders, its leadership included Mr. Berl Katznelson and 
Mr. Yitzhak Ben Zvi, both of whom were influential in the formation of Mapai in 
193o4. 
The other major element of the labour movement was Hapoel Hatzair, which 
like Po'alei Zion was established in 1906 by Second Aliyah Eastern Europeans, but 
which unlike Po'alei Zion saw Jewish labour in Palestine as a unique movement. It 
therefore rejected most of the Socialist doctrines established in Europe and used by 
Po'alei Zion. It did not, for example, celebrate May Day or have connections with the 
international workers movements. However, under the leadership of Mr. Chaim 
Arlosoroff, its position gradually changed in the 1920's, as it became closer to both 
the International and (within Palestine) to Ahdut Ha'avodah, eventually merging with 
the latter in 1930 to form Mapai. Among the leaders of Hapoel Hatzair were Mr Levi 
Eshkol, Mr. A. D. Gordon and Mr. Yosef Sprinzak5. 
The period up to 1930 saw the arrival of the first four Aliyah's in Palestine, but 
it was the arrival of the Second Aliyah, and its subsequent successful battle for 
influence with the First Aliyah, which proved the most politically significant. The First 
Aliyah (1882-1903), in numerical terms numbered 20,000-30,000, and arrived in 
reaction to the growing anti-Semitism in Russia. The majority of the 2.5 million Jews 
who left Eastern Europe at the time went to the United States. The minority that 
Interview with Mr. Amiram Efranti, Secretary General of Kibbutz Artzi, Tel Aviv, 29th 
August 1994. 
Interview with Mr. Victor Shemtov, Former leader of Mapam, Tel Aviv, 12th July 
1994. 
4 Mr. Ben Zvi served as Israel's second President from 1952-1963. 
s Mr. Eshkol became the fourth Prime Minister of Israel in 1963. 
Mr. Gordon was one of the spiritual leaders of the labour movement in general who 
died in 1922. 
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came to Palestine were ideologically committed to the Zionist movement, and had 
received formal training from Eastern European based Zionist groups. They formed 
a number of agricultural colonies (Moshavot) where the land was privately ownecP. 
They were educated people from urban backgrounds, but lacked agricultural skills 
and the work itself was mainly carried out by hired Arab labour. This Aliyah was 
largely saved by gift capital and the start of the Second Aliyah7. 
The Second Aliyah (1904-1914}, mainly came out of the failed Russian 
revolution of 1905 and numbered 35,000, most of whom were RussianS. As 
previously indicated the early labour parties and leaders came from this group, and 
the political institutions that the Second Aliyah founded had a great impact on the 
future of both the Yishuv and the state. The members of this Aliyah were more 
highly motivated than the First Aliyah, being predominantly young, politically 
socialist, single males. It is therefore not surprising that they soon rejected what 
they termed the capitalist-colonialist politics of the first immigrants and in particular 
their use of cheap Arab labour. The pioneering spirit of this group was evident in its 
belief in Hebrew labour and its desire to sacrifice for the development of the Zionist 
dream. The conflict between the first two Aliyah's intensified when it became clear 
that the newly arriving immigrants of the Second Aliyah expected to be provided 
with employment by the veteran colonialists, who themselves preferred to use the 
local cheap Arab labourS. 
The Third Aliyah (1919-1923) numbered 35,000, mostly from Russia with an 
estimated 15,000 being classed as pioneers. This brought the total Jewish 
6 Etzioni-Halevy with Shapira, Political Culture in Israel. Cleavage and Integration 
Among Israeli Jews, Praeger, USA, p4. 
7 1bid. 
8 Arian, Politics in Israel: The Second Generation, Chatham House, New Jersey, 
1989, p12. 
9 Etzioni-Halevy with Shapiro, Icc. cit. 
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population in Palestine to as,ooo10. The Aliyah comprised mainly single, young 
males from Poland and Russia. Much like the Second Aliyah, they were 
ideologically committed to Zionism, and brought with them an appreciation of the 
importance of political organisation and control gained from their experience in 
Eastern Europe. They came to Palestine on nationalistic grounds to build a Jewish 
state, and had received political instruction in their countries of origin to help 
prepare them for their role. Crucially, they accepted the leadership of the Second 
Aliyah, and together these two groups became known as the founding fathers of 
Israel and can be seen as the decisive factor in shaping the labour movement in 
both the Yishuv and the state of Israel. 
In 1920 the labour movement, led by the leaders of the Second Aliyah, and 
with the support of the newly-arriving immigrants of the Third Aliyah, started 
mobilising support in order to win power in the pre-state Yishuv 11. This attempt 
was clearly the main reason behind both the formation of a more united party 
representing the labour movement (Ahdut Ha'avodah) and the formation of the 
Histadrut (General Federation of Hebrew Labour). The aim of the mobilisation of 
support was twofold: first to secure funds from the World Zionist Organisation 
(WZO) and thus have the freedom to distribute them12; second, to use these funds 
to develop the activities of the newly created Histadrut in such fields as immigrant 
absorption and social services 13. By the mid-1920's it was clear that the labour 
leadership were building strong centralised political institutions, and that this was 
1o Arian, loc. cit. 
11 Shapiro, The Formative Years of the Israel Labour Partv. Sage Publications, 
London, 1976. 
12 The WZO held its first Congress in Basle with the aim of creating A Jewish home 
in Palestine. Its main organ was the annual Congress in which the various 
federations, unions and parties were represented according in numbers according 
to the size of their membership. The congress took the major decisions relating to 
the work of the WZO and to the organisation and distribution of the WZO budget. 
13 Aronoff, loc. cit. 
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leading to economic and political dependence on these institutions by the Jewish 
population of Palestine. Evidence of this could seen in the increasing role of the 
Histadrut, which was responsible for taking care of the education, social, political 
and economic needs of the population. 
By way of this mobilisation of the population through the Histadrut, the labour 
elite was able to dominate the Jewish Agency14_ As a result of such domination, it 
gained control of the distribution of the funds from the WZO, which were based on a 
party system (the size of the party's representation on the Jewish Agency equalled 
the level of funds it was awarded). This control of the finance of the Yishuv allowed 
the elite to further develop the institutions it had itself set up, and consequently 
increase the dependence of the population on them. 
This dependence was compounded, for the newly arriving immigrants of the 
Fourth Aliyah (1924-1930), by their economic failure which led to the economic 
crisis of 1927. The Fourth Aliyah numbered 82,000 Jews with some 25,000 arriving 
in 1925 alone. They were predominantly Polish and middle class, many of them 
bringing capital and a bourgeois orientation with them in direct contrast to the 
pioneering Zionist Socialism of the members of the Second and Third Aliyah's. The 
1927 economic crisis was caused mainly by bad capital management by this group, 
in that they used their capital for property speculation and not to develop factories 
or agriculture 15. This led to some 8,000 workers being unemployed and the crisis 
resulted in 23,000 out of the original 82,000 immigrants of the Fourth Aliyah leaving 
the country 16. This Aliyah is often referred to as that of "capitalists without capital" 
14 The Jewish Agency was established in 1922 but it was only in 1929 that it 
became a separate body with the task of building the Jewish national home. Unlike 
the WZO the Jewish Agency also included prominent non Zionist Jewish 
personalities such as the French socialist leader Mr. Leon Blum. 
15 Shapiro, "The Origins of Israeli Democracy", in Sprinzak and Diamond (ed). Israeli 
Democracy Under Stress, Lynne Rienner, London, 1993, p70. 
16 Laqueur, A History of Zionism, Schoken Books, New York, 1989, p315. 
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or simply "bad capitalists" (notably by the leadership of the Second and Third 
Aliyah)17. 
The formation of Mapai in 1930, bringing together the major parties of the 
labour movement in one united party, meant that the growing control of the labour 
movement became even more centralised and powerful. By the mid 1930's, Mapai 
dominated the manpower sector with its distribution of the immigration certificates 
from the British colonial power. This was compounded when the British imposed 
restrictions on Jewish immigration, and Mapai controlled the Haganah and Palmach 
Jewish military, consequently becoming responsible for running illegal immigration 
boats to Palestine. The labour movement also consolidated its domination of the 
agricultural movement, which included the Kibbutzim and Moshavim, and which 
provided many of the leaders of Mapai including Mr. David Ben-Gurion. 
In terms of ideology, Mapai sought to attain both national and class goals at 
the same time, as well as maintaining the principles of democracy and a 
commitment to international institutions such as the Socialist International. This 
"constructive socialism", as Hattis-Rolef describes it, was based on an active 
pioneering movement which viewed itself as the vanguard for achieving social and 
national goals 18 . In short, the central theme was that of social democratic 
pragmatism and the realisation of the need to include non-socialist parties in order 
to reach hegemony 19. These ideas were largely the work of the two leaders of 
Mapai, Mr. David Ben-Gurion and Mr. Berl Katznelson, the first of whom after the 
death of Mr. Katznelson (1944) became the single dominant leader of the party, 
until his resignation in 196320. The emphasis on pragmatism was not always 
17 Laqueur, Ibid. 
18 Hattis-Rolef, (ed), Political Dictionary of the State of Israel, Jerusalem Publishing 
House, Jerusalem, 1994, p213. 
19 This later became apparent with the historic relationship between Mapai and its 
successor parties with the Zionist religious parties which lasted up to 1976. 
20 Merhav, The Israeli Left, Barnes and Noble, New York, 1980. 
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accepted by everyone in Mapai, and in 1944 a group from the Tel Aviv area and the 
Kibbutzim broke away to form Ahdut Ha'avodah (Siah B). 
The organisation of Mapai, which was mirrored in its successor party, the 
Israel Labour Party, is important, as it remained relatively unchanged up to 1992. 
The party organs are based on a conference which meets once every four years, 
and which in theory is the supreme decision making body of the party. The Central 
Committee, which in numerical terms, has expanded over the years and meets 
several times a year, and the Bureau (sometimes known as the Leadership Bureau) 
which meets two or three times a month, are the two other formal party 
institutions21 • The "Havereinu" (our colleagues) is the main informal party institution; 
it comprises of the Ministers from Mapai (ILP), the Secretaries-General of the party 
and the Histadrut, and often the Coalition Chairman. Illustration 1(b) provides a brief 
summary of the formal party institutions and the power relationship between them. 
Note the differences between the theoretical line of power and the reality of the 
concentration of power in the leader. 
21 The current sizes of the party organs (1994 figures) are as follows: 
Party Congress, 3,000 members; Central Committee, 1,300 members; Bureau, 110 
members. 
9 
1(b): The Israel Labour Party Structure 1992 (based on Mapai) 
Formal 
Reality: Power from top down 
Theory; Power from bottom up Chairman (Leader) 
Leadership Bureau 110 members 
Central Committee 1,300 members 
Party Conference 3000 members 
Note: The size of the party instituions given are 1992 figures. 
In theory the Party Conference is the supreme body of the party. 
In reality the Chairman (Leader) is the most powerful figure. 
Although the institutions have not undergone fundamental refonn, their size 
and roles have evolved over the years. Much of the change has originated from the 
elite, using the institutions as a fonn of patronage for supporters, and/or in order to 
either maintain or shift the balance of power in the party. This had led to the 
"democratic" nature of these institutions often being compromised by Mapai's elite's, 
control over nominations to these various organs. The extent of this, and the 
methods employed by the leadership in maintaining control over the party, are 
examined in detail in Chapter Two. 
Mapai and the labour movement's major opposition in the Yishuv were the 
Revisionists. However, the Revisionists during this fonnative period of the mid 
1930's suffered from two major problems: first, their lack of charismatic leadership in 
Palestine and second, a coherent lack of ideology (in contrast to the labour 
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movements)22. At organisational level the Revisionists were no match for the labour 
movement in Palestine, particularly after the latter merged to form Mapai. The 
Revisionists based most of their activities in Eastern Europe, where their 
charismatic leader Mr. Jabotinsky lived most of his life23. 
The period between the formation of Mapai and the formation of the state of 
Israel saw the arrival of the Fifth Aliyah (1932-1948), which represented the largest 
Aliyah numbering over 200,000 immigrants, who came to Palestine in response to 
the spread of anti Jewish activity in Europe (in 1935 alone, a record 66,000 arrived). 
This Aliyah is often referred to as the German Aliyah, although in reality only 25 
percent were of German or Austrian origin. In many respects they were similar to 
the Fourth Aliyah coming from middle class backgrounds and urban lifestyles, 
bringing capital and business organisational skills with them. 
Although the Fourth and Fifth Aliyahs were the largest numerically, and made 
contributions to the economic development of the Yishuv, their influence on the 
socio-political system was less than that of the Second and Third Aliyah's. Etzioni-
Halevy with Shapira identify the struggle between the members of the First and 
Second Aliyah as the fundamental reason for this24. They argue that the dispute 
over the use of Jewish labour led the members of the Second Aliyah to form their 
own labour parties and trade unions, which later formed the basis of the Histadrut. 
Consequently, by laying the foundations of the labour movement, the Second 
Aliyah, and to a degree the Third Aliyah, were subsequently able to dominate the 
various political and social entities of the Yishuv and later the state. 
22 Aronoff, op. cit., p118. 
23 Mr. Jabotinsky did settle in Palestine in 1928 but following the 1929 riots he left 
the country and was not allowed to return. 
24 Etzioni-Halevy with Shapira, op. cit. p5. 
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1.2: The Development of the State 1948-1967 
With the creation of the State of Israel in 1948, the labour elite (and in 
particular Mapai) were seen as the winners of statehood, and thus enjoyed a period 
of both ideological and electoral support from the population. Table 1.1 reveals that 
despite Mapai being the largest party in the Knesset, it never won an overall 
majority, but importantly the party always occupied the pivotal position, in that no 
coalition could be formed without its participation. 
Table 1.1: Mapai and Alignment Performance in Knesset Elections 1949-
65. 
Election Mapai Total Seats 
1949 46 120 
1951 45 120 
1955 40 120 
1959 47 120 
1961 42 120 
1965 45 120 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem. For the results of all 
Knesset elections (Number of Seats Won by Each Party} see Appendix 1. 
Mapai's main coalition partners were the non-Zionist religious parties, which in 
return for supporting Mapai were assured that the religious status quo would be 
maintained. This included the observance of the Sabbath and religious holidays by 
the state. This coalition presented Mapai, and the other emerging labour parties 
such as Mapam, with an in-built majority against the other parties. 
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The relatively homogeneous nature of the population of the new state, and 
their shared experiences and backgrounds with the elite, meant a low level of 
alienation, leading to the general consensus of support for Mapai. The high level of 
penetration of Mapai in all aspects of the population's life, together with the 
continuing threat posed by the conflict with the Arabs, helped identify the ideological 
goals of the party with those of the national will. The fortunes of the party became 
so closely related to the state that opposition to the party came to be seen as an 
attack on the state itself25. 
The early years of the state were marked by the transfer to state control of the 
Yishuv institutions such as the military (Palmach and Haganah) and, importantly at 
this time, the immigrant absorption machine. The power of these institutions 
increased as their legitimacy and authority were strengthened with the formal 
sovereignty and power to coerce that statehood brought. Consequently Mapai 
enjoyed a similar increase in power from having directed these institutions in the 
Yishuv. In short, the direct control of these institutions by the party had been 
replaced by a form of indirect rule which was formally responsible to parliament and 
the electorate26. As the activities of these labour-founded institutions increased in 
the early years of the state, so the level of dependence by the population (and in 
particular the newly arriving immigrants) on them increased. 
A key part of the programme of institutionalisation was the shift in the balance 
of the ideology of the elite in Mapai further away from socialism to nationalism, or 
what became known as Ben-Gurion's version of statism, "mamlachtiut". This 
"mamlachtiut" defined the state as existing free from the labour movement or 
political parties, but emphasised the close relationship between the labour 
25 This was used by Mr. Ben-Gurion in attempting to de-legitimise the Revisionists 
and is still employed in modem times by Mr. Rabin when attacking the Likud. 
26 Medding, The Founding of Israeli Democracy: Parties Politics and Governments, 
Oxford University Press, 1990, p135. 
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movement's dominance and the legitimacy of the government27. In practical terms 
this led on the one hand, for example, to Mapai acting in accordance with 
"mamlachtiut" ideology in dismantling the Palmach and giving up the labour stream 
in education, while on the other hand, keeping the Kupat Holim health fund (in the 
movement's interests)28. There were clear short term gains for Mapai in pursuing a 
"mamlachtiut" policy, namely the increased potential and actual constituency of the 
party, through appealing to groups other than its traditional constituency of the 
workers. However, in the long term, the abandonment of socialist principles led to 
internal party problems, and crucially to the reliance on material inducements rather 
than ideology to attract support. This reliance on non-ideological incentives to 
mobilise support was true of both society as a whole and of the party itself. The 
consequences of this are dealt with in Chapter Three. 
The elite of Mapai, at this time, were almost exclusively drawn from the 
Second Aliyah of Jews and had held their positions since the days of the Yishuv. 
The methods as to how they maintained their power are covered in Chapter Three, 
but the tensions caused by the rising of a new generation of potential leaders came 
to a head with the Lavon Affair. The affair began in 1954 with the arrest of an Israeli 
spying ring in Cairo and the subsequent trial and conviction of the members of the 
group. It was claimed that the then Defence Minister (Mr. Pinhas Lavon) had not 
informed the Prime Minister ( Mr. Moshe Sharrett) about the operation and had 
therefore acted without the consent of the government. Mr. Lavon always 
maintained his innocence in the affair and in 1960 a special Cabinet Committee 
found that he had not given the order for the operation29. Mr. Ben-Gurion refused to 
27 Hattis-Rolef, op. cit. p208. 
28 Kupat Holim is the health insurance scheme of the Histadrut to which most 
Israelis subscribed. 
29 The evidence against Mr. Lavon was based on a meeting he was alleged to have 
had with a key member of the defence establishment a week before the order was 
given for the operation. At this meeting Mr. Lavon was said to have given the go 
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accept the Committee's verdict, and the affair became the central divisive issue in 
the government and within the party for nearly 10 years, threatening to permanently 
split the labour movement30. 
The Lavon Affair although important in its own right was indicative of a wider 
power struggle within the party. This was principally between the "Gush" (party 
machine) of which Mr. Lavon was one of the leaders (which in simple were trying to 
preserve its own positions within the party) and Mr. Ben-Gurion and the young 
guard who were attempting to challenge the "Gush"31 .. The struggle became 
extremely bitter partly due to the predominantly power oriented nature of it and 
partly due to the obsession of Mr. Ben-Gurion in pursuing it. The central area of 
conflict was the debate between "mamlachtiut" (statism) favoured by Mr. Ben-
Gurion and the "tse-irim" (youth section) and "chalutztiut' (pioneering) favoured by 
the party machine. In simple terms the youth section wished to see more of the 
labour institutions moved into the state sector. The "tse'irim's" principal demand was 
that the party moved the Kupat Holim (health insurance fund) away from the 
Histadrut and into the state sector32. As Secretary General of the Histadrut (1956-
61) Mr. Lavon had opposed such a move aware of its use in political patronage 
terms and in maintaining direct links between the party and the population (although 
he had agreed to some of the demands of the young guard and Mr. Ben-Gurion)33. 
ahead for the operation. However, the Committee of enquiry reported that the 
meeting had in fact taken place a week after the operation had started. 
3> The central issue of the Lavon Affair was connected with the relationship 
between the military and civil. sectors in decision making. However, the personal 
and power nature of the conflict tended to overshadow this. 
31 Interview with Mr. Yitzhak Ben-Aharon, Givat Hayim, 8th August 1994. 
Mr. Ben-Aharon was a founder of Achdut Ha'avoda in 1944, and the main driving 
force behind unification of the labour movement in 1968, and framer of the 
constitution of the Israel Labour Party. 
32 Sachar, H. The History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to our Time", Knopi 
Books, New York, 1979, p544. 
33 1bid. 
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It should be stressed that these differences did not represent major ideological 
differences but rather reflected the more modernised and technocratic style of the 
youth section and Mr. Ben-Gurion against the more conservative tendencies of the 
party machine. The "Gush survived this.predominantly generational challenge and 
actively isolated the leading members of the young guard from any of the major 
party positions. 
Eventually, the Lavon Affair led to Mr. Ben-Gurion, Israel's First Prime Minister 
and leader of Mapai, to eventually leave the party and set up a new party, Rafi, in 
1965, along with two leaders of the Tzeirim, Mr. Moshe Dayan and Mr. Shimon 
Peres. Although Rafi rejoined the Mapai in 1968 as part of the Israel Labour Party, 
Ben-Gurion and others refused to join the new party, indicating the continued 
intense bitterness that still existed among key figures of the elite and their followers. 
The period between 1948 and 1967 saw the anival of the members of two 
additional Aliyahs to Israel, and the exodus of Palestinian refugees after the 1948 
War of Independence. First, between 1948 and 1951 the remnants of European 
Jewry anived in Israel, some 320,000 immigrants in total. Second, this period saw 
the anival of Jews from North Africa and Asia with the rate of immigration peaking 
during the period between 1961-1965 when 230,000 anived, mainly from Morocco. 
The absorption of the Aliyah from North Africa and Asia transformed the 
demographics of Israel from that of a relatively homogeneous society to a state 
containing different ethnic backgrounds and experiences. The successful 
integration of this Aliyah presented the leadership with a new challenge, in contrast 
to the integration of the Jews of European origin. This challenge, Horowitz and 
Lissak argue, prevented the labour movement from making any attempt to reshape 
the social order in accordance with socialist ideas34. This was an indication of the 
34 Horowitz and Lissak, Trouble in Utopia: Israel's Overburdened Polity, State 
University Press of New York, USA, 1989, p103. 
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dominance of the labour movement's Zionist priority of immigration over any other 
ideological concerns. However, by the mid-1960's it was clear that the elite, through 
their shift away from socialism, had in fact alienated this Aliyah. The Jews from 
North Africa and Asia tended to come from poor backgrounds with little or no 
education, and after their arrival in Israel they were usually employed in menial jobs. 
Their settlement in so-called "development towns", away from the traditional 
Ashkenazi (Jews of European and North American origin) population centres, added 
to the widening gap in the standard of living between the newly-arriving Sephardim 
(Jews of African, Asian or Middle Eastern origin). The conditions in the development 
towns were poor, in terms of welfare provision, social conditions, employment 
prospects and education. 
Initially, after the arrival of these Sephardim Jews there followed a period of 
deference to Mapai. The immigrants were grateful to the elite for the opportunity to 
live in Israel. They were also highly dependent on the Histadrut, and other Mapai 
controlled institutions for their everyday needs and existence. However, over a 
period of time this group started to form its own constituency interests as Mapai 
failed to represent their needs and ambitions. By the mid 1960's, elements of this 
Aliyah were already deserting Mapai - a process which continued throughout each 
subsequent Knesset election. Therefore, on the eve of the Six Day War, Mapai was 
faced by growing internal problems involving clashes of personality over key issues 
of party organisation, compounded by the strains of generational conflict and 
succession to the elite of Second Aliyah. Mapai's constituency, although still large, 
as indicated by its continued Knesset strength, was being reduced notably by the 
growing political and social alienation of the Sephardim immigrants. Many in the 
party argue that this decline in the fortunes of the party would have been more rapid 
had it not been for Israel's dramatic victory in the Six Day Wai35. 
35 1nterview with Mr. Sholomo Hillel, Jerusalem, 25th July 1994. 
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1.3: The Years of lmmobilism 1967-1973. 
The two most important events for the labour movement during this period 
were the Six Day War and the subsequent occupation of lands to the west of the 
River Jordan (as well as the strategically important Golan Heights), and the 
formation of the Israel Labour Party in 1968. These events were inter-related with 
the Six Day War proving to be one of the major reasons why the various labour 
parties chose to work together36. 
Because of the threat of an imminent third war against the Arabs in 1967, a 
National Unity Government was formed (NUG1), which included Mapai, Rafi, Ahdut 
Ha'avodah, and for the first time Gahal (later the Likud) led by Mr. Menahem Begin. 
The coalition continued after the war unti11970, when the Likud left the government, 
over the acceptance by the Israel Labour Alignment of the Rogers Plan which called 
for Israeli withdrawal from the territories captured by Israel in 1967. The war itself 
brought a series of challenges in terms of what should be done with the lands that 
Israel had occupied. Importantly, the war granted the Revisionists, in the form of the 
Likud, a degree of ideological legitimacy for their agenda of "Greater Israel", which 
meant the annexation of the lands of the West Bank to the Israeli state. The labour 
movement, unlike the Likud, was deeply divided over the future status of what 
became known as the Occupied Territories, with no clear degree of unity emerging 
among the elite on the issue. These divisions are defined and examined in detail in 
Chapter Three. 
The Israel Labour Party was formed in 1968 against, first a backdrop of major 
economic recession which led to large scale unemployment (notably among the 
middle classes) and a high rate of emigration. All these factors had led to a decline 
in the popularity of Prime Minister Mr. Levi Eshkol and the government as a whole. 
36 Interview with Mr. Yitzhak Ben-Aharon, 8th August 1994. 
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The merger between Ahdut Ha'avodah and Mapai appeared perfectly natural as 
they had become, in the preceding years, closely identified with each other, 
submitting joint lists to the Knesset. Their respective elites had worked together in 
Cabinets, and Ahdut Ha'avodah, even before any formal arrangements, had been 
the natural coalition partner of Mapai. Ahdut Ha'avodah, had in fact tried to reach 
agreement with Mapai in the past, leaving out Rafi which they viewed as being 
dangerously anti-socialist. Much of the motivation, from Ahdut Ha'avodah's point of 
view, for the merger was to attempt to dilute the growing influence of Rafi in the 
labour movement, and in particular a·mong the younger generation of Mapai 
members37. 
Rafi was seen as a much more difficult fusion38. This was caused by the 
great deal of personal hostility between the Rafi leader, Mr. Moshe Dayan, and the 
elite of Mapai, which can be traced back to the Lavon Affair. In truth, Rafi had very 
little option but to seek to join the new party. It had performed badly in the 1965 
Knesset elections, winning only 1 0 seats, and it had failed to develop the local party 
structures, needed to increase its support in the short term. In spite of these 
reasons, the vote to rejoin Mapai was only 60:40 in favour, and many of the latter 
joined Mr. Ben-Gurion in forming the New State List39 
The formation of the new Israel Labour Party took place at the start of the 
race to succeed Prime Minister, Mr Eshkol, with each of the factions having their 
37 1bid. 
This same argument was also used by Mapam in justifying their decision to form the 
Alignment with Israel Labour Party in 1969. 
Interview with Mr. Shemtov, 12th July 1994. 
38 Aronoff, Power and Ritual in the Israel Labour Party, M.E Sharpe, London, 1993, 
p26. 
39 The narrow margin of victory and the rationale for rejoining Mapai were explained 
to the researcher by Mr. Gideon Ben-Israel, who was one of the founders of Rafi 
and worked with Mr. Ben-Gurion. 
Interview with Mr. Gideon Ben-Israel, Tel Aviv, 21st October 1994. 
Interestingly, all but one of the Knesset members of Rafi rejoined Mapai before the 
end of the Knesset term. 
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preferred candidates. Mr. Dayan was keen to persuade his Rafi colleagues to join 
the new party to pursue his succession claim40, and in order to prevent Mr. Eshkol 
remaining as Prime Minister, or his political enemy, Mr. Pinhas Sapir, becoming 
Prime Minister. Mr. Sapir, although officially the Finance Minister, was in charge of 
the "Gush", and ran the party both financially and organisationally41. Ahdut 
Ha'avodah had their own candidate, Mr. Yigal Allen, who at the time of the merger 
was the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Education42. Mapai's own candidate 
was clearly Mr. Sapir, whose power in the newly formed party continued on from his 
pivotal role in Mapai. The importance of this succession battle cannot be over-
stressed in determining the action of the key members of the elite during this period. 
In the event, after Mr Eshkol's sudden death in February 1969, Mrs Golda Meir took 
over without a challenge. In the preceding period, Mr Sapir had become the 
Secretary General of the party and had put together a centre party majority based 
around Mapai which was so strong that Mr. Dayan did not challenge it43. 
Consequently, the fundamental problem of the merger was that it did nothing 
to address the problems which Mapai, and the other parties of the left had been 
experiencing44. It led to a further decline in the importance of ideology in the party, 
with competition for the leadership among the various factions for Cabinet positions, 
representation in party institutions and Knesset lists. The increased size of the 
party, made it easier for the party machine to control it, due to the decline in the 
efficiency of the party institutions. The shortcomings of the party were illustrated by 
the growing feeling of alienation, even among many of its supporters, and were 
40 Medding, Mapai in Israel, Cambridge University Press, London, 1972, p298. 
41 Mr. Sapir's position in Mapai was such that he was the king maker for any Prime 
Minister from this period up to his death in 1975. 
Interview with Mr. Chaim Zakok, former Minister of Justice, Tel Aviv, 11th July 1994. 
42 Mr. Allen was one of the founders of the Palmach and a representative of the 
kibbutz movement. 
43 Medding, Joe. cit. 
44 Interview with Mr. Ben-Aharon, 8th August 1994. 
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drastically highlighted, by the failure of the party prior to, during and after the Yom 
Kippur war (1973). The merger also failed to achieve one of the central aims of the 
Mapai faction which was to secure a parliamentary majority and make it less reliant 
on coalition partners (desire was seen in part as Mapai's response to its declining 
elecotoral strength). 
In addition to the above merger, in 1969, Mapam formed an electoral pact with 
the Israel Labour Party to create the Alignment, which although it preserved the 
independent status of the Mapam, Jed to a degree of close co-operation between 
the two parties from 1969 to the formation of the National Unity Government (NUG 
2) in 1984. Mapam's ideology was more dovish than that of the component parties 
of the Israel Labour Party, and its socio-economic programme was more socialist 
than the Labour Party's. From the beginning there were many in Mapam who 
opposed the Alignment, but these at this time were in the minority. The ideological 
differences between the two eventually led to a split in 1984. 
1.4: Crisis of Confidence 1973-1977. 
The Yom Kippur war had a traumatic effect on both the Labour Party and 
Israel as a whole, leading to a crisis in confidence, in both the leadership and the 
party as a whole. The clear failings of the leadership, and in particular the Prime 
Minister, Mrs Golda Meir and the Defence Minister, Mr. Dayan, in declining to act on 
intelligence briefings warning of an imminent Arab attack, illustrated the sense of 
arrogance, and lack of clear direction coming from the elite. This was compounded 
by a lack of strong leadership during the first days of the war, when Israel was 
sustaining heavy losses, which shocked a society which had come to rely on the 
party elite to provide such defences. Arian argues that the 1973 war broke the 
emotional dependence of Israeli society on the labour elite, whose ability to defend 
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Israel had never previously been questionecJ45. This dependence had been 
reinforced by the party's performance during the Six Day War, in which it was 
generally viewed as having shown great tactical skill in the conduct of the war. 
The resignation of Mrs. Meir, less than a year after the end of the war, brought 
to an end the period of domination of the labour elite by Jews of the Second and 
Third Aliyah's. In the end Mrs Meir had little choice, although the party still won the 
delayed 1973 Knesset elections but with a reduced majority. Table 1.2: illustrates 
the gains made by the Gahal at this time. 













Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem . The Alignment 
consisted of the Israel Labour Party and Mapam. For the complete results 
(Number of Seats Won by Each Party) see Appendix 1. 
The Labour Party's reduced majority made it more difficult for the party to form 
coalitions, as the number of coalition partners required increased. Mrs Meir, 
although officially cleared by the Agranat Commission (1974) of incompetence, was 
politically badly damaged and kept in power by the efforts of Mr. Sapir and the 
"Gush", who saw the need for stability46. Mrs Meir's refusal to ask for Mr. Dayan's 
45 Arian, ''The Electorate, in Penniman" (ed), Israel at the Polls 1977, American 
Enterprise Institute, USA, 1979. 
46 The Agranat Commission in to the failings presented its final report in 197 4. 
Surprisingly, it did not directly censure either Mrs. Meir or Mr. Dayan. 
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resignation caused further damage. Israelis held Mr. Dayan as being most directly at 
fault for the initial mistakes of the war. Eventually, with Israel entering economic 
recession and increasing social unrest due to the government's lack of 
responsiveness to the publics concerns, Mrs Meir resigned. For a party, which had 
relied so much on symbolism, the ending of the period of domination of the first 
generation of leaders was of great importance. Mrs. Meir was replaced by Mr 
Yitzhak Rabin, a Sabra Jew (born in Israel), who, although he was an ex-military 
man and outsider, was the choice of Mr. Sapir and the "Gush" 47. 
For the Labour Party, the period between Mr. Rabin becoming Prime Minister 
and its first election defeat in 1977, can be defined as one of making too few 
changes too late. Mr. Rabin was not a party man and decided to largely ignore the 
party, concentrating on Cabinet government. Thus, at the time when the party 
needed to be reformed and revitalised, it received little attention. A second problem 
was that Mr. Rabin did not enjoy a position of total hegemony in the party. Mr. 
Shimon Peres, although an outsider to the "Gush", enjoyed considerable support 
among the younger members of the party and the Rafi faction4B. Mr. Rabin and Mr. 
Peres had in effect merely replaced the first generation leaders, with little change in 
the autocratic style of the elite. In short, they were the product of existing patron-
client or factional ties within the party. Mr. Rabin was viewed as a client of Mr. Sapir 
and Mr. Peres likewise had been a client of the ex-Prime Minister Mr. Ben-Gurion. 
Consequently, when they took over power, these ties continued to operate, making 
it difficult for upwardly mobile politicians to express dissent. 
47 1n the end, Mr. Sapir did not seek the job for himself, due to a mixture of ill health 
(he died soon after) and a preference to stay in the background. 
Interview with Mr. Zakok, 11th July 1994. 
48 Mr. Peres challenged unsuccessfully for the leadership in 1974. 
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Unsurprisingly, attempts during this period at reforming the party and bringing 
greater democratisation were largely unsuccessful49. The leadership election 
between Mr. Rabin and Mr. Peres was seen as more of a personality or factional 
contest in that there were no real ideological differences between the two 
candidates. The rivalry between Mr. Rabin and Mr. Peres reflected simple power 
politics in that since 197 4 they have both been rivals for the same office. In addition, 
their backgrounds and experiences were vastly different. Mr. Rabin's entire career 
had been spent in the army, while Mr. Peres had been a career political technocrat. 
Mr. Peres never served in the armed services, although he was largely credited with 
having made a considerable contribution to Israel's defence via arms procurements 
and the development of the country's nuclear capability. Peri traces the rivalry back 
to the early 1960's, when Mr. Peres worked in the Defence Ministry and Mr. Rabin 
was a senior officer in the IDF (eventually becoming Chief of Staff). The main 
source of tension between them arose from the fact that Mr. Rabin preferred to buy 
military equipment from abroad, whereas Mr. Peres wanted to build up the Israeli 
Defence lndustry50. Finally there are many personality differences between them. 
Mr. Rabin is considered an introvert, doesn't trust people, and likes to appear above 
politics, while Mr. Peres is an extrovert who enjoys the political intrigues and party 
games. In understanding the history of the Peres-Rabin rivalry, the personality 
factor cannot be stressed strongly enough. 
Apart from the Peres-Rabin rivalry, the government of Mr. Rabin experienced 
a series of both international and domestic problems, all of which contributed to the 
timing of the party's decline. The major external factor concerned relations with the 
United States and the election of President Carter in 1976. Both during the 
49 Aronoff, op.cit. 
50 Interview with Mr. Yoram Peri, Editor of Davar and former spokesman of the 
Labour Party. Tel Aviv, 1st August 1994. 
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Presidential campaign and upon coming to office, Mr. Carter made statements 
about a Palestinian homeland which were widely reported in the Israeli media51. 
Israel, with its permanent economic and military dependence on America, became 
deeply worried by this proposed change in American policy52. For the first time, it 
was not the Labour Party which stood to gain from such perceived threats to Israel's 
security, but rather the Likud, by way of its strong stand of not returning the 
territories under any circumstances. The Labour Party, as previously discussed, 
after 1973 was no longer viewed as the obvious party to guarantee Israel's security 
in spite of the fact that it was led by Mr. Rabin, who had served as Chief of Staff 
during the Six Day War and was the Israeli Ambassador to Washington during the 
1973 war63. 
In addition to external problems, there were two domestic problems. First, 
was the break-up of the historic partnership between the Labour Party and the 
religious parties. This ended in 1976, to a large degree due to the political 
inexperience of Mr. Rabin, who had organised an official government function to 
welcome the arrival of some new F15 jet fighters from America on the eve of the 
Sabbath 54. Agudat Israel tabled a motion of no confidence, claiming that a public 
desecration of the Sabbath had taken place, and in the subsequent vote some 
members of the NRP abstained, leading Mr. Rabin to dismiss the NRP from the 
coalition and thus remain as head of a minority government until 1977. 
The second was the growing number of scandals involving leading Labour 
Party personnel in both the government and in the Labour-controlled institutions. 
51 See, Cockburn and Cockburn, Dangerous Liaison, Bodley Head, London, 1992. 
52 Reich, The United States and Israel, Praeger, New York, 1984, p41-42. 
53 The role of Mr. Rabin in helping persuade the American administration to airlift 
arms to Israel during the war proved to be of great significance to the outcome of 
the war. 
54 Bradley, Parliamentary Elections in Israel. Three Case Studies, Tomson and 
Rutter, New Hampshire , 1985, p48. 
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The first major scandal involved Mr. Asher Yadlin, the party's choice for the post of 
Governor of the Bank of Israel, who was jailed for accepting bribes and making 
false tax declarations. During his trial he implicated two Cabinet Ministers and 
several other Labour Party leaders in illegal fund raising activities for the party. Prior 
to his trial the Minister of Housing, Mr. A vraham Ofer, committed suicide after 
charges that he had been involved in corruption. However, the resignation of Mr. 
Rabin was the most serious scandal, both because of the person involved and the 
timing of the resignation, coming just before the Knesset elections in 1977. Mr. 
Rabin resigned after his wife was convicted of infringing the strict foreign currency 
controls which prevented Israelis from holding bank accounts abroad55. Therefore, 
just before the election the Labour Party was forced to change its leader and Mr. 
Peres was selected to take over. 
The Labour Party, although it had narrowly survived in the Knesset elections 
of 1973, lost power for the first time in 1977. The underlying explanations for this 
Joss are reserved for Chapter Three. However, with regards to the timing of the 
demise, all the above factors played a part, as did the related event of the formation 
of the Democratic Movement for Change (DASH), which had been formed largely in 
response to the failings of the Labour Party. The major electoral reason for the 
defeat of the Labour Party was the defection of many of its members and voters to 
DASH. This new party fought the election with a list of candidates selected in 
American style primaries, in sharp contrast to the "smoke filled rooms" method of 
selection, which was still employed by the Labour Party. DASH cost the Labour 
Party 15 seats in the 1977 election and overall, the Labour alignment was reduced 
56 For a detailed account of Mr. Rabin's decision to resign see: Rabin, The Rabin 
Memoirs, Steimatzky, Bnei Brak, 1994. 
Because Mr. Rabin was head of a minority caretaker government, he was not 
constitutionally allowed to resign, so he chose to take an extended leave of 
absence. 
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from 51 to 32 seats. The Likud gained four seats, increasing its representation from 
39 to 43 seats, and was for the first time able to form a coalition government. Thus, 




EXISTING APPROACHES TO UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF THE ISRAELI 
LABOUR PARTY IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 
In order to fully understand the relationship between the Israel Labour Party 
and the political system it is necessary to examine the existing different approaches 
to the party's position within the party system in Israel taken by political analysts. In 
addition to this, consideration needs to be given to the role of the political system in 
shaping the development of the party, in terms of the related effects on the party of 
the electoral system, coalition government, together with the importance of 
personality and intra-party politics. 
As regards the first, there exists within democratic r~gimes three types of 
party system namely; a two party system, in which the two major parties compete 
for power, a multi-party system, in which different coalitions rule, and finally, the 
dominant party system, in which a single party is dominant. In Israel, the period up 
to 1977 was dominated by the Labour Party (or former1y Mapai), although it never 
won more than 50 percent of the vote in any one election. 
2.1: Dominant Party Theories and Party Systems. 
The classic definition of a dominant party was provided by Maurice Duverger 
and it is this definition which the majority of scholars use or develop to describe the 
status of the Labour Party in Israel prior to 1977. Duverger states that a dominant 
party need not win the majority of the votes, but over a period of time it gains more 
votes than any of the other parties, consequently creating a system in which there is 
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one party which dominates the whole system 1. He argues that the reason for this 
dominance is that the party is identified with an epoch, and is therefore able to 
appeal to a broad strata of society, with a mutual identification of political ideology, 
philosophy and style2. Dominance is also related to belief. A party can be dominant 
when the public believes it to be. Shapiro argues that Duverger's definition thus 
includes the notion of the inferiority of the opposition parties, caused by the 
dominance of one party affecting their conduct and actions3. The spiritual 
advantage (as Duverger puts it) accounts for the possibility of a dominant party 
ruling without an electoral majority, thus achieving legitimacy by a lack of viable 
alternatives. The other parties may be in a coalition which is built around the 
dominant party, but they do not play a significant role in government. In short, a 
party that can convert such a spiritual advantage into electoral success is likely to 
remain in power for a considerable of time4. 
Other political scientists disagree with Duverger, claiming that there is no 
difference between a multi-party system and a dominant party system, and 
therefore the presence of a dominant party system does not effect the party system. 
Giovanni Satori states that a party's electoral dominance is directly related to its 
ability to attract more resources than other parties, and this is only a temporary 
advantageS. Samuel Huntington argues that the presence of a dominant party leads 
to a special set of inter-party relationships, claiming that the electoral dominance of 
a party is achieved by its ideological flexibility, which attracts support from wide-
1 Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organisation and Activity in the Modem State, 
Wiley, London, 1960. 
2 1bid. 
3 Shapiro, "The End of the Dominant Party System", in Arian (ed), The Elections in 
lsrael1977, Jerusalem Academic Press, 1980. 
4 1bid. 
5 Satori, Party and Party Systems, Cambridge University Press, London, 1976. 
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ranging strata in society6. When the electorate disagrees with the party, they cast 
their votes for a second or contender party, which takes the fonn of a pressure 
party?. Consequently, the dominant party takes note of the feelings of the public 
and adapts its policies to the changing consensus in order to attract voters. 
Huntington, therefore, argues that the key to the party's dominance is this 
ideological flexibility which allows it to modify itself when the need arisesB. 
The vast majority of Israeli academics take Duverger's definition of a dominant 
party, and the effect it has on the political system as a whole, in explaining the 
fortunes Mapai and its successor the Labour Party9. However, Medding, doesn't 
agree with much of Duverger's theory and is sceptical of the extent to which Mapai's 
dominance can be identified with an epoch, which he feels was more identified with 
the state rather than the party10_ He accepts, as previously discussed, that the two 
were closely related, but argues that they were not the same. He also sees 
difficulties in defining the differences between a dominant party, and dominant party 
systems. Mapai (the dominant party), occupied the pivotal position in the system, in 
that no coalition could be fonned without it. This constitutes, therefore, merely an 
elaboration of Satori's theory 11_ 
In addition, both Aronoff and Shapiro stress the importance of the special set 
of historical circumstances required for the ideological and material resources to be 
concentrated in the hands of a small elite, who set up strong political, social and 
economic organisations which lead to this spiritual superiority. 12_ The historical 




9 See, in general the work of Arian, Aronoff and Shapiro. 
10 Dr. Medding is the author of Mapai in Israel and several other works on the labour 
movement and Israeli politics. 
11 The above was related to the researcher in an interview with Dr. Medding. 
Interview with Dr. Peter Medding, Jerusalem, 14th November 1994. 
12 Shapiro, The Fonnative Years of the Israel Labour Party. 
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circumstances which were present within the Jewish community in Palestine in the 
1920's and 1930's included the presence of immigrants (willing and keen to modify 
their way of life), the desire of this group to establish an independent state, and their 
willingness to be mobilised by an elite, in order to achieve this aim. The period of 
the pre-state Yishuv (up to 1948) was an almost unique period, in which the 
decisions of the leaders were not supported by the sovereign state, but rather their 
authority was based on two factors. First, moral authority, and simply the power of 
persuasion. However, this was not enough in itself to create and develop a strong 
political organisation. Second, the provision, by the leadership, of economic 
resources to the newly arriving immigrants, many of whom brought little or nothing 
with them from their countries of origin. As previously described, the elite was able 
to do this with its control of the financial resources of the WZO, and the 
development of the Histadrut. This led to the forming of economic or material 
dependency ties, in contrast to the first which can be viewed as forming ideological 
links . 
. There is general agreement on the above, but it is at this point that Israeli 
academics start to differ on the role and importance of ideology and dependency 
ties, together with the agendas of the elite within the labour movement. Gomi 
emphasises the importance of ideology, arguing that the leadership gained 
legitimacy by articulating and implementing the ideological consensus of their 
followers 13. Shapiro, on the other hand, stresses the pragmatic tendencies of 
Aronoff, Power and Ritual in the Israel Labour Party. 
13 Gomi, Ahdut Ha'avodah 1919-1930. The Ideological Principles and the Political 
System 1919-30, HaKibbutz HaMeuchad Publishing House, Tel Aviv, Israel, 1973, 
(Hebrew). 
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leaders such as Mr. Ben-Gurion, shown by the building of strong centralised political 
institutions leading to dependence on these by the population 14. 
2.2: Party Organisation: The Party Elite Framework. 
In providing an understanding of the Labour Party's dominant party status it is 
necessary to develop the concept put forward by Aronoff and Shapiro (see previous 
page) concerning the concentration of ideological and material resources in the 
hands of a small elite. In doing so it is important to describe the framework of how 
the leadership of Mapai (ILP) succeeded in achieving and maintaining its control of 
the party through the use of these ideological and material resources . 
The organisational pattern of elite domination of the party was formed in the 
Yishuv, and was not radically altered in the period up to the party's electoral defeat 
in 1977. The elite employed the following methods in order to maintain this control. 
First, a top group of national leaders controlled (and had the power to veto) 
appointments, the size and scope of party committees, and the nominations for 
positions, both in the political sphere and economic institutions such as the 
Histadrut. After the winning of statehood, the scope of this control increased to 
include party lists to the Knesset, as well as the other institutions of the new state, 
still dominated by the labour movement. The top tier of the elite maintained its 
position by way of a series of pyramid relationships, with a second tier of leadership 
in a patron-client situation. Consequently, personal loyalty was viewed as the single 
most important characteristic, and not initiative taking or other qualities. Thus, there 
emerged a group of party functionaries, dependent on their party patrons for 
political advancement. It was this second tier leadership which took responsibility for 
ensuring the control of the party mechanisms, the first tier dealing predominantly 
with the affairs of the state. This led to an over representation of key groups, 
14 Shapiro, loc. cit. 
32 
notably supporters of the elite in the party institutions such as the Central 
Committee and the Bureau as the elite reinforced its hegemony. The perceived, 
rather than actual, link between the party elite and the national will, allowed the 
leadership to often ignore or flout the party constitution and democratic 
procedures 15. The elite went as far as to not only use the charge of acting against 
the national will against the Revisionists but also against intra-party opposition from 
within Mapai. 
The birth of the state of Israel in 1948 was marked by a strengthening of the 
party machine. The Tel Aviv branch party machine acted as the basis for the 
national model and was noted for the growing economic dependence of party 
functionaries on the elite. The patronage networks included the provision of 
housing, jobs and favours, for the party machine workers. The dominance of the 
labour movement in the vast majority of economic activities in the state meant that 
the rewards offered to these functionaries were substantial. In return, these 
functionaries remained loyal to the leadership and, in particular, to their patron in 
the leadership. The Tel Aviv machine was mirrored in the rest of Israel, 
guaranteeing a majority of support for the elite. 
The resilience of this party machine to withstand attack was illustrated by its 
survival of the major divisive issue of the ear1y years of the state, the Lavon Affair, 
and the subsequent departure of the co-founder and first leader of Mapai, Mr. Ben-
Gurion. The departure of Mr. Ben-Gurion , originating from the dispute between the 
"Tzeirim" and the "Gush", was significant for two reasons. First, despite the fact that 
Mr. Ben-Gurion left the party, many of his supporters did not follow him, as they 
were too dependent on the party machine16. The leaders that did follow Mr. Ben-
15 Aronoff, "The Decline of the Israel Labour Party: Causes and Significance", in 
Penniman, (ed}, Israel at the Polls 1977. 
16 Aronoff, Ibid. 
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Gurion, included Mr. Moshe Dayan and Mr. Shimon Peres. However, many of Mr. 
Ben-Gurion's supporters were unable or unwilling to break their economic 
dependence on Mapai, indicating the strength of such dependency ties on party 
functionaries. Consequently, this contributed to the organisational structure of Rafi 
being relatively weak, especially at local level. It also helps to account for Raft's 
relatively disappointing electoral performance in 1965, and the ease with which the 
majority of members rejoined the mainstream (ILP) in 196817. Second, it further 
illustrated the Jack of substantial ideological debate within the party. As previously 
stated, the dispute centred around generational politics, rather than marking an 
ideological challenge to the elite1a. The Tzeirim offered no radical alternative to the 
party, although they proposed differences in terms of the desire to transfer the 
powers from the Histadrut to the state. However, these changes can only be seen 
as modifications to existing policies of "mamlachtiyut" (statism) being pursued by the 
party machine, of which Mr. Ben-Gurion was the founder. 
In terms of the maintenance of power by the elite, the period following the Six 
Day War (1967) was marked by the continuing decline in the role of ideology and an 
increased reliance on the resources of the state and the Histadrut. Increasingly any 
intra-party dissent to the policies of the leadership from below was either ignored or 
defeated by the elite, particularly on issues of security and foreign affairs. Israel's 
victory in the Six Day War further increased the domination of the elite in these 
areas. Aronoff describes a feeling of powerlessness throughout the party as a 
whole and within fringes of the inner elite19. Shimon Peres, the Minister of 
Communications, vented such frustrations, stating that he was not in the 
government to fix telephones. 
17 Rafi won 10 seats in the Knesset elections of 1965. 
18 Interview with Mr. Yitzhak Ben-Aharon, 8th August 1994. 
19 Aronoff, "The Decline of the Labour Party: Causes and Significance". 
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The elite had been down to two small groups, who between them controlled 
the affairs of the nation and the party. The first grouping was Mrs. Meir's, "Kitchen 
Cabinet", which comprised of four or five senior Ministers who met regularly away 
from the official Cabinet, taking the most important policy decisions20. The second 
group dealt with intra-party affairs in a similar way, under the direction of Mr. Sapir. 
The importance of the latter of these groups increased with the merger of three 
parties in 1968 to form the Israel Labour Party, which led to an increase in the 
number of factions competing for representation and power within the party. 
Consequently, the ability of Mr. Sapir and his group to manage this increase 
effectively was vital for the elite's continued intra-party control. 
Medding and Aronoff disagree on the success of the elite in managing the 
party21 . Medding stresses that in his research he found a high number of instances 
in which local parties managed to exert influence on the elite22. Aronoff disputes 
Medding's claims on the following grounds: Medding's primary research took the 
form of an examination of Knesset and party protocols, which he argues did not 
present the whole picture. Aronoff, in his primary research, attended meetings of 
local parties, national committees and executives, and noted the high instances of 
agenda-fixing at such meetings, together with the methods used to control the 
selection of officers and candidates. In particular, he identified three areas where 
the elite enjoyed effective control: candidate selection, the party conference and 
representation within the party23. 
20 Members of the Kitchen Cabinet included, Mr. Dayan, Mr. Israel Galili, Mr. Sapir, 
and advisors to Mrs. Meir. For account of Mrs Meir's Kitchen Cabinet see, 
Meir, My Life, GP Putnam's Sons, New York, 1977. 
Dayan, The Story of My Life, Warner Books, USA, 1976. 
The significance of the Kitchen Cabinet was confirmed to the researcher by Mr Ben-
Aharon. 
Interview with Mr. Ben-Aharon. 
21 Medding, Mapai in Israel, Cambridge University Press, London, 1972. 
22 1bid. 
23 Aronoff, Power and Ritual in the Israel Labour Party. 
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The first of these controls concerned candidate selection which took place 
within the centrally controlled Candidate Selection Committee, where the elite's 
most loyal deputies were appointed to make the selections. The Central Committee 
merely rubber stamped these appointments, and thus legitimised them. Second, the 
elite controlled the party conference, allowing little token dissent from the floor. The 
Preparation Committee, responsible for organising the event, was highly effectively 
centrally managed, at this time by Mr. Sapir. Agenda-fiXing of the conference was 
widespread, resolutions were agreed in advance, and debated for ceremonial 
approval. Representation at the conference was not balanced with, for example, 
the Kibbutz movement being vastly over-represented. This is important, as the 
Kibbutz representatives tended to be of a similar generation and background to the 
elite (Ashkenazi Jews of the Second or Third Aliyah}. Other groups, such as the 
Sephardim (Oriental Jews}, were greatly underrepresented24. 
Third, representation within the party as a whole is an important method in 
evaluating the party's responsiveness to the various developin·g constituencies in 
Israeli society. Aronoff argues that representation in the Israel Labour Party merely 
mirrored the patron-client relationship, with the patron dominating one of the major 
factions: Mrs Meir and Mr. Sapir for Mapai, Mr Allen for Ahdut Ha'avodah and Mr. 
Dayan for Rafi. A consequence of the merger of the three parties was that, in order 
to absorb them, it proved necessary to expand the size of party institutions such as 
the Central Committee. This increase led to them becoming more ineffective and 
inefficient. Disputes were concentrated on the size of representation on the party 
organs of the various factions, and not challenges to the elite. The problems of 
maintaining party unity, therefore, became more difficult to manage, and this led to 
an increased failure of the elite to respond to the demands and interests of society. 
24 Arian, Politics in Israel, The Second Generation, p62. 
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2.3: The Electoral System, Coalitions and Intra-Party Conflict. 
In understanding the Labour Party's position in the Israeli political system is 
also important to describe the effect of the electoral system on the party. This 
section will argue that one of the direct consequences of the electoral system was 
that it helped (in addition to previously described framework) maintain the ability of 
the elite to control the party. 
Israel uses the purest form of proportional representation, the party list 
system. Section four of Israel's Basic Law stipulates that the elections should be 
general, national, direct, equal, by secret ballot and proportional25. A further clause 
was introduced, so that an absolute majority and not a simple majority is required in 
the Knesset, to change any aspect of the electoral system26. This was inserted due 
to the fear that Mr. Ben-Gurion and Mapai would attempt to change the system to a 
first-past-the-post method. Bogdanor argues that this would have transformed the 
political system with Mapai becoming not only the dominant party, but one with an 
absolute majority of seats in the Knesset and therefore enjoying a total monopoly of 
power27. 
The basic details of the electoral system are the following. First, Israel has 
adapted the closed party list system, in which the party draws up a list of candidates 
and the order in which the candidate is placed on the party list. Second, at election 
times Israel becomes one single national constituency, and the electorate votes, in 
25 1sraeli Electoral Basic Law, Translated by the Israeli Embassy, London. 
26 The decision to use the party list system was not taken after much thought. The 
pre-state eleCtions in the Yishuv were conducted under PR in order that all the 
parties involved should be represented, and consequently this system was carried 
over into the state. At the time of making the decision on the electoral system Israel 
was involved in the War of Independence with the Arabs, therefore, the leadership 
decided to continue with the old system. Mr. Ben-Gurion was in favour of using the 
British first past the post system, but accepted at the time that the undefined 
borders of the infant state made it impossible to draw up the constituencies needed 
for this system. 
27 Bogdanor, The Electoral System, Government and Democracy, in Sprinzak and 
Diamond (ed), Israeli Democracy Under Stress, Lynne Rienner, London, 1993, p84. 
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theory, not for the candidate, but for the party. Third, once the candidate has been 
elected, there is no impediment preventing him from joining a different party. There 
are no by-elections, the next name on the list simply fills the gap caused by 
resignation or death. Finally, the electoral threshold (the percentage of votes 
needed to win one seat) has been relatively low, set at one percent until1992, when 
it was raised to one and a half percent. This was meant to ensure fair 
representation for all parties, important in a country where the parties stand for a 
particular principle and represent differing sizes of constituencies. Consequently, 
Israel has a high degree of party fragmentation, with in 1984, 15 out of 26 party lists 
winning at least one seat. Even with the increase in the threshold in 1992 some 10 
party lists were still elected to the Knesset. Such a system has at times allowed 
extreme parties to gain representation to the Knesset, as Kach did in 198428. Within 
a dominant party system, the election of radical parties was not particularly 
significant. Mapai merely excluded them from the coalition bargaining process. 
However, in the post-1977 competitive party system, in which there was relative 
parity between the Likud and the Labour Party, the election of such groups as Kach 
was extremely important in that, in theory, they held the balance of power29. 
The party list system had important 'conditioning effects' on the internal 
organisation of Mapai and the Israel Labour Party. Hermens, in his classic study of 
proportional representation, argues that the democratic nature of parties is 
destroyed by the system, in that the individual deputy is no longer independent as 
he lacks the support of his constituents~. Once the leadership has gained control 
over the appointments committee, this leads to total domination of the elite over the 
28 Kach called for the forcible of transfer of the Arabs from the Occupied Territories. 
29 Although the Likud refused to deal with Kach in 1984, they allowed Moledet in to 
the coalition in 1990. Moledet stood on the single issue of the voluntary transfer of 
Arabs from the Occupied Territories. 
~ Hermens, ''The Dynamics of Proportional Representation", in Eckstein and Apter 
(ed), Comparitive Government Macmillan, Canada, 1968, p269. 
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party31. The leader, or leadership, has the ability to destroy and make political 
careers with the stroke of a pen, the only compensation for a rebellious candidate 
being that he can form another list and run as an independent. However, in reality, 
the cost of campaigning prevents most candidates from attempting to do so32. 
Mapai dearly contained many of the above characteristics, with its highly-
centralised, oligarchic party machine and the control of the leadership over 
appointments to the Knesset list. This situation was compounded by the fact that 
Mapai was a dominant party, winning the largest number of seats in Knesset 
elections, thus helping to reinforce the power of the leadership. 
On the other hand, Medding disagrees with the notion of the leaders using the 
appointments committees to destroy political careers33. He argues that the 
temporary nature of the Appointment Committees prevented them from influencing 
or dictating the candidates parliamentary behaviour. He goes on to say that: 
There is no evidence to suggest that Mapai parliamentarians were dropped 
because they offended members of the appointment committees; most were 
dropped for reasons of age or unsatisfactory parliamentary performance or 
because groups recognised as having a right to nominate candidates for "safe 
places" decided to alternate between their leading members34. 
However, Medding, ignores two key factors. First, the appointment 
committees, although temporary in nature, were comprised of either the elite 
themselves or their lieutenants, and therefore there was a high degree of 
consistency in membership of these committees35. Second, he fails to account for 
31 Ibid. 
32 The cost of doing this in a party list system, is exaggerated by the need of the 
majority of the candidates to appeal to the single national constituency. This will 
involve him campaigning in the entire country, attempting to win votes from every 
region. 
33 Medding, Op. Cit. , p164 
34 1bid. 
35 For example the 1951 appointments committee comprised of Prime Minister, Mr. 
Ben-Gurion, Foreign Minister, Mr. Sharett and former Secretary General of the 
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the active conditioning factor of this system, in terms of the motivation of the 
prospective candidate, to please the elite, and at least not confront or challenge the 
leadership. In simple terms, the limitations imposed by the electoral system on the 
candidate, and the power it provided the elite with, were not always visibly evident, 
but rather acted as a restraint on the actions of the individual candidate-'36. 
The electoral system tended to reinforce the importance of intra-party politics 
over inter-party politics in Mapai. With the party serving as the central reference 
point for the candidate, as opposed to the electorate in a first past the post system 
this led to an intensification of intra-party conflict, as the candidate struggled to gain 
a realistic place on the party list37. Various factions in the party, whether interest 
groups or party factions (post 1968 merger), fought to increase their representation 
on the list. Leaders attempted to get their clients placed in a realistic position on the 
list in order to enhance their own position within the elite. This became more 
profound, as the divisions within the leadership grew and the old factions became to 
be replaced by simply personality and power politics. The strength of a leader, 
therefore, came to be measured by how many of his supporters he could get into 
realistic positions on the Knesset list. The intensification of the intra-party struggle, 
with the Lavon Affair and the emergence of the first serious divisions within the elite, 
confirms this. Mr. Ben-Gurion was keen to ensure that his "young guard" were given 
a realistic number of places on the party list so as to bolster his intra-party position, 
in the conflict with Mr. Lavon and subsequently with the Gush itself. 
Histadrut, Mr. Lavon. The consistency in the membership of the committee can be 
seen by the presence of the first two in the 1955 version of the committee. 
36 It should be remembered that much of Dr. Medding's research was based on a 
detailed examination of party protocols. Such restraining tools employed by the elite 
would not be visible in such documents just as such tactics as agenda fixing of party 
organ meetings would not be recorded. 
37 Hermans, loc, cit. 
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Notions of the dominance of intra-party politics were compounded by the long 
period of Mapai or Labour Party rule in Israel, in which a generation of party 
functionaries came to rely on the party for their career, thus making them more 
concerned about their own position within the party structure, rather than any inter 
party conflict concerns38. The inter-party conflict, prior to 1977, was based around 
which parties would fonn a coalition with Mapai (ILP), and not on any real threat of 
the party losing its pivotal role in the coalition negotiations. Hence, its importance 
was not as significant as it would have been in a competitive party system. 
However, even with the emergence of a competitive party system in 1977, intra-
party conflict continued to dominate inter-party conflict, within both the Labour Party 
and in the Likud, illustrating the deep-rooted nature of the phenomenon39. 
2.3.1: The Coalition-Forming Process. 
Because Mapai, was unable to win an overall majority in any election, or to 
change the electoral system, it proved necessary after each Knesset election to 
fonn coalitions with other parties. The process of coalition-forming itself had 
important consequences for Mapai both in tenns of ideology and organisation. As 
previously mentioned, Mapai, occupied the pivotal role in the coalition process, in 
that no government could be fonned without its participation. Consequently, after 
each election it was the leaders of Mapai who became the prime movers in coalition 
negotiations. 
Mapai was keen to include as many parties as possible in the coalition, with 
the exception of Herut and the Communists, based on the notion that the larger the 
38 Korn, The National Unity Years, (Hebrew) or PhD Thesis (English), London 
School of Economics, 1991. 
39 The importance of intra-party conflict in the Likud notably after the resignation of 
Mr. Begin (1983) was confinned in interviews with the leadership of Likud conducted 
by the researcher for example; 
Interview with Dr. Moshe Arens, Tel Aviv, 26th September 1994. 
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coalition, the easier it was to manage for Mapai. Evidence from the period starting in 
1949 clearly shows that Mapai included at least one excess party in the coalition (a 
party not needed to create a coalition majority), and often three or more excess 
parties in a coalition«>. Large coalitions had two advantages for Mapai: first, they 
contained many diverse elements which increased Mapai's freedom of action, and 
second, the coalition could survive the resignation of one of the participating 
parties41. Mapai for these reasons preferred to have all the smaller parties in a 
coalition (except Herut and the Communists). Hence it was the smaller parties which 
determined who participated in government coalitions-42. These smaller parties 
joined coalitions for various reasons, the religious parties to ensure the maintenance 
of the religious status quo and their share in the distribution of religious funds, while 
others did not join mainly because of the electoral damage that membership in a 
previous coalition had brought. The General Zionists, for example, were convinced 
that their poor performance in the 1955 Knesset elections had been caused by their 
participation in the previous government. 
Etzioni went further to argue that Mapai used the coalition-forming process to 
adapt to change in voting patterns, and in particular the strength of its rival parties. 
Mapai did this in order to attempt to diffuse voter dissatisfaction with aspects of its 
polices by attempting to introduce into the coalition, a party or parties that had 
significantly increased its share of the vote in the previous Knesset election43. In 
1955 Mapai lost votes to two parties which pursued an activist approach towards 
40 Medding, The Founding of Israeli Democracy, 1948-1967, p95. 
41 Despite the attempts of Mapai to include a large number of parties in the coalition 
to avoid it being a "government of blackmail" where the resignation of one of the 
partners would undermine its majority, the periods between 1949-51, 1961-65, and 
197 4-77 were marked by the existence of such types of government coalitions. For 
a complete history of members of coalitions see Appendix 2. 
42 Issac, Party Politics in Israel: Three Visions of A Jewish State, Longman, New 
York, 1981, p114. 





the Arabs, Herut and Ahdut Ha'avodah, and hence included the latter in the 
coalition. Etzioni believes that coalition-building is the method that a dominant party 
uses to adapt to changes in voter sentiment. In short, the party is not replaced, but 
rather changes its coalition partners and polices in response to the change in public 
opinion44. Issac finds Etzioni's theory difficult to accept, in that all the evidence was 
based on the 1951 and 1955 Knesset elections and that he ignores the efforts of 
Mapai to include other parties in the coalition such as Mapam in 1955 (which had 
just split from Ahdut Ha'avodah). 
In terms of ideological development, the formation of coalitions by Mapai 
reinforced Mapai's position at the centre of Israeli politics and, as Mr. Ben-Aharon 
argued, led to a pragmatic ideological programme of government which bore little 
resemblance to the parties original programmes45. The need to reach compromises 
in coalition formation tended to blunt the ideological edge of even the most radical 
left wing parties such as Ahdut Ha'avodah (from 1965), and Mapam (1969-1984), as 
they were dominated in the government by the centre party, Mapai. The central 
principle of all coalition agreements in Israel was the collective responsibility of the 
government46, and this together with the in-built Mapai majority in the government, 
as well as the fact that it always held the most important portfolios, meant that 
Mapai was practically 'able to translate a coalition government into a close 
approximation of government by a single party47. There is, therefore, a clear 
relationship between the electoral system which has always led to coalition 
government, and the decline in the importance of ideology, or lack of an ideological 
challenge to Mapai, from the parties positioned to the left of it. 
44 1bid. 
451nterview with Mr. Ben-Aharon. 
46 This principle became law in 1949. 
47 Medding, op. cit. p92. 
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On the other hand, the Revisionists (Gahal) did not share the same Zionist 
ideology as the labour movement and were not included in any government coalition 
from 1948 up to the NUG in 196748. Mapai's refusal to accept Herut as a 
constructive party, and the hostile relationship between Mr. Begin (leader of Herut) 
and Mr Ben-Gurion, created a bitterness between the two parties and their 
successors which is important in understanding contemporary party politics in 
lsrael49. Mr. Ben-Gurion and the other Mapai leaders saw the Revisionists' Zionist 
ideology as a danger to the state, and consequently attempted to de-legitimise them 
in the eyes of the voters, by not allowing them in to a coalition government. This 
view was shared by the other parties of the left and the NRP up to the mid 1960's. 
Consequently this made it near1y impossible to form a coalition which did not include 
Mapai, or its successor the Labour Party, up to its electoral defeat in 1977. 
However, as the electoral support for the Labour Party substantially declined so it 
became more difficult for it to form majority coalitions (61 seats). This fact was 
illustrated by the problems which Mrs Meir experienced forming a coalition after the 
1973 election, and by the fact that as the 1977 election approached Mr. Rabin was 
in charge of a minority, caretaker government. 
In bringing together the central aspects of the relationship between Mapai 
(ILP) and the Israeli political system, it is worth remembering that it was largely the 
labour movement which founded, shaped and defined the political system. The pre-
state period of the Yishuv acted as a model for the state of Israel, and therefore 
many aspects of the political system such as the electoral system, the dominance of 
a small elite over Israel's highly centralised and oligarchic labour parties, have their 
48 Isaac, op. cit. p116. 
49 The bitterness between the two leaders was such that even in the Knesset, Mr. 
Ben-Gurion would not bring himself to refer to Mr. Begin by name of communicate 
with him in anyway. However, on the eve of the Six Day War their relationship 
improved to the extent that it was Mr. Ben-Gurion who called for Gahal to be 
included in the NUG. 
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origins in this period. An understanding of this "loading of the dice" in the Yishuv is 
also central to explanations of how the labour movement, and in particular Mapai, 
remained in a dominant position until1977. In short, the labour movement 
dominated the early years of the state of Israel because it had founded and 
controlled the institutions of the Yishuv, and had delivered their promise of 
statehood in 1948. What is clear is that by 1977 the methods used by the elite to 
maintain power over a dynamic developing society were bankrupt. Had the 1973 
election not been conducted with the country in a state of shock following the Yom 
Kippur war then the bankruptcy of the methods employed by the elite to maintain 




THE 1977 ELECTION AND THE DECLINE OF THE LABOUR PARTY 
The defeat of the Alignment in the 19n election was twofold. First, it lost its 
position as the single largest list, and second, it no longer held the pivotal position in 
the coalition bargaining process1. The results of the election are often referred to by 
Israeli scholars as an upheaval or earthquake (mahapach), marking the end of the 
labour movement's rule and the ascendance to power of the Likud. Consequently, 
the election marked the end of the dominant party system and its eventual 
replacement with a competitive party system in Israel. In providing an analysis of the 
decline of the Labour Party, it is necessary to first examine the events surrounding 
the loss of the Knesset elections and second to examine the models and evidence 
which Israeli scholars employ to account for this decline. 
3.1: The Background, Organisation, and Personalities of the 1977 
Campaign. 
In the period leading up to the campaign and to an extent during the 
campaign itself, the leadership of the Labour Party made a series of organisational 
errors and misjudgements which contributed to the party's poor showing in the polls. 
These can be classified into two related categories, personalities, and internal 
organisational mistakes. One of Mr. Rabin's final decisions, before resigning as 
Prime Minister, was to appoint Mr. Chaim Bar-Lev as Campaign Manager for the 
1 The use of the word "lisf' is significant here. The Labour Party was still the single 
largest party with 26 seats out of 32 for the Alignment (Mapam 6 seats). Herut won 
19 seats out of the total Likud block's 43 seats. It was not until1988 that Herut and 
the Liberals formalised their relationship in order to from a united party called the 
Likud. However, the election marked an increase in the significance of political 
blocks over single parties. 
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1977 Knesset elections. Such a move was a clear illustration of one of Mr. Rabin's 
failings in his first premiership. Mr. Bar-Lev, like Mr. Rabin, was an ex-General in the 
IDF, with minimal experience of party politics and therefore lacking the party 
organisational skills required during an election campaign2. The tone of the 
campaign, that Labour knew what was best for Israel, appeared arrogant and failed 
to respond to the concerns of the electorate about the perfonnance of the Labour 
leadership, manifest since the Yom Kippur war. 
In organisational tenns, the decision to hold the elections to the Histadrut after 
the Knesset elections was an error. The Histadrut elections had come to be viewed 
as an opportunity for the electorate to cast a protest vote (in the absence of by-
elections in Israel), in an organisation where the labour movement could absorb 
such a vote and still, with its large majority, retain power. The moving of the 
Histadrut elections until a month after the Knesset elections removed the possibility 
of absorbing such votes, thus increasing the significance of the Knesset vote. A 
similar mistake was made with the decision not to hold the Municipal elections on 
the same day as the Knesset elections, as had traditionally been the case. The 
presence of Municipal elections was an important factor in motivating the local party 
workers in the branches to campaign vigorously and to ensure that Labour Party 
supporters turned out to vote. The removal of this linkage took away the strong 
sense of personal motivation to ensure such a turnout. 
During the campaign itself the two central personalities were Mr. Peres from 
Labour and Mr. Weizman from the Likud. Both in a way deputised for absent 
colleagues: Mr. Peres for Mr. Rabin (resigned), and Mr. Weizman for Mr. Begin 
(i11)3 . They were joined by Mr. Yadin from DASH (DMC), a new party with a platfonn 
2 Mr. Bar-Lev had been Mr. Rabin's successor as Chief of Staff of the IDF, serving 
from 1968 to 1972. He became Secretary General of the Labour Party in 1978. 
3 Mr. Weizman was a fonner commander of the Israeli Air Force and Deputy Chief 
of Staff from 1966 to 1969, serving as Mr. Rabin's deputy during the Six Day War. 
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calling for electoral reform, an exchange of land for peace, and a decentralisation of 
Israeli govemment4. The party contained many figures who had previously been 
identified with the Labour Party, and appealed predominantly to disillusioned Labour 
voters5. The central ideology of Likud, the Revisionist vision of a Greater Israel (a 
Jewish State on both sides of the River Jordan) was no longer the cornerstone of 
Likud's campaign which instead concentrated on the corruption and failings of the 
Labour Party6. 
Mr. Begin was ill and hospitalised for much of the 1977 campaign, and therefore did 
not play a dominant role in the campaign itself, although his position as leader of 
Likud was secure. 
4 Mr. Yadin had served as the second Chief of Staff of the IDF serving unti11952. 
During the War of Independence (1948), Mr. Yadin served as Acting Chief of Staff. 
Importantly, he was a key member of the Agranat Commission set up following the 
Yom Kippur war. 
5 1nterviewwith Mr. Avraham Poraz, Shinui MK (1994), and founding Member of 
Dash, Tel Aviv, 24th August 1994. 
6 Leaders of Likud accept that the party was not elected because of the issue of 
Greater Israel in 1977, although they say that it was then(19n) not as unpopular as 
it had been in the past. 
Interview with Dan Meridor, Mr. Begin's Cabinet secretary, The Knesset, Jerusalem, 
17th October 1994. 
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3.2: Results and Analysis of the Election. 
The elections were held on the 17th May 1977, 1,771,726 votes were cast 
(79.2% turnout), and produced the following results; 
Table 3.1: Number of Seats Each Party Won in the Respective Blocks. 
Labour Led Block Likud Led Block 
Alignment 32 Likud 43 
Sheli 2 NRP 12 
Ratz 1 Agudat Israel 4 
Hadash 5 Shlomzion 2 
United Arab List 1 
Total41 Total62· 
Other parties accounted for the remaining 18 seats, of which the most 
important was Dash which won 15 seats. The Independent Liberals, Flatto-Sharon 
and Poalei-Agudah each won one seat. The most significant factors in the results 
were, first, that the Labour Party (Alignment) had lost its pivotal position in the 
coalition building process, and second, that the Likud was able to put together a 
winning coalition (62 seats including Mr. Dayan)), without the support of Dash. The 
founders of Dash had not envisaged such a situation and were preparing 
themselves for coalition negotiations with the Alignment after the election7. 
However, their success in the election become the single most important statistical 
factor in the defeat of the Labour Party, and its subsequent inability to form a 
7 The majority of Dash preferred a coalition with the Labour Party and this was to 
issue which eventually led to the collapse of the party. 
Interview with Mr. Poraz, 24th August 1994 
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coalitions. Eventually Dash joined the coalition of Mr. Begin on 24th October 1977, 
after being offered four Cabinet portfolios. 
Of great importance to the Likud was the move of the religious parties away 
from the Labour Party, after what Mr. Peres's supporters term as the "smart 
exercise" of 1976 (the breaking of the historic partnership between these parties 
and the labour movement, by Mr. Rabin), towards the Likud nationalist campS. In . 
truth, this trend had started well before the 1976 split with the radicalisation of 
especially the NRP. One of the major reasons for this change in the NRP was the 
growing influence in the party of settlement movements such as Gush Emunim 
(Block of Faithful), from the 1967 war onwards. The change in the NRP was both 
ideological and generational, with the younger generation proving more militant and 
messianic supporters of Greater Israel, as well as the settlement drive in these 
areas10_ Consequently, in positional terms they moved into the Likud camp along 
with the other religious parties, thus providing the Likud with an in-built blocking 
majority in 1977 and for much of the 1980's. In 1977 the strength of the religious 
parties increased to 17 seats, thus compounding the difficulties for the Labour 
Party. 
The performance of the Likud, in increasing its number of seats from 39 in 
1973 to 43 in 1977, while impressive, was therefore not the single most important 
factor in its victory. Nevertheless, the elections clearly marked a sea change in the 
8 1bid. 
9 Many of Mr. Peres's supporters view the "smart exercise" as one of the 
fundamental reasons that allowed Likud to gain and maintain a central hold on 
power for 15 years. 
Interview with Mr Avraham Hatzharmi, Director of the International Department of 
the Israel Labour Party, Tel Aviv, 29th November 1994. 
10 The details of the fundamental change in the NRP and the split with the Labour 
Party were explained to the researcher by Mr. Avraham Burg, Labour MK, (currently 
in 1995 Chairman of the Jewish Agency), and son of the founder and leader of NRP 
Mr. Yosef Burg. 
Interview with Mr. Avraham Burg (Currently Chairman of the Jewish agency 1995), 
The Knesset, Jerusalem, 13th September 1994. 
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move away from labour Zionism towards a more nationalistic brand of Zionism led 
by the Likud and the religious parties. Importantly, it represented the ascendance of 
block politics over simple party politics with smaller parties lining up behind one of 
the two major parties (Labour and Likud), to form political blocks and potential 
coalition partners 11. The fact that Mr. Begin had a choice as to whether he wanted 
Dash in the coalition or not was a clear indication that the Likud-led-block had 
become the stronger of the two. This was compounded by the addition of Mr. Moshe 
Dayan to the Likud list and his presence in the government as Foreign Minister, 
giving the Likud an additional seat in the Knesset while reducing the Alignment to 
31 seats. 
The Alignment experienced its single largest loss of seats in any election, 
losing support on two fronts, first to DASH, in traditional Labour middle class 
strongholds, and second, to the Likud, among the key inter related groups of low 
income groups, ethnic groups and the young. In the low income areas of the major 
cities Likud received nearly three times the votes of the Alignment, and also 
performed much better than previously in the wealthy areas against the Alignment. 
Part of this marked Likud improvement in the wealthy areas was caused by Dash 
taking away some traditional Labour Party supporters. Table 3.2 reveals the basic 
statistics for Tel Aviv and Haifa, illustrating the scale of the Alignment's problem. 
11 Interview with Mr. Hanan Crystal, Political Corespondent Israel Radio and 
Hadashot, Tel Aviv, 4th September 1994. 
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Table 3.2: The Alignment and Likud Vote in the Cities of Tel Aviv and 
Haifa in the 1977 Knesset Election. 
City 
Tel Aviv (low ln.) 
Tel Aviv (wealthy) 












Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem. The figures are in 
percentages. 
The Alignment's performance in the IDF was equally bad. The Ukud polled 
twice as many IDF votes as the Alignment. The only area where the Alignment won 
a plurality of the vote was in the Kibbutzim12. A more detailed analysis of the 
statistical reasons for the decline of the Labour Party is left to 3.3.2, where they are 
presented as evidence for the decline of the party due to demographic changes 
which led to an increase in the type of voter who was likely to vote for the Likud. 
3.3: The Decline of the Labour Party: Four Frameworks. 
Existing explanations by Israeli scholars for the decline of the Labour Party as 
represented by the 1977 election results divide into four theoretical areas: the 
political dynamics framework, a political culture framework, national conflict 
12 The IDF vote is used by Israeli commentators as a guide to the young vote. Most 
first time voters are doing their national service in the IDF at the time of elections, 
and vote in special polling stations. 
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structuring internal politics, and a political economy framework. The frameworks at 
times overlap, but scholars place emphasis on different reasons for the decline. 
3.3.1: The Political Dynamics Framework. 
Aronoff argues that the decline of the Labour Party can be attributed to two 
factors: the degeneration of the party from within which led to the elite becoming 
estranged from the electorate. This made the elite unable to respond to the rising 
protest groups which grew out of the voters alienation and frustration13. In addition, 
using Duverger's notion of the arrogance of power, he argues that this was 
illustrated by a lack of reform in Labour's highly centralised, oligarchic party 
structure. Both Aronoff and Shapiro argue that Mapai (ILP) did not adapt its 
ideology to the changing needs and realities of Israeli society. Therefore, after a 
period of time, it came to rely more and more on non-ideological incentives to 
mobilise support. They see this failure as being directly related to the organisational 
patterns of the party14. Duverger supports this, stating: 
When a left wing party becomes dominant, its appetite for revolution is dulled ... 
The dominant party wears itself out in office, it loses its vigour, its arteries 
harden ... Every domination bears within it the seeds of its own destruction15 
As was argued in Chapter Two, the control that the elite had over the party 
remained radically unaltered up to the electoral defeat in 1977. However, in 
presenting evidence to support the political elite framework, Aronoff sees the failure 
of the elite to respond to changes in Israeli society as taking place from the Yom 
Kippur war (1973) to the election defeat (1977). The post-war period in Israel was 
13 Aronoff, Power and Ritual in the Israel Labour Party, M.E. Sharpe, London, 1993. 
14 1bid. 
Shapiro, The Formative Years of the Israel Labour Party: The Organisation of 
Power 1919-1930, Sage Publications, London, 1976. 
15 Duverger, Quoted from Arian, ''The Electorate", in Penniman, (ed), Israel at the 
Polls 1977, same article also appears in Arian (ed), The Elections in lsrael1977, 
Jerusalem Academic press, Tel Aviv, 1980, p67. 
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marked by a period of attacks on the Labour elite from the general public, and 
increased frustration being voiced by some elements of the party itself16. The 
response of the elite, in dealing with these frustrations, was to attempt to avoid 
talking about the leadership's handling of the war, or the peace process in general, 
in order to preserve a degree of public party unity. 
At the first meeting of the Central Committee of the party after the war, the 
failings of the leaders, in particular Mrs Meir and Mr. Dayan, were not even 
discussed17. When the party eventually did discuss the subject on 5th December 
1973, there was a major confrontation between Mr. Sapir and Mr. Dayan which 
threatened to split the party, and which led to a rare public dispute between Mrs. 
Meir and Mr. Sapir over her continued support for the Defence Minister Mr. Dayan18. 
The lack of responsiveness of the elite was compounded by the presentation of the 
party list, in the delayed Kneseet elections of 1973, which was identical to the list for 
the original election date. In reality, this was not the decision of the Labour Party, 
but it illustrated the lack of change and new blood in the party19. Hermans, however, 
argues that this inertia, and lack of opportunity for new and young candidates, was 
16 One of the main internal critics was Mr. Lova Eliav (Secretary General of the 
Labour Party 1970 to 1972), who was at the time in the running to succeed to Mrs. 
Meir. His main objection was to the lack of progress in the peace process. He left 
the party in 1977, eventually formed Sheli and was subsequently elected to the 
Knesset. 
Interview with Mr. Eliav, Tel Aviv, 25th July 1994. 
17 This represents a key example of agenda fixing by the elite and Mr. Sapir in 
particular. Central Committee, Party Protocols, Labour Party Archives, Beit Ber1, 
near, Tel Aviv, Israel. 
1a The confrontation between Mr. Sapir and Mr. Dayan was fundamentally about 
personalities, although there were substantial differences between them on the 
future status of the territories which are catalogued in 3.3.3. 
Minutes of the Central Committee, 5th December 1973, Labour Party Archives, Beit 
Ber1. 
19 The decision to hold the election with the same list of candidates was taken by 
law and was the same for all parties that had submitted their lists for the original 
election date. 
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a direct consequence of the party list electoral system which contributes to the 
decline in the vitality of political parties20. 
The ending of the domination of the party by Jews from the founding 
generation was completed with Mrs. Meir's resignation, in the aftermath of the war. 
Her natural successor, Mr. Sapir (4th Aliyah), declined to be considered for the post 
due to ill health. The selection of Mr. Rabin in the first leadership contest did little to 
change the structure of the party machine. Mr. Rabin, as previously described, was 
the choice of Mr. Sapir and the party machine, even though his background was in 
the military. In the years following his election, Mr. Rabin made little attempt to 
reform the party, instead choosing to largely ignore it and concentrate on cabinet 
government. In addition to the problems between Mr. Rabin and Mr. Peres, the old 
factionalism in the Cabinet was replaced by new divisions between Mr. Rabin's 
mainly ex-military, security teams (recruited from outside the party) and those who 
had come up through the party machine21. 
The changes which were instigated from the bottom up from second tier 
national leaders and the branches at this time failed to radically alter the balance of 
power in the party. The changes included, the creation of eight new districts in the 
party, and a membership drive which resulted in over 50,000 applications being 
rejected because of some form of irregularities. The majority of these came from the 
two largest districts, Tel Aviv and Haifa, whose numbers were reduced from 45,000 
and 44,000 respectively to around 27,000 members each22. This was a rather crude 
attempt by these branches to increase their representation within the party, and 
especially the number of delegates they sent to the Party Conference. Third, the 
20 Hermans, ''The Dynamics of Proportional Representation", in Eckstein and Apter 
(ed), Comparitive Politics, Macmillan, Canada, 1968. 
21 One such example was the appointment by Mr. Rabin of Mr. Ariel Sharon to serve 
as a special advisor of security issues to the Prime Minister. 
22 Aronoff, op.cit. , p139. 
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Central Committee was increased to 819 members, which only made it larger, 
easier to control and hence less effective. Fourth, attempts were made to open up 
the party conference, by way of by-passing the centrally controlled Steering 
Committee, and forming informal committees of their own to discuss and debate 
issues. 
Taken together, these changes were seen as a step forward. In addition, 
there was some movement from the elite on a further opening up of the leadership 
and Knesset list selection process as well as changes to the organisation of the 
Party Conference. However, Aronoff argues that this was all too little too late, and 
did not therefore amount to the major internal party reforms which were needed if 
the party was going to revitalise its fortunes23. 
In conclusion, the highly centralised and oligarchic party structure which 
permitted the elite to dominate policy making decisions and appointments could not 
reform itself and adapt to the changing needs of the dynamic Israeli society. The 
final phase was completed with the engineering of a successful challenge from the 
right, starting with the merger between Herut and the pro business Liberal party in 
1965, whose legitimacy had been increased by its inclusion in the 1967 NUG. 
During the late 1960's and early 1970's Likud, under Mr. Begin, shifted its ideology 
away from pure Revisionism to a more pragmatic programme which thus appealed 
to a wider constituency. In short, as the fortunes of the Labour Party declined, so 
the right was able, for the first time, to mount a serious challenge to Labour's 
dominance, culminating in its electoral victory in 1977. 
3.3.2: The Political Culture Framework. 
Proponents of the political culture approach place a different emphasis on the 
decline of the Labour Party. Arian argues that demographic change is the key 
23 Aronoff, op.cit. , p140. 
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starting point in explaining this decline24. Therefore, the decline is seen in tenns of 
political change of the mass public, rather than within the elite. Etzioni-Haley and 
Shapira stress that the changing composition and background of the electorate 
moved Israel's political culture to the right, while the dominant party (Mapai) did not 
make the corresponding change25. In addition, lnbar suggests that this change in 
the electorate was particularly true in matters of defence and security from 1967 
onwards26. In defence of their hypothesis they concentrate on statistical analysis, 
based on the various cleavages which have emerged in Israeli society since 1948. 
In short, they argue that the demographic changes which occurred in Israel led to 
the proliferation of the type of voter who tends to vote for the right27. This voter is 
traditionally of Sephardi background and I or young, whereas the typical Labour 
voter is seen as older and of Ashkenazi background. Arian elaborates on this, 
stating that the Labour Party is conservative in nature. It wanted to preserve what it 
had won for the state. Its support, therefore, comes from the more conservative 
elements in society, such as the elderly and middle education or income groups. On 
the other hand, Likud's support came from two areas. The Herut faction was seen 
as representing the Sephardim, many of whom were poor. The other faction of the 
Likud, the Liberals, were a bourgeois party, drawing support from the upper middle 
class merchants and business community2B. In assessing how these changes took 
place it is necessary to first examine the various cleavages in Israeli society, and 
second, their effect on voting patterns. 
24 Arian, ''The Electorate", in Arian (ed), The Elections in lsrael1977. 
25 Etzioni-Haley and Shapira, Political Culture in Israel: Cleavage and Integration 
Among Israel's Jews, Praeger, USA, 1977. 
26 lnbar, War and Peace in Israeli Politics: Labour Party Positions on National 
Security, Lynne Rienner, London, 1991. 
27 Shalev, Labour and the Political Economy in Israel, Oxford University Press, 
London, 1993, p287. 
28 Arian, op.cit. , p59 
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The two major population developments in Israeli society have been the 
proportional growth of the Israeli bom (Sabra) Jew, which now equals more than 50 
percent of the total Jewish population of Israel, and the halving of the European or 
American bom Jews, from more than 50 percent of the population in 1948 to just 
over 20 percent in 1988. Table 3.3 shows the voting potential of the Jewish 
population in 1967 and 1988. 
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Table 3.3: Voting Potential of the Jewish Population in Israel, 1967 and 
1988. 
Percentage of Population Number of Potential Seats 
Group Could Elect. 
Group 1967 1988 1967 1988 
Israeli 6.5 19.5 4 8 
Born. Father 
Israeli 








Asian or 27.8 17.2 38 27 
Africa Born. 




Total 100% 100% 106 
Source, The Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1968 and 1989 editions. 
The potential number of Knesset seats assumes an 80 percent 
turnout, and that 12,000 votes equalled one seat in 1967 and 17,600 votes were 
needed to win one Knesset seat in 1988. 
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The major distinction among the Jewish population is between Sephardim, 
who immigrated from the countries of Asia and Africa, and Ashkenazim, who came 
from America and Europe. As Table 3.3, shows the demographic balance moved 
considerably towards the Sephardi (born in Israel with a father of Sephardim origin 
or born in Asia or Africa). The Sephardi Jews, arriving in Israel, tended to be poor 
with little education or training, and consequently were directed by the already 
established Ashkenazi Jews to perform mainly manual jobs. On their arrival, the 
Sephardi were highly dependent on the Labour-led governments to supply them 
with jobs, housing and social services, and as a result of these dependency ties, in 
the initial years, they supported these governments. However, from the mid 1960's 
onwards their support started to shift away from the Labour Party to parties of the 
right, and especially the Likud. Israeli scholars offer three different explanations as 
to why this happened. 
First, the protest vote theory, the most common perspective, is employed by 
Yishai and Cohen29. They argue that the lack of opportunity of the Sephardim led to 
a feeling of frustration and bitterness, directed against the dominant Labour Party 
who they held responsible for their situation. Second, the class or economic strata 
explanation suggests that the Labour Party is seen as a middle class party, while 
the Sephardim are concentrated in the lower classes. Thus, once they had seen 
that the Labour Party was not a true socialist working class party, serving their 
interests, they started voting for a party which promoted their concerns3J. Third, the 
Arab explanation, concerns the fact that Sephardim attitudes and relations with the 
29 Yishai, "Israel's Right Wing Jewish Proletariat", Jewish Journal of Sociology, 4, 
1982. 
_ Cohen, "Ethnicity and Legitimation in Contemporary Israel", Jerusalem Quarterly, 
28, 1988. 
3> Arian, Politics in Israel: The Second Generation. 
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Arabs are reflected in Likud's hawkish policy concerning the Arab-Israeli dispute31. 
Often, the Middle East Jews were, before arriving in Israel, a persecuted minority in 
Arab countries, and hence tended to be more hawkish in their views towards the 
Arabs. In reality, it has probably been a combination of all three factors which 
account for the way the Sephardim Jews votes. Different explanations are more 
relevant to particular individuals, depending on that person's personal experiences 
and values. 
The shift of the Sephardi vote away from the Labour Party is shown in Table 
3.4. 
Table 3.4: Party Preferences for the Two Major Parties of the Sephardi 













Source, Peres and Shemer, The Ethnic Factor in Elections. 
In 1965, the year of the merger of Herut and the Liberals, Mapai's lead over 
the Likud in the Sephardim community was 15 percent. However, by 1973 the Likud 
had caught and overtaken the Labour Party, and by the 1977 Knesset election 
Likud's rating was twice that of the Labour Party, confirming the dedine of the latter 
among this constituency. 
The second major deavage in Jewish society is age, with a direct link 
between support for one of the major parties and the respective age groups, 
illustrated by Table 3.5. 
31 Yishai, Ibid. 
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Table 3.5: Party Vote By Age, 1969, 1973, 1977. 
1969 (In Percent) 
Age Num. Lab. Likud Relig other 
<24 210 40 36 15 9 
25-39 414 54 30 9 7 
40-49 272 61 25 10 4 
+50 461 62 21 14 3 
Total 1357 56 27 12 ~ 
1973 (In Percent) 
Age Num. Lab. Likud Relig other 
<24 154 39 44 6 11 
25-39 277 37 44 7 12 
40-49 135 48 35 7 10 
+50 310 54 23 13 10 
Total 876 45 35 ~ !1 
1977 (In Percent) 
Age Num. Lab. Likud Relig Dash 
<24 144 20 51 4 21 
25-39 336 25 34 11 27 
40-49 156 38 29 10 20 
+50 314 53 23 8 15 
Total 950 35 32 ~ 21 
Other parties totalled the remaining 3 percent. 
Source: Adapted from Arian, Politics in Israel. The Second Generation-
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1) The Labour Party includes Mapam (Alignment) 
2) The Religious parties include the NRP, Agudah Israel and Po'alei 
Agudat. 
3) The Likud in 1973 includes Mr. Ariel Sharon's list. 
The Labour Party in 1969 had a clear advantage in each of the respective age 
categories (something that a dominant party would naturally expect). However, by 
1973, the Likud was more popular among the under-39 age groups. In the 1977 
election, with the presence of Dash, Labour Party support among the young was 
near to collapse. As Table 3.5 confirms, the Likud vote among the younger age 
groups was twice that of the Labour Party. On the other hand, Labour support 
among the older age categories remained more consistent, the party holding a lead 
over the Likud in the over 40's categories. 
Most Israeli scholars explain the rejection of the Labour Party by the younger 
age groups as evidence of the conservative nature of the Labour Party. The party, 
after the success of winning statehood, was keen to preserve what it had won, and 
did not adapt to the newly forming constituencies such as the Sephardim and the 
young32. In short, in preserving the position of the earlier Aliyah's, the party was 
sacrificing its appeal to the demographically important young and Sephardim 
constituencies. The feelings of political alienation of the young were apparent in the 
fact that many of this age group were involved with Dash in 1977, and the setting up 
of other parties such as Ratz(CRM). The conservative nature of the Labour Party 
policy, and its lack of ideological fervour did not appeal to the younger generation. 
This group perceived the party as the establishment which was responsible for their 
difficulties and they demanded more radical solutions to both socio-economic and 
security issues. 
32 Arian, Ibid. 
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In addition to the above constituencies cited by Arian, there are two more 
major cleavages within Israeli society, which both stimulated an element of 
realignment away from the labour movement, eventually leading constituencies to 
adopt a more extreme position on the political spectrum. 
The third cleavage in Jewish society is the secular-religious divide. At inter-
party level this divide is not as significant as the previous two, in that the religious 
constituency has been served by a number of religious parties which attract the vast 
majority of support from religious society. Consequently, in direct terms, neither the 
Labour Party or the Likud attract much direct support from this constituency. 
However, at inter-block level the role of the religious parties has become extremely 
significant in determining which of the major two parties can form a winning coalition 
(61 seats). As previously described, there has been a profound change in the 
religious parties linked to the changing political agenda, with after the 1967 war and 
the conquest of the West Bank, the inclusion of Greater Israel as a realistically 
obtainable prospect33. Prior to this political awakening, the main function of the 
religious parties had been to secure a favourable share of the allocation of state 
funds and to ensuring the continuation of the religious status quo in lsrael34. With 
the emergence of a younger, more radical leadership, notably in the NRP, and the 
ending of the historic alliance in 1976, the religious parties moved into the Likud-led 
block. This movement was illustrated by the decision of the religious parties to 
support a Likud led coalition after the 1977 election and subsequently support the 
Likud if there was any chance of the Likud forming a coalition35. 
33 Herzog, "Penetrating the System", in Arian and Shamir (ed), The Elections in 
lsrael1992, State University of New York, 1994, p84. 
34 These constituted the basic principles of the historic alliance between the labour 
movement and the religious parties up to 1976. 
35 The preference of the religious to form a coalition with the Likud in 1977 and after 
was confirmed in interviews with leaders of the Labour Party with the researcher. 
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The fourth cleavage in Israel is the Jewish-Arab divide. By 1977, Arabs 
accounted for nearly 9 percent of the electorate. Prior to 1977 the Labour Party 
(Mapai) won a largest number of votes cast for Zionist parties in Knesset elections. 
This support was compounded by the support given to Arab lists aligned to the 
Labour Party. Table 3.6 shows the history of the Arab vote up to 1977. 
Table 3.6: The Arab Vote, 1949-1977. 
Election Arab Labour Zionist Arab 
Voters in% Vote in% Parties in% List Aligned 
of Electorate with Labour 
1949 6.6 10 28 
1951 7.5 11 26 55 
1955 8.2 14 23 48 
1959 7.9 10 26 42 
1961 8.3 20 29 40 
1965 8.6 13 27 38 
1969 8.4 17 27 40 
1973 8.5 13 29 27 
1977 8.9 11 21 16 
Source: Adapted from AI-Haj, The Political Behaviour of Arabs in Israel in 
the 1992 Elections, in Arian and Shamir (Ed's), The Elections in lsrael1992. 
The total Zionist vote consists of the Labour Party vote and the vote of 
the other Zionist parties. 
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The ability of Mapai to win a plurality of the Arab vote from the early years of 
the state until the late 1960's was based on the party's control of the Arab affiliated 
lists. These lists were initiated and supported by Mapai in particular with the 
fundamental aim of catching Arab votes36. The demise of these lists reflected the 
growing active political participation of the Arabs due to a number of factors such as 
the renewed contacts between Arabs within Israel and the West Bank Arabs after 
the Six Day War in 1967. Also, the emergence of more radical parties such as the 
Communist Party which provided an electoral alternative to the affiliated lists, and 
an increased awareness among Arabs of the rules of the political game in their 
relationship with the Jewish state37. Consequently in electoral terms the Labour 
Party saw its share of the vote and number of seats from the Arab sector move 
away from party lists which were affiliated to the Labour Party toward more radical 
Arab parties. The problems of dealing with these independent Arab parties meant 
that the Labour leaders never felt able to use them at inter-block level, for anything 
more than a blocking majority, thus depriving the party of vital seats within its block. 
In conclusion, the Labour Party was losing votes among the very sectors of 
the population which were growing in size and therefore importance. The fact that it 
was unable to respond to this challenge is both an illustration of its own failings, and 
the confirmation of the emergence of a number of alternative parties. These parties 
provided the electorate with an outlet for a protest vote and in the case of the Likud, 
a viable alternative government. 
36 AI-Haj, ''The Political Behaviour of the Arabs in Israel in the 1992 Elections", in 
Arian and Shamir (ed}, The Elections in lsrael1992, p142. 
37 Smooha, Arabs and Jews in Israel: Conflicting and Shared Attitudes in a Divided 
Society, Boulder: Westview, USA, 1989. 
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3.3.3: National Conflict Structuring Internal Politics Framework. 
Both Kimmerling and Shafir argue that the conquest of the territories in the 
1967 war opened up divisive debates, notably in the Labour Party, on the 
fundamental nature of Zionism and national security38. Shalev describes the 
consequence of this: 
The right fell heir to the very elements which in the pre-state context had 
secured Mapai's own ideological dominance; nationalism, militarism, 
messiansim and settlement39. 
Mapai, which as previously described had been expert in directly linking the 
Jewish national struggle to the fortunes of its own party, failed to react decisively to 
the occupation of the lands conquered in 1967. This resulted in the party alienating 
both the hawkish nationalists, who demanded annexation, and the predominantly 
Ashkenazi liberal war weary, who believed in returning part or all of the territories in 
exchange for peace. The policy of the Labour Party towards the territories needs to 
be viewed within the framework of the intra-party politics of factionalism, succession 
battles and inter-elite personality problems. 
Three separate Labour Party positions emerged on the future status of the 
Occupied Territories: the functionalist approach or integration of lands into Israel 
(but not annexation), the Allen plan, which amounted to some exchange of land for 
peace and the use of the lands as simple bargaining chips in future negotiations 
with the Arabs40. Each of these plans was supported by one of the factions and 
leaders of the party. Mr. Dayan was the prime mover of the first and had the support 
38 Kimmerling, Zionism and Territory. The Social Territorial Dimensions of Zionist 
Politics, University of California, 1983. 
Shafir, "Changing Nationalism And Israel's Open Frontier on the West Bank", 
Theory and Society, 13-6, 1984. 
39 Shalev, op.cit., p287-288. 
40 In interviews with the Labour leadership conducted by the researcher it is 
interesting to note the differing definitions of the functionalist approach which varied 
from eventual annexation of the lands or simply a short term solution. 
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of the Rafi faction. Mr. Allen was the author of the second plan, who although 
coming from Ahdut Ha'avodah, drew support mainly from Mapai for his plan. The 
third was the policy of Mr. Sapir who controlled the party machine41. 
The importance at the time of maintaining party unity led Mr. Sapir to not 
challenge Mr. Dayan, who as Defence Minister (1967-1973) had responsibility for 
the administration of the territories. The Prime Minister Mrs. Meir, in not making any 
formal decision on the future of the territories, allowed Mr. Dayan to pursue his 
policy of integration42. The party platform remained vague, thus allowing the 
leadership to shape their positions depending on the audience with, for example, 
one speech for the settlers and another for the international community. This tactic 
has been consistently used by the leadership, and even in the 1992 Knesset 
campaign was employed by Mr. Rabin over the future of the Golan Heights. 
The Galili document (3rd September 1973) was the first major attempt to 
define the party's aims for the territories. The document, which was considered 
extremely hawkish, satisfied most of Mr. Dayan's demands, and accelerated the 
settlement programme43. Its recommendations included the following: the 
development of economic ties between Israel and the territories and the 
development of the economic, social service infrastructure for the Arabs in the 
territories. In addition, it called for the encouragement of Jewish settlement in the 
areas of the Rafa Salient, Jordan Valley Rift, the Golan Heights as well as the 
continuation of the development of Jewish settlements in the area surrounding 
41 Yishai, Land or Peace. Wither Israel, Stanford Hoover, USA, 1987,p63. 
42 There was a definite policy of the elite not to commit anything to paper on the 
future status of the territories. Decisions which had to be made were done so within 
the realms of Mrs. Meir's Kitchen Cabinet and not in full sessions of the cabinet. 
Only in 1977 was the Allen plan publicly accepted by the party leadership as its 
official platform on the territories. 
43 The plan also alienated many doves in the party including the former Secretary 
General Mr. Eliav, who left the party as a result of it. Mr. Eliav's main objection to 
the document was that it allowed private land purchases in the territories. 
Interview with Mr. Eliav. 
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Jerusalem. In terms of land purchases in the territories it called for the majority to be 
conducted by the government sponsored Israel Lands Administration. However, the 
document permitted private land purchases providing the land was purchased for 
what the document referred to as "constructive enterprises" and not for "speculative 
purposes"44. 
The document although endorsed by the party institutions was never binding 
to members of the Labour Party. Consequently, in addition to satisfying Mr. Dayan's 
demands it allowed Labour Party candidates to adopt independent positions and 
still remain within the party. However, even after the 1973 war and the demise of 
Mr. Dayan, tension remained in the party. The key problem concerned the Ahdut 
Ha'avodah faction which had a historical commitment to "Greater Israel" and were 
therefore pushing for an extremely active settlement policy45. The period of Mr. 
Rabin's premiership (1974-77), was marked by continuing uncertainty and lack of 
decisive action over the future status of the territories, which was typical of the 
government's performance at the time. 
Both Kirnrnerting and Shafir argue that it was this divisive issue which was the 
major factor in the decline of the Labour Party. The splits and divisions in the party 
were compounded by the timing of the debate, corning at the end of the dominance 
of one generation and the subsequent battle for succession. The merging of the 
three parties (1968), with differing ideologies on the territories, made it difficult to 
discuss the issue without threatening party unity, thus allowing the dominant 
personalities in the elite to pursue their own agenda with little or no consultation46. 
44 Galili Document 1973 (Hebrew), Labour Party Headquarters, Tel Aviv. 
45 Ahdut Ha'avodah's historical ideological link with Greater Israel goes back to the 
party's opposition to the partition of Palestine in 1948. It was in favour of the IDF 
occupying what it termed "Judea and Samaria" during the War of Independence in 
1948. 
46 Kirnrnerting, Ibid. 
Shafir, Ibid. 
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3.3.4: The Political Economy Framework. 
In recent years Israeli political economists have developed explanations for 
the decline of the Labour Party. Shalev stresses the need for this framework to 
complement the other political explanations, and he does not challenge the validity 
of these works47_ The political economy framework emphasises that it is not enough 
for a dominant party to be on top of political issues and functioning effectively as a 
party, but it must be able to perform the basic economic functions of satisfying the 
material interests of business4B. The three requirements for this are, first, to have 
developed a formula for economic growth which is workable and benefits the 
interests of the party as well as the state. Second, to find solutions to problems of 
distributional conflicts, notably in respect to the organised working class and the 
problems of industrial peace. Third, to establish a relationship with the international 
economic community which is economically supportive. By the mid 1970's, it was 
apparent that these three ingredients were missing. The underlying causes for this 
lay in the declining usefulness of the Histadrut, problems with the elite's distribution 
of gift capital to the security sector (notably after 1973), and the increasing problem 
of marrying the interests of business to those of the state. 
Regarding the first of these, there were three main factors which contributed 
to the decline in the Histadrut's usefulness the party. There was a weakening of the 
Histadrut's influence over its mass membership. Also there was a growing 
independence of a new generation of Histadrut leadership and the problem of 
subsidies to Histadrut enterprises. The Histadut influence over its mass 
membership, which was central to the Mapai's control of the labour sector of the 
economy and its direct link with the party, proved more and more difficult to 
47 Shalev, op.cit. , p288. 
48 1bid. 
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maintain. The fundamental reason for this difficulty was the party's commitment to 
full employment, which strengthened the bargaining power of the workers. 
Consequently, this led to a series of increased wage settlements, inflationary 
spending, and eventually a series of embarrassing industrial strikes. Indeed, by the 
mid 1970's the workforce had become extremely militant, leading to increased 
industrial action, and thus the Labour Party's management of the Histadrut was 
made more difficult49. The character and nature of the elite in the Histadrut changed 
over a period of time. The new breed of leaders enjoyed more fonnal training and 
were more independently minded. In addition to this, there was a growing 
resentment among this group of political patronage appointments in the Histadrut by 
the Labour Party leaders and their new sense of independence was illustrated by 
some Histadrut magnates being involved in the fonnation of Dash in 1976. The 
increase in state subsides to the Histadrut enterprises led to an increase in the 
inefficiency of the labour controlled economy as they were predominantly used to 
write off debts or simply maintain ovennanning levels. In general tenns, Mr. Ben-
Aharon saw the decline in the Histadrut's usefulness as linked to the ending of 
people's dependence on the centralised organisation of the Histadrut as they 
acquired their own funds, and the failure Histadrut to find a new role for itselfSO. 
Abed examines the problems of the distribution of the gift capital, and in 
particular Israeli dependence on American aid from 1973 onwards, and the decision 
of the Israeli leadership, to use this capital, to follow a strategy of near self 
sufficiency in weapons systems51. The aid contributed little to the macro econo01ic 
policy but led to a militarization of the economy and the paying of large subsidies to 
49 Reshef, "Political Exchange in Israel, Histadrut-State Relations", Industrial 
Relations, 25-3, 1986, p308. 
This article contains a list and classification of disputes from 197 4 onwards. 
SJ Interview with Mr. Ben-Aharon. 
51 Abed, "Israel in the Orbit of America, The Political Economy of A Dependency 
Relationship", Journal of Palestine Studies, 16-1, 1986. 
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this sector. Shalev argues that the elite's distribution of this aid to companies did 
little to help their profitability in the long term52. The Military Industrial Complex 
(MIG), he argues, was not the answer to Israel's economic problems and proved 
difficult for the elite to control. In short, the elite were distributing large amounts of 
gift capital to one sector in which both the political and economic returns from this 
investment, were not significant. 
The third factor in the decline can be seen in the rise of capital and the 
reduction in state autonomy which took place during the early 1970's. The labour 
movement, being so closely related to the state, therefore suffered a similar loss of 
power. The state, despite a fiscal crisis, continued to increase subsidies dramatically 
to the public sector diverting state resources away from other areas. The business 
sector, once dependent on the goodwill of Mapai, had now become more 
independent. Consequently, during the economic crisis of the 1970's, the state was 
not able to rely on its previous control of either labour or capital, which would have 
helped it through the crisis53. 
In summarising the arguments of the political economy framework the central 
theme is that with the party unable to successfully manage the economy, its 
legitimacy was undermined. This, taken in accordance with the previous 
explanations of the loss of its ideological commitments, meant that the party came 
to rely more on deference and emotional dependency which were to be shattered in 
the Yom Kippur war. Shalev, in defending the framework, notes that the decline in 
the state's autonomy was not reversed when the Labour Party lost power, making it 
more difficult for the subsequent governments to successfully manage the political 
economy to benefit both capital and the party. 




The decline of the Labour Party, and the use of the four explanatory 
frameworks by Israeli scholars, illustrate differences more in emphasis of particular 
points than any fundamental argument over the causes of the decline. They all see 
the 1960's as the start of the reversal of fortunes for Mapai and subsequently the 
Labour Party, which culminated in its electoral defeat in 1977. The importance of , 
the political consequences of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and in particular the Six Day 
War (1967) and Yom Kippur war (1973) cannot be over stressed. The Labour Party 
saw its political fortunes benefit (temporarily) from its conduct of the 1967 war, while 
its role in the conduct of the 1973 war is generally viewed as marking the end of the 
party's dominance. In some respects, the electoral system protected the Labour 
Party from an earlier decline, with its party list system and subsequent reliance on 
coalition government. The Labour Party, as its support declined, merely had to 
include more coalition partners in the government. Even in 1977, if the religious 
parties had decided to remain within the Labour-led-block there would have been 
the possibility of it forming a coalition involving the religious parties and DASH. This 
could have happened despite the fact that it was no longer the largest list. 
Conversely, the rise of the Likud, with its base in the 1965 merger of Herut and the 
Liberals, provided the electorate with an alternative party (block) to Labour, capable 
in the long run of building a winning coalition to govern. Although, the Likud's major 
electoral gains were made in the 1973 Knesset elections, the decision of the Labour 
Party to include it in the 1967 NUG provided the Likud with a sense of political 
legitimacy, which previously had been denied to the party. The rapprochement 
between the previously bitter enemies, Mr Ben-Gurion and the Herut leader Mr. 
Begin, contributed to this new found status of the Likud, as did the conquest of the 
territories in 1967, bringing with it, a realistic chance of building Greater Israel, a 
central feature of Likud ideology. 
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Recent explanations, such as the political economy framework, have drawn 
heavily on the more traditional notions of the party holding within itself the seeds of 
its own destruction. The Lavon Affair marked the start of this destruction as the 
previously relative homogenous nature of the Labour leadership was shattered. The 
political consequences of the Affair was one of the single most important factors in 
determining the inter-elite relations and, in particular, the relationship between the 
party and its co-founder Mr. Ben-Gurion and his followers up to its electoral defeat 
in 1977. Both the national conflict structuring internal politics and the political 
dynamics frameworks, concentrate on the failure of the Labour leadership to act 
decisively on the issue of the period. The party's failure, with respect to the question 
of the future of the territories, was clearly linked to its paralysing divisions and the 
fundamental need to preserve party unity above all else. The political culture 
framework offers an interesting contrast to the party dynamics approach with its 
concentration on the dynamic nature of Israeli society, and the failure of the labour 
movement to incorporate or react to these changes. Its central theme was the 
conservative nature of the Labour Party, both in terms of ideology and internal 
organisation, and its corresponding declining, predominantly Ashkenazi, ageing 
constituency. 
As the party went in to opposition in 1977, it was faced with a number of 
challenges it needed to address if it was to return to government. There was a clear 
need to address both the problems of internal organisation, and notably internal 
democratisation, in order to rejuvenate the party, both in the eyes of its members 
and the electorate as a whole. In terms of policy, the party needed to adopt a clear 
and definitive approach to the future of the territories, and consequently to the 
peace process in general. In addition, it needed to find a way of renewing the bond 
between itself and the Sephardim, soon to be a demographic majority in Israel, and 
broaden its appeal to the young and low income groups of the electorate. In 
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parliamentary tenns, the party needed to find a way of renewing the historic 
relationship with the religious parties, to prevent the Likud-led block from holding a 
near blocking majority after each Knesset election. Finally, the leadership had to 
understand their previous mistakes, and that the party had suffered a major defeat 
in 1977 as the result of a process of long tenn systematic decline, and not merely 
because of events surrounding the election. In short, they had to understand the 
illness before applying the remedy. This should have led to a solving of the 
damaging intra-elite divisions, and a concentration on offering dynamic clear 
leadership to Israeli society. 
The degree to which these challenges were met would be shown by the 
party's fortunes in opposition and in the National Unity Governments (NUG), from 
1977 to 1992. 
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CHAPTER4 
THE LABOUR PARTY IN OPPOSITION 1977-1981. 
The Labour Party's response to its electoral defeat in 1977 and its subsequent 
actions between 1981-1984 can be attributed in part to it having continued to act as 
a dominant party which had temporarily lost power, but this being a situation which 
would be reversed at the next Knesset elections scheduled for 1981. In Chapter 
Two a dominant party was defined using Duverger's work as when: 
... it is identified with an epoch; when its doctrines, methods, and its style so to 
speak, coincide with those of the epoch ... Domination is a question of influence 
rather than strength, it is also linked with belief. A dominant party is that which 
public opinion believes to be dominant... even the enemies of the dominant 
party, even citizens who refuse to give it their vote, acknowledge its superior 
status and its influence they deplore it but admit it1. 
Such a definition can also be applied to a dominant party in opposition where 
it continues to act as a dominant party. This chapter does not aim to argue that the 
Labour Party remained a dominant party after 1977, but rather key elements, 
notably among the elite, continued to act as if the party's status had not changed. 
As outlined in Chapters 1 to 3 this group, with the highly centralised and oligarchic 
nature of the party, constituted the most important element in control of party 
institutions and policy. Thus their perception of the place and status of the party in 
the Israeli political system was vital in explaining the failings of the Labour Party in 
opposition. 2 
1 Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organisation in the Modem State, Wiley, 1960, 
p308-309. 
2 In the period immediately following the election defeat none of the leadership of 
the party offered anything more than superficial explanations for the defeat. Mr. 
Rabin blamed the series of scandals and Mr. Peres for the defeat stating; 
''The residue of scandals, genuine and fabricated was especially bitter for the 
Labour Party, since 1977 was an election year and incumbent administrations are 
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The first term of opposition presented a series of unique challenges to a party 
that could not attribute the political development of the state to anyone else but 
itself. The fact that it was responsible for everything that happened in Israel until 
1977 limited the party's opportunities to criticise the new administration. This was 
compounded by seeing its exile to opposition as a temporary phenomenon. Dr. 
Yossi Beilin confirms these problems arguing that the party still controlled the 
Histadrut, the Municipal Councils and the Presidency, and that the party believed it 
would soon return to controlling the Knesset3. 
Dr. Beilin's comments provide an added complication to the definition of a 
dominant party in Israel. As described in Chapter One many of the Labour 
controlled institutions of the pre-state Yishuv had continued to exist after the birth of 
the state in 1948 such as the Histadrut. The birth of the state and the policy of Mr. 
always an easy target of public agitation and discontent.. Clearly the time had come 
for the party to close ranks and dedicate a maximum effort to preparing for the 
upcoming contest at the polls. Mr. Peres was engaged in his own private race for 
the Prime Ministership, and instead of engendering unity on the eve of the battle, he 
tore the party into two opposing camps". 
Yitzhak Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs, Steimatzky, Bnei Brak, 1994, p240. 
Some 15 years later Mr. Rabin's views on the reasons for the party's defeat in 1977 
remain relatively unaltered as does his belief that it could have been avoided. 
Mr Peres, the party man, saw the defeat as an organisational failure and therefore 
the party needed to be reorganised. He did not envisage many other changes. On 
the night of the defeat he argued; "undoubtedly the moment that the new party 
DASH was created, it was clear that they were going to take away some votes 
which were traditionally due to our party". 
Address at Labour Party Headquarters, Tel Aviv, 18th May 1977. 
Mr. Peres in his memoirs published in 1995 devoted a whole chapter to the reasons 
for the loss of power in 1977 and showed a deeper understanding of the processes 
which took place. 
Shimon Peres, Memoirs: Battling For Peace, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 
1995. 
Even the scholarly former Foreign Minister Mr. Abba Eban failed to offer anything 
more than a similar version to Mr. Rabin's, but without the personal attacks on Mr. 
Peres. 
Abba Eban, An Autobiography, Random House, New York, 1977, postscript. 
3 1nterview with Dr. Yossi Beilin, The Foreign Ministry, Jerusalem, 29th August 1994. 
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Ben-Gurion to transfer certain tasks away from these institutions to the state 
(mamlachtiut) meant that these institutions had a reduced role. However, the 
Histadrut still remained in control of for example, the health care of two-thirds of the 
population as well as the large labour sector of the economy. This meant that the 
party which controlled the Histadrut still enjoyed a certain influence in shaping 
socio-economic policy of the country. In short, the notion of the loss of dominance 
was not as "black and white" in Israel as it generally is within other dominant party 
systems. 
The lack of an understanding of the profound changes which took place in 
Israel at this time were not confined to the leadership of the Labour Party. Israeli 
society, even those who had supported the Likud, continued to view the Labour 
Party as the dominant party or the establishment. This fits in with the final part of 
Duverger's definition of a dominant party where he suggested even those who did 
not vote for the party accepted its superior status. The penetration of the labour 
movement in to the everyday life of the population remained substantial. As well as 
its control of the Histadrut, it controlled the Municipals (local government), the civil 
service (after years of political appointments) and the media (newspapers and the 
sole television channel). Consequently, despite the fact that the party was now in 
opposition it could not, in the eyes of the public, function free from complicity for 
both the past failings of the state and the present problems which confronted it. In 
addition to this the Likud in its first period of government did not try to challenge the 
view of the Labour Party as the establishment. It did not, for example, attempt to 
dilute the influence of Labour Party in the civil service or conduct a programme of 
mass political appointments to replace the previous Labour ones4. 
4 Interview with Mr. Dan Meridor, The Knesset, Jerusalem, 17th October 1994. Mr. 
Meridor served as Mr. Begin's Cabinet Secretary. 
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Consequently, the Labour Party was still perceived by both itself and the 
population as a dominant party and thus failed to introduce substantial reform to its 
party institutions, representation and methods of policy formation. Finally the fact 
that the Labour Party had been in power since the pre-state Yishuv meant that there 
was a lack of an organisational infrastructure, leadership and a platform for the 
successful conduct of a party in opposition. In short, the labour movement had been 
based on action such as the building of social, economic and eventually state 
structures and had no clear idea how to fill the role of a party in opposition5. 
4.1: Internal Labour Party Response to the 1977 Election. 
The Labour Party was in a state of shock and dismay following its election 
defeat. The Histadrut elections which took place three weeks after the Knesset 
defeat left the party with little time to contemplate the loss of power. This was 
illustrated by the decision of Mr. Peres and the leadership to postpone the post-
mortum on the defeat until after the Histadrut electionss. At this time, there was 
widespread fear and panic within the party that they would lose control of the 
Histadrut. Both the Histadrut and the Kibbutzim feared for their future as a result of 
attacks from the Likud who described them as a privileged enclave of Israeli 
society7. There was a feeling in the Labour Party that it was vital to maintain its 
control over the Histadrut to act as a counter balance to the Likud government, and 
51nterview with Mr. Ben-Aharon, Givat Hayim, 8th August 1994. 
Interview with Mrs Esther Herlitz, Former Labour MK and Israeli Ambassador, Tel 
Aviv, 15th August 1994. 
6 Party protocols reveal that the party organs at this time tried to concentrate on 
putting forward a clear united platform for the Histadrut elections. Mr. Peres, 
concerned about his intra-party standing, was in favour of such a postponement as 
was the Secretary General Mr. Bar-Lev. 
Party Protocols of Central Committee Meetings and Bureau Meetings, Labour Party 
Archives, Beit Berl, near, Tel Aviv. 
7 Such statements had been employed by the Likud during the 1977 Knesset 
campaign. The Likud threatened to split up the Histadrut and retain it only as a 
Trade Union, selling off its holding companies and health care systems etc. 
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to maintain a key party institutions. In order to aid the party's efforts the Kibbutzim 
mobilised their volunteers to both Labour Party Central Headquarters and into the 
periphery to help run the Histadrut campaign. Such a resource proved of vital 
importance to the Labour Party which was experiencing severe financial problems. 
The results of the Histadrut elections reflected a slight decline in support for 
the Alignment, but were hailed as a victory by the party clearly maintaining control of 
the Histadrut for the labour movement. 




Ratz +Ind. Libs(1). 5.97 
Religious Workers 4.27 
Sheli (2) 2.75 
Hadash (3) 2.38 
(1) In 1973, only Independent Liberals 
(2) In 1973, only Moked, Meri (radicals and left union) 
(3) In 1973, only Rakah (New Communist Party) 








8 The depth of feeling on the need to maintain control of the Histadrut was 
expressed to the Researcher in several interviews with the leadership of the party 
for example, 
Interview with Mr. Gideon Ben-Israel, Head of Histadrut-Knesset faction Relations 
(Number Two in the Histadrut), Head of Histadrut Labour Party Faction, Tel Aviv, 
21st October 1994. 
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As Table 4.1 reveals the most worrying trend for the Alignment (Labour and 
Mapam) was the increase in support for the Likud which, although not enough to 
challenge the hegemony of the Alignment, represented an increase of over six 
percent from 1973. However, such a victory in these elections presented the Labour 
Party with an opportunity and an institution with which to check and balance the 
power of the Likud government. It also contributed to the feeling within the Labour 
Party that it was still a dominant party which had been punished by the electorate in 
the Knesset elections. The fact that it had retained control of the Histadrut (only 
three weeks after the Knesset elections) led many in the party to presume that the 
electorate had registered a protest vote in the Knesset elections and that the party 
was now on course to return to government in 1981. 
With the successful conclusion of the Histadrut campaign the post-mortem 
into the Knesset defeat started in earnest. In assessing the changes which took 
place within the party as a whole, and the leadership in particular, following the 
Knesset defeat the central theme is that of the continued cosmetic nature of 
change. This lack of substantial change applied to both changes in the organisation 
and composition of the party organs and the continued importance of elite 
personalities supported by newly emerging factions which were to partially replace 
the old factional divisions of Ahdut Ha'avodah, Mapai and Rafi. 
Aronoff identified three fundamental criteria for assessing the changes which 
took place in the Labour Party: change in the way consensus is reached within the 
party,9 the consideration of alternative polices and changes in the groups that were 
represented in the decision making process in the party organs. In addition to these, 
he examined the general question of the degree to which the policy makers in the 
party become more representative to the constituents they represented. A high level 
of change would indicate an understanding of the loss of the party's dominance and 
9 Aronoff, Power and Ritual in the Israel Labour Party, p168. 
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correspondingly an acceptance that Israel had moved from a dominant party system 
to a competitive party system. This would indicate an awareness of the need for the 
party to rebuild to meet the challenges discussed in the conclusion of Chapter 
Three. Correspondingly, a low level of change would illustrate a lack of acceptance 
of the defeat and confirmation of the assumption that the party believed it would 
soon recover from this "freak road accident"10. 
4.2: Representation Within the Party, Internal Change and Generational 
Conflict. 
The decline in the power of the Labour Party machine after the Knesset 
defeat was matched by an increase in the influence of the Histadrut and Kibbutzim 
within the party. The fact that the Labour Party retained control of the Histadrut in 
1977 meant that the Histadrut faction had a greater degree of influence within the 
party than prior to the Knesset defeat. At a national level Histadrut leaders such as 
Yisrael Kessar increased their status and power bases with their maintenance of 
control over the Histadrut11. Their autonomy from central party direction also 
increased as a result in this shift in the balance of internal power12. 
The strength of the Kibbutz movement within the party also grew in the wake 
of the electoral defeat. The Kibbutzim were perceived at the time as the saviours of 
the party providing the resources and personnel to help maintain the Histadrut in 
Labour hands and save the party from financial ruin. In the months following the 
electoral defeat a special committee charged with cutting party expenditure 
recommended the dismissal of over half the employees in the Labour Party 
10 The term "freak road accidenf' was used by many in the Labour Party to explain 
the loss of power in 1977 for example; 
Interview with Mrs Daphna Sharfman, Chair of Labour Party Human Rights 
Committee 1994, Haifa, 
11 Interview with Mr. Ben-Israel. 
12 Interview with Mrs Herlitz. 
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Headquarters and among its administration. During this period the party's debts 
rose to over 35 million Israeli pounds which was compounded by the inability of the 
party to sell property because of the law governing the financing of parties. With the 
reduction in Alignment seats to just 32 so the sum allocated by the state to the party 
fell adding to its financial difficulties13. Consequently, this led to dramatic changes at 
party Headquarters in Tel Aviv, party functionaries became out numbered by the 
young volunteers sent by the Kibbutz movement to run the party bureaucracy14. The 
major motivation of these volunteers had been to fill the vacuum caused by the 
break up of the old political machine and alignments and the protection of the 
Histadrut. A secondary consequence of their action was the short term 
strengthening of the Kibbutzim representation within the party. 
Unsurprisingly, the rise of the Kibbutzim representation in the party was not 
welcomed by the large city branches of Tel Aviv, Haifa and Jerusalem, who were 
not content to watch their power basis and patronage networks being eroded. 
However, the large city branches were at this time themselves in a bad way both 
financially and organisationally as they attempted to regroup after the election 
defeat15. Moreover, the machines themselves were undergoing a period of 
realignment with new groupings and factions starting to evolve out of them. In short, 
they had little option but to accept the increased role of the Kibbutz movement in 
the party in the short term while they put their own house in order. 
In terms of representation within the party organs there was little change in 
the method of selection and role of the organs. The Central Committee, the so 
13 The financial problems of the Labour Party in 1977 were widely reported in the 
Media see for example, "Mass Dismissal of Alignment Employees", Middle east 
International, 75, September 1977, p27. 
Interview with Mr. A vraham Hatzharmi, Director of the International Department, 
Party Headquarters, Tel Aviv, 29th November 1994. 
14 1nterview, Ibid. 
15 1nterview with Mr. Gideon Saguy, Mk, Head of Tel Aviv Machine 1994, The 
Knesset, Jerusalem, 25th July 1994. 
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called central policy making body, continued to be highly ineffective. Out of the 814 
Central Committee members only between 200 and 300 effectively participated in 
meetings1s. Out of this group only around seventy were involved in the formation of 
tactical coalitions that affected party policy decisions17. These intra-party coalitions 
were arranged in a highly hierarchical manner with Mr. Peres, the head of the party, 
at the top of a ruling group which included the former Foreign Minister Mr. Abba 
Eban and the Secretary General Mr. Bar-Lev. Mr Rabin and another ex-Foreign 
Minister Mr Allon headed separate other groupings in the Committee and within the 
party as a whole. In order to get elected to the Central Committee it still proved 
necessary to be a client of one of these three senior leaders. The trio had by this 
time all but replaced the old party factionalism (Ahdut Ha'avodah, Rafi and Mapai) 
with a more personality oriented form of patronage1a. 
The two most important groupings which evolved during this period were the 
Beit Berl Group (named after the location of their first meeting) and the Yahdav 
group. The Beit Berl Group was founded in 1977 as the result of a series of 
meetings involving around 20 people19. Its membership included the Labour Party's 
economic expert Mr. Ya'acov Levinson, Mrs Nava Arad (Deputy Secretary General 
of the Histadrut), Mr Israel Gat (Chairman of the International Department of the 
Party) and Mr Uzi Baram (later to be Secretary General of the party). The image of 
16 For example in four crucial Central Committee meetings to decide upon the 
Labour Party's programme for opposition the following number of members were 
present at each meeting: 21st July 1977- 290 members 
28th July 1977- 312 members 
31st July 1977-232 members 
8th August 1977 - 394 members. 
Details from Minutes of Central Committee Meetings, Beit Berl Archives and Labour 
Party Headquarters, The Offices of the Secretary General. 
17 Goell, Jerusalem Post, 13th June 1977 .. 
18 This replacement of the old style of factionalism to the new more personality 
oriented form was confirmed to the researcher in several interviews for example, 
Interview with Mr. Yoram Peri, Labour Party Spokesman, Labour Party 
Headquarters, 31st October 1994. 
19 Azmon, "Labour and its Factions", in Jerusalem Quarterly, Spring 1981, p122. 
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the group was that of a mainly Ashkenazi, liberal dovish faction. Members of the 
group claim that it was instrumental in attempting to push the Labour Party towards 
a more dovish party20. However, the main aim of this group was that of a 
generational and power challenge as Dr. Yoram Peri describes: 
The challenge was almost natural, the major common denominator was the age 
and the fact that they were pushing ahead to get a better position in the party 
power structure ... They covered themselves in beautiful ideological differences 
but basically their fundamental aim was that of self interest21 . 
After 18 months meetings were expanded to a larger group but it still 
remained somewhat elitist in nature22. The group, although it had originally 
supported Mr. Peres, contained supporters of Mr. Rabin. Eventually it was this split 
which brought the activities of the group to an end during the 1981 leadership 
contest between Mr. Peres and Mr. Rabin. The strength of this group lay in its 
composition which included the heads of the Kibbutz Movement and of the 
enterprises of the Histadrut. Its influence peaked in 1979 with a series of weekend 
meetings which were used to express concern over the leadership of Mr. Peres and 
the lack of change within the party. However, Mr. Peres succeeded in getting the 
second of these weekend meetings cancelled amid concern that the meeting 
amounted to the first volley in a new internal party battle and a threat to his 
leadership23. Once Mr. Peres succeed in doing this the role and threat of the group 
to the leadership started to diminish as members moved on to other groupings or 
positions within the party. 
If the Beit Berl Group was an elitist self appointed group, then the Yahdav 
Group was the opposite, open to all, and largely made up of party branch workers. 
20 Interview with Mrs. Nava Arad, Tel Aviv, 27th July 1994. 
21 Interview with Dr. Yoram Peri, Editor of Davar and former Spokesman for the 
Labour Party, Davar, Tel Aviv, 1st August 1994. 
22 Azmon, loc. cit. 
23 Honig, "Labour Discontent Mounts", Jerusalem Post International, 11th to 17th 
November 1979. 
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The group was led by two top Tel Aviv party officials, Mr. Speiser and Mr. Ben-Amir, 
and included Histadrut leaders as well as leaders of the Moshavim and leaders to 
the opposition to the official party leadership in Haifa and Jerusalem. The group was 
more oriental and hawkish than the Beit Berl group as well as being somewhat 
closer to Mr. Peres (who never officially adopted the group )24. The composition of 
both of these groups mirrored the divisions within the party. On the one hand there 
was a loose alliance between the leaders of the Histadrut and the Kibbutzim who 
were demanding changes to party institutions, leadership, and policies which they 
felt were necessary in order to win the next Knesset election. On the other hand, the 
local party leaders close to Mr. Peres along with many of the rank and file 
membership (including party workers) perceived the actions of the Beit Berl Group 
to be potentially dangerous. A note of caution is required in that it is too simple to 
view these groups totally in this light for being informal groupings they both tended 
to include crossover members, and therefore neither was totally uniform in its 
membership. 
There were two other influential groups within the party at this time: Group 77 
and the Young Guard. Group 77 consisted of a group of University Professors who 
joined the party after the election defeat. Importantly there was an awareness within 
Group 77 of the profound changes which had taken place in the Knesset elections 
of 1977. They understood that the party had experienced something more than a 
temporary loss of power for a dominant party which would automatically be reversed 
in 1981. Consequently, this group were the most notable proponents and 
supporters of reform of both party structure and ideology which they viewed as 
necessary to return the party to power. They argued that without the suggested 
reforms the party would not return to power in 1981. 
24Aronoff, op. cit., p171. 
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In organisational terms they attempted to link up with the Kibbutz movement 
which shared its interest in ideological politics. However, such efforts failed as their 
views differed on key issues. The "Professors" were more dovish that the Kibbutzim 
members notably on the issue of settlements25. Mr. Peres offered some 
encouragement to these academics, offering to get them elected to the Central 
Committee, but the Group failed to make a decisive impact on party affairs26. Dr. 
Hatis-Rolef, a member of Group 77 explains this failing as due to the fact that they 
(Group 77) came to save the party and wrote some beautiful position papers, but 
they were not in touch with the grass roots of the party. In addition, despite that fact 
that Mr. Peres helped them to get elected to the Central Committee they could not 
convince the Committee of their ideas. In short, they did not have what it took to 
play intra-party politics and the party at the time did not fully understand the extent 
of its problems27_ Another member of the Group, Mrs Hertilz, saw the problem as 
similar to the above in that the party never really took the academics seriously and 
that the Professors were eventually lost to parties to the left of Labour. Many of the 
Professors were influential in the building of Meretz in 199228. 
The Young Guard (members up to the age of 35) were ideologically similar to 
Group 77 due in part to many of them being either past or present students of the 
above professors. Within the party they performed the role of "enfants terribles" and 
were strong supporters of party reform (especially internal party democratisation of 
the party organs and decision making processes). Their level of influence however 
was minimal within these institutions in which they had little representation at the 
25 Aronoff, op. cit. , p172 
26 The Labour Party leadership had previously been somewhat suspicious of 
academics and their intentions. Mr. Peres's decision therefore, marked a change of 
policy as the party attempted to rebuild itself and its constituency. 
27 Interview with Dr. Hatis-Rolef, Editor of Spectrum, Member of Group 77, 
Jerusalem, 29th August 1994. 
28 Interview with Mrs Esther Herlitz. 
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time. The members of this group were still too young and inexperienced to mount a 
generational challenge to the leadership of the party at this stage. The leadership 
therefore, in controlling the similar challenge from members of Beit Ben Group, 
successfully survived any form of generational challenge to their position. 
4.2.1: An Assessment of Internal Change. 
Between 1977-1979 no single strong united elite ruled the party. There was 
no party machine similar to the "Gush" dominated by Mr. Sapir so the intra-party 
conflict within the elite heightened. Mr. Peres was in a semi-dominant position 
having ensured that in the rebuilding of the party that many of his supporters gained 
places in the party organs (notably the Central Committee). In reality Mr. Peres's 
rebuilding programme for the party was motivated for two reasons. These were to 
construct what eventually resembled a similar party structure to the old model (pre-
1977) and also to ensure that he had control over the party in order to maintain his 
position amid the intra-party conflict. Mr. Peres's need to both gain control and then 
tighten this advantage of the party machine became all the more necessary over the 
years because of his inability to win elections29. The commitment of Mr. Peres to 
rebuilding the structure of the party was such that by the time of the 1981 election 
he had succeeded in bringing the organisational side of the party nearly up to the 
level of the old party machine. The major difference was that he was now the major 
although not the only power broker in the party. This evidence of Mr. Peres's 
growing domination of the party organs was illustrated by his landslide leadership 
victory over Mr. Rabin in the Party Conference vote in 1980 (Mr. Peres won 72 
percent of the votes to Mr. Rabin's 18 percent). This was in direct contrast to the 
situation between 1974-77, when Mr. Peres had been the outsider competing 
against the party machine's choice of candidate Mr. Rabin. However, an ex-Minister 
291nterview with Dr. Kom, Tel Aviv, 13th September 1994. 
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Mr Zakok correctly argued that this rebuilding of the organisation was not enough in 
itself to win an election without the necessary reforms to accompany it30. Thus the 
emphasis on developing new power bases within the newly emerging party 
deflected from what should have been a period of substantial party reforrn31. 
Mr. Rabin at this time, in the aftermath of the scandal which forced him from 
office, slowly started to reassert himself within the party. However, he was no match 
for Mr. Peres (as the 1980 result confirmed) in intra-party politics. In addition to this 
he was without the support of the old pre-1977 party machine. A third candidate 
emerged for the leadership, Mr. Allen (a former Foreign Minister), but he did not 
enjoy much support away from the Kibbutz movement and the old Ahdut Ha'avodah 
faction in the party. Like Mr. Rabin he was no match for Mr. Peres at the games and 
manipulations of intra-party politics32. 
A consequence of the intra-party conflict was the decision to expand the size 
of both the Central Committee and Bureau to allow the building of the new elite 
constituencies. The Secretary General of the party Mr Bar-Lev, acting on 
recommendations for internal party change, increased the size of the Central 
Committee by 40 members and introduced 3 new members to the Leadership 
Bureau. Crucially, the latter appointments all parachuted in from above by means of 
appointment by Mr. Peres and Mr. Bar-Lev33. 
30 Interview with Mr. Chaim Zakok, Minister of Justice 1974-77. Mr Zakok at this time 
was still influential behind the scenes in the party and in policy formation. 
31 Mr Zvilli, Secretary General of the Labour Party 1994, agrees that the importance 
of Mr. Peres rebuilding programme was not as great as the need for widespread 
reforms. 
Interview with Mr. Zvilli, The Knesset, Jerusalem, 5th September 1994. 
32 Mr. Allen died in 1980, an event which was seen as prompting the challenge of 
Mr. Rabin to regain the leadership. Mr. Allen's wife was reported to have told Mr. 
Rabin that it was now his tum to take up the mantle and challenge Mr. Peres. 
Interview with Dr. Kom, who served as an advisor to Mr. Allen in the Foreign Ministry 
(1974-77). 
33 The three appointees were Mr. Mordecai Gur retiring Chief of Staff of the IDF, Mr. 
Chaim Herzog retiring Ambassador to the United Nations and Mr. Ya'acov Levinson 
a former Chairman of Bank Hapoalim. 
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Reforms to the procedure for selection of candidates to the Knesset list 
appeared to take a degree of power away from the leadership. However, the 
changes were superficial with the final control remaining within the inner-elite of the 
party. In the new system candidates who wished to stand for a third term in the 
Knesset were required to win the support of 60 percent of the Central Committee. 
Balancing this new reform was the continuation of the Party Selection Committee (a 
remnant from the old party machine) which selected half the names for realistic 
places on the Knesset list. The other fifty percent were selected by the local 
branches, but importantly it was the Selection Committee which determined the 
candidates who received a realistic place on the list. The Committee comprised of 
Mr. Peres, the .leaders of the Kibbutzim and Moshav movement, together with the 
heads of the city branches, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and Haifa'34. Such a committee bore 
a remarkable similar resemblance to the old Selection Committees employed by 
Mapai and in particular the "Gush" from 1948 onwards. 
The Party Conference (December 1980) was still a highly managed affair with 
the leadership still in control of the delegate selection process for the conference. 
Also it was still the elite-controlled Preparation Committee which still effectively set 
and controlled the agenda of the Conference. The party platform which emerged 
from the Conference represented little in the way of substantial change from the 
previous Conference and was subsequently widely criticised in the Israeli media35. 
The resulting Manifesto was full of contradictions notably on the peace process and 
the Settlements issue. Paragraph Seven outlines the party's aims: 
34 Details of the new system for selecting the Knesset candidates are contained in 
the Labour Party Constitution 1981, Labour Party Headquarters, Tel Aviv, Office of 
the Secretary General. 
35For example see, Keshet, Yediot Aharonot, 30th January 1980. 
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Israel under a Labour government will endeavour to reach peace agreements 
with Jordan and Syria with defensible borders based on territorial compromise 
with each of them36 
However, this seemingly contradicts with Paragraph thirty-one on the Peace 
with Syria which states: 
The Government led by the Labour Alignment will work for the consolidation of 
the Israeli position on the Golan Heights and will insist that in peace time the 
security and Settlement deployment on the Golan shall be under Israeli 
sovereignty, as an inseparable part of lsraef37. 
As Syria had consistently stated that any peace with Israel would be based on 
a complete return of the Golan Heights, then it was 9ifficult to see how the Labour 
Party programme offered any chance of such a prospect. 
On the issue of the Settlements Paragraph Thirty states: 
Settlement in the Jordan valley (including the area to the north-west of the 
Dead Sea), in the Etzion Block, in the areas surrounding Jerusalem, in the 
South of the Gaza Strip and also on the Golan Heights is vital to the security of 
the state. The Government of Israel led by the Labour-Alignment will work for its 
consolidation and development. 
The Labour Party not only talked about the continuation and consolidation of 
the settlements(Paragraph 30), but for the first time formally declared that 
settlements established by the party beyond the Green Line would remain part of 
Israeli territory. This stance reflected the new realities in the party, and in particular 
the more prominent role being played in the party by the newly formed United 
Kibbutz Movement. The Kibbutzniks along with the Ahdut Ha'avodah traditions of 
aggressive settlement thus confirmed their ascendancy in the party with the above 
decisions at the Party Conference. 
The lack of a well organised and carefully thought out plan of reform or the will 
of the elite to introduce a package of measures meant that the party during this 
36 The Labour Party Manifesto for the 1981 Knesset elections. The Manifesto is 
based on the decisions reached at the Party Conference. 
Labour Party Headquarters, Offices of the Secretary General, Tel Aviv. 
37 1bid. 
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period was hoping the changes they did make would prove sufficient for it to regain 
power. The elite's reluctance to introduce any significant reforms were largely due to 
its failure to understand the illness (described in Chapter Two) before administering 
the necessary medicine to the patient. In short it c~nfirmed that the party did not 
realise that the 1977 election defeat represented something more than a temporary 
loss of power for a dominant party. This lack of understanding was compounded by 
the serious problems which beset the Likud led government which seemingly 
indicated a return to power for the Labour Party in 1981. 
4.3: The Likud-led Government, Issues of the Day, and Labour Party 
Responses. 
Prior to 1977 the major debate within Israeli society had been predominantly 
on socio-economic issues, but after 1977 it was largely on the issue of peace38. The 
Camp David Accords (17th September 1978) and the subsequent signing of a 
formal peace treaty with Egypt transformed the political party landscape of Israel in 
several ways. It led to the birth of the radical right which included many ex-Likud 
members who rejected the Camp David Accords (in particular the evacuation of the 
Sinai settlements). In addition, it threatened to split the Labour Party into those who 
were willing to return all the Sinai (including the air bases) and those who were 
unwilling to cede control of all of the Sinai. Consequently, the Camp David Accords 
came to be seen as the single most important divisive issue of the time for both 
major political blocks. 
38 The change in 1977 from socio-economic issues to the peace process was 
confirmed to the researcher in many of the interviews conducted with leaders of the 
Alignment for example, 
Interview with Mr. Victor Shemtov, Former Leader of Mapam and Minister in the Last 
Alignment Government, Tel Aviv, 12th July 1994. 
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The period prior to the Camp David Accords saw the setting up of Mr. Begin's 
coalition which included the centre party DASH and the former Labour Party 
Defence Minister Mr. Dayan serving as the Foreign Minister. Initial fears of an 
immediate annexation of the West Bank by the new government proved to be 
unfounded. The cautious nature of the government was confirmed by its 
maintenance of many Labour-appointed personnel in key posts in the civil service 
and government institutions39. 
This cautious approach was indicative of a natural lack of confidence from a 
party which had come to power after 27 years in opposition. In short the Likud 
government did not during the life of the government attempt to dismantle the 
Labour dominated state apparatus. This to some extent confirmed Duverger's 
argument of the inferiority of opposition party's in a dominant party system (see 2.1). 
Transferred to the post-1977 Israeli party system this argued that the Likud although 
it was now the party in power (government) acted at times as if it were still a non-
dominant party in a dominant party system. This represented the other side of the 
coin from the Labour Party which continued to act as it were a dominant party 
although it was now without power (not in government). 
After an initial honeymoon period the government of Mr. Begin became 
increasingly unpopular with a series of high profile cabinet splits on both the peace 
issue and economic matters. This was compounded by the raised expectations of 
Israelis after the historic visit of President Sadat to Jerusalem and the failure of Mr. 
Begin to secure a quick breakthrough in the peace process following this visit. 
The single most significant event for the Labour Party, and Mr. Peres in 
particular, was the meeting in Vienna between Mr. Peres and President Sadat (June 
39 Mr. Meridor describes the first Likud administration as one of the cleanest in the 
history of Israel as they had not yet started the process of political appointees which 
had been part of Israeli political culture. 
Interview with Mr. Meridor, The Knesset, Jerusalem, 17th October 1994. 
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1978) which helped to develop Mr. Peres's image as a leader with international 
recognition40. In short, it appeared that Mr. Peres would come to terms with 
President Sadat more quickly than Mr. Begin did at the time41. The meeting took 
place at the time when the negotiations between Israel and Egypt were stalled and 
had been arranged by members of the Socialist International (SI) to help push the 
peace process forward. The resulting document from the meeting put together by 
Mr. Peres and two Labour Party colleagues (Mr. Zadok and Mr. Harish) and was 
accepted with slight modifications by Mr. Sadat42. The main result of the meeting 
was that for the first time President Sadat stated that he distinguished between the 
Sinai and the West Bank. He accepted that in the latter Israel had real security 
problems. Importantly he also told Mr. Peres that Egypt would be willing to conclude 
the first stage of negotiations and sign an agreement after it had reached an 
understanding with Israel on the Sinai, and after Israel had issued a declaration of 
intentions which would draw King Hussein of Jordan in to the process43. 
The document was officially presented by the Austrian Chancellor Mr. Bruno 
Kreisky and the ex-German Chancellor Mr. Willie Brandt, and while both Mr. Peres 
and President Sadat viewed the document in a positive light they felt unable for 
domestic reasons to publicly endorse it44. On Mr. Peres's return the document was 
discussed within the Labour Party organs, but due to concern expressed that it 
would lead to a Palestinian state the original document was never voted on in any of 
40 For a detailed highly personalised account of the meeting and the events 
surrounding it see, Peres, Memoirs, Battling For Peace, p203-206. 
41 Mr. Israel Gat summarised the mood in Israeli political circles that it appeared that 
Mr. Peres might steal Mr. Begin's thunder on the principal issue of the day. 
Interview with Mr. Gat, Chairman of the International Department of the Labour 
Party, Party headquarters, Tel Aviv, 11th August 1994. 
42 Beilin, a Dominant Party in Opposition, The Israel Labour Party 1977-1981, in 
Middle East Review, 17, 1985, p35. 
43 Minutes of the Meeting between Mr. Peres and President Sadat, Labour Party 
Headquarters, Tel Aviv. 
44 Beilin, Ibid. 
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the party organs. Instead the party inserted a clause stating that the Palestinian 
problem should be solved within the framework of a Jordanian-Palestinian state and 
emphasising that Israel would not return to the pre 1967 borders45. 
The historical importance of the Vienna document was superseded by the 
Camp David Accords, but it could have represented the Labour Party's finest 
moment in opposition. If it' had simply been an opposition party and did not still 
consider itself to be a dominant party then it would have been more likely to adapt 
the original draft of the Document (especially as leaders of the Labour Party were its 
principal authors). It would have then put it forward to the electorate as a clear 
alternative to the policy of the Likud government. In reality, the Labour Party was 
still acting as a dominant party working in the national interest and helping to break 
the deadlock in negotiations which had followed Mr. Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 
197746. In addition, its reactions to the original document illustrated the problems of 
altering the party platform on the key issue of the peace process. These lay in the 
fact that the party was still deeply divided on the issue. 
4.3.1: The Camp David Accords. 
The Camp David talks marked a way out of the increasingly precarious 
position of Mr. Begin's government and were one of the many factors which 
45 The Document was discussed at the Central Committee meeting on 23rd July 
1978 where the new clauses were inserted making the new document almost 
unrecognisable to its original form. At the meeting there was general support for the 
document, but fears were expressed that if the party endorsed the document as its 
platform it would suffer at the polls. Mrs. Meir (the ex Prime Minister) summarised 
the position stating that we (the Labour Party) should support the document but not 
endorse it. 
Party Protocols of Central Committee Meeting, 23rd July 1978, Labour Party 
Archives, Beit Berl, Near Tel Aviv. 
46 Mr. Peres claims to have made it perfectly clear that everything that was said to 
him would be reported back to Mr. Begin and that he was not attending the meeting 
to make domestic political capital. 
Peres, op. cit. , p205. 
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undennined the perfonnance of the Labour Party during this period47. Prior to the 
Camp David talks the Labour Party had been mounting strong personal attacks on 
Mr. Begin accusing him of slowing down the peace process and a failure to manage 
the economy48. There was widespread economic unrest culminating in a series of 
one day strikes organised by the Histadrut. In addition to this the government 
suffered from a series of self-inflicted wounds involving public disputes and internal 
divisions49. 
However, there was a marked change of tactics by the Labour Party between 
the Camp David talks up to the signing of the treaty and its subsequent ratification 
in the Knesset. The major reason for this was the Israeli tradition of uniting behind a 
government in times of crisis or external pressure on security issues. Thus the 
Labour Party refrained from attacking the Likud during the Camp David negotiations 
so as not to weaken Mr. Begin's negotiating position~. A major tactical problem for 
the Labour Party at the time was the unexpected flexibility of Mr. Begin during the 
negotiations with Egypt following a period of inflexibility from the government. This 
was compounded the fact that Mr. Begin eventually delivered a peace treaty with 
47 The Camp David Accords have been widely published for example, the Israeli 
Embassy London, and have not been included in the Appendix section because of 
the length of the Accords. 
48 1nflation by November 1978 was running at an annual rate of 50 percent. The 
Labour Party tabled an unsuccessful motion of no-confidence in the Knesset on this 
issue (16th November 1978). 
49 Many in the Likud saw the failings of the government at the time as the result of 
Mr. Begin's devotion to the peace process which took up most of his energies. 
Consequently, he allowed Ministers to get on with their own jobs and did not employ 
much central management of the government. This resulted in a situation where 
Ministers were given too much freedom over the traditions of Cabinet collective 
responsibility. 
Interview with Dr. Yossi Ben-Aharon, Director of Mr. Shamir's Prime Minister's 
Bureau, Jerusalem, 18th September 1994. 
~ The restraint of the Labour Party at this time was confinned by Mr. Shahal, the 
Head of the Labour Party Faction in the Knesset, 
Interview on Israel Radio, 21st August 1978. 
Mr. Shahal agreed not to reconvene the Knesset during the summer recess so as 
not to weaken the Cabinet's position in the talks. 
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Israel's potentially most threatening Arab neighbour. The Labour Party's response to 
the Camp David Accords illustrates the problems the leadership experienced in 
opposition. 
Of primary importance was the Labour leaderships inability to reconcile 
criticism of the treaty with their self perceived role as the dominant party in Israel. In 
short, the Labour Party's past meant that it could not oppose a peace treaty with 
Egypt. This despite the party having strong reservations concerning Mr. Begin's 
conduct of the process and the decision to return all of the Sinai. The Labour Party 
clearly felt that an Accord could have been reached at a much lower cost to Israel 
(notably the decision to give up the Sinai Airfields )51. An additional problem for the 
Labour leadership was the fact that it soon became clear that Mr. Begin was going 
to have to rely on their support to ratify the Accords in the Knesset. This despite Mr. 
Begin having successfully enlisted the support of Mr. Sharon in agreeing to 
dismantling of the settlements in the Sinai. During the subsequent debate in the 
Knesset Mr. Peres articulated many of the problems facing the Labour Party. He 
started by welcoming the Accords: 
I unhesitatingly congratulate the Government and the Israeli Prime Minister on 
the difficult and awesome, but vital decision they have made to march towards 
peace in return for a price that seemed impossible for the present Government, 
to free themselves from their commitments, conventions and ideology, and 
progress towards a new direction in the history of the Middle East52. 
However, Mr Peres moved on to catalogue what the Labour Party saw as the 
totally inadequate perfonnance of the government during the negotiations and its 
inability to retain some Israeli control of the Sinai: 
51 Many in the Likud believed that Mr Sadat's price for peace was in fact lower than 
a complete return of all the Sinai. 
Interview with Dr. Yossi Ben-Aharon. 
52 Mr. Peres Address to the Knesset, 25th September 1978, Knesset Library, 
Jerusalem. 
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We have paid a heavy price for these mistakes. Mr. Chairman, this Cabinet 
conceded all of the Sinai on one clear Jerusalem evening. Afterwards it held 
negotiations, characterised by regrets, but it did not help. In conceding the 
Sinai, the Cabinet shattered Israel's credibility. We stood on a defensible border 
with settlements and airfields ... We have returned to 1967 borders and have 
given up this defensible border63. 
Mr. Peres's justification for supporting the Accords said a lot about the 
continuing ethos of dominance within the Labour leadership. He portrayed the party 
as responsible towards the people and argued that had the Likud been in opposition 
their response would not have been so responsible. 
The major intra-party problem for the Labour Party stemming form Camp 
David was that it reopened old wounds in the party between the hawks and doves, 
notably over the dismantling of the Sinai airfields and the evacuation of the 
settlements. The Accords were eventually ratified in the Knesset (27th September 
1978) by a vote of 84 in favour to 19 against (17 abstained)54. One of the leading 
dissenters in the Labour Party, Mr. Hillel, argued that the Labour Party should 
support the peace treaty, but that the problem of the settlements had to be resolved 
independently. In addition to this he supported retaining around 25 percent of the 
Sinai for security reasons55. Subsequently he called for there to be two votes: one 
on the peace treaty and the other on the settlement issue. Mr. Begin refused to 
allow such a vote and after the Labour Party leadership had discussed the issue 
they eventually agreed with Mr. Begin. Consequently, it was the Labour leadership, 
who, although they had strong reservations about the Accords, got Mr. Begin out of 
trouble and presented him with the single biggest achievement of his premiership56. 
This was due to the fact that had Mr. Begin been forced to hold two separate votes 
53 Ibid. 
54 Those that voted against included Dr. Moshe Arens (Likud), Mr Shlomo Hillel 
(Labour). Those that abstained included Mr Yitzhak Shamir (Likud) and Mr Yigal 
Allon (Labour). 
55 Interview with Mr Shlomo Hillel, Jerusalem, 25th July 1994. 
56 Ibid. 
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on the Accords it is generally viewed that he would have won the first on the overall 
Accord, but lost the second on the question of the Sinai settlements57. 
4.3.2: Post Camp David. 
In many ways Camp David, while representing Mr. Begin's single biggest 
achievement, proved to be extremely problematic for his government. On the one 
hand some hawkish members, notably Mrs Geula Cohen, left to form Tehiya. On 
the other hand Mr Begin's two Senior Ministers Mr. Dayan and Mr. Weizman 
resigned in October 1979 and May 1980 respectively mainly over differences about 
the conduct and overall lack of progress in the peace process58. To make things 
worse the centrist party DASH had collapsed due to a bitter intra-party conflict over 
the party's future continuation in the coalitionss. The unpopularity of the government 
was visible in opinion polls published at the time predicting that the Labour Party 
may win an overall majority for the first time in the Knesset elections in 1981. 
The Labour Party had overtaken the Likud in the opinion polls from the 
summer of 1979 onwards. This further added to the over confidence of the Labour 
Party leadership and reinforced their conviction that the party's return to its past 
status of a dominant party with power was assured in 1981&>. However, Israeli 
57 Mr. Begin would have secured around 90 percent approval in the Knesset vote on 
the overall Accords, but only around 40 percent approval for the dismantling of the 
settlements. These figures are based on interviews with Labour MK's 1977-1981 
conducted by the researcher. 
58 In Mr. Weizman's letter of resignation he was extremely condemning about all 
aspects of the governments policies stating; 
" My reservations have increased more and more regarding the Government's 
peace policy, the economic programme, its social programme, and its functioning". 
Extract from Letter of Resignation, Published 28th May 1980. 
59 DASH eventually split in to two groups one led by Mr. Yadlin while the other group 
eventually became Shinui (Liberal party) led by Mr. Rubinstein. Mr Poraz Shinui MK 
sees the death of DASH as a consequence of its original decision to join the Likud-
led coalition in 1977. 
Interview with Mr. Poraz, 24th August 1994. 
&> May 1979 put the Alignment at 42 seats to the Likud's 41 seats. 
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commentators identified this Labour as highly vulnerable because the polls 
represented a vote of no confidence in the Likud rather than any public perception 
of real change in the Labour Party since 1977. In addition the fragility of the party's 
lead was confirmed by the large number of undecided voters due to the collapse of 
DASH61_ However, at the time the major concern of the Labour leadership was not 
reforms to the party, but rather preparing for the prospect of returning to power, 
sooner rather than later (many in the party believed that the Likud would not serve 
out its term, and therefore elections would have to be brought forward)62. In short, 
the strategy of the Labour Party was to let the Likud government bum itself out, and 
not itself undergo a radical change. Such tactics of relying on the continued poor 
performance of the Likud proved to be extremely costly to the party . Importantly this 
strategy also ignored the opportunities for an incumbent administration to 
manufacture short term favourable changes in the economy and the possibility of a 
major security issue increasing the government's popularity. 
June 1979 put the Alignment at 46 seats to the Likud's 40 seats 
Both polls were commissioned by the Jerusalem Post. 
61 Segal, "Exorcising Labour's Ghosts", Jerusalem Post, 27th May 1979. 
62 At the time in Israel, Mr. Begin was described as the late Mr. Begin by the Labour 
Party and the press. 
Interview with Mr. Meridor, 17th October 1994. 
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Conclusion. 
The major problem for the Labour Party during this widely accepted difficult 
period was the failure of the leadership to understand what had happened in 1977 
and react accordingly. The party after its election defeat continued to act as a 
dominant party or more specifically a dominant party without power. This chapter 
has not attempted to argue that the Labour Party was indeed a dominant party, but 
rather that key elements of the party and Israeli society perceived it to be such a 
party. As Duverger outlined in his definition of a dominant party such a perception is 
itself enough to justify the use of the term dominant party. In addition the behaviour 
of the Likud government was affected by the extended period of the Labour Party's 
dominance ( 1948-1977). This at times made the Likud between 1977-81 appear to 
be a non-dominant party operating within a dominant party system with power (in 
government). An additional complication concerned the meaning of 'in power. Here 
it has been employed to mean 'in government'. However, as outlined in this Chapter 
the Labour Party enjoyed a high degree of penetration into the socio-economic 
affairs of the nation through its continued control of the Histadrut. This tended to 
cloud the question of where power lay and helped encourage the Labour Party into 
its perception that 1977 had not really changed the position of the party within the 
political system. 
As the party failed to understand the illness it did not actively seek a cure. 
Hence it did not under go the revolution which was required if it was again to 
expand its narrowing electoral base. There is little evidence of the party taking 
measures to win support from the Sephardim and younger generations. Mr. Peres 
concentrated on rebuilding the organisation of the party and developing his own 
intra-party position. Little attention was given to either reforming the party's organs 
or methods of arriving at policy decisions. 
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A small minority in the party (particularly members of Group 77 and the Young 
Guard) recognised the need to make apparent reforms to the party, but the end 
result of these changes was cosmetic not substantial reform of the party. This suited 
the elite figures (like Mr. Peres) but diminished the ability of the wider party to 
appreciate the real predicament. Hence the Labour Party in 1981 bore a remarkable 
resemblance to the pre-1977 Labour Party which the electorate had rejected in the 
previous election. Thus the party employed the high risk strategy of relying on the 
unpopularity of the Likud government as the single most important factor in its 
attempt to regain power in 1981. 
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CHAPTER 5 
A SECOND TERM IN OPPOSITION: THE ISRAEL LABOUR PARTY 1981-1984. 
The period between the party's second consecutive election defeat in 1981 up 
to the Knesset election in 1984 saw the next stage of development in the Labour 
Party's position within the Israeli party system. This chapter deals with the 1981 
election and the period following it, during which the Labour Party acted more as a 
non-dominant party operating in a competitive party system without power. 
Illustration Two summarises the development of the Labour Party. 
2: Development of the Labour Party 1948-84. 
( 1948-1977: Dominant party with power) 
I 
1977-1981: Dominant party without power 
I 
1981-1984: Non-Dominant party without power 
It needs to be stressed that the competitive party system in Israel at this time 
was not fully matured. This was illustrated by the actions of the Likud, which during 
this period attempted to dismantle the remaining areas of Labour dominance and 
replace it with their own Revisionist brand of dominance. In simple terms this period 
saw the attempt of the Likud to become the dominant party in Israel. Therefore in 
understanding the developments in the Labour Party during this period it is vital to 
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understand these objectives of the Likud and how they affected the political 
agenda. 
5.1: Background to the 1981 Knesset Elections. 
In the six months prior to the election Mr Begin and the Likud had engineered 
a successful reversal of fortunes while the previously described "soft" Labour Party 
support declined rapidly. The recovery of the Likud can be attributed to three 
factors: the re-emergence of Mr. Begin (in good health now serving also as Defence 
Minister and exercising control over the Cabinet); the blatant election economic 
package of the new Likud Finance Minister Mr. Yoram Aridor, and the renewed 
intra-party struggle within the Labour Party surrounding the allocation of the Finance 
portfolio in a future Labour-led government. 
The importance of the personality of Mr. Begin during this period and in the 
· campaign itself cannot be overestimated. After the election he emerged with a 
personal mandate not enjoyed by any Israeli leader since Mr. Ben-Gurion and not 
equalled until Mr. Rabin's victory in 19921. In holding the Defence portfolio (after the 
resignation of Mr. Weizman) he was more able to manipulate and control not only 
the peace process (a meeting with President Sadat during the campaign), but also 
Israel's responses to external threats (notably the Iraqi nuclear programme and the 
successful bombing of the Osiraq reactor on 7th June 1981)2. 
1 The change in Mr. Begin was extremely visible to those who worked closely with 
him at the time. Mr. Meridor argues that Mr. Begin a year before had been referred 
to as the late Mr. Begin and that he (Mr. Begin) had taken it upon himself to win the 
election. 
Interview with Mr. Dan Meridor, The Knesset, 17th October 1994. Mr. Meridor at the 
time served as Mr. Begin's Cabinet Secretary. 
2 Mr. Begin's main motivation in assuming the Defence portfolio had not been to 
achieve such control but had been more aimed at preventing Mr. Sharon from 
becoming Defence Minister. 
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The economic package, which became known as the "Aridor sales", included 
the reinstatement of government subsidies on some basic commodities and oil 
products. The measures immediately eased the financial burden on especially the 
lower income families (the effects from this increase in government spending were 
only felt at a later date). In addition to this a wide range of tax cuts were 
implemented which included a selective reduction of purchase taxes and other tax 
measures which reduced the tax burden on almost everyone. Consequently, there 
was a massive increase in the importing of consumer goods such as cars and 
televisions3. Although massively damaging to Israel's balance of payments, the 
policy proved to be extremely popular with the Israeli electorate. The popularity of 
Mr. Aridor's measures was compounded by the failings of the Labour Party to 
respond to the package of measures4. 
In a related matter Mr. Peres's authority was damaged by his inability to 
appoint a Labour Party finance spokesman after the natural choice, Mr. Levinson, 
withdrew due to Mr. Peres's failure to cede supreme command on economic matters 
to him. Mr. Levinson represented the new face of the Labour Party and he had been 
the star of the Party Conference the previous December6. The failure of Mr. Peres 
to appoint Mr. Levinson raised questions about his leadership abilities and proved 
extremely unpopular both with the party and the electorate. Taken in addition with 
3 Imports of consumer goods into Israel increased by 62 percent in the first quarter 
of 1981 compared with the previous year. 
Statistical Abstract of lsrael1981, Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem. 
4 The details of the Aridor sales are taken form the Bank of Israel Annual Report 
1981 and interviews with economic experts from the Histadrut; 
Interview with Dr. Robbie Nathanson, Director of the Institute of Economic and 
Social Research, The Histadrut Headquarters, Tel Aviv, 29th July 1994. 
5 The importance of Mr. Levinson to the party was stressed in a number of 
interviews with Labour Party leaders. The Levinson document on Economic and 
Social Affairs (1981) was seen by many as the key economic document of the 
1980's for the Labour Party. 
Interview with Mrs Nava Arad, Deputy Secretary General of the Histadrut at the 
time, Tel Aviv, 27th July 1994. 
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the controversy of the replacement of Mr. Bar-Lev with Mr Rabin as the party's 
candidate for the Defence portfolio (see previous chapter) it meant that there were 
extremely public intra-party conflicts surrounding two out of the three major 
portfolios in a future Labour-led government. 
The consequence of all three of the above factors was that by the time the 
campaign started the Likud had recovered much if not all of the ground that it had 
lost to the Labour Party in the previous three years. Therefore at the outset of the 
campaign it was clear that either of the major blocks had an opportunity to win the 
election, thus making the campaign and events surrounding it extremely important 
in determining the victor. 
5.2: The 1981 Knesset Campaign. 
The campaign was the most bitter and violent in Israeli political history due 
largely to the perceived closeness of the outcome and the desire of Mr. Begin to 
secure a second term in office in order to implement his settlement plans in Judea 
and Samaria. The aim of the latter was to create demographic realties in these 
areas and thus prevent any future Labour-led government from returning them to 
Arab sovereignty. Consequently, Mr. Begin's dream and the emphasis the Likud 
placed on the settlement programme meant that the party was extremely highly 
motivated to win the elections. The settlement programme represented the most 
significant but not the only part of the Mr. Begin's motivations for winning the 
election. The Likud wanted a mandate to start to dismantle the last areas of Labour 
dominance and introduce Revisionist symbols which up to this period had been 
largely absent from Israeli political culture. 
The strategy employed by the Likud relied heavily on the personality of Mr. 
Begin who during the Campaign emerged as the dominant figure with his charisma 
6 Aronoff, Israeli Visions and Divisions, Transaction Books, New Jersey, 1989, p28. 
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and powers of oratory in direct contrast to the more bureaucratic style of Mr. Peres. 
The Labour Party's dominant party status became one of the central themes of the 
campaign. Mr. Begin, in addressing the key Likud constituency of the Sephardim, 
made constant references to the Ashkenazi establishment and elite who continued 
to rule Israel. What in effect Mr. Begin did was to attack the idea of the labour 
movement's past and present dominance through the use of the Jewish ethnic 
cleavage in Israeli society. In short, he argued to the Sephardim that the Ashkenazi 
Jews (his code for the Labour Party) continued to treat the Sephardim as second 
class citizens. Unsurprisingly Mr. Begin's now near demi-god status with the 
Sephardim was evident in election rallies and in the subsequent results7. 
Mr. Begin's tactics of courting the Sephardim, together with his highly emotive 
rhetorical style and use of symbolic themes, played a significant role in the divisive 
nature of the Campaign. These included several incidents of political intimidation 
and violence against both voters and politicians8. The Labour Party was not 
altogether innocent in increasing the ethnic tension between the Sephardim and the 
Ashkenazi Jews during the campaign. Mr. Peres, in response to heckling at rallies, 
made some anti-Sephardim comments which served to heighten the tension9. The 
most significant anti-Sephardim comments came at a Labour Party mass rally 
7 Mr. Begin's status with this the Sephardim was confirmed in interviews with Israeli 
commentators for example, 
Interview with Mr. Hanan Crystal, Political Correspondent Israel Radio and 
Hadashot, Tel Aviv, 4th September 1994. 
8 During the Campaign Mr. Peres had tomatoes thrown at him when he attempted to 
hold or attend election rallies in the predominantly Sephardim "development towns". 
On one occasion it is alleged that someone drew a knife on Mr. Peres. 
9 Mr. Peres's relationship problematic relationship with the Sephardim was to 
become one of them most significant electoral problems for the Labour Party in the 
1980's. It cause was due in part to Mr. Peres being viewed as untrustworthy by this 
group. His style was seen as too statesman like for this group which preferred 
straight talking. There were all sorts of false rumours about Mr. Peres which 
originated from this group illustrating the deep suspicion of him. 
Interview with Mr. David Horowitz, Editor of the Jerusalem Report, Jerusalem, 25th 
July 1994. 
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outside Tel Aviv City Hall which was attended by the leadership of the party. The 
MC. Mr. Topaz (a famous Israeli comedian) made what were seen as blatant anti-
Moroccan remarks1o. Unsurprisingly Mr. Begin was quick to exploit such a mistake 
citing it as an example of Ashkenazi arrogance. There were also some examples of 
violence instigated by Labour Party supporters against Likud leaders during the 
campaign (an unsavoury example were the death threats made against Likud MK 
Mr. Dov. Shilansky (16th June 1981)11. 
The most significant event during the campaign was the successful attack on 
the Iraqi nuclear reactor(?th June 1981) by the Israeli Airforce which Labour Party 
leaders claimed was primarily motivated by election considerations12. Mr. Begin 
denied such suggestions arguing that his prime motivation for carrying out the raid 
was his fear that if the Likud lost the election then a Labour-led government would 
not undertake the raid13. The subsequent national rejoicing at the outcome of the 
raid seemed to remind former Likud supporters of the more positive aspects of the 
1o Mr. Topaz used the phrase to "Cha Cha" which is slang to describe the Moroccan 
Jews and their lack of education. Mrs Herlitz who attended the rally stated that there 
was an eerie silence after the remarks. Despite attempts by party managers to limit 
the damage done it is seen by the leadership of the party as costing the party at 
least one mandate. The significance of the comment could have perhaps been lost 
in a normal campaign, but in the highly charged ethnic dominated campaign its 
importance cannot be overstated. 
Interview with Mrs Herlitz, Former Labour MK and Ambassador, Tel Aviv, 15th 
August 1994. 
11 Tensions were such at the time that on a daily basis incidents of violence were 
carried out by supporters of both the major parties. Examples included the burning 
down of one of the Labour Party's campaign headquarters in Jerusalem and the 
burning of a car belonging to a Labour Party election worker. 
12 Mr. Chaim Zadok argues that the timing of the raid was motivated by the election, 
and moreover that it gave the Likud two extra mandates. 
Interview with Chaim Zadok, Tel Aviv, 11th July 1994. 
13 Central to the Labour Party's allegations were the following. First, the Cabinet had 
given its approval for the raid at the beginning of May and yet the raid did not take 
place until June. Second, the Israeli planes were camouflaged (not normal for the 
Israeli Airforce). Third, Mr. Begin publicly accepted responsibility for the raid when 
the Israelis had traditionally not publicly done so in previous similar instances. 
Finally the Labour Party leadership had not been fully informed of the raid in 
contrast to Mr. Rabin's briefing of Mr. Begin prior to the Entebbe raid (1976). 
108 
party14_ In addition to this there was a successful helicopter attack on Beirut which 
benefited the Likud as the campaign came to a close. 
Both of these events illustrated the problems with the Labour Party strategy 
(1977-81) of believing that the Likud would bum itself out. Importantly it also 
indicated a failure of the Labour Party leadership to take into account the 
opportunity that an incumbent government enjoys with regard to creation of a short-
tenn national feel good factor. By the end of the campaign the Likud had 
· successfully manufactured a favourable climate in both the security and economic 
spheres. 
5.3: Statistical Analysis of the 1981 Knesset Elections. 
The elections were held on 30th June 1981 and produced the following 
results. Out of a possible 2,490,014 registered voters 1,954,609 votes were cast 
(78.5% turnout) with 15,312 votes required to win a single seat in the Knesset. 
Table 5.1 reveals the distribution of seats after the election. 
14 Diskin, Elections and Voters in Israel, Praeger, New York, 1991, p34. 
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Table 5.1: Number of Seats Each Party Won and Totals of the Respective 
Blocks in 1981. 
















In addition Telem won two seats but have not been placed in either of the 
blocks because its leader Mr. Dayan had served in both Likud and Labour led 
governments. 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, The Results to the 1oth Knesset 
Elections, Jerusalem. 
Table 5.2: Voting by Geographical Districts in the 1981 Knesset Elections. 
Alignment percentage of valid votes. 
City % of Sephardim Alignment vote in 1981 
Dimona (83) 22.2 
Kiryat Gat (69) 32.1 
Ramie (68) 28.3 
OrYehuda (66) 18.6 
Givatayim (23) 49.8 
Haifa (24) 43.5 
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Likud percentage of valid votes. 
City o/o of Sephardim Likud vote in 1981. 
Dimona (83) 60.1 
Kiryat Gat (69) 48.3 
Ramie (68) 51.7 
OrYehuda (66) 58.5 
Givatayim (23) 31.3 
Haifa (24) 34.1 
Source; Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem. The percentage of 
Sephardim is based on the 1983 survey and had been rounded up to the 
nearest percentage point. 
Table 5.3: The Arab Vote in the 1981 Knesset Elections. 
Percentage of valid Arab votes. 
Alignment (ILP and Mapam) 26.2 
Hadash 37.9 
Minority Lists 13.4 
Others 22.5 
Source; Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem. 
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5.4: The IDF Vote in the 1981 Knesset Elections. 
Party % ofiDF vote % of Civilian Vote 
























The results of the election confinned the transfonnation of the Israeli party 
system from a dominant party system to a more competitive party system15. 
However, it needs to be stressed that this competitive party system was not yet fully 
matured as the attempt of the Likud to achieve the status of a dominant party 
illustrated. In addition the election highlighted the importance of intra-block politics 
which in many respects came to replace the party system with a competitive block 
system. 
Table 5.1 illustrates that the Alignment, despite increasing its number of seats 
from 32 in 1977 to 47 in 1981, was still not the single largest party. There also 
15 Aronson and Yanai, "Critical Aspects of the Elections and their Implications", in 
Caspi, Diskin and Gutmann (ed), The Roots of Begin's Success, Croom Helm, 
London, 1984, p11. 
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wasn't any prospect of the Labour-led-block forming a winning coalition (61 seats). 
Much of the increased Alignment support came directly from the disintegration of 
DASH and the return of the majority of its voters to the Alignment 16. The major 
winner was the Likud, and in particular Mr. Begin who had personalised and 
dominated the election campaign. Not only did the Likud's number of seats increase 
from 43 in 1977 to 48 in 1981 but also the majority of its block over the Labour-led-
block increased. This insured that it would be able to present a winning coalition 
without the need to include any of the centre parties17. 
The major loser was the NRP whose number of seats fell to only 6 seats. 
Many of its supporters transferred their votes across to one of the growing number 
of parties of the radical right such as Tehiya. Consequently, the election marked 
the demise of the moderate elements within the NRP and the ascendance of the 
more nationalistic younger elements within the party. This placed the party firmly in 
the Likud-led-block and in tum reduced the chances of the party joining any Labour-
led administration in the future1s. Overall, despite the reduced number of seats won 
by the smaller parties their influence increased due to the closeness of the two 
major parties (48 to 47 seats). However, against this was the fact that near1y all the 
parties had publicly committed themselves to one of the blocks prior to the results. 
In particular, it would have proved extremely difficult for any of the parties from the 
Likud block to transfer their support to the Labour Party given their respective 
hawkish constituencies and the clear possibility of forming a Likud-led government. 
16 See Diskin, Elections and Voters in Israel, p143-44. 
17 The centre party Telem (led by Mr. Moshe Dayan) was the only party not to 
declare which of the two blocks it would join after the election clear1y hoping to 
occupy the pivotal position in coalition negotiations. However, due to size of the 
victory Mr. Begin was able to form a coalition without them. 
18 Mr. Peres still held hoped to tempt the NRP or at least elements of it back into the 
Labour camp. Consequently, attempts were made during the term of this Knesset to 
renew the historic alliance but without success. 
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5.3.1: Analysis of the Labour Performance in the Election. 
Tables 5.2 and 5.2 illustrate that despite increasing its number of seats the 
Labour Party failed to substantially improve its performance among the key 
constituency groups of the Sephardim and the young. Many in the party argue that it 
was extremely lucky that DASH collapsed, allowing a seeming cosmetic 
improvement in the Labour Party's electoral performance19. Table 5.2 shows that in 
towns where the majority of the population were Sephardim the Alignment (ILP and 
Mapam) performed badly in contrast to the Likud. Its electoral strength continued to 
lie in the predominantly Ashkenazi towns such as Givatayim (a veterans towns 
comprising of mainly Polish Jews). Arian, in his Electoral Studies series puts 
Alignment support among the Sephardim in 1981. as low as 18 percent compared to 
69 percent who claimed to have supported the Likucj20. 
The results illustrated the success of Mr. Begin's linkage of the Labour Party's 
past dominant position to the problems of Sephardim Jews. Put simply, the 
Alignment's poor performance among this constituency confirmed that even though 
the Likud had been in government for four years its image had not transformed into 
that of a party of the establishment. Similarly four years in opposition had not 
changed the image of the Labour Party among this constituency as representing the 
privileged elite and establishment in Israeli society. In short, if the Likud had been 
defending its four year term in office then the Labour Party had to account for its 
period of 29 years of rule. An additional worrying factor for the Labour Party was 
that it appeared to make little difference that 14 out of 47 Labour Mk's who were 
elected were of Sephardim origin compared with only 6 out of 48 for the Likud. Thus 
this indicates that the problem the Labour Party had with the Sephardim was not 
19 1nterview with Dr. Kom, Tel Aviv, 13th September 1994. 
20 Arian (ed), The Elections in lsrael1981. Ramot Publishing House, Tel Aviv, 1983. 
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simply a matter of under representation of this group, but rather a deeper image 
problem21 . 
The Labour Party performed equally badly among the younger voters as 
shown in Table 5.4 they secured only 24 percent of the IDF vote compared to the 
Likud's 37 percent22. The generational trends are confirmed in Table 5.5 which 
indicates that the Alignment continued to be the party of the older generations 
(notably of the 50 and over category) while the Likud still appealed to the younger 
voters. 
21 Many leaders in the Labour Party describe the problem of the Sephardim towards 
the party as irrational and thus making it difficult to define the problem and then 
solve it. They argue that it was basically an emotional response to vote against the 
party which they perceived to be the establishment. Mr. Eli Dayan agues that the 
Likud gave this constituency pride but little else, but that this pride was their key 
demand. 
Interview with Mr. Eli Dayan, Former Tami Mayor of Ashkelon (predominantly 
Sephardim party) and Chairman of the Labour Party Knesset faction and Coalition 
1994, The Knesset, Jerusalem, 8th November 1994. 
22 The IDF vote is a good indicator of the young vote in Israel as the majority of the 
nations youth are at the time of elections serving in the IDF and vote in separate 
polling stations. The majority of the IDF vote is comprised of people performing 
their National Service and therefore the IDF vote is a good illustration of the voting 
patterns of Men 18 to 21 and women 18 to 20 years old. 
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Table5.5: Party Vote by. Age in the 1981 Knesset.Elections (in percent). 
Age N. Align Likud Relig Oth. 
.:. 
-24 191 27. 51 4 18 
25-39 410 35 43 6 15 
40-49 147 35 55 1 8 
+50 277 50 37 7 7 
Total 1025 38 45 ~ 13 
Source; Arian and Shamir, Electoral Studies Series 1981, Data Archives, 
The Hebrew University, Jerusalem. 
Also published in Arian, Israeli Politics - The Second Generation. 
Despite the fact that the survey was not totally balanced (the majority of the 
respondents were Likud supporters) it illustrated the continuing problems of the 
Labour Party among the younger age groups. Support for the Likud among the 
under-24 age group was nearly twice that of the Alignment (ILP and Mapam). It was 
only in the over-SO's age group that the Alignment enjoyed a plurality of the 
responses. Two major conclusions can be drawn from this. The four years of 
opposition had done little to change the image of the party as the party of the 
conservative elders. Also that the Likud's continuing popularity among the younger 
age groups indicated that they were not yet seen as the party of the establishment 
by this group. 
· ., . Overall the Labour Party's performance in the 1981 elections can be viewed 
as ~even more disappointing than the party's defeat in the 1977 election. The party y .. 
arfd the leadership in particular had to come to terms with the fact that its 
.. . 
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predominantly Ashkenazi declining constituency was in 1981 no longer sufficient to 
automatically return it to power. Mr. Peres and his team had worked extremely hard 
to win back the votes the party had lost to the now defunct DASH party in 1977. 
However, even with the majority of DASH voters returning to the Labour Party in 
1981 it was still not enough to ensure that the party emerged as the single largest 
party. This fact Jed the leadership of the party to finally understand that the party 
was no longer a dominant party and to seek alternative strategies to secure a return 
to power. An additional worry for the Labour Party was the clear emergence of the 
Likud-led-block as the strongest block. This Jed many in the Labour Party to 
conclude that the Likud and the religious parties would enjoy at least a blocking 
majority (60 seats) for the foreseeable future and prevent any Labour-led 
government23. 
5.4: Internal Labour Party Response to the 1981 Election. 
The outcome of the 1981 election placed the Labour Party in a difficult 
position for despite all the problems outlined in 3.4.1 the party had emerged almost 
on level terms with the Likud at inter-party level. Consequently, despite its failure to 
win back power the leadership was able to claim with some justification that it had 
recouped the party's losses from 1977. On the one hand the party had not won 
enough votes to return to government while on the other hand it did not lose enough 
votes to necessitate immediate radical changes to its leadership and platform. 
At intra-party level the position of Mr. Peres was damaged by his failure to 
secure a return to power for the party. Therefore the period between 1981 and 1984 
23 Interview with Mr. Hanan Crystal, 4th September 1994. 
Many in the Labour Party feared that after the 1981 election defeat the Labour 
Party was heading for a continued long period of exile because of the strength of 
the Likud-Jed-block. 
Interview with Dr. Yossi Beilin (Dr. Beilin at the time was an advisor to Mr. Peres), 
The Foreign Ministry, Jerusalem, 29th August 1994. 
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witnessed a further intensification of the struggle between Mr. Peres and Mr. Rabin. 
A third candidate, the ex-President Yitzhak Navon, emerged as an alternative 
leader to Mr. Peres24_ However, Mr. Navon made it dear that he would not 
challenge Mr. Peres for the leadership but would be willing to take over if Mr. Peres 
agreed to stand down in the interests of the party. The speculation surrounding the 
intentions of Mr. Navon came to dominate the Israeli media interest in the party 
between 1981 to 1982. This even after Mr. Rabin declared that he would try again 
for the leadership even if Mr. Navon was to stand. 
The uncertainty over the leadership position greatly influenced the actions of 
Mr. Peres between 1981 and 1984 in devising Labour Party strategy to bolster his 
intra-party standing against both Mr. Rabin and Mr. Navon. Mr. Peres adapted three 
major tactics to oppose the Likud government and deliver some form of a victory for 
himself and the party25. He made attempts on several occasions to form a National 
Unity Government with the Likud (NUG), prior to the Lebanon war (1982), after the 
Kahan Commission's Report on Israeli conduct during the war( February 1983) and 
24 Mr. Navon was orginally a Rafi and then a Labour MK of Sephardim origin. In the 
1977 Presidency election he was unopposed by Mr. Begin in an effort to show the 
Likud's Sephardim credentials. When Mr. Navon's term of office finished it was 
natural that he would again become active in the Labour Party. The concern of the 
Likud about this was illustrated by their attempts to pass legislation to prevent an 
ex-President from returning to active politics for a period of time after his term of 
office. 
25 !VIr Peres assumed (probably correctly) that if the Labour Party were to join a 
NUG then he would be made Deputy Premier and be given a leading portfolio. 
Equally important Mr. Rabin would be given his favoured Defence Ministry and thus 
not challenge Mr. Peres. It should be stressed that this was consistently Mr. Rabin's 
price for not challenging Mr. Peres and if Mr. Peres failed to deliver it then Mr. Rabin 
was far more likely to challenge Mr. Peres. Despite his defeat in 1981 Mr. Rabin's 
intra-party standing had increased due in part to the decline in support for Mr. Peres 
following his failure to win the 1981 election and also in part to opinion polls which 
indicated that Mr. Rabin was more popular with the electorate as a whole than Mr. 
Peres. Mr. Peres needed also to give Mr. Navon a senior position in order to prevent 
a similar challenge from him. The party appeal of Mr. Peres versus the electorate 
appeal of Mr. Rabin was explained to the researcher in interviews for example, 
Interview with Mr. A vraham Hatzharmi, Director of the International Department of 
the Israel Labour Party, Party Headquarters, Tel Aviv, 29th November 1994. 
118 
after the resignation of Mr. Begin (September 1983)26. Each time negotiations broke 
down either through Alignment opposition to the Likud's settlement programme or 
due to a lack of interest from the Likud27. He also attempted to call for early 
elections (a high risk strategy as there were no clear signs that the state of near 
parity between the two major parties had changed)28. Finally he tried to form an 
alternative government by either attracting members to defect from the Likud or 
winning the support of one of the religious parties away from the Likud-led-block. 
With a small Likud inter-party majority there was constant speculation over possible 
defections form the Likud, notably from its Liberal wing. As Appendix 1 confirmed 
the Labour Party actually finished this Knesset with more seats than the Likud (49 to 
46) after a series of such defections from the Likud. However, the Labour Party was 
still not able to form an alternative government at inter-block level despite this new 
inter-party majority (a clear illustration of the importance of inter-block politics). 
Dr. Beilin confirmed that there was a marked change in the behaviour of the 
Labour Party during its second term of office. The party was transformed from 
acting as a dominant party without power (1977-81) to adapting more traditional 
26 Bar-Natan, "Labour a Viable Alternative", Newsview, 7th February 1984, p11-13. 
27 The final attempt was almost successful due to the intra-party needs of the new 
Likud leader Mr. Shamir to block the ambitions of his rival Mr. David Levy. However, 
the Likud would not accept the Alignment in to a government of equal terms so 
negotiations broke down. 
28 Opinion polls at the time indicated that in fact the Likud enjoyed a lead over the 
Labour Party for example in polls commissioned by Ha'aretz the position was; 
July 1981, Likud 49 seats to Labour's 44 seats 
September 1981, Likud 51 seats to Labour's 44 seats 
March 1982, Likud 54 seats to Labour's 44 seats 
May 1982, Likud 51 seats to Labour's 46 seats. 
Source: Ha'aretz, 20th July 1984. 
Similar results for the period were produced in polls conducted for the Jerusalem 
Post, 29th August 1982 and 30th October 1983. 
This indicates the growing concern of Mr. Peres and his concentration on simple 
power politics that he was actively trying to go to the country at a time when there 
was a clear majority support for the Likud government. Mr. Peres's high risk strategy 
was also apparent in similar attempts made in 1990-1991. 
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roles and methods of opposition behaviour29. However, as stressed above Mr. 
Peres was motivated in part by the need to secure a victory of sorts in order to 
preserve his position as leader. Consequently, the apparent dominance of these 
intra-party considerations over inter-party conflict led to such strange actions as the 
attempt to force new elections at a time when the Labour Party was trailing the 
Likud in opinion polls. The seemingly illogical nature of such actions illustrated the 
continuing conditioning effect of the Labour Party's period as a dominant party 
which continued even after the party no longer considered itself to be a dominant 
party. The importance of intra-party politics which had its origins in the period when 
the party was dominant (see 2.3) clearly survived the transformation of the party 
from a dominant to non-dominant party. 
It is also clear that the Labour Party while no longer acting or believing itself to 
be a dominant party continued to be haunted by its past which restricted the party's 
responses on many of the key issues of the day. These included the settlements 
issue, the annexation of the Golan Heights (1981) and the Lebanon war (1982-85). 
These restrictions when taken together with the continuing intra-party conflict 
among the elite and the factional divisions within the party made the conduct of 
effective opposition during this period extremely difficult. 
5.5: The Likud Government, Issues of the Day, and The Labour Party 
Response. 
Before examining the continuing problems of the Labour Party in opposition it 
is necessary to stress the differences between the second Likud government led by 
Mr. Begin from the first Likud administration. Unlike the first Likud government the 
second administration of Mr. Begin attempted to dismantle the areas of the labour 
291nterview with Dr. Yossi Beilin, 29th August 1994. 
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movement's dominance in Israel and replace them with its own brand of 
Revisionism3:>. This period therefore marked the Likud's attempt to become the 
dominant party and construct a similar party system to the pre-1977 dominant party 
system. Hence the Likud used the power of appointment to attempt to transform the 
civil service and other government organisations as well as attempting to politically 
rehabilitate the memory of Revisionist figures such as Mr. Jabotinsky31. 
In terms of composition of the government there were no more centrist 
elements (no Mr. Dayan or Mr. Weizman). The two most important portfolios of 
Foreign Affairs and Defence were occupied by two hawks, Mr Shamir and Mr. 
Sharon32. Unsurprisingly, with such figures in prominent positions the government 
pursued an extremely active and aggressive security policy culminating in the 
Lebanon war (1982). It also devoted a great deal of resources and energies into 
developing Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza33. In short, the second 
Likud government had a more radical agenda and was set upon establishing its 
Revisionist ideology thus changing the character of the state, which was still heavily 
influenced by the labour institutions. 
30 Aronoff, Joe. cit. See particularly Chapter Three. Interestingly Aronoff concludes 
that the Likud's attempt to do so failed at this time due to deep entrenched nature of 
the labour movement's dominance. 
31 The Likud planned to use the event of the 1 OOth anniversary of his birth to do 
this. 
32 It should be noted that the Mr. Shamir of this period was not the same Mr. Shamir 
of the late 1980's. Mr. Shamir was at this time much more hawkish. He had 
abstained on the ratification vote of the Camp David Accords. Mr. Begin had 
reluctantly appointed Mr. Sharon as Defence Minister who he saw as a potential 
rival, as a reward for M. Sharon's support of the Camp David Accords and his role in 
the Likud election victory. In addition to this the Chief of Staff of this period was Mr. 
Eitan well known for his belief that a military solution to the Palestinian problem was 
possible. 
33 There· were a total number of 43 new settlements constructed during this period 
(by far the largest number under any Israeli government). 
Sources: Central Bureau of Statistics Jerusalem and Jewish Settlement in the West 
Bank and Gaza: Profile 1992, The International Centre for Peace in the Middle East, 
Tel Aviv. 
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The Labour Party's response to this challenge was restricted not only by the 
problems of its past actions but by the need for the party to court the key electoral 
constituencies of the young and the Sephardim. These were traditionally hawkish 
and thus generally supportive of Likud's policies34. Consequently, Labour's "catch 
all tactics" meant that at times the leadership of the party were extremely reluctant 
to take a stand against the policies of the government and present a clear 
alternative for fear of offending these key constituency groups35. All of these 
problems were clearly apparent in the Labour Party's policy and response to the 
three major issues of the time; the annexation of the Golan Heights, the settlements 
issue and the Lebanon war. 
The Knesset vote on the Tehiya sponsored motion (Mrs Geula Cohen) to 
annex the Golan Heights (14th December 1981) exposed the problem of the 
continued divisions within the Labour Party and marked the beginning of the end of 
the party's electoral association with Mapam. The Labour Party itself split into three 
groups: those in favour of annexation (comprising of mainly Kibbutz representatives 
and members of the old Achdut Ha'avoda faction), those against (including the 
prominent dove Mr. Yossi Sarid) and a third group which believed the party should 
boycott the proceedings and included the party's economic expert Mr. Gad 
Ya'acobi. In the absence of Mr. Peres and Mr. Rabin (both in the United States) Mr 
Ya'acobi secured the support of 33 Labour MK's. However, members of the pro-
annexation lobby refused to accept the verdict arguing that they were bound by 
votes in their Kibbutzim. The Kibbutzim in particular were keen to annex the land 
34 The restraints placed on the Labour Party by the need to attempt to capture the 
votes of the Sephardim and youth are emphasised by the leaders of Mapam who 
argued that the Labour Party policies were largely dictated by this "catch all factor''. 
Interview with Mr. Victor Shemtov, 12th July 1994. 
35 For an account of the failure of Labour's "catch all tactics" see, 
Mendilow, "Israel's Alignment in the 1984 Elections: Catch All Tactics in a Divided 
Society", Comparitive Politics, 20, 1988. 
122 
due in a large part to fact that the settlements which had been built on the Golan 
Heights since 1967 were sponsored by the labour movement. As a result the Golan 
settlements contained Labour Party supporters who constituted part of the strong 
pro-Golan Heights lobby within the party 36. Consequently, the split in the Labour 
Party allowed the annexation bill to be passed easier than would have otherwise 
been the case. 
The events surrounding the Golan Heights annexation bill played a significant 
role in the debate over whether Mapam should remain within the Alignment or return 
to being an independent left wing party. It is important to stress the somewhat 
arbitrary nature of this on-going debate. There is no evidence available to suggest 
that the leadership of either the Labour Party or Mapam took any formal decision on 
the issue. Rather there was a general move away from one another as the Labour 
Party drifted to the right in its search for the Sephardim vote37. The Alignment 
36 The fact that the settlers on the Golan Heights were put there by the Labour 
Party and are in general strong Labour Party supporters is extremely important in 
understanding the current situation with regard the peace negotiations between 
Israel and Syria. This is of particular relevance to the difficulty that Mr. Rabin has in 
securing a majority of support from within his own party for the withdrawal and 
abandonment of these settlements. 
37 The two senior figure in Mapam at the time confirm this. Mr Jaffe argues that it 
became apparent over a period of time that the Labour Party and Mapam were 
voting against each other on the major issues of war and peace of the day. 
Consequently, the Golan vote was just the one of the first instances of which the 
second was the Lebanon war. Mapam clearly defined the red line if which the 
Labour Party crossed would lead to the end of the Alignment as being any 
formation of an NUG involving the Likud. Mr. Jaffe also stresses that there was a 
new leadership in Mapam at this time 1981-84 with a more militant outlook (more 
dovish), and this happened at the same time as the Labour Party leaders were 
courting the Sephardim more hawkish constituency. Mr. Shemtov also argues that 
the Golan Heights marked the start of the end of the Alignment. He argues that the 
Labour Party's main motivation for supporting the annexation bill was not only the 
settlements but also because it was an extremely popular within Israeli society, thus 
the party was following public opinion on the issue. 
Interview with Mr. Victor Shemtov, Former Leader of Mapam, Tel Aviv, 12th July 
1994. 
Interview with Mr. Aryieh Jaffe, Former Leader of Mapam, Kibbutz Hakum, 28th 
August 1994. 
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survived the period between 1981 to 1984 even though at times they voted 
separately in the Knesset, but eventually split after the 1984 election over the 
Labour Party's participation in the NUG. 
The Likud government's settlement drive in the West Bank and Gaza 
presented the Labour Party with two major dilemmas. The Labour Party manifesto 
dealt specifically with the defence of what it termed as "security settlements''38. 
However, it was clear that the Likud settlement programme included settlements 
which were not located in strategic positions. This presented a major problem to the 
Labour Party to define what it would do with such settlements in the future. 
Unsurprisingly, the response of the Labour Party remained vague and at times 
contradictory reflecting its own internal divisions on the issue and a further 
consequence of its targeting of the hawkish Sephardim vote-'S. 
In addition, the Labour Party's own settlement programme vis-avis the 
Kibbutzim and Moshav movements became a victim of the Likud's settlement 
priorities. The Likud as the party in government was able to divert huge sums of 
government expenditure into areas which suited its ideological perspectives. 
Consequently, central government funds which had previously been channelled by 
Labour-led governments into its Kibbutz and Moshavim movements were greatly 
reduced. This eventually led to economic difficulties for both these movements 
during the early to mid-1980's40. This failure of the Labour Party to be in a position 
38 The term 'security settlement' was deliberately somewhat vague. However, the 
Settlements on the Golan Heights and the Jordan valley were generally seen as of 
a security nature, as were the Sinai Settlements prior to the return of the Sinai to 
Egypt. 
Interview with Dr. Alpher, Tel Aviv University, 4th December 1994. 
39 The Israeli media recorded in detail the question of what a future Labour Party 
government would do with the settlements. See for example; 
Barzilai, "Labour and Likud Settlements", Ha'aretz, 7th May 1982. 
Ha'aretz Editorial, "Labour; Settlements May Exist under non Israeli Sovereignty", 
Ha'aretz, 4th May 1982. 
40 The extent of the financial crisis of the labour movement within and beyond the 
Green Line was shown by in 1980-81 not one new Kibbutz was established 
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to deliver financial assistance to the Kibbutzim and Moshavim was a further 
indication of the loss of its dominant status. 
The Lebanon war came to dominate all aspects of Israeli political life during 
this period. The domestic consequences of the war led to the resignation of Mr. 
Begin and forced Mr. Sharon to leave the Defence Ministry. In addition it caused a 
level of polarisation in Israeli society not seen since the birth of the state41. Details 
of the fighting which broke out when the IDF crossed the border on 6th June 1982 
are well chronicled elsewhere. This study therefore deals specifically with the 
response of the Labour Party to the fighting42. There were four major stages of the 
war: the limited aims of the 40 km advance, the push further north to surround 
Beirut (11th June onwards}, the evacuation of the PLO and the massacre at Shatilla 
and Sabra refugee camps (September 1982). A summary of the position of the 
Labour leadership on the four stages is that they accepted the first stage, but felt 
that the second and third stages were over ambitious and dangerous while the 
fourth was a tragic consequence of the overall war.43 
Yishai argues that in times of war the formation of policy is usually left to the 
elite normally in the form of a War or Inner Cabinet. This was also the case with the 
opposition Labour Party44. The key players in the Labour Party during the initial 
(excluding Kibbutz Artzi). Also 100 Moshavim were close to bankruptcy. Labour 
sponsored settlements beyond the Green Une were close to failure with only a few 
inhabitants. 
41 For the first time many Israelis did not believe that the war was a just war (about 
the survival of the state of Israel) and opposed the war or felt that the Israel did not 
have to go so far. 
Interview with Mr. Offer Bronstein, Director of the International Centre for Peace in 
the Middle East, Tel Aviv, 9th August 1994. 
42 For a critical account of both the military operations and its international and 
domestic political and social consequences see for example; 
Schiff and Ya'ari, Israel's Lebanon War, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1985. 
43 Interviews with leaders of the Labour Party conducted by the Researcher. 
44 Yishai, "The Israel Labour Party and the Lebanon War', Armed Forces and 
Society, Spring 1985, p379. 
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stages of the war were Mr. Peres, Mr, Rabin and Mr. Bar-Lev. The official party 
organs such as the Central Committee either did not meet or did not debate the war. 
The lack of party activity during the period of the war can be seen by the fact that 
the Labour Party submitted only two motions connected with the war in the 
Knesset45. The Labour Party's major strategy was carried out in the Foreign Affairs 
and Security Committee of the Knesset where the Labour contingent included three 
ex-Chiefs of Staff (Mr. Rabin, Mr. Gur and Mr. Bar-Lev), the party leader Mr. Peres 
and the party spokesman on Foreign Affairs Mr. Eban46. The Committee was 
convened by the Labour Party in order to criticise the government and get involved 
with the conduct of the war (Labour saw the Committee as the best opportunity to 
obtain classified information on the war). However, the Committee did not prove to 
be the most successful institution for obtaining such information during the war. Mr. 
Sharon and Mr. Eitan (Chief of Staff) misled the Committee on several occasions 
claiming that, for example, Israel had no intention of attacking Beirut. Mr Sharon's 
tactics were clearly to deflect any dissent of the war by arguing that this was not the 
time for debate while Israeli soldiers were dying. 
45 An analysis of party protocols confirms the lack of meaningful discussion of the 
war in the Central Committee during the initial stages of the war. This to a large 
extent reflected the Israeli tradition of not criticising the purpose of a military action 
while the IDF were still fighting. However, such traditions were based on past wars 
where there had been only minimal dissension about the war. 
Party Protocols, Labour Party Archives, Beit Berl, near Tel Aviv. 
46 The committee is the most prestigious and important of the Knesset committees. 
It has a membership of 17 people and a party needs to have at least Six seats in 
the Knesset to be given a seat on the committee. Most of the committee's work is 
performed at sub-committee level. The main committee meetings have 
unfortunately become like the Knesset floor (partisan). The major aim of the 
committee is to give people the knowledge of what is happening in the IDF and 
senior IDF commanders are regularly interviewed. Much of the committees work is 
done in secret, but in recent times a number of leaks have compromised this 
secrecy (notably over IDF views on the Security arrangements on the Golan Heights 
and the Oslo Agreements). 
Interview with Mr. Ori Or, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, 
The Knesset, Jerusalem, 21st November 1994. 
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The Lebanon war was the first war not to be fought under a Labour-led 
government and thus Labour Party leaders found their exile from power and 
information all the more difficult to accept. Mr. Rabin himself did eventually become 
directly involved in the conduct of the war accompanying Mr. Sharon to Beirut and 
acting as an unofficial security advisor47. Mr. Peres relied to a large extent on 
briefings from Mr. Begin to gain his information of the conduct and progress of the 
war. However, it soon became clear that Mr. Begin's information from the Ministry of 
Defence was not altogether accurate48. This can be shown in Mr. Peres's 
statements after meetings with Mr. Begin. On 6th June Mr. Peres issued a 
statement after meeting Mr. Begin: 
This is purely a defensive action on our part. Israel has no territorial claims on 
Lebanon and its paramount interest must be to avoid a situation which would 
deteriorate into war-49. 
On 10th June after a second meeting with Mr. Begin and with the IDF in 
mountains around Beirut, Mr Peres declared that: 
I understand that there is no intention of conquering BeirutsO. 
It was at this point that the Labour Party stated to actively oppose the war 
and on 12th June issued the party issued confirmed this in the following statement: 
The Alignment opposes any attempt at using the IDF to impose political 
arrangements not included in the Government's declaration concerning the 
47 It was during this trip that Mr. Rabin made his remark about tightening the siege 
of Beirut by cutting off the water supply to the city. 
48 For an account of the information that Mr. Begin was receiving or not see Schiff 
and Ya'ari, Israel's Lebanon war. It became apparent that Mr. Begin had not been 
informed over major aspects of the aims of the war and the details of the price that 
Israel was paying. Mr. Meridor stated that Mr. Begin was led to believe that the war 
would be over in 48 hours at the most. 
Interview with Mr. Dan Meridor, Mr Begin's Cabinet Secretary, 17th October 1994. 
49 Statement issued by Mr. Peres, 6th June 1982, Labour Party Archives, Beit Berl. 
50 Address to the Press by Mr. Peres, 11th June 1982, Labour Party Archives, Beit 
Berl. 
127 
existence of a 40 km zone North of Israel kept free of the threat to Israel's 
security51. 
The Labour Party's attacks increased as the IDF entered Beirut and then after 
the massacres at Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps in September the party called 
for the resignation of Mr. Begin and Mr. Sharon and the setting up of an inquiry. 
This was confirmed in a statement by the Labour Party members of the Foreign 
Affairs and Defence Committee on 19th September: 
The Alignment expresses terrible shock and outrage at the terrible massacre 
committed in the Beirut refugee camps. The massacre harmed innocent people 
in a way that on one in Israel can nor will be able to bear. The Alignment calls 
upon the Prime Minister and Defence Minister to draw immediate personal 
conclusions because of their responsibility for what has happened in Lebanon 
and because of their decision to put lDF forces into West Beirut, in total 
contradiction of their promise. The Alignment calls for the immediate departure 
of the IDF from Beirut. The Alignment calls for the establishment of a legally 
appointed judicial inquiry commission52. 
There were two major restraints on the Labour Party which prevented the 
party from adopting a more radical approach to opposing the war, even after the 
rise of Peace Now, the mass rallies in Tel Aviv opposing the war and the growing 
public awareness that Israel could not win the war63. The first of these was the 
internal divisions within the party on the question of the war where there were three 
distinct groups: the 'objectors' who included the leading dove Mr. Yossi Sarid who 
opposed the war as a matter of principle and emphasised political solutions; the 
'reserved' which included both Mr. Peres and Mr. Rabin who supported the initial 
51 Statement issued by the Israel Labour on 12th June 1982, Labour Party Archives, 
Beit Berl. . 
52 19th September 1982, Statement from the Knesset Archive Library, The Knesset, 
Jerusalem. 
53 Of the last point Mr. Zeev Schiff argues that the war made it apparent to certain 
key parts of the intelligentsia, the military and security elites, the limit of Israel's 
power in imposing a solution on a third country or the PLO. This was therefore an 
important stage in the move towards peace. In short, the military plans of the likes of 
Mr. Eitan to defeat the PLO had failed. 
Interview with Mr Zeev Schiff, Military and Security Corespondent of Ha'aretz and 
co-author of Israel's Lebanon War, Tel Aviv, 25th November 1994. 
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stages of the war up to 40 km in to Lebanon; and finally 'the supporters' who 
included leading hawks such as Mr. Hillel who supported all the stages of the war. 
The continuing influence of this third group should not be under-estimated 
especially when taken in conjunction with the second restraint on the Labour Party 
response. This second restraint concerned the need for the party to court the 
Sephardim constituency54. The final group with its general hawkish tendencies 
supported the war thus making it more difficult for the Labour leadership to radically 
oppose it. Consequently, the leadership of the party had one eye on maintaining 
party unity and the other on the need to court electoral constituencies in order to 
return to power at the next Knesset elections55. 
The war marked the first major event in Israeli history where the Labour Party 
as a whole was forced to admit that its dominant position no longer existed. For 
much of the war the party was relegated to the position of a critical spectator with 
little or no influence on the conduct of the war. Even during the previous major 
event in Israeli history, the Camp David agreement, Mr. Begin had been forced to 
rely on the Labour Party to ratify the Accords in the Knesset. The Lebanon war 
which was conducted almost exclusively by Mr. Sharon helped to illustrate to both 
the Labour Party and to a lesser degree Israeli society that it was now a non-
dominant party without power. 
54 The leadership of the party after losing two elections was extremely sensitive to 
public opinion at this time. The importance of the strategy of trying to court the 
Sephardim constituency was confirmed in interviews conducted by the researcher 
for example, 
Interview with Mrs Daphna Sharfman, Chairperson of the Labour Party's Human 
Rights Committee, Haifa, 3rd August 1994. 
55 Mr. Lova Eliav argues that some of the elite were politically blinded by the desire 
for public popularity and perceiving the Israeli public to be hawkish they wanted to 
reflect this at almost all costs. 
Interview with Mr. Lova Eliav (Former Secretary General of the Labour Party), Tel 
Aviv, 25th July 1994. 
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Conclusion. 
The 1981 election and events between 1981 to 1984 confirmed that the 
Labour was no longer a dominant party but rather a non-dominant party operating 
without power. Unlike the party's defeat in 1977 the leadership understood this 
change in the party's position in Israeli politics and did not presume that the party 
would automatically return to power in 1984. In addition there was also a greater 
understanding within Israeli society (notably during the Lebanon war) that the party 
was no longer dominant. However, key parts of Israeli society (the Sephardim) still 
regarded the party as responsible for their continuing hardships even though the 
Likud had been in office since 1977. This in part confirms the blurred nature of 
power in Israel and in particular economic power with the continued influence of the 
Labour controlled Histadrut on the everyday life of the population. 
The Labour Party's responses and actions during this period were motivated 
by its desire to return to power. After the 1981 elections it was apparent that the 
Likud-led-block was numerically stronger than the Labour-led- block. Consequently, 
the leadership of the Labour Party moved to actively court new electoral 
constituencies such as the Sephardim. However, the Sephardim constituency was 
generally more hawkish in nature than the Labour Party. This Jed to leadership of 
the Labour Party with its increasingly pragmatic ideology to adopt a more hawkish 
position on the key issues of the day in order to attempt to attract this constituency. 
Hence at times such as the growing public protest against the Lebanon war when 
the party could have taken a radical stand against the polices of the Likud 
government, and in particular the Likud led goverments conduct of the Lebanon 
war, the Labour Party leadership felt restricted by its desire to win votes from this 
key constituency. 
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Clearly the success of the Labour Party's "catch all tactics" would be seen in 




THE NATIONAL UNITY YEARS 1984-1988 
The fonnation of the NUG which followed the Knesset election of 1984 
marked the next logical step in the development in the Labour Party. The party's 
participation in the NUG (1984-88) indicated that it was now a non-dominant party 
with a share of power operating in a competitive party system. Illustration Three 
summarises the development of the party between 1948 and 1988. 
3: Development of the Labour party 1948-1988. 
1948-1977: Dominant party with power 
I 
1977-1981: Dominant party without power 
I 
1981-1984: Non-Dominant party without power. 
I 
1984-1988: Non-Dominant party with a share of power 
The period between 1984 and 1988 also saw a maturing of the Israeli 
competitive party (block) system. Both of the major parties seemed to accept the 
relative state of near-parity between the two parties and functioned in a more 
nonnal manner for such a system. In short, there was no attempt by either the Likud 
or the Labour Party to portray itself as a dominant party operating within a dominant 
party system. However, within the Labour Party there was the continued presence 
132 
of the 'conditioning effects' of its pre-1977 dominant party status. These were 
clearly visible in the continuing importance of intra-party politics, the party's 
reactions to the events of the day and in its electoral positioning strategy. All of 
these are examined within the context of the 1984 Knesset election and the 
formation, performance, and consequences of the NUG. 
6.1: Background and Campaign for the 1984 Knesset Election. 
The Likud government was forced through the defection of the Tami party 
leader Mr. Aharon Abuhatzeira and his two colleagues to bring the election forward 
to July 1984, more than a year earlier than required by Israeli electoral Jaw1. The 
decision of Tami to bring down the government although widely reported to be due 
to a series of economic and social policy differences was due more to the 
increasing alienation of its highly dictatorial leader Mr. Abuhatzeira2. Mr. Begin had 
by this stage been replaced by the Jess charismatic Mr. Yitzhak Shamir, and the 
Defence Minister Mr. Sharon by Dr. Moshe Arens in a new-look Likud government. 
However, the two dominant issues of the day remained unchanged, the Lebanon 
war and the economic crisis (and in particular the hyper inflation which most 
1 Mr. Eli Dayan thinks that it was a major mistake for Tami to force the Likud into 
early elections as Tami's constituency was Sephardim and thus punished the party 
at the subsequent election for its role in bringing down the government. This is an 
important point in understanding the actions of the Shas party in the late 1980's 
onwards with regards to its support for the Likud and its reluctance to publicly back 
a Labour government if there was a possibility of a Likud-Jed administration. 
Interview with Mr. Eli Dayan, Former Mayor of Ashkelon (Tami), and Chairman of 
the Labour Party faction 1994, The Knesset, Jerusalem 8th November 1994. 
2 Mr. Abuhatzeira was a former MK from the NRP who left the party over what he 
claimed as the under-representation of Moroccans in the party, and established 
Tami in May 1981. Tami ran on a predominantly ethnic platform to close the 
economic gap between the Sephardim and Ashkenazim. In 1982 he was convicted 
of a felony and was sentenced to three months in prison. 
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economists saw as a long term consequence of Mr. Aridor's election economics of 
1981)3. 
In response to these issues the Labour Party produced an election manifesto 
which contained no big changes from the 1981 version. A paragraph was inserted 
about the Lebanon war calling for the need for security arrangements and a speedy 
withdrawal4. On economic issues the party decided that the electorate was not 
ready for the kind of shock therapy that economists were arguing was necessary to 
successfully deal with the crisis. On the settlements issue the party, careful for the 
need to court the generally hawkish Sephardim constituency, inserted a clause 
stating that no Jewish Settlement would be uprooted. The overall tone of the 
programme was in part set by this perceived need of the leadership to appeal to the 
Sephardim. Hence the party still said an explicit no to negotiations with the PLO. In 
addition, with regards to its economic programme it was unwilling to solve the crisis 
in a way which would in the short term reduce the standards of living of population, 
and particularly the lower income groups which are mainly Sephardims. 
3 Mr Begin resigned on 15th September 1983 primarily over his acceptance of 
responsibility for the casualties Israel took during the Lebanon war and also due to 
ill health and the death of his wife the previous November. 
Mr Sharon was forced to resign after the publication of Kahan Report (7th February 
1983) into the massacres at Sabra and Shailla refugee camps. 
For a detailed account of the history of the economic crisis see, Chapter Two of 
Shalev and Grinburg, "Histadrut-Government Relations and the Transition from A 
Likud to a National Unity Government. Continuity and Change in Israel's Economic 
Crisis", Discussion Paper. The Pinhas Sapir Centre For Development Tel Aviv 
University, October 1989. 
4 Mr. Rabin proposed for an IDF withdrawal within six months including the setting 
up of necessary security arrangements for Israel. 
Interview with Mr. Rabin, Spectrum, June-July 1984. 
5 Details of Manifesto are from the Labour Party's Programme for Government 
1984, Labour Party Headquarters, Offices of the Secretary General, Tel Aviv. 
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The Campaign in contrast to 1981 was one of the cleanest but dullest in 
memory with no single personality dominating the campaign6. _On the one hand this 
illustrated the maturing of the competitive party system with an acceptance by both 
of the major parties that they were functioning within such a system. On the other 
hand there was little in the way of meaningful debate on the major issues of the day 
during the 1984 cam.paign. Both parties agreed on the need for some kind of 
withdrawal from' Lebanon, presented similar economic packages and the Labour 
. Party adopted a hawkish approach to the future of the West Bank and Gaza in 
order to attract votes from the Sephardim constituency. 
The major event of the campaign was the television debate between Mr. 
Shamir and Mr. Peres in which Mr. Shamir called for a National Unity Government to 
be formed after the election. Such tactics were based on three considerations. It 
.~ 3 
looked highly unlikely that the Likud would win the election and the idea of a · 
National Unity Government was seen by Likud leaders as highly popular with the 
electorate. In addition Likud leaders felt that the party would attract more votes if 
people knew they were voting for the Likud to be strong in a NUG rather than if they 
were just voting for the Likud7. A more significant consideration was the relatively 
weak intra-party position of Mr. Shamir who had only assumed the premiership 
some nine months prior to the election and was facing considerable intra-party 
challenges from in particular Mr. David Le~. Mr. Shamir himself was a supporter of 
unity ancJ enlisting everyone into the big fight for Israel and thus his personal beliefs 
6 1sraeli commentators saw this. as a consequence of the absence of Mr. Begin and 
the relative agreement between the major parties on how to deal with the issues of 
the day, in contrast to the highly decisive 1981 campaign. 
7 This argument was outlined by Dr. Moshe Arens, Defence Minister who saw the 
move as a simple election strategy. 
Interview with Dr. Arens, Tel Aviv, 26th September 1994. 
8 The intra-party explanation for Mr. Shamir's action is supported by Dr. Yossi Ben-
Aharon, Director of Mr. Shamir's Prime Minister's Bureau. 
Interview with Dr. Ben Aharon, Jerusalem, 18th September 1994. 
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were an additional factor in the Likud calling for an NUG9. It is important to 
understand the motivations of the Likud in calling for a NUG for if it was simply an 
electoral ploy then it would have been more likely to find an excuse to leave the 
government at some future stage. In reality its participation in the NUG was primarily 
motivated by the intra-party considerations of Mr. Shamir which remained relatively 
unchanged in the period between 1984-88, ensuring the continuation of the NUG 
for its full tenn of office. 
Mr. Peres and the Labour Party rejected the calls for the fonnation of a NUG, 
believing during the campaign that they would win the election. The Labour Party 
enjoyed a healthy lead in opinion polls at the start of the campaign which peaked at 
the point of the television debate between Mr. Peres and Mr. Shamir and which 
despite Mr. Shamir's surprise call for a NUG Mr. Peres was perceived to have 
won10• However, problematically for the Labour Party after Mr. Peres's apparent 
success in the debate, there were signs that the Labour lead in the polls was 
9 1nterview with Mr. Yitzhak Shamir, Prime Minister 1983-83, 1986-1992, Tel Aviv 
17th August 1994. 
The depth of Mr. Shamir's personal belief in national unity is confinned by the fact 
that despite all the problems he encountered working with the Labour Party and Mr. 
Peres in particular he still views the NUG as a great success. 
Mr. Dan Meridor in agreeing with Mr. Shamir's explanation states that Mr. Shamir 
had made efforts prior to the election to fonn an NUG, but that elements of the 
Labour Party had leaked the details of the negotiations to the Media. Mr. Meridor 
who was one of Likud's negotiators at the talks therefore dismisses the idea of Mr. 
Arens that it was simply an electoral ploy. 
Interview with Mr. Meridor, The Knesset, 17th October 1994. 
1o The Labour Party had enjoyed a lead over the Likud in the polls from October 
1983 with the following figures being recorded: 
October 1983, Labour 54 seats, the Likud 40 seats, difference +14. 
December 1983, Labour 57 seats, the Likud 41 seats, difference +16. 
February 1984, Labour 61 seats, the Likud 37 seats, difference +24. 
March 1984, Labour 51 seats, the Likud 36 seats, difference +15. 
June 1984, Labour 53 seats, the Likud 38 seats, difference +15. 
July 1984, Labour 47 seats, Likud 37 seats, difference +10. 
The polls were commissioned for the Jerusalem Post and Ha'aretz daily 
newspapers and were published in Ha'aretz on 20th July 1984. 
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eroding during the last week of the campaign, an indication which was eventually 
confirmed by the results11. 
6.2: A Statistical Analysis of the 1984 Knesset Election Results. 
The elections were held on 23rd July 1984 and produced the following results; 
Table 6.1: Number of Seats Each Party Won and The Respective Blocks. 





















In addition to the above Yahad led by Mr. Ezer Weizman won 4 seats and 
Kach the extreme nationalist party won 1 seat. 
11 Professor Diskin, the Labour Party Pollster in 1984 confirmed this change for 
which the explanations of are examined in 6.3. 
Interview with Professor Diskin, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 14th November 
1994. 
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Table 6.2: Voting By Geographical District in the 1984 Knesset Elections. 
Alignment Percentage of Valid Votes 
9b! % of Sephardim Alignment vote in 1984 
Haifa (23.9) 43.0 
Dimona (83.4) 22.6 
Kiryat Gat (69.2) 29.7 
Ramie (67.8) 27.3 
OrYehuda (66.2) 16.7 
Givatayim (22.8) 48.8 
Likud Percentage of Valid Votes 
9!i % of Sephardim Likud Vote in 1984 
Haifa (23.9) 27.4 
Dimona (83.4) 49.5 
Kiryat Gat (69.2) 44.1 
Ramie (67.8) 49.4 
OrYehuda (66.2) 52.8 
Givatayim (22.8) 24.8 
Note that in 1984 the Alignment consisted of the ILP and Mapam. 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Results to the 11th Knesset 
Elections, Jerusalem. 
138 
Table 6.3: The Arab Vote in the 1984 Elections in Percent. 





Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem. 
Table 6.4: The IDF Vote in the 1984 Elections in Percent. 
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Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem 
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Out of a potential2,654,613 voters some 2,091,402 votes were cast (78.8%) 
with each party needing to win a minimum of 16,786 votes to win a seat. No clear 
party emerged as a clear winner in the elections, but with thirteen smaller parties 
passing the electoral threshold, and winning a total of 35 seats between them, it 
became more difficult for either the Likud or the Labour Party to form a winning 
coalition. This was compounded for the Labour Party by Mr. Peres's reluctance to 
form a coalition which relied on the support of the Arab parties. The election, while 
not representing a triumph for the Likud and Mr. Shamir, did at least consolidate its 
position in the post-1977 competitive party system. The fact that it emerged at a 
level of near-parity at inter-block level despite all the problems of the war in 
Lebanon, the economic crisis and the loss of its charismatic leader (Mr. Begin) 
confirmed that it's status of a non-dominant party competing for power would not 
change in the foreseeable future. 
At inter-block level the Likud at first appeared to be in a strong position, but 
the decision of Mr. Weizman and Yahad to join the Labour block effectively meant 
that the blocks were tied at 60:6012. In addition, Mr. Shamir made it clear that he 
would not form a government which relied on the support of the extreme Kach party 
and its leader Mr. Meir Kahane13. The increase in support for the smaller parties 
was an illustration of the growing polarisation of Israeli society, notably in the wake 
12 Mr Weizman and Yahad occupied the pivotal position, but Mr Weizman did not 
exploit this when he announced in public after the election that he had left the Likud 
for ideological reasons and would not return to it. 
13 In practice Mr. Shamir would not have needed to use Kach to remain in power. 
Under Israeli electoral if Mr. Peres failed to form a government (as appeared likely) 
then Mr. Shamir's previous Likud government would have remained in office until 
new elections were organised. By general agreement this process could have taken 
a year or more. However, the Likud did not consider the election as a major vote of 
confidence in Mr. Shamir therefore with the loss of seven Knesset seats Israeli 
commentators argues that it would have been likely that even if he had remained as 
a caretaker Prime Minister he would have faced an intra-party challenge to his 
leadership. 
Interview with Hanan Crystal, Political Corespondent of Israel Radio and Hadashot, 
Tel Aviv, 4th September 1994. 
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of the Lebanon war that led more voters to seek radical solutions to the issues of 
the day from the alternative parties than the major two. The increased influence of 
these smaller parties (with the 60:60 tie) became an additional reason in the 
fonnation of a NUG as both Mr. Peres and Mr. Shamir were reluctant to pay the high 
price the religious parties in particular were demanding14. 
6.2.1: An Analysis of the Labour Perfonnance in the 1984 Election. 
The Labour Party did not view the election as a victory despite the fact that it 
won three more seats than the Likud15. The election reflected the failure of the 
party's "catch all tactics" .Table 6.2 indicates that support for the party among in the 
predominantly Sephardim towns remained low. Conversely, the Likud continued to 
out-perfonn the Labour Party in these areas as well as winning the plurality of the 
vote in Jerusalem16. The Labour Party continued to draw support from its traditional 
constituency of mainly Ashkenazim areas such as Haifa and Givatayim and from the 
older generation groups. Such results were extremely disappointing for the 
leadership and Mr. Peres in particular who had invested a tremendous effort into 
courting the Sephardim vote. However, Table 6.2 does not reveal the late shift away 
from the Labour Party by the Sephardim nor the probable explanation for the last 
minute swing back to the Likud by the Sephardim which cost the Labour Party 
victory. 
14 1n Israeli coalition politics the fact that the smaller parties increased their number 
of seats in the Knesset was not as important as the 60:60 tie between the blocks in 
assessing their level of influence. Hence if one of the major two parties had a clear 
majority then the negotiating position of the smaller parties would have been 
substantially reduced even if the number of seats the smaller parties won increased. 
15 1nterview with Dr. Yossi Beilin, The Foreign Ministry, Jerusalem, 29th August 
1994. 
Dr. Beilin also conceded that most people in the Labour Party now cannot 
remember that the party actually won three more seats that the Likud. In short, 
historically the result of the election is viewed as a tie. 
16 Likud won 33.9% of the vote in Jerusalem to the Alignments 24%. 
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Results of internal party polling by the Labour Party during the last week of 
the campaign were summarised by the chief pollster in one word "collapse"17. The 
polling was particularly devastating for it indicated that many of the voters who had 
voted for the Likud in 1981, and who had previously stated their preference for the 
Alignment in 1984 were returning to the Likud18. This group accounted for around 
three percent of the electorate, were of Sephardim origin and were thus crucial to 
the outcome of the election. Diskin explained this change on two levels. The decline 
in the popularity of Mr. Peres who after the television debate was preferred to Mr. 
Shamir as future Prime Minister by a margin of three to two, but who by the last 
week of the campaign was not even the most popular Alignment candidate for 
Prime Minister19. 
The decline in the popularity of Mr. Peres is difficult to explain. There was no 
major event during the last week of the campaign which could have damaged his 
personal level of support. It therefore appears to confirm the irrationality of the 
attitude of the Sephardim to Mr. Peres which was discussed in Chapter 5. Diskin 
viewed this irrationality as the additional level of explanation for the Alignments 
problems or put simply the "Peres excuse factor". In short, Mr. Peres with his 
previously described image problem was used as a reason by the floating voters, 
particularly those from lower income Sephardim backgrounds, not to transfer their 
17 Crucially this key report dated 15th July 1984 (eight days prior to the election) 
was censored by the Campaign Manager Mr. Gur who merely cut out the bad news 
from the report before showing it to Mr. Peres. 
Interview with Professor Diskin, Labour Party Pollster 1984, Hebrew University 
Jerusalem, 14th November 1984. 
An account of the censoring of the Report appears in Diskin, Elections and Voters in 
Israel, p158-161. 
18 1n Labour Party telephone polling 19 out of 48 former Likud supporters who had 
stated that they would support the Alignment in 1984 continued to hesitate until the 
last minute when the voted for the Likud only after 6 PM on election day. 
Internal party Polling 1984, Labour Party Headquarters, Tel Aviv. 
19 Internal party polling indicated that Mr. Navon was the most popular Alignment 
candidate with 22 percent then Mr. Rabin with 15 percent and Mr. Peres by this time 
was the favoured candidate of only 7 percent. 
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support to the Alignment. In reality a more probable explanation for this reluctance 
of the Sephardim was the strength of the voters' previous emotional commitment to 
the Likud together with a continued suspicion of the Alignment. There was also a 
feeling that the Alignment was going to win the election anyway therefore a vote for 
the Likud did not carry the same significance as in 198120. 
Overall the performance of the Labour Party confirmed that it had become a 
party which enjoyed a continuing high degree of support from its traditional 
constituencies, but importantly did not enjoy access to all stratas of society as it had 
done during its period as a dominant party. Consequently the election results 
confirmed its status as a non-dominant party operating within a competitive party 
(block) system. The one variable in its position within the party system was now 
whether it was with or without power or as in the post-1984 period with a share of 
power. 
The result was extremely damaging personally to Mr. Peres who was viewed, 
either fairly or unfairly, as an electoral liability among the party's key target groups of 
the lower income I Sephardim groups. Mr. Peres intra-party standing suffered 
accordingly and his actions after the election were to a large degree motivated by 
the need to secure his own leadership of the party against potential challenges from 
Mr. Rabin and Mr. Navon. 
20 The first of these explanations is emphasised by Professor Diskin and the second 
by Dr. Moshe Arens. 
Interviews with the above, 26th September 1994 and 14th November 1994. 
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6.3: The Formation and Consequences of the National Unity Government 
(NUG). 
In truth the Labour Party had little choice but to agree to the fonnation of a 
NUG after the election. Mr. Weizman's Yahad party was against the fonnation of a 
narrow-based Labour-led government which relied on the support of the Arab 
parties making it extremely difficult for the Labour Party to fonn such a government 
even if they had desired. However, Mr. Peres himself was against the fonnation of 
such a government for the principal reason that he believed that a government with 
a Jewish majority was necessary in order to withdraw the JDF from Lebanon. This in 
part also reflected the pre-1977 dominant status of the party. The Labour Party 
which saw itself as the builder and founder of the Zionist state was extremely 
reluctant to rely on the votes of non-Zionist parties to provide it with a winning 
coalition. There was also a fear that the Likud would be quick to exploit the 
economic difficulties that such a government would have faced as it attempted to 
deal with economic crisis21. Mr. Peres views were widely representative of the 
Labour Party at the time. Even the leading young doves accepted (in retrospect) the 
need to join such a government in order to deal with the Lebanon and economic 
crisis with only Mr. Yossi Sarid leaving the party over the decision to participate in 
the NUG22• 
Mr. Peres had strong intra-party motivations for at least securing a share of 
government in order to protect his position as leader of the party. He needed to 
secure positions in the government for his clients. The patron-client system of elite 
21 The Likud had similar motivations in tenns of economic policy for joining an NUG 
for they needed the Labour Party and its control of the Histadrut to help with the 
implementation of economic policy. 
Interview with Hanan Crystal, 4th September 1994. 
22 This point was made clear in interviews with Mr. Burg, Dr. Beilin. Mr. Zvilli and Mr. 
Merom, Ibid. At the time Dr. Beilin opposed the fonnation of the NUG but still 
accepted the position as Mr. Peres's Cabinet Secretary in the government. 
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control (described in 2.3) was a product of both the electoral system and the 
extended period of time when the party was seen as a dominant party. 
Consequently, Mr. Peres's need to gain at least a share in government to protect his 
intra-party position was related to the continued "conditioning effect' of the party's 
past dominant position. In addition, the fact that Mr. Peres failed to win the 1981 
election meant that he also needed to provide jobs for his potential leadership rivals 
in order to prevent them from mounting a challenge to his leadership. Mr. Rabin 
had made it clear that his price for not challenging Mr. Peres was the Defence 
Ministry. Mr. Navon likewise agreed to settle for a major portfolio in the Cabinet as 
the price of his support for Mr. Peres's leadership. 
To some extent the complex negotiations which took place after the election 
between Labour and the Likud gave Mr. Peres some badly needed intra-party 
breathing space by in effect postponing any contest over the leadership of the 
party23. As a result of the negotiations Mr. Peres secured a rotation agreement for 
the position of Prime Minister and the Defence Ministry for the entire four year 
period of the government as well as an equal division of the remaining 24 Portfolios 
between the Likud block and the Labour block (see Appendix 3a)24_ In addition to 
23 Any leadership challenge at a time when Mr. Peres was conducting coalition talks 
with the Likud would have been seen as weakening his negotiation position and 
consequently that of the Labour Party's. Mr. Peres has employed this tactic after 
each of the party's election defeats as he attempted to make it seem possible that 
he has a chance of forming a coalition. In 1984 this was vital as it is generally 
viewed that had either of Mr. Rabin or Mr. Navon challenged at this time they would 
probably have been successful. 
Dr. Korn argues strongly that this was in particular Mr. Rabin's opportunity to 
challenge Mr. Peres and his failure to do so was a grave mistake. 
Interview with Dr. Korn, Tel Aviv, 13th September 1994. 
24 The price Mr. Peres paid for his intra-party need to secure to secure the Defence 
Ministry for Mr. Rabin was a rotation agreement with Mr. Shamir in which Mr. Peres 
would serve as Prime Minister for the first 24 months of the NUG with Mr. Shamir as 
Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. After 24 months the roles would be 
reversed and Mr. Shamir would become Prime Minister an Mr. Peres Foreign 
Minister. Mr. Shamir agreed to Mr. Peres serving as Prime Minister for the first 
period because the Labour Party was the largest single party in the Knesset. In 
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this an Inner-Cabinet was created consisting of 10 Ministers (5 from Labour and 5 
from the Likud). 
The agreement which formed the basis of the NUG, as well as reflecting the 
immediate priorities of withdrawal from Lebanon and the need for and IMF-type 
solution to economic crisis, contained a series of compromises on other aspects of 
policy especially the settlements issue25. The agreement called for the 
establishment of six new settlements during the governmenfs first year with a 
possible 21 more if finances permitted. Consequently restrictions on settlements 
were dealt with not on ideological grounds, but rather on the financial resources 
available26. In addition it was also decided that all decisions on the future size and 
scale of the settlement programme would be taken within the Inner-Cabinet (a clear 
attempt to keep the divisive debate within elite control). Mr Peres eventually 
presented the NUG to the Knesset on 13th September 1984 and won a vote of 
confidence by 98 votes in favour to 18 against. 
The consequences for the Israeli left of the NUG became clear almost 
immediately with the decision of Mapam to leave the Alignment (September 1984) 
addition, he felt that it would be easier for Mr. Peres to withdraw the IOF from 
Lebanon. 
Both Mr. Shamir and Mr. Peres were so concerned about challenges to their 
leadership of their respective parties that the agreed document uses their names 
and not the term leader of the Labour Party or Likud: see Appendix 3(a) NUG 
Agreement 1984-88). 
Mr. Shamir exacted a heavy price from Mr. Peres for giving the defence Portfolio to 
Labour for the entire duration of the government because Dr. Moshe Arens the 
Likud candidate for the post was a close political ally of Mr. Shamir was extremely 
reluctant to give up the post for the four year duration of the government. 
Interview with Dr. Moshe Arens, Tel Aviv, 26th September 1994. 
25 For the complete document see Appendix 3(a). 
26 For a detailed account of this see Schuldiner, "Israel's National Unity", MERIP 
Reports, January 1985, p21. 
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and return to opposition27. The vote of 300 Mapam Central Committee members in 
favour with only six dissenting illustrated the strength of feeling in Mapam against 
joining the Likud in government2B. This split marked a realignment in the Israeli left 
with the Labour leadership drifting further towards the right in pursuit of government, 
while Mapam started to offer an alternative path to the Labour Party culminating in 
its more radical manifesto document for the 1988 Knesset election29. This period 
also marked the start of attempts to forge a new party of the left uniting Mapam, 
Ratz and parts of the peace movement which culminated in the formation of Meretz 
in 1992. 
The leaders of Mapam accused the Labour Party of putting the peace process 
back 10 years with its participation in the NUG and argued that the Labour Party 
should have either attempted to form a narrow based left of centre government or 
returned to opposition30. They stressed that the Labour Party was obsessed by 
power which had its origins in its extended period of dominance. In short, if there 
was any opportunity to return to government (or even a share of government) the 
27 On the formation of the NUG Mapam became the single largest opposition party 
with six seats in the Knesset. The size of the NUG at times made effective 
opposition difficult, but Mapam at times were joined by dissenting Labour MK's in 
Knesset debates. 
2Binterview with Mr. Jaffe, Kibbutz Hakum, 28th August 1994. 
Mr. Jaffe was not surprised by the overwhelming vote as during Mapam's 
Convention in 1983 a similar motion to leave the Alignment had been defeated by 
only 17 votes with the majority of the leadership voting against the continuation of 
the Alignment. However, at this Convention the Central Committee set the red line 
of not joining a NUG which included the Likud. 
29 For a detailed analysis of this see, Mapam Direct Line from Israel, November-
December 1984, p4. 
By 1988 Mapam had accepted the principle of direct negotiations with the PLO 
providing that they accepted UN Resolutions 242 and 338 thus making it the first 
Zionist party to be willing to talk to the PLO. In addition Mapam, under certain 
conditions, accepted the notion of an independent Palestinian state, something that 
the Labour Party still has not publicly done. Consequently, Mapam's 1988 manifesto 
was seen as a radical departure from that of the Labour Party. 
30 Interview with Mr. Victor Shemtov, Leader of Mapam 1984, Tel Aviv, 12th July 
1994. 
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party would seize it31. However, others in Mapam understood the need of the 
Labour Party to join a NUG for a least two years in the national interest to help 
organise the withdrawal from Lebanon and deal with the economic crisis32. 
The Labour Party's participation had two important consequences for the 
party itself. The damage to the Labour Party parliamentary faction was limited to the 
loss of Mr. Sarid. However, within three months of the agreement there were clear 
signs of the emergence of a strong dovish element within the parliamentary party 
with the new Secretary General of the Party, Mr. Baram, as its unofficial head33. Mr. 
Baram used his new position to articulate his dovish views which were sometimes in 
direct contrast to the party leader Mr. Peres who himself was restrained by being 
head of a government which included the Likucf34. 
Highly significant in the longer term was the growing independence of the 
parliamentary party from the leadership. In short, with a government that enjoyed a 
majority as large as the NUG's (it occupied as many as 85 seats in the 120 seat 
Knesset) it was clear that some of the opposition would originate from within the 
Labour Party itself. While the leadership worked out compromises with the Likud in 
order to maintain the government the backbench MK's continued to emphasise the 
differences between themselves and the Likud (particularly on the peace process). 
In terms of voting such a large majority meant that there were ample opportunities 
31 Ibid. 
32 1nterview with Mr. Yossi Gazit, Spokesman for Mapam, Party Headquarters, Tel 
Aviv, 17th August 1994. 
33 The loss of Mr. Sarid should not be under-estimated as he had served as Mr. 
Sapir's right hand man and was a former leader of the Young Guard of the party. 
Mr. Sa rid had been influential in Mr. Rabin becoming Prime Minister in 197 4. He 
was largely viewed as the man who convinced Mr. Sapir and the party machine to 
support Mr. Rabin's candidature. 
34 Mr. Baram saw the development of a strong dovish group in the Labour Party as 
beneficial to inter-party conflict in that Mr. Peres when negotiating over policy with 
Mr. Shamir could express the pressure he was under from the doves. This was 
much in the same way that Mr. Shamir made constant references to the pressure he 
was under from the right at these policy meetings. 
Interview with Mr. Baram, Spectrum, March 1985, p21-22. 
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for the leadership to allow the Mk's to 'let off steam' in votes where the 
government's majority was assured. An analysis of the Knesset voting records 
between 1984 and 1988 does not reveal an excess number of rebellions by Labour 
MK's, but as this period was relatively unique it is difficult to make valid numerical 
comparisons with previous Knesset's35. However, it was made clear in interviews 
conducted by the researcher that the formation of NUG did indeed lead to a greater 
distance between the leadership and the parliamentary party which helped create 
the climate for a degree of internal democratisation within the party36. Mr. Lova Eliav 
summarised this change in ideological terms as the leadership becoming more 
hawkish while the parliamentary party became more outspokenly dovisl"t37. It is 
important to stress that this distancing of the elite and the Labour Mk's did not 
transform the party overnight, but rather created the conditions for some of the 
changes which took place from 1988 onwards. 
35 The researcher wishes to thank Knesset records for attempting such numerical 
analysis of the voting records of Labour Party Mk's. 
36 1nterview with Mr. Nissim Zvilli, Secretary General of the Labour Party 1994, The 
Knesset, Jerusalem, 5th September 1994. 
Dr. Yossi Beilin while agreeing with that the NUG led to a break down in party 
discipline argues that the distancing in effect started earlier while the party was in 
opposition 1977-1984 and that the most important aspect of this was over the future 
status of the territories. 
Interview with Dr. Yossi Beilin, Deputy Foreign Minister, Foreign Ministry, Jerusalem, 
29th August 1994. 
Dr. Yoram Peri adds that the weakening of party discipline that took place at this 
time provided a direct opportunity for continued internal democratisation of the party 
which had started with the Rabin-Peres Central Committee contest for the 
leadership in 197 4. 
Interview with Dr. Peri, Editor of Davar, Tel Aviv, 1st August 1994. 
37 1nterview with Mr. Lova Eliav, Former Secretary General of the Labour Party, Tel 
Aviv, 25th July 1994. 
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6.4: Performance of the NUG and Issues of the Day. 
The performance of the NUG needs to be examined in two parts first, the 
NUG Jed by Mr. Peres which served from 1984-86, and second, the NUG Jed by Mr. 
Shamir which was in office from 1986-88. In general terms the performance, 
organisation and degree of co-operation between the parties was much greater and 
more successful in the first period than after the rotation agreement. There were a 
number of reasons for this: the impressive performance of Mr. Peres during his time 
as Prime Minister, the clear political goals of dealing with the economic crisis and 
the Lebanon which dominated the agenda for the first 24 months as well as the 
acceptance of Mr. Shamir as Mr. Peres's number two in the governmenf38. 
However, there was a major source of tension present during these two years which 
occupied the minds of the both the Likud and the Labour parties. This concerned 
the uncertainty over whether Mr. Peres would renege on the rotation deal and not 
hand over power to Mr. Shamir as agreed in 1986. Consequently, it needs to be 
stressed that there was a high degree of mistrust within the government during this 
first period, but that these difficulties were much Jess significant than those which 
afflicted the post-rotation period (1986-88). The problems which dogged the latter 
period were caused the Likud claimed by Mr. Peres's reluctance to play a similar 
role to that which Mr. Shamir had occupied in the pre-rotation period, and the 
38 For a positive appraisal of Mr. Peres's performance as Prime Minister see for 
example, Lewis, "Israel: The Peres Era and its Legacy", in Foreign Affairs, 65, 3, 
1987. 
Mr. Shamir himself accepts that Mr. Peres operated much better when he was in 
charge or number one. However, Mr. Shamir still found him nearly impossible to 
work with under any circumstance and in particular that Mr. Peres did not 
understand the meaning of the word partnership. 
Interview with Mr. Yitzhak Shamir, 17th August 1994. 
Mr. Shamir's took the meaning of a secondary role in the government's first two 
years to such an extent that the Israeli media dubbed him "the invisible man". 
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Labour Party's attempt to push the peace process beyond the previously agreed 
boundaries of NUG policy39. 
6.4.1: National Unity Government 1984-1986. 
The success of the first two years of the government can be measured by the 
fact that it withdrew the IDF from an increasingly hostile environment in Southern 
Lebanon and dealt effectively with the economic crisis. Much of the credit for these 
achievements went to the two senior Labour Party Ministers, Mr. Rabin for the 
withdrawal and Mr. Peres for his handling of the economic crisis. The high opinion 
poll rating of both these Ministers confirmed that the Israeli public likewise perceived 
Mr. Peres and Mr. Rabin as the most highly effective Ministers in the government«>. 
The Cabinet decision to withdraw from Lebanon (13th January 1985) marked 
the first real achievement of the NUG and was widely welcomed in lsrae!41. The 17 
to 8 vote in the Cabinet was an illustration of both the political skills of Mr. Peres and 
39 In interviews conducted with the leaders of Ukud they all stress that the major 
problem of the post rotation period was the behaviour of Mr. Peres. 
Interview with Mr. Shamir, Dr. Arens, Dr. Ben-Aharon. 
This concentration on the personality of Mr. Peres is a further example of the 
personality oriented nature of Israeli politics 
40 The performance ratings of the key Ministers in the government commissioned by 
the Jerusalem Post and published on 28th June 1986 and 4th October 1986 confirm 
this. 
August 1984: Mr. Peres 62, Mr. Rabin 65, Mr. Navon 55, Mr. Shamir 48, Mr. Levy 
48, Mr. Sharon 36. 
March 1986: Mr. Peres 74, Mr. Rabin 71, Mr. Navon, Mr. Shamir 51, Mr. Levy 37. 
Mr. Sharon 31. 
May 1986: Mr. Peres 79, Mr. Rabin 73, Mr. Navon 61, Mr. Shamir 59, Mr. Levy 43, 
Mr. Sharon 36. 
The above figures in percentages represent the number of good ratings for 
Ministers in their respective jobs. 
41 For Israeli reaction to the withdrawal see for example Abramovitz, "A Good Week 
in Politics", Ma'ariv, 18th January 1985. The Israeli press in general gave a cautious 
welcome to the proposed withdrawal. Ben-Porat in Yediot Ahronot saw it as a major 
victory for Mr. Peres (18th January 1985). Goodman in the Jerusalem Post argued 
that the war had lasted too long, cost too much and achieved too little (18th January 
1985). Samet writing in Ha'aretz saw the withdrawal as coming to terms with the 
limitations of Israel's military strength (17th January 1985). 
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Mr. Rabin, and the widespread feeling away from the Likud that Israel's northern 
border could be adequately protected by arrangements drawn up by Mr. Rabin 
which included the setting up of a security zone to be controlled by the Israeli 
supported Southern Lebanese Army (SLA)42_ The Likud opposed the withdrawal, 
but Mr. Peres and Mr. Rabin were careful to attempt to negotiate a solution with the 
Syrians and Lebanese. When this failed they sought to gain support for a unilateral 
withdrawal from the Israeli military establishment. Upon receiving this support they 
made sure that they had the support of all the Labour Ministers and then convinced 
the minority parties notably the NRP and Shas, thus ensuring a government majority 
in favour of the withdrawal. Mr. Peres however, was keen to avoid a direct Labour-
Likud split on this fundamental issue and so he looked for support from within the 
Likud. After much speculation Mr. Levy and Mr. Patt from the Likud did eventually 
vote in favour of withdrawal giving Mr. Peres a larger than expected majority43. 
Along with the Lebanon withdrawal the economic crisis represented the first 
major challenge for the NUG. At the time of the establishment of the NUG inflation 
was running out of control at an annual rate of around 500 percent and had been in 
42 The mechanisms employed by Mr. Peres and Mr. Rabin to win withdraw the IDF 
from Lebanon are an excellent of their intra-party and inter-party abilities when they 
choose to work together. 
43 Mr. Levy's motivations for voting with the Labour Party were in part dictated by 
intra-party considerations in that he wished to damage Mr. Shamir and in particular 
Mr. Sharon. Mr. Levy who once described himself as an "opinion poll on two legs" 
was also aware of the popularity of such a move within Israeli society. 
Opinion polls commissioned at the time confirm that the majority of Israelis were in 
favour of a withdrawal for example a Modi'in Ezrahi poll published in Ma'ariv (3rd 
February 1985) revealed that 33.7% favoured a withdrawal to the international 
border with the necessary security measures. A further 15.5% called for an 
unconditional withdrawal and 23.9 accepted the idea of a partial withdrawal. A 
further 17.1% opposed a pullback until agreements were reached with Syria and 
Lebanon, but importantly only 5.5 percent wanted the IDF to remain indefinitely in its 
then current position. 
For a more detailed statistical analysis of the Israeli majority in favour of withdrawal 
in 1984 see, Arian, "Israeli Public Opinion and the War in Lebanon", p8, JCSS 
Memorandum 15, October 1985. 
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the three digit bracket since 1979. However, Israel's runaway inflation was merely 
an expression of deeper social and economic problems which manifested 
themselves in balance of payments problems and increasing foreign and domestic 
debts44. The import-surplus which under the Likud had reached a record $5 billion in 
1983-84 was still running at $4 billion in 1985 and was unsustainable. The foreign 
debt of $20 billion in 1983 was growing at a rate of 7 percent per annum making 
Israel one of the world's major debtors45. 
In securing the positions of Prime Minister and Defence Minister the Labour 
Party had in effect sacrificed the Finance Ministry to the Likud, but Mr. Peres and 
the Labour Party knew that the party would be judged on its ability to restore some 
order to the economy46. Hence Mr. Peres took it upon himself to largely determine 
economic policy during his premiership with the help of Labour's Minister of 
Economics Mr. Ya'acobi, at times by-passing the Likud Finance Minister Mr. 
Moda'i47_ The major aims of the economic policy which emerged after long and bitter 
debates within the Cabinet were twofold: to restrict wage increases and freeze 
prices through a series of package deals between the government, the Histadrut 
and the Manufacturers Association. In addition, during the summer of 1985 the 
government introduced an austerity programme (Emergency Stabilisation Plan) with 
the aim of making realistic cuts in budget expenditure which both the Labour and 
44 Barkai, "Israel's Attempt at Economic Stabilisation", Jerusalem Quarterly, Summer 
1987. 
45 Statistical Abstract of Israel, Various Editions, Central Bureau of Statistics, 
Jerusalem. 
46 Interview with Dr. Robbie Nathanson Director of the Institute of Economic and 
Social Research, The Histadrut, Tel Aviv, 29th July 1994. 
47 Mr. Peres's dominant role in dealing with the economy was confirmed by Dr. 
Nathanson the Senior Histadrut economist involved in the negotiations over the 
Package Deals. 
Interview with Dr. Robbie Nathanson, Ibid. 
Mr. Moda'i was eventually sacked by Mr. Peres in April 1986 after speaking out 
against government policy and personally criticising Mr. Peres. His removal caused 
a major crisis in the NUG which almost led to its collapse 
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Likud parties accepted were only short-term measures aimed at reducing the level 
of the initial crisis. The more fundamental economic problem was found in the 
Zionist institutional structures which instead of allowing production to determine the 
standard of living permitted the flow of capital to do so48. In attempting to redress 
this balance the government announced its intention to introduce a programme of 
economic liberalisation with four basic aims. These were to liberalise Israel's capital 
markets, to reduce the governments highly interventionist role in the economy, the 
encouragement of greater competition within the domestic market, and the sale of 
state of state-owned enterprises49. 
In order to reduce the impact upon the poor sectors of the population (the key 
electoral target constituency for the Labour Party), Mr. Peres needed support from 
America to balance the budget cutting with a financial safety net. The aid package 
which was agreed upon provided Israel with an additional package of $1.3 billion 
linked to commitments to devaluation, a reduction in wage increases, and a 
substantial reduction in government subsidies. A further package of $1.5 billion was 
to be forthcoming if Israel implemented a package which had been jointly agreed by 
the Americans and Mr. Peres which became known as 'Stein's Ten Points'. This 
package was followed by further budget cuts in 1986, but by the time Mr. Peres 
handed over power to Mr. Shamir the Labour Party had returned to the norm of 
making promises of financial assistance to public sector industries and Histadrut 
companies which were experiencing financial troubles thus abandoning the austerity 
programme. 
48 Murphy, "Structural Inhibitions to Economic Liberalisation in Israel", Middle East 
Journal, 48-1, Winter 1994. 
49 Dr. Nathanson argues that this was only a proclamation to keep the Americans 
happy and that at the time the Histadrut (a major target of the privatisation 
programme) was much stronger and able to resist attempts at privatisation. 
Interview with Dr. Nathanson, 29th July 1994. 
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Mr. Peres's motivations for abandoning the austerity programme said much 
about the continuing influence of the Histadrut within the Labour Party. The 
Histadrut leaders demanded that after two years of it having made sacrifices, Mr. 
Peres should now strengthen its position among the workers by supplying the 
finance to prevent the prospect of increased unemployment from the troubled 
Histadrut-owned companies such as Koor and Solei Boneh which were heavily in 
debt. Importantly they demanded that this be done before the less accommodating 
Mr. Shamir assumed office. 
Overall, although the long-term economic value of the original package deals 
was questionable, in the short-term the deals and the ESP proved extremely 
popular with the population. The fact that they produced price stability and relative 
economic calm benefited the popularity standings of both Mr. Peres and the Labour 
Party. Correspondingly when the economy entered into recession in 1987 it was 
under a Likud Prime Minister60. Clearly the Labour Party's historical control of the 
Histadrut had helped make the implementation of the various deals a realistic 
prospect. However, it was this same link and the influence of the Histadrut within the 
party itself that contributed to their abandonment in the long-term. 
Mr. Peres disappointed many in the Labour Party by implementing the rotation 
agreement in 1986, but in truth he had little choice in the matter as the other 
alternatives were fraught with danger. Mr. Peres had clearly established himself as 
a successful Prime Minister and could have therefore with his personal and the 
Labour Party's popularity rating high in the opinion polls called for new elections51. 
50 In polls commissioned for the Jerusalem Post the Labour Party enjoyed a 
considerable lead over the Likud from 1985 to 1987 averaging around 40 percent of 
the vote to an average of 26 percent for the Likud. See, Jerusalem Post, 7th 
September 1985, 28th June 1986, 4th October 1986 and 9th May 1987. 
51 As previously described Mr. Peres's time as Prime Minister was viewed as 
extremely successful by most Israeli commentators. However, it needs to be 
remembered that Mr. Peres operated within a rotation situation where Mr. Shamir 
was extremely careful not to challenge Mr. Peres for fear that Mr. Peres would be 
155 
However, in such circumstances the party may have been defeated because the 
electorate thought it unfair that the party had avoided implementing the rotation 
agreement. Also there was a clear majority among the electorate that wished to see 
the maintenance of the NUG in preference to other forms of government52. Mr. 
Peres's other alternatives were even more limited in that he could not have formed 
a narrow based Labour-led government as the religious parties were unwilling to 
participate in such a government. All of these factors forced Mr. Peres to keep the 
rotation agreement and hand over power to Mr. Shamir in October 198653. 
6.4.2: National Unity Government 1986-1988. 
The post-rotation government led by Mr. Shamir with Mr. Peres serving as 
Foreign Minister was dominated by the peace process together with the issues and 
events arising from it. Consequently, this NUG was characterised by a sense of 
paralysis caused by the major differences between the Labour and the Likud on the 
conduct of the peace process and by the state of parity within the Inner-Cabinet and 
given an excuse to break the rotation agreement. This would have prevented Mr. 
Shamir from assuming office in 1986. In short, Mr. Shamir had a strong intra-party 
motivation for controlling the more radical elements in the Likud and allowing Mr. 
Peres and the Labour Party its successes. For a detailed account of the politics of 
rotation see; Korn, The National Unity Years 1984-1990, (in Hebrew). 
52 Opinion polls conducted at the time indicated that majority of the electorate 
wished to see the rotation agreement kept. For example a Hanoch Smith poll 
published in the Jerusalem Post (7th April 1986) found that 54 percent wanted to 
keep the rotation agreement. Also Dahaf polls conducted in 1985 to 1986 revealed 
the majority of the electorate favoured the NUG over any other form of government 
with the results varying between 59 to 66 percent in favour of the NUG. 
53 Up until the last minute there was concern in the Likud that Mr. Peres would not 
keep the agreement and would call early elections. 
Interview with Dr. Ben-Aharon, Director of Mr. Shamir's Prime Ministers Bureau. 
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Cabinet which prevented any substantial decisions from being taken on this 
dominant issue54. 
The basic divide between the two major parties on the peace process became 
the International Peace Conference. The proposed conference would be co-
sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union and would provide a forum for 
direct negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbours. By 1988 both Mr. Peres 
and Mr. Rabin had accepted providing that its findings were not binding on the 
lsraelisss. Mr. Shamir and the Likud were fearful of what such a conference would 
attempt to impose on Israel and thus called for direct negotiations between Israel 
and the Arab countries. These differences were compounded by a deterioration in 
the relationship between Mr. Peres and Mr. Shamir as the latter accused Mr. Peres 
of attempting to run an alternative foreign policy to that of the NUG. Mr. Peres 
insisted he had a mandate from the Knesset to follow the International Conference 
path. In October 1985 the Knesset had passed a resolution in which it stated that 
direct negotiations could begin through an international forum (as eventually 
happened with the Madrid Conference 1991). However, Mr. Shamir argued that it 
was the Cabinet which decided on implementing policy and if the Knesset was not 
satisfied with this policy then it could propose a motion of no-confidence in the 
government66. 
54 The Likud did not see the parity of the Inner Cabinet or Cabinet as a structural 
failing of the government. Dr. Begin argues that the Inner cabinet was extremely 
effective in maintaining the status quo (the agreed policy guidelines of the NUG) 
and acted as a restraint on policy moving away from these guidelines. 
Interview with Dr. Benni Begin, The Knesset, Jerusalem, 8th November 1994. 
55 The question of Soviet participation in such a Conference had to be resolved. 
Both Mr. Peres and Mr. Rabin stated that they would not attend a Conference which 
included the Soviet Union unless it established diplomatic ties with Israel and 
allowed its Jewish community the opportunity to emigrate to Israel. 
Interview with Mr. Peres, Israeli Television News, 16th July 1987. 
56 Interview with Mr. Shamir, Israel Radio, 25th February 1987. 
157 
The tensions and differences within the NUG were brought to a head with Mr. 
Peres's London agreement (April1987) which called for an International Conference 
with the participation of the Israel, Jordan, United States and the Soviet Union 
followed by direct negotiations between Israel and Jordan (see appendix 5 for 
complete plan). The Likud was not only angry about the content of the plan but the 
fact that Mr. Peres had secretly negotiated the deal with King Hussein in London. 
Mr. Peres informed Mr. Shamir of the existence of the agreement only after the 
agreement had been finalised57. The London agreement was consequently blocked 
by Mr. Shamir and the Likud in the Inner-Cabinet leading to the eventual withdrawal 
of King Hussein form the dialogue and the ending of Jordan's commitment to the 
West Banksa. There was much bitterness in the Labour Party and particularly from 
Mr. Peres about the refusal of the cabinet to support the agreement. Mr. Peres saw 
the agreement as important as the Camp David Accords59. 
Effectively from this point on the NUG was finished but continued to function 
in order to serve the intra-party needs of both Mr. Shamir and Mr. RabinED. Since the 
rotation agreement Mr. Rabin had become in effect the senior Labour Party Minister 
57 Interview with Dr. Yossi Ben-Aharon, Director of Mr. Shamir's Prime Minster's 
Bureau, 
58 The London Agreement divided the Inner-Cabinet on party lines 5:5 and was 
therefore effectively vetoed. 
$Dr. Yossi Beilin argues that the Labour Party should have left the NUG over this 
issue and mobilised support for it. 
Interview with Dr. Yossi Beilin, Director General of the Foreign Ministry 1986-88, 
29th August 1994. 
The Likud on the other hand argued that there was never a clear majority of support 
for the deal either within the Knesset and or the country as a whole. They also 
stress that King Hussein's commitment to Mr. Peres not to make the conclusions of 
the International Conference binding were in actual fact denied later by the King. 
Interview with Dr. Yossi Ben-Aharon. 
ED Mr. Shamir was particularly keen to maintain the NUG because as Prime Minister 
his intra-party standing had increased considerably, and the Likud was enjoying a 
period of relative internal calm. This was in direct contrast to 1984-86 period when 
the bitter internal divisions within the Likud, notably between Mr. Shamir, Mr. Levy 
and Mr. Sharon and their supporters were rarely out of the headlines. 
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and consequently it was in his interest to maintain the NUG for as long as possible. 
Therefore the crucial relationship within the NUG from this point on was between 
Mr. Shamir and Mr. Rabin. In order to maintain and develop this the Likud took 
particular care to build up Mr. Rabin's public image in contrast to their constant 
attacks on the credibility of Mr. Peres61 . In addition, one of the reasons the 
settlement issue did not become as divisive as feared was the restraint shown by 
Mr. Shamir who sought to avoid a clash with Mr. Rabin and provide the Labour 
Party with an excuse to leave the NUG62. 
Unsurprisingly Mr. Peres was not happy with this situation . However there 
was little in reality he could do about it. The rotation agreement had transformed his 
personal position from number one in the government to at best second equal with 
Mr. Rabin. The failure of the London Agreement had in effect further relegated him 
to third position in the NUG63. Without a clear majority in the Knesset to bring 
elections_ forward or widespread support in the country or without the chance of 
forming a minority government there was little Mr. Peres could do except start what 
became an 18 month election campaign prior to the 1988 Knesset elections. 
The Labour Party's problems with the peace process were compounded by 
the outbreak of the Palestinian uprising (Intifada) in the Occupied Territories. The 
short-term consequence of which was a shift in the Israeli public opinion to the right, 
in effect ending the status quo in Israel over the future status of the territories. This 
manifested itself in a shift in voting intentions of the electorate away from the 
61 Interview with Ms. Honig, 13th November 1994. 
62 Korn, National Unity Years, (Hebrew). 
Mr. Shamir was extremely pro-settlement movement but his intra-party priority was 
to avoid the NUG collapsing, therefore he allowed Mr. Rabin in his role as Defence 
Minister (in charge of the Occupied Territories) to largely influence settlement policy. 
63 Mr. Peres's personal popularity ratings fell below those of his rival Mr. Rabin as 
old questions were asked about his trust worthiness, notably after a series of 
attacks from the Likud in the wake of the London agreement. 
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Labour Party to the parties of the right64. In addition, it was a Labour Minister Mr. 
Rabin, who as Defence Minister was charged with dealing with the Intifada (an ironic 
situation given the fact that the Labour Party argued that it was the intransigence of 
Mr. Shamir and the Likud in the peace process which led to the outbreak of the 
unrest ). Mr. Rabin's methods in dealing with the violence were criticised by the left 
in particular for being too strong and this further damaged the Labour Party's 
election prospects among the Israeli Arab sector. Taken together the problems 
caused by the Intifada and the directly related decision of King Hussein to 
effectively give up Jordanian claims to the West Bank damaged the position of the 
Labour Party. King Hussein's decision ended Mr. Peres's cherished 'Jordanian 
option' and left the Labour Party without a negotiating partner in the peace process. 
6.5: Labour Party Internal Party Reform. 
A further indication of the party's transformation to a non-dominant party 
operating in a competitive party system was the introduction of internal party 
reforms aimed at opening up the method for selection party candidates for 
elections. The most significant internal party reform was the decision to introduce 
American style primaries in the party's Central Committee to select and order the 
party Knesset list for the 1988 elections. The decision to introduce this reform while 
marking a climb down by an initially sceptical leadership did not radically alter the 
balance of power within the party. The principal aim of the reforms (proposed by 
Secretary General Baram) was to make the Knesset list more representative of the 
party membership and Israeli society as a whole, and thus help broaden the 
64 Arian and Shamir found that one-third of Israelis had become more hawkish as a 
result of the Intifada and around one quarter more dovish. 
Shamir and Arian, "The Intifada and Israeli Voters, Policy Preferences and 
Performance Evaluations", Discussion paper. Pinhas Sapir Centre for Development 
Tel Aviv University, 1990. 
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electoral appeal of the party to the electorate. Mr. Baram elected in 1984 on a 
platform of introducing internal reform believed in a stage by stage process of 
democratisation. His strategy was to push for an introduction of primaries within the 
Central Committee and subsequently if these elections were deemed to be a 
success to introduce party primaries in the future. In these the entire party 
membership was to be given a chance to vote for their candidatesSS. 
There were a number of reasons why the party and the leadership in 
particular embraced the majority of the changes proposed by Mr. Baram. The 
reforms marked a natural progression in a process which had started with the 
opening up of the method of selection for leadership of the party. In Mr. Ben-
Gurion's day in the 1950's he had selected his successor. Subsequently the second 
time he resigned he, together with three or four people, decided who was going to 
take over. At the end of the sixties a group of four or five senior party figures 
decided on Mrs Golda's Meir appointment. In 1974 there was an open competition 
between Mr. Peres and Mr. Rabin in the party's Central Committee of around 400 
people for the leadership. Some four years later there was a similar contest 
between these two rivals, but this time at the party conference with around 1 ,400 
people voting (in 1992 this developed into closed or party primaries)66. Therefore 
Mr. Baram argued that the next logical step at this time was to start to open up the 
methods of candidate selection for all elections and party positions such as General 
Secretary. 
An additional factor as discussed earlier in this chapter was what was to some 
degree a break down in party discipline. This had been predominantly caused by 
the party's participation in the NUG and the large majority the NUG enjoyed which 
65 Mr. Baram victory was narrow over Mr. Harish who was the chosen candidate of 
Mr. Peres. However, Mr. Peres did not attempt to overtly intervene in the election 
allowing the Central Committee a free choice. 
66 1nterview with Dr. Peri, Tel Aviv, 1st August 1994. 
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therefore permitted the development of a more independent parliamentary faction. 
A by-product of this development was the growing confidence of the younger 
generation of the party in particular who supported Mr. Baram's programme and 
worked effectively to help implement it. 
In the end both Mr. Peres and Mr. Rabin accepted the idea after both 
expressing initial concern over what they felt was a leap in the dark for the party. 
However, their change of heart took place when it became apparent that the 
primary system would, so they believed, be beneficial to themselves. Mr. Peres with 
his continued majority in the Central Committee would not lose many of his so-
called clients. Mr. Rabin saw the opening up of any selection process as his best 
opportunity of mounting a successful future challenge against Mr. Peres. This was 
based on the assumption that these primaries were a trial run for the wider party 
membership primaries where Mr. Peres's control of the party machine would not be 
as significant. In addition it soon became clear that the idea of primaries was 
extremely popular with the electorate and hence both Mr. Peres and Mr. Rabin 
embraced the populist idea. In short, the apparent popularity of the reform both 
within the party and with the electorate would have made it difficult for Mr. Peres 
and Mr. Rabin to reject the changes out of hand. 
The results of the primaries, which were divided into Central Committee and 
District elections, can best be described as 'ensuring continuity and change'. The 
top-tier leadership of Mr. Peres and Mr. Rabin's emerged with their intra-party 
positions relatively unchanged. Most of the candidates who were selected to a 
realistic position on the Jist (1 to 45) were functionaries of these two leaders, 
ensuring their continued dominance over the party. Even among the new 
candidates there was clear evidence of the operation of patronage networks with for 
example the selection of Dr. Yossi Beilin's. He had been a functionary of Mr. Peres 
since 1977. 
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At other levels there is evidence of deals being struck by the various groups in 
the party to ensure that their candidates were selected. The major example was the 
deal between the Tel Aviv, Haifa, Jerusalem party branches and the United Kibbutz 
and Moshav movements67. The clear aim of such deals was to guarantee the 
traditional groupings of power within the party, but despite this of those selected by 
the Central Committee there were a large number of young and new faces. 
In assessing the major internal reform of the period it needs to be stressed 
that its short-term effect was that it achieved a principal aim of creating a favourable 
impression with the Israeli electorate and produced an attractive new Knesset list68. 
However, the method of selection needs to be viewed as a transitory stage in which 
the balance of power within the party remained relatively unchanged before the 
party and the leadership had the confidence to open the primaries up to the entire 
party membership. 
Conclusion. 
The 1984 election results were very disappointing for the Labour Party. For 
despite the problems surrounding the Likud in terms of its performance in 
government and the continuing intra-party struggle succeed to Mr. Begin the Labour 
Party was unable to secure a clear electoral victory. The results subsequently 
confirmed to the party its status as a non-dominant party operating within a 
competitive party system. The election also illustrated the importance of inter-block 
politics and the relative weakness of the Labour-led-block which prevented the 
Labour Party from forming a Labour-led coalition government. 
67 Of the candidates who were included in this group all but three were elected to 
realistic places on the party list. 
68 The list contained 13 new faces, 4 women, 15 of Sephardim origin, and a single 
Arab candidate. 
The Knesset Library, The Knesset, Jerusalem. 
163 
In agreeing to fonn the NUG Mr. Peres confinned the continuing existence of 
the two major characteristics of the Labour Party namely; the self perceived need 
for power and the related importance of intra-party politics. The 'thirst for power' in 
the party was based on the past status. The Labour Party for its entire history prior 
to 1977 had been at the centre of the ·development of the state and had enjoyed the 
status of a dominant party. By 1984 it accepted that this dominant position no 
longer existed but the 'conditioning effects' of this period were still apparent in its 
overriding desire to return to government. Related to this 'conditioning effect' was 
the continued importance of intra-party politics in the Labour Party. This led Mr. 
Peres to accept the rotation agreement of his position of Prime Minister in order to 
gain the Defence portfolio for his intra-party rival Mr. Rabin. 
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CHAPTER 7 
FROM NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT TO OPPOSITION: THE ISRAEL 
LABOUR PARTY 1988-90. 
The formation of the NUG which followed the Knesset election of 1984 
confirmed that the Labour Party was a non-dominant party with a share of power 
operating in a competitive party system. Illustration Four summarises the 
development of the Labour Party up to 1990. 
4: Development of the Labour Party 1948-1988. 
1948-1977: Dominant party with power 
1977-1981: Dominant party without power 
1981-1984: Non-Dominant party without power 
1984-1990: Non-Dominant party with a share of power 
1984-88: Parity in NUG. 
Rotation of Prime Minister 
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1988-90: Junior Partner in NUG 
No rotation of Prime Minister 
It needs to be stressed that the share of power that the party enjoyed in the 
NUG (1988-90) was not the same as in the previous NUG (1984-88). After the 1988 
election the Likud emerged victorious and the Labour Party joined the government 
as a junior partner. Its level of power was reduced by there being no rotation of the 
position of the Prime Minister. The Labour Party, while no longer a dominant party, 
still experienced the 'conditioning effects' of its extended period of dominance which 
in part dictated its behaviour. This chapter examines these within the context of the 
party's mo~ivations for joining the NUG, the performance of the NUG and the party's 
decision to eventually leave the government and return to opposition. Chapter Eight 
deals with the developments to the internal dynamics of the party which took place 
during the time of the party's participation in the NUG. Both of the chapters aim to 
stress the importance of this period for the party, a period which saw the start of 
processes of change in both the Labour Party and the Israeli political system which 
were to culminate in Labour's election victory in 1992. 
7.1: Background and Campaign for the 1988 Knesset Election. 
The Intifada and the directly related question of the future status of the 
Occupied Territories dominated the period prior to the campaign and the campaign 
itself. The Labour Party, in response to King Hussein's withdrawal from the 
negotiations over the West Bank, was forced to rethink its political and defence 
platform. As in the past the priority was to maintain party unity and reach a 
pragmatic compromise. The doves in the party who hoped that the platform would 
open up the way to future contacts with the PLO while the hawks wanted the 
document to exclude any possibility of the PLO being considered a future partner 
for negotiations. The resulting document (18th August 1988) reflected a further two 
considerations. These were the failure of Mr. Peres to accept the ending of the 
Jordanian option and the perceived need of the leadership not to appear 'too 
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dovish' in light of the party's continued quest to win the predominantly hawkish 
Sephardim vote. In terms of Jordan, article 1 ,2.4 states: 
A government headed by the Alignment will renew as a top priority the initiative 
of talks and negotiations with Jordan in partnership with a Palestinian 
representation, in order to arrive at peace along the eastern border, and a 
settlement of the Palestinian problem 1. 
Article 1.2.5 cites on talks with Palestinians that: 
In accordance with its aspiration to put an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the 
Alignment will be willing to hold talks with Palestinian personalities and bodies 
who recognise Israel, denounce terrorism and accept UN Resolutions 242 and 
3382. 
Clearly the party saw the need to talk directly to Palestinians but was reluctant 
to deal with the PLO especially in light of the short term shift in Israeli society to a 
more hawkish position following the outbreak of the Intifada. Later in the document 
the party referred to the possibility of a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation which 
was a shift from the past insistence on a Jordanian-Palestinian state. However, 
such changes in the party's platform did little to offer a clear way forward in the 
peace process, but merely represented the continued self imposed restrictions the 
party worked under. Mapam, operating free form the chains of the Alignment, called 
for direct negotiations with the PLO and full self-determination for the Palestinians 
(see 6.4). 
The campaign itself was dominated by the peace process with little attention 
given to socio-economic issues3. The Labour Party in concentrating on the 
1 The Israel Labour Party's Political and Defence Platform, August 1988, Party 
Headquarters, Tel Aviv. Note that the Labour Party continued to use the name 'the 
Alignment' in 1988 despite the fact that Mapam had left the Alignment in 1984 thus 
ending the Alignment. 
21bid. 
3 Many people see it as a major failing of the campaign for the Labour Party that 
they allowed the peace process and in particular the future status of the territories to 
be the single most important issue. Professor Doron argues that this area was the 
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personality of Mr. Peres attempted to tum the contest into the suitability of Mr. Peres 
and Mr. Shamir for the post of Prime Minister. Such a high concentration on 
personality politics, although a characteristic of Israeli politics was taken to new 
extremes during the 1988 campaign. The major television debate between Mr. 
Peres and Mr. Shamir produced no clear-cut winner with both the Likud and the 
Labour parties claiming that their respective internal polls indicated a victory for their 
leader4. During the campaign there was a major terrorist attack at Jericho on a bus 
which resulted in the deaths of a mother and her children. Such an attack focused 
attention on the issue of personal security for Israelis and largely dictated the 
agenda of the latter part of the campaign. 
weak point for the Labour Party and it should not have spent so much time and 
resources responding to attacks in this area and tried to develop other areas. 
Interview with Professor Doren, Senior Election Strategist for Mr. Rabin 1992, Tel 
Aviv University, 12th October. 
4 By 1988 polling had become an important part of Israeli electoral politics with the 
major polling companies being hired by the major parties to present daily polls. 
168 
7.2: A Statistical Analysis of the 1988 Knesset Election Results 
The elections which were held on November 1st 1988 provided the following 
results: 
Table 7.1 Number of Seats each Party Won and the Respective Blocks. 
Labour Led Block Likud Led Block 
Labour 39 Likud 40 
CRM 5 Shas 6 
Mapam 3 Aguda 5 
Shinui 2 NRP 5 
Rakach 4 Techiya 3 
PLP 1 Tsomet 2 
ADL 1 Moledet 2 
Degel Hatora 2 
Total 55 Total 65 
Table 7.2: Voting by Geographical Districts in the 1984 and 1988 Knesset 
Elections. 
Alignment (ILP) percentage of valid votes. 
9!v % of Sephardim ILP vote 1984 ILP vote 1988 Difference 
Dimona (83) 22.6 21.3 -1.3 
Kiryat Gat (69) 29.7 24.7 -5.0 
Ramie (68) 27.3 20.8 -6.5 
OrYehuda (66) 16.7 15.6 -1.1 
Note that in 1984 the Israel Labour Party included Mapam in the Alignment 
and in 1988 Mapam ran independently but Yahad joined the Labour list for 
1988. 
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Likud percentage of valid votes. 
~ % of Sephardim Likud vote 1984 Likud vote 1988 Difference 
Dimona (83) 49.5 47.6 -1.9 
Kiryat Gat (69) 44.1 41.2 -2.9 
Ramie (68) 49.4 46.1 -3.3 
OrYehuda (66) 52.8 50.6 -2.2 
Source: Adapted from Diskin, Elections and Voters in Israel, Diskin Israel 
Radio, 2nd November 1988 and Election results to the 12th Knesset, 
Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem. 
Table 7.3: The Arab vote in the 1984 and 1988 Knesset Elections. 
Percentage of Valid Arab votes 









Source, Central Bureau of Statistics and Gal, The Arab Vote in the 1988 
Elections5. 
5 In calculating the Arab vote the author has included mixed cities in the results. 
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Table 7.4: The IDF Vote in the 1988 Knesset Elections. 
Party o/oofiDFVote % of National Vote 
Labour led Block. 
Alignment 29 30.0 
Ratz 6.5 4.3 
Mapam 2.3 2.5 
Shinui 2.2 1.7 
Arab Parties 0.9 7.8 
Likud led Block 
Likud 35.1 31.1 
Tehiya 8.9 3.1 
Tsomet 4.8 2.0 
Moledet 2.0 1.9 
Shas 2.5 4.8 
·NRP 2.3 3.9 
Agudat Israel 1.6 4.5 
Source, Jerusalem Post 11th November 19886• 
Out of a potentia12,894,267 registered voters some 2,305,576 votes were 
cast (79.7%) with each party requiring at least 18,567 votes to pass the one percent 
threshold and win a seat. The results provided no clear cut winner at inter-party 
level, but provided Mr. Shamir and the Likud with a victory at block level with the 
parties of the right and the religious parties together securing 65 out of the 120 
6 The IDF vote has been used to illustrate the vote of the young as most of the 18 
to 21 year old first time voters are doing their national service at the time of 
elections. The IDF vote is therefore seen as a relatively accurate reflection of the 
votes of this age group. 
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seats in the Knesset. Mr. Shamir therefore, unlike in 1984, had the clear possibility 
of forming a narrow based coalition with the ultra-right wing parties together with the 
religious parties. 
The major winners of the 1988 elections were the religious parties whose 
strength increased from 13 seats in 1984 to 18 seats in 1988. Shas with 6 seats 
emerged as a serious challenger to the Likud's traditional Sephardim constituency 
notably in the development towns. With its 6 seats it became the third largest party 
in the Knesset and occupied a pivotal position in the various coalition manoeuvres 
which took place within the life of the 12th Knesset. 
Both of the two major parties, in losing votes to their splinter parties, saw their 
power further eroded by the close nature of the result which increased the 
bargaining power of the smaller parties (notably those holding the pivotal position in 
the form of the religious parties). The poor performance of both the major parties 
can be explained in part by the indecisiveness of the 1984-88 NUG (mainly the 
1986-88 NUG) and the ideological compromises which both parties had to reach in 
order to maintain the government. In such circumstances it is natural that extreme 
nationalistic or religious parties benefit from such a situation7. Ironically the rise of 
these extremist parties was one of the major reasons for the formation of a new 
National Unity Government by Mr. Shamir. The emergence of a new ultra-right wing 
block confirmed the move of the Likud towards the centre of Israeli politics. This 
allowed splinter parties to emerge with policies ranging from annexation of the 
territories to Moledet's call for the transfer of Arabs from these lands. In addition this 
marked a maturing of the Likud and of the competitive party system. The Likud and 
the Labour Parties were by 1988 both attempting to position themselves in the 
centre ground and were competing for the floating voters within this area. Elections 
7 D. Kom, The National Unity Years 1984-90 (in Hebrew). 
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were therefore decided on which of the parties could attract these voters which 
numbered around 100,000 and accounted for approximately four seats in the 
Knesset. 
7 .2.1: An Analysis of the Labour Performance in the 1988 Election. 
Critics have explained the poor performance of the Labour Party as due to a 
number of organisational failures during the campaign. These included the collapse 
of the London agreement (December 1987) after King Hussein withdrew from the 
peace process, and continuing problems that the party, Mr. Peres in particular, still 
faced with the Sephardim and the lower income groups. This problem was 
compounded in 1988 with a similar problem Labour's other national leader Mr. 
Rabin now faced with the Israeli Arabs for his brutal suppression of the lntifada8. 
There were two major terrorist attacks during the later stages of the campaign, one 
of which was a particularly emotive attack resulting in the murder of a woman and 
her children in Jericho on the eve of polling. These attacks were thought to have 
hardened anti-Arab attitudes which benefited the parties of the right9 . 
The 1988 Knesset election and the subsequent 1989 Municipal elections 
reinforced the failure of the party to attract support from within the Sephardim 
communities and confirmed the continuing decline in its share of the Israeli Arab 
8 The term brutal was used by Dr. Arens, Likud Minister of Defence from 1982-84 
and 1990-92, to describe Mr. Rabin's method of dealing with the Intifada. 
Interview with Dr. Moshe Arens, Tel Aviv, 26th September 1994. 
Such a comment is interesting as Likud's response to such events was considered 
to be traditionally harsher than that of the Labour Party. 
9Many senior figures in the Labour Party see this particular attack as crucial in the 
party not at least as emerging as the single largest party. They believe that it cost 
the party up to two seats and thus allowed the Likud to emerge as the single largest 
party. 
Interview with Mr. Yoram Peri, Labour Party Spokesman 1994, Party Headquarters, 
Tel Aviv, 31st October 1994. 
Interview with Mr. Hatzharmi, Director of the International Department of the Labour 
Party, Party Headquarters, Tel Aviv, 29th November 1994. 
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vote. Compounding these problems was the party's failure with the younger 
generation illustrated by its declining share of the IDF vote. In analysing these 
problems it needs to be stressed that in an electoral situation where a three to four 
seat swing could make the difference between occupation of the pivotal coalition 
position or failure the Labour Party was not looking for dramatic swings in these 
constituent groups but rather signs of improvement1o. However, even using this 
criteria the results proved extremely negative in the following ways. It became clear 
that the Sephardim constituency started to move away from the Likud but in the 
opposite direction from Labour. The major beneficiary from this shift was Shas 
along with the ultra-right wing parties such as Tsomet and Tehiya11 . In addition, the 
Israeli Arab vote, in the wake of the Intifada, for the Labour Party was significantly 
reduced by the transfer of these votes to non-Zionist parties12. Tables 7.2, 7.3 and 
7.4 reveal the extent of these problems: 
The results of Table 7.2 indicate the two trends within predominantly 
Sephardim areas. The Labour Party, starting from an already low base, saw its 
share of the vote further decline despite the slight shift in support from Likud whose 
vote moved to the right and religious parties. Such results were interpreted in two 
ways within the Labour Party. The hawks such as Mr. Hillel saw it as evidence that 
the party had moved ideologically too much to the left on the peace and security 
issue. They stated that the party under Mr. Peres had surrendered the centre 
10 Interview with Mr. Crystal, Political Correspondent of Hadashot and Israel Radio, 
Tel Aviv, 4th September 1994. 
Mr. Crystal emphasises the point that each election since 1977 has been decided 
by three to four mandates. 
11 Diskin, ''The Israeli General Election of 1988", p80, Electoral Studies 1989. 
12 Such a transfer was not worrying at inter-block level for the Labour Party as 
there was no chance of the Arab parties joining the Likud block. However, at inter-
party level it cost the Labour Party between 1 and 2 seats which had they won 
would have allowed it and not Likud to emerge as the single largest party in the 
Knesset. This would have altered the coalition bargaining process by strengthening 
Mr. Peres's position. 
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ground of Israeli politics to Likud13_ Conversely, the doves understood it as the 
failure of the Labour Party's "catch all tactics" and more specifically its overtures to 
the Sephardim. They consequently called for the party to move to a more distinct 
dovish ideological position14. The Labour leadership realised that in order to win the 
next Knesset election (1992) they had either to convince enough Sephardim voters 
to transfer their votes to the Labour Party or to at least shift their vote to another 
right or religious party. This central electoral strategy to a large extent dictated the 
replacement of Mr. Peres with Mr. Rabin as head of the party in 1992. 
The drop in the Arab vote for the party (Table 7.3) indicated the price the party 
paid for its participation in the NUG (1984-88) and in particular the role of Mr. Rabin 
in formulating the Israeli response to the Intifada (1987- onwards), as well as the 
general trend away from Zionist to Jewish-Arab or Arab parties15. The result was 
particular1y disappointing given that in 1988 Labour had replaced Mapam with Mr. 
Weizman's Yahad party in the Alignment. Mr. Weizman's dovish views had made 
him extremely popular in the Arab sector and Yahad had polled near1y 10,000 votes 
in the this sector in 198416. However, at inter-block level the fact that both Mapam 
13 Interview with Mr. Hillel, Speaker of the Knesset 1984-88, Jerusalem, 25th July 
1994. 
14 Dr. Beilin pointed out that instead of investing resources, especially time 
resources in other areas, "we tried everything to court them. The idea of going out 
to the markets, the poor neighbourhoods and saying they applauded me, they didn't 
throw tomatoes was so strong that the leadership forgot that none of them (the 
Sephardim I poor) voted for the party". Dr. Beilin sees this as directly linked to the 
past when the Labour Party was a dominant party with access to all strata of society 
which the party in 1988 clear1y didn't have. 
Interview with Dr. Beilin, the Foreign Ministry, Jerusalem, 29th August 1994. 
15 In 1984, 48.75% voted for Zionist parties and 51.25% for Jewish-Arab or Arab 
parties. In 1988, 59.3% voted for Jewish Arab parties and only 40.7% for Zionist 
parties. 
Source: Capitanchik, ''The Political Stalemate Continues: The 1988 Israeli General 
Election", The Academic Study Group Research Report, 1989. 
161bid. 
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and Ratz with their more dovish platform won 8 percent of the vote between them 
helped compensate the Labour Party losses17. 
The party's poor performance among the young (Table 7.4), was indicative of 
the continuing generational cleavage in Israeli politics which saw the Labour Party 
being increasingly considered as the party of the older generations. The 1988 
results revealed a substantial increase in the vote for ultra-right wing parties as well 
Ratz on the opposite political extreme. Such results can be viewed as part of the 
young's resentment of the inertia of the NUG (1984-88) and especially the period 
between 1986-88. These parties held a common ideology which represented an 
ending of the status quo in the territories leading either to the return of the lands to 
the Arabs or to annexation. Such clear1y defined ideologies attracted the young 
voters in contrast to the more pragmatic programmes of both the Labour and Likud 
parties. The Labour Party's poor performance showed the need for the party to 
present a clear ideology on the future of the territories and to increase the 
representation of the younger generations in the party organs and within the 
leadership. 
A personal profile of the 1988 Knesset lists reveals that the problems that the 
Labour Party experienced with these constituent groups went beyond simply the 
question of representation within the party. The Labour Party had 15 MK's of 
Sephardim origin out of the 39 elected compared to only 11 in the Likud. It had a 
single Arab Mk ( Mapam was the only other Zionist party to have one) and 5 MK's 
were younger than 40 in contrast to only 3 in the Likud. As well as this there were 4 
women MK's in the Labour list out of a total of 7 in the Knesset. In the 1988 election 
17 For a full and detailed analysis of the Arab vote in the 1988 election see, Gal, 
"The Arab Vote in the 1988 Elections", Givat Haviva Paper, 1989 (in English and 
Hebrew). 
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13 new Labour MK's were elected against only 8 in the Likud and a total of 37 in the 
Knesset18. 
The party's problematical relationship therefore needs to be viewed within the 
framework of personality image problems of the elite; Mr. Peres with the Sephardim 
and Mr. Rabin with the Israeli Arabs and to some extent both of them with the young 
constituency. Also the lack of a clear ideology on the peace and security issue 
which could have appealed to at least one of these groups (instead of succeeding in 
alienating to some degree all of them). The party's relationship with these groups 
also influenced the debate on the future ideological direction of the party in 
particular for the 1992 Knesset elections. The influence of these groups needs to be 
examined in conjunction with the internal pressures for ideological change in the 
party's platform from within the party itself, the Israeli left in general and external 
agents such as the American administration and the Socialist International (see 
Chapter 8). In short, the party after the 1988 election failure needed to perform a 
delicate balancing act taking into account all the above criteria to create a winning 
formula of ideology and personality appeal to win the next Knesset elections due in 
1992. The party's awareness of the need to develop such a strategy was far 
deeper than had previously been the case. This in tum indicated a growing maturity 
of the Labour Party operating as a non-dominant party in a competitive party 
system. 
18 Source, Knesset Records, The Knesset, Jerusalem. 
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7.3: The Formation of the National Unity Government. 
In understanding the internal development of the Labour Party between 1988-
90 it is necessary to examine its motivations for joining another NUG and the effects 
of its participation in the government on both the leadership of the party and its 
future development. In addition it needs to be stressed that it was Mr. Shamir and 
the Likud which proposed another NUG when the Likud had a clear possibility of 
forming a coalition without the Labour Party. Consequently, throughout this chapter 
the weakness of the position of the Labour Party in the NUG needs to be 
remembered in contrast to its position of parity with the Likud in the previous NUG 
(1984-88). 
The decision of Mr. Shamir to form another NUG illustrated both the 
importance of intra-party politics in Israeli political culture and secondly concern over 
the rise of extremist parties from both of the major blocks. The coalition forming 
process after the 1988 election was similar to every other one since the move to a 
more competitive party system in 1977. It contained elements of bluff, intrigue and 
careful secret playing of their respective hands by both Mr. Peres and Mr. Shamir. 
Mr. Peres at first attempted to court at least one of the religious parties to join 
the Labour-led-block. From a relative position of weakness he secured the support 
of Agudat Israel with a series of controversial promises in connection with amending 
the law of right of return to Jews from outside Israel. This substantial achievement, 
(Agudat had not even supported the Labour Party when it had been the dominant 
party) should not be underestimated in that it offered the Labour Party block parity 
with Likud's at 60:60. Such a result would have ensured that the Labour Party would 
have been able to join the NUG on equal terms with the Likud. This in tum would 
have secured an agreement for Mr. Peres to again rotate the position of Prime 
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Minister with Mr. Shamir19. However Mr. Peres moves were doomed to failure when 
under pressure from their spiritual and religious mentors Agudat withdrew from the 
deal20. Korn argues that when parts of the deal became known to the Labour Party 
organs there was widespread condemnation of the deal from Labour Party 
members. This would have made it difficult for Mr. Peres had he been in a position 
to honour the agreement. 
Mr. Shamir at first opted in public to form a narrow based coalition from parties 
within the Likud block and was close to a final deal when he decided to form 
another NUG. The price of the religious parties with their demands for changes to 
religious laws, increased funding for religious schools and exemptions for religious 
students from service in the IDF were viewed by Mr. Shamir as too high. From the 
ultra-right there were calls for the annexation of the West Bank and Gaza all of 
which Mr. Shamir knew would lead to international condemnation and possible 
sanctions against Israel. 
19Jt had become apparently clear to the leaders of the Labour Party by this stage 
that all the religious parties preferred to deal with the Likud. They would only deal 
with the Labour Party when there was no possibility of a Likud-led government 
Interview with Mr. Eli Dayan, Labour Party Knesset faction leader and coalition 
leader, The Knesset, Jerusalem, 8th November 1994. 
20 Korn, The National Unity Years 1984-90. 
However, prior to the deals collapse Mr. Peres had successfully engineered the 120 
member Bureau of the party to reject joining an NUG led by the Likud. At the time, 
the vote was incorrectly viewed as a defeat for both Mr. Peres and Mr. Rabin, See 
for example: 
Whitley, "Labour Party young Guard Risk Party Poll Hopes", Financial Times, 2nd 
December 1988. 
Both Mr. Peres and Mr. Rabin had publicly supported the motion but in true 
Machiavellian traditions Mr. Peres close aides had privately campaigned for the 
motion to be defeated in order to strengthen his hand in the coalition negotiations 
with the Likud, and in light of his hope of forming a narrow based government with 
the support of Aguda Israel. This illustrated the control and manipulative skills that 
Mr. Peres still (despite a poor electoral performance ) maintained over the party 
organs. 
Interview with Dr. Korn, 13th September 1994. 
Interviews with close associates of Mr. Peres. 
179 
The intra-party motivations for another NUG were that by forming such a 
government Mr. Shamir would have to give key portfolios to the Labour Party and 
thus deny them to his Likud adversaries, notably the ex Likud Minister of Defence 
Mr. Sharon and the most prominent Sephardic Mr. Levy. Predictably Mr. Sharon in 
particular was against another NUG and favoured the setting up of a narrow based 
govemment21. Mr. Shamir's closest ally Mr. Arens favoured the setting up of an 
NUG as did most of Mr. Shamir's centre faction of the party22. 
With the failure to secure any deal with the religious parties the Labour Party 
joined the NUG as a junior partner with no rotation of the position of Prime Minister, 
but with Mr. Rabin appointed as Defence Minister for the entire duration of the 
govemment23. Mr. Peres reluctantly and under great pressure from the party 
accepted the relatively junior position of Finance Minister in order to oversee the 
economic package to save the Kibbutzim and Histadrut companies from financial 
21Mr. Sharon had been in favour of the NUG in 1984 as after the Lebanon war his 
political credibility needed rebuilding and he benefited from sitting in the same 
Cabinet as the Labour Party which allowed him to regain his political legitimacy. In 
1988 this had been achieved to such an extent that he would have expected to be 
made Minister of Defence or to hold one of the other major portfolios in any narrow 
based coalition. Mr Sharon's opposition to another NUG grew stronger and more 
public as the coalition dragged on and it became clear to him that Mr Shamir's 
preference was for an NUG. Mr. Sharon stated in an interview with the Jerusalem 
Post that another NUG would be a historic mistake: 
Jerusalem Post 28th November 1988. 
Also at a meeting of Likud's Central Committee in Tel Aviv he argued that the 
consequence of the formation of another NUG would be the inevitable 
establishment of a PLO run state in the territories. 
Speech to Likud Central Committee, Tel Aviv, 20th December 1988. 
Mr. Levy was eventually persuaded to support another NUG with membership in the 
newly enlarged Inner Cabinet and a series of promises of support from Mr. Shamir. 
22 In interviews with senior members of the Likud it is clear that there was 
widespread support for Mr. Shamir's decisions. 
Interview with Mr. Meridor, Minister of Justice 1988-92, The Knesset, Jerusalem, 8th 
November 1994 
Interview with Dr. Begin, The Knesset, Jerusalem, 8th November 19994. 
23 See Appendix 3(b) NUG agreement 1988. 
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collapse24 . The pressure applied on Mr. Peres to accept this portfolio was a further 
illustration of the continuing problems for the Labour Party originating from its past 
dominant position. The Histadrut and the Kibbutzim had in the past been examples 
of the Labour Party's dominant position in both the pre-state Yishuv and in the state 
of Israel (see 1.1 and 1.2). However, by 1988 these vestiges of labour dominance 
were becoming more of a burden to the party. The financial failings of these 
institutions therefore further eroded the power and influence of the Labour Party. 
The election and coalition building process had exposed the failings of the 
Labour Party to attract sufficient support from the Sephardim and Arab sectors to 
occupy the pivotal position in the coalition bargaining process. The simple election 
mathematics for the Labour Party were that in order to retum to power it had to 
significantly increase the strength of its own representation at inter-party and inter-
block level and attract one or more of the religious parties away from the Likud 
block. Clearly in 1988 the party had failed to achieve either of these. An additional 
option was to call for electoral reform such as the raising of the threshold which 
parties must cross in order to gain Knesset representation. The implementation of 
such a reform would in theory increase the strength of the larger parties and lead to 
a smaller number of parties gaining representation in the Knesset. 
Mr. Peres in seeking the support of the party Central Committee for joining the 
NUG stated: 
Our country knows the answer to all questions, except two: who is a Jew and 
who won the elections. After each election there are negotiations to ascertain 
who won them. Only by terminating the dependence on small parties will there 
24 Interview with Dr. Nathanson, Director of the Institute of Economic and Social 
Research, the Histadrut, Tel Aviv, 30th July 1994. 
Mr. Martziano, political advisor to Mr. Peres agrees that Mr. Peres only interest at 
the time was in the peace process. 
Interview Mr. Martziano, The Foreign Ministry, Jerusalem, 8th September 1994. 
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be any chance of effecting an electoral system that will enable Jewish 
democracy to exist, run affairs and select a political way25. 
Likud was to a lesser degree in favour of some type of electoral reform. The 
present situation suited Mr. Shamir in that it provided him with a clear majority to 
block any Labour Party government through Likud's links with the religious parties. 
However, Mr. Shamir was aware of the price of turning this in to a narrow based 
government and had indicated his lack of willingness to meet the demands of the 
smaller parties26 
The Labour Party was also aware of the growing populist appeal of electoral 
reform within Israeli society. On November 12th 1988, 100,000 people attended a 
rally in Tel Aviv calling for a change in the electoral system which would ensure a 
clear cut victory for one of the parties allowing them to govern the country more 
effectively27. By March 1989 a joint-partisan Knesset committee had been set up 
chaired by the veteran Labour election reformer Mr. Gad Yaacobi to examine 
electoral reforms28. Public support for reform was furthered by the attempts of Mr. 
Peres and Mr. Shamir to form narrow based coalitions after the collapse of the NUG 
in 1990. 
25 Mr. Peres speech to the Labour Party Central Committee at Beit Bert Campus, 
near Tel Aviv, 21st December 1988. 
26 Mr. Shamir saw the need for the Likud to remain a party at the centre of Israeli 
politics and this together with his preference for unity among the Jewish people 
made him reluctant to pay the price to the smaller parties. He argues that the history 
of the Jewish people is of long internal confrontations and that important lessons 
need to be learnt from this in to the modem context. Mr. Shamir clearly believed that 
giving in to the extreme demands of some of the smaller parties would have led to 
increasing divisions within Israeli society. 
Interview with Mr. Shamir, Tel Aviv, 17th August 1994. 
Mr. Shamir first publicly called for changes to the electoral system on 28th 
December 1989 during an interview on Israel Radio arguing that it was impossible to 
continue for long with the present system. He indicated some preference for some 
~fe of constituency based proportional representation. 
T. Hermann, ''The Rise of Instrumental Voting: The Campaign for Political 
Reform", In Arian and Shamir (ed), The Elections in lsrael1992, State University of 
New York, USA. 1994. 
281bid. 
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7.4: The NUG: Organisation, Performance and Consequences for the 
Labour Party. 
The Labour Party's decision to join the NUG was a further illustration of the 
continuing effects of its past dominant position. The fact that the party chose to 
remain as junior partner in the NUG rather than return to the opposition indicated 
that its desire for power was above and beyond any ideological considerations. As 
Mr. Nissim Zvilli confirmed: 
The Labour Party's participation in the 1988 NUG was a silly thing to do. There 
was nothing special on the agenda. Nothing similar to 1984 with the Lebanon 
War and Economic crisis. It was simple power politics. Our leadership felt bad 
in opposition29. 
In addition it again confirmed the importance of intra-party politics in the elite 
over inter-party politics and the importance of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Put another 
way if the party had been operating solely on inter-party conflict then it would have 
chosen to return to opposition and prepared a strategy to win an election free from 
the complexity of involvement in the government. 
Mr. Peres intra-party motivations for joining the NUG played a significant role 
in the Labour Party's participation but as will be revealed Mr. Peres paid a high price 
for this. After the election failure the leadership of Mr. Peres was in the short-term 
not threatened as he was involved in delicate coalition negotiations the party was 
relatively united behind him. When it eventually became clear that the choice for the 
party was between opposition and junior partnership in the NUG there was a debate 
within the party on which course of action to follow. A substantial number of people 
believed that Mr. Peres had missed an opportunity to leave the government after 
the Inner-Cabinet had rejected the London Agreement. Such a move then would 
29 1nterview with Mr. Nissim Zvilli, Secretary General of the Labour Party, The 
Knesset Jerusalem, 5th September 1994. 
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have allowed the party to go in to opposition for positive reasons and appeal directly 
for support to the Israeli public:JJ. As Beilin argued: 
Unfortunately people are conservative. They didn't want to leave the 
government and they always had the pretext that without us they (the Likud) 
would settle widely. There was no real debate in the party about this issue and 
it was only discussed in the meeting of the Labour Party Cabinet members and 
only a few members supported the idea of leaving. Their main argument as to 
why we (the Labour Party) should always be in power was the idea of putting 
the foot on the breaks on Likud's idea and not to initiate resolutions31 • 
Beilin was not alone in such beliefs. Several other members of the younger 
generation viewed the failure to leave the government at this time as a missed 
opportunity32. The fact that Labour's two senior leaders Mr. Peres and Mr. Rabin, 
did not support leaving the government at this time meant that real debate within the 
party organs was muted. 
As previously described Mr. Peres had successfully engineered a motion not 
to join an NUG in 1988 under the Likud. However, in the time between this vote in 
the party Bureau and the meeting of the Central Committee to ratify the agreement 
with the Likud it had become apparent that Mr. Peres's hopes of forming a narrow 
based government had evaporated. Therefore, both he and Mr. Rabin addressed 
the meeting urging ratification of the agreement. In his speech, as well as 
discussing the need for electoral reform, Mr. Peres employed all the rationale 
outlined by Dr. Beilin concerning the decision not to leave the previous NUG. He 
cited five reasons for the participation. 1 )The fear of a Likud-led coalition driven by 
the extreme right wing into annexing the territories. 2)The fear of such a coalition 
30 Interview with Dr. Beilin, The Foreign Ministry, Jerusalem, 29th August 1994. 
311bid. 
32 For example, Mr. Zvilli (Secretary General of the Labour Party 1994) argues that 
the party should have left the NUG at this time. By not doing so all that was 
achieved was the preservation of the generation of leaders who were in their mid-
SO's and who held Cabinet portfolios. 
Interview with Mr. Zvilli, 5th September 1994. 
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attempting to crush the Intifada within two or three weeks and the measures that 
would be employed to achieve this. 3)The increase in polarisation of Israeli society 
which a coalition driven by the right and religious parties would create. 4)The need 
for the Labour Party to deal with the economic problems of the country and finally 5) 
as already discussed to push for a change in the electoral system33. 
Mr. Peres's intra-party motivations were to preserve his leadership in light of 
his failure to form a Labour-led coalition. Had the Labour Party chosen to go into 
opposition then Mr. Peres would have almost certainly faced a leadership challenge 
from Mr. Rabin and one or two of the second tier elite ex-Ministers such as Mr. 
Moshe Shahal or Mrs. Ora Namir. By joining another NUG Mr. Peres was able to 
secure the Defence portfolio for Mr. Rabin and key Ministries for the other possible 
challengers to his leadership34. Mr. Peres was forced to accept the Portfolio of 
Finance Minister after it became clear that Mr. Shamir wanted total control over 
Israel's Foreign policy. With Mr. Rabin as Defence Minister for the duration of the 
government he had become in effect the central Labour Party leader in the 
government and therefore the unofficial leader of the party35. Mr. Peres aimed at 
33 Mr. Peres speech to Labour Party Central Committee, Beit Bert campus, Near 
Tel Aviv, 21st December 1988. 
34 Mr. Rabin has described the Defence portfolio as his favoured position over any 
other. There were times in both NUG's that Mr. Rabin's desire to remain Defence 
Minister prevented him from challenging Mr. Peres notably after the 1984 election. 
Of the Peres appointed Ministers to the NUG in 1988 all represented the generation 
who were in their mid to late-fifties or older, and had been loyal servants of either 
Mr. Peres or Mr. Rabin. The Young Guard was greatly under represented because 
of this patron-client division of portfolios. Only Mrs. Namir, of the possible leadership 
contestants was omitted from the Cabinet and she was regard as being relatively 
close to Mr. Rabin. 
Interestingly Mr. Shamir took this opportunity to introduce some new young talent in 
to Cabinet from the Likud. The appointment of Mr. Dan Meridor, Mr. Ehud Olmert 
and Mr. Ronni Milo as Ministers and Mr. Bibi Netanyahu as a deputy Foreign 
Minister created a favourable impression with the electorate with this group being 
termed the "Likud Princes". 
35 The portfolio of Minister of Defence in the Israeli Cabinet, unlike most countries, 
is the second highest office after Prime Minister and before Foreign Minister. 
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the Finance Ministry to deal with the economic crisis in Israel. In addition he hoped 
that he could use the control over the distribution of economic funds to help win the 
support of one or more of the religious parties he needed in order to form a new 
Labour-led governmenf36. 
Despite these set-backs Mr. Peres still remained in a strong position within the 
party institutions where his representation was much larger than that of Mr. Rabin. 
Such a majority still provided him with large powers of patronage to his clients in 
terms of selection to Committees and to the party institutions. In short, in spite of 
failing to secure either a Labour Party victory at the polls or succeeding in forming a 
Labour led coalition Mr. Peres still remained the official head of party and in control 
of the party machine. 
Many of the features and problems of the NUG 1984-88 were carried over to 
the new NUG. There was again no broad consensus on the peace issue which 
made it difficult for peace initiatives to stand a realistic chance of success37. The 
most damaging problem for the success and maintenance of the new NUG was that 
its formula was unacceptable to key elements of both the Labour Party and the 
Likud. In the Labour Party Mr. Peres after his initial acceptance privately opposed 
the deal as there was no rotation of the position of Prime Minister and consequently 
his arch rival Mr. Rabin had become the dominant Labour Party figure in the 
government. Within the Likud Mr. Sharon and the ex Finance Minister Mr. Moda'i 
were soon joined by Mr. Levy in opposing the NUG for both policy reasons and 
intra-party considerations. Therefore the crucial relationship in the NUG was again 
36 Likud charge Mr. Peres with attempting to break up the NUG of 1988 from day 
one. Mr. Peres was clearly unhappy with a government where the two pivotal figures 
were Mr. Rabin and Mr. Shamir. 
Interview with Dr. Begin, 8th November 1994. 
37 Arian. A. . "Israel's National Unity Governments", p215, in Arian and Shamir (ed) 
The Elections in lsrael1988, Westview, USA, 1989. 
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between Mr. Shamir and Mr. Rabin and the success of the government depended 
primarily on the continuation of this relationship38. 
During the 15 months of the NUG's existence the peace process, being the 
central divisive issue, was used by the anti-government groupings in both parties to 
destabilise the government. The consequence of such actions was that no major 
decisions with the exception of approving the Rabin-Shamir Peace Plan (May 1989) 
were made during the life of the NUG. This inertia was compounded by the lack of 
any dominant issue such as was present in 1984 with the Lebanon war and hyper 
inflation. Mr. Peres as Finance Minister worked at salvaging the labour sector of the 
economy and from time to time there were clashes with the Ukud on specific 
proposals such as the restructuring of the Kibbutzim debt. Consequently it became 
clear that the continuation of the government depended on the Rabin-Shamir Peace 
Plan which was based on the holding of Palestinian elections in the Occupied 
Territories leading to a degree of autonomy for the inhabitants of these areas. The 
importance of this plan in understanding developments in the Labour Party was 
simply that it prevented the party from leaving the NUG at a much earlier stage than 
it eventually did. A detailed examination of the intra-party and inter-party conflicts 
surrounding the plan reveals the failure of the NUG and the limitations for the 
Labour Party of trying to operate within it government's framework. 
38 The chemistry between Mr. Shamir and Mr. Rabin was much better than for 
example that of Mr. Shamir and Mr. Peres or Mr. Rabin and Mr. Peres. Mr. Shamir's 
describes Mr. Rabin as more honest than Mr. Peres, more sincere and more soldier 
like, but be qualifies this by stating that he is still not a man of principle. Mr. Shamir 
defines the major problem of working with the Labour Party in terms of personalities 
rather than ideologies or organisational problems. 
Interview with Mr. Shamir, 17th August 1994. 
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7.4.1: The Rabin-Shamir Peace Plan. 
The four point plan was put forward amid two key related events, a worsening 
of the Palestinian Uprising and the election of President Bush in the United States. 
Both events had a profound effect on Mr. Rabin and Mr. Shamir. Mr. Rabin had 
become aware that force was not the sole weapon needed for ending the Intifada 
and that there was a need for a negotiated solution from within the framework of the 
NUG. This position was radically different than that of the previous year when 
interviewed on Israeli television he had stated: 
They (the Palestinians) are leading it (the Intifada) in an incorrect manner, in a 
manner of violence, but we will suppress this violence ... We prefer to establish 
order using a minimum of force, but one thing is clear; we shall prove to them 
that nothing can be achieved through violence. It is preferable indeed that the 
period of violence be shortened, since those who will mainly suffer from this are 
the residents of the territories39. 
· By the following January the emphasis in Mr. Rabin's public statements had 
moved towards dialogue: 
I am telling them (the residents of the territories) that I want you to know that we 
are ready to talk to you. You are the partners to negotiations. The time for you 
has come to want more than to throw stones. Abandon that path and sit down 
and negotiate with us40. 
Mr. Rabin always included in such statements some degree of threat 
concerning the continued use of force if there was no ending of the uprising. His 
concern over the new administration in the United States was illustrated in his 
opening remarks aimed at justifying his position: 
The setting up of a government in Israel is now over and today a new 
administration is entering office in the United States. I have always believed 
39 Interview with Mr. Rabin on Israeli Television News, by Ehud Ya'ari, Moshe 
Shlonsky and Yoram Ronen, 13th January 1988. 
40 Interview with Mr. Rabin on Israeli Television News, by Ehud Ya'ari, 20th January 
1989. 
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that on the one hand Israel must extend its hand in a peaceful gesture although 
not at all costs and only under certain circumstances41 
Mr. Shamir was extremely concerned about Israel's deteriorating image 
abroad and particularly in the United States. After eight years of warm relations 
between the Reagan administration and Israel there was concern over whether Mr. 
Bush would prove to be such a strong supporter of Israel. Mr. Shamir's staff had 
monitored Mr. Bush's statements during his time as Vice President and during the 
American Presidential campaign and foresaw more problems in dealing with him 
than with President Reagan42. Mr. Shamir therefore felt the need to act in order to 
attempt to improve Israel's image abroad and secondly to please the new American 
administration. 
As previously stated both Mr. Rabin and Mr. Shamir had strong intra-party 
motivations for maintaining the NUG and especially for Mr. Rabin who was now the 
senior Labour Party leader in the government ahead of his rival Mr. Peres43. The 
existence of a peace plan which was approved by the NUG cabinet prevented the 
Labour Party from leaving the NUG while the peace process was alive44. 
The plan which called for elections in the Occupied Territories leading to 
Palestinian autonomy was approved by the NUG Cabinet (14th May 1989) with 
three Likud Ministers voting against (Mr. Sharon, Mr. Levy and Mr. Moda'i) insisting 
411bid. 
42 Interview with Dr. Yossi Ben Aharon, Director of Mr. Shamir's Prime Ministers 
Bureau, Jerusalem, 18th September 1984. 
43 Although Mr. Peres maintained and tightened his control over the party Mr. Rabin 
by virtue of being the senior Labour Party Minister meant that he was in essence the 
most important figure in the Labour Party. It needs to be understood that the 
Defence Minister's portfolio in Israel includes a large degree of control over the 
Occupied Territories, both in everyday life and longer term policy such as the 
settlements programme, control over the defence establishment and hence security 
policy of Israel, and therefore a large say in the conduct of the peace process. 
Hence Mr. Rabin was the most senior Labour Party figure on the dominant issue of 
peace and security and therefore the dominant figure in the party itself. 
44 The fact that there were intra-party and inter-party conflicts about the proposal 
ten9ed to overshadow the fact that Palestinian groups were not impressed by its 
content. 
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the plan went too far and two Labour Ministers (Mr. Weizman and Mr. Edri) doing 
likewise claiming that the plan did not go far enough45. However, it was from the 
Likud that the strongest opposition emerged. The three Ministers who opposed the 
plan claimed that it would lead to a Palestinian state in the Occupied territories. 
Such assertions were based not only on the plan itself but calls from within some 
elements of the Labour Party to open a dialogue with the PL046. The group of Likud 
Ministers now dubbed the "constraints faction" or "Shackle Ministers" demanded 
that four constraints or amendments be inserted in to the plan as follows: 1) No 
participation of East Jerusalem Arabs in the elections, 2) An end to the Intifada 
before negotiations take place, 3) No to talking with the PLO and no to a Palestinian 
state and 4) The continuation of the Jewish settlement programme in the West 
Bank47. 
The emergence of this loose alliance of Ministers was a major threat to Mr. 
Shamir. Had he ignored these intra-party considerations and pressed ahead with 
the plan he would have faced increasing opposition from within his own party48. It 
was also clear that the views of the "Shackle Ministers" reflected those of the vast 
majority of Likud members. Consequently Mr. Shamir was faced with a difficult 
choice between the NUG and his own intra-party considerations. At a crucial 
meeting of the Likud Central Committee (5th July 1989) Mr. Shamir was forced by 
the "Shackle Ministers" in a series of tactical votes led by Mr. Sharon (the Chairman 
45 For the complete text of the Rabin-Shamir Peace Plan see Appendix 6. 
46 Within the Labour Party there were growing calls to talk to the PLO, notably from 
the younger generation members such as Mr. Ramon and Mr. Burg, but also a 
Labour Party Minister Mr. Weizman attempting to start such a dialogue. 
47 D. Kom, op.cit. , p345. 
481bid. 
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of the Central Committee) to not only accept their constraints but to make them 
binding to Likud members of the NUG49. 
The Labour Party's response to these events was swift. Mr. Peres rejected 
Likud's position and again stated that the NUG was bound by the original vote of the 
cabinet&>. However Mr. Shamir's decision marked the beginning of the end of the 
NUG with relations between himself and Mr. Rabin deteriorating from this point on. 
The NUG was from here on was dominated by the two key personalities who for 
ideological and personal reasons wished to see the demise of the government 
namely, Mr. Peres and Mr. Sharon. 
Mr. Peres's position within the Labour Party itself had been weakened by the 
disastrous performance of the party in the Municipal elections which were held in 
February and March 1989. The Likud made nation-wide gains winning 6 out of the 
biggest 10 cities as well as many medium sized towns. Overall the Likud now 
controlled 44 Municipalities to Labour's 32 compared with 54 to 26 in Labour's 
favour in 198451. Mr. Shamir was quick to exploit such gains as support for Likud's 
foreign policy. Taken together with opinion polls which put the Likud well ahead of 
the Labour Party under Mr. Peres this placed Mr. Shamir in a strong inter-party 
position52. 
49 The Central Committee meeting which was televised Jive on Israeli television was 
seen as a major triumph for Mr. Sharon who had manoeuvred a series of separate 
votes to ensure that Mr. Shamir's plans were not directly voted on. Had there been a 
direct choice for the members between supporting their leader and their principles 
than they would have almost certainly backed Mr. Shamir's proposals. The meeting 
was not one of Likud's finest moments with the threat of physical violence against 
Mr. Shamir. Eventually Mr. Shamir agreed to include the four restraints in his speech 
in order to avoid the further humiliation of them being passed in separate votes of 
the Committee. 
50 Interview with Mr. Peres on Israeli Television, 6th July 1989. 
51 "Likud Gains leave Labour Floundering", Financial Times, 2nd March 1989. 
"Likud Achieves fresh Poll Gains", Financial Times 16th March 1989. 
52 All the major Israeli newspapers carried polls that indicated that if elections wee 
held in 1989 the Labour Party's Knesset representation would fall to between 25 to 
30 seats. 
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Article 1.22 of the coalition agreement (see appendix 3b) stated that in the 
event of the NUG collapsing then fresh elections would be called and no other 
government would replace it such as a narrow based Labour or Likud-led coalition. 
At this time it was clear to both Mr. Shamir and Mr. Peres that in the event of new 
Knesset elections it would be the Likud which stood to gain and the Labour Party to 
lose. Mr. Shamir's relative strength at inter-party level over the Labour Party 
therefore influenced his decision to put his intra-party conflicts with the "Shackle 
Ministers" before the maintenance of the NUG on the issue of the peace process, 
and in particular, the peace plan he had co-sponsored with Mr. Rabin .. 
7 .4.2: External Peace Initiatives and the Collapse of the NUG. 
The emergence of two external peace initiatives put forward by President 
Mubarak (4th September 1989) and the United States Secretary of State Baker 
(14th October 1989), further destabilised the government63. The addition of these 
two plans divided the NUG in to three groupings: the Labour Party who supported 
the NUG plan as well as the foreign proposals; Mr. Shamirwho was against both 
the foreign initiatives but in favour of the NUG plan and finally the "Shackle 
Ministers" in the Likud who rejected all three. Mr. Shamir's own acceptance of the 
NUG was a reflection of the growing concern in the Likud over the Bush 
Administration and its views on the peace process. Mr. Baker, in addressing an 
AIPAC meeting in May 1989 had told Israel to forget about Greater Israel stating in 
clear and direct terms: 
For Israel now is the time to lay aside, once and for all, the unrealistic vision of 
a Greater Israel. Israeli interests in the West Bank and Gaza, security and 
otherwise, can be accommodated in a settlement based on Resolution 242. 
Forswear annexation. Stop settlelement activity54. 
53 See Appendix 7 and 8 for complete text of both plans. 
54 Address by Secretary of State Baker, AIPAC, 22nd May 1989. 
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The Likud was suspicious that the United States was trying to move the NUG 
too far from its agreed position.ss However, the major achievement of both external 
plans was that they forced the actors to show their true colours. The NUG 
eventually collapsed in March 1990 when Mr. Shamir accepted the "Shackle 
Minister's" view that no Palestinian representatives from East Jerusalem or 
deportees be allowed to take part in the meeting in Cairo to discuss Palestinian 
elections. Once Mr. Rabin's attempted compromise that they could take part but not 
vote was rejected by Mr. Shamir it became clear to Mr. Rabin that there was no 
point in continuing with the government. Mr. Shamir's was unwilling to alter his 
position even after his heir apparent and Foreign Minister, Dr. Arens, had privately 
come to an arrangement with Secretary of State Baker. They agreed that Israel 
should consider the Palestinian participants on a name to name basis and 
accepting the criteria that the list would include people who had an additional 
address in Jerusalem or had been expelled at one time. The Likud's and 
subsequent Cabinet rejection of this plan proved to be the final nail in the coffin of 
the NUG56. 
It was Mr. Rabin's decision to leave the government which proved vital to the 
Labour Party withdrawal. In his speech to the Central Committee of the party (12th 
March 1990) he stated that:57 
55 Interview with Dr. Dore Gold, JCSS, Tel Aviv University. Dr. Gold was an advisor 
to Mr. Shamir on the peace process specialising in US-Israeli relations. 
56 Interestingly, Dr. Arens views this failure to accept this plan as Likud's single 
biggest mistake of the time. Had the plan been accepted then the Labour Party and 
Rabin in particular would not have had the excuse to leave the NUG. He also views 
this as the start of Likud's decline which was to result in their electoral defeat in 
1992 and stresses it was at this point that the American administration turned 
against Likud and Israel. 
Interview with Dr. Arens, Tel Aviv, 26th September 1994. 
57 Speech to Central Committee, Beit Berl near Tel Aviv, 12th March 1990. 
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Despite my desire to continue the peace process within the NUG, without a 
peace process, a fact resulting from the objection to providing a positive reply 
to Baker's question, I see no point in the continued existence of a unity 
government that blocks the process instead of promoting it. This is the question 
we are faced with. This is the question that the Likud members should ask 
themselves today and tomorrow, as it is impossible to carry on. There is nothing 
over which to drag things out. 58 
The result of this meeting and a similar one in the party Bureau was that the 
party Knesset members were given a green light to vote against the NUG in a vote 
of no confidence sponsored by the Ratz scheduled for March 15th. Mr. Shamir 
preempted the vote by first sacking Mr. Peres thus causing the Labour Party 
Ministers to resign en masse from the government (13th March 1990)59. Despite, 
last minute attempts from Shas spiritual leader Rabbi Yossef to find a compromise 
formula on the issue of the composition of the Palestinian delegation to the 
proposed talks in Cairo, feelings were such that this proved impossible. The motion 
of no confidence was passed on March 15th by 60 votes to 55 with five of the Shas 
Knesset members abstaining. The five members of Shas who had not been in the 
chamber for the vote did so on the advice of Rabbi Yossef after Mr. Shamir had 
failed to give him a positive response to his compromise formula. 
Shas had in recent months moved closer to the position of the Labour Party, 
on the issue of the peace process when Rabbi Yossef had said on a visit to Cairo 
that the saving of human life was more important than the issue of land. Mr. Peres 
had also been attempting to court Rabbi Deri, the parliamentary leader of the Shas 
party and Interior Minister with increased funding for the development towns where 
58 Ibid. 
59 Spectrum, April1990, p7. 
Mr. Shamir's main motivation for the sacking of Mr. Peres is that in the event of any 
caretaker government being set up he did not want to have the Labour Party 
ministers in office during the period of coalition negotiation. There was also concern 
that Mr. Peres in his role as Finance Minister could use his position to help buy the 
religious parties by allocating extra funds to them. 
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Shas' support was strongest&>. However, there was still surprise that Mr. Peres had 
been able to persuade Shas to bring down the NUG. 
60 Peres and the Labour Party understood that Shas occupied the pivotal position 
in the Knesset and Rabbi. Deri in interviews provided the Labour Party with some 
hope that Shas, at a price may be a willing partner. 
Interview with Rabbi. Deri, Spectrum, October 1989, p15-17. 
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7.5: The Dirty (Unholy) Exercise 1990. 
The fundamental aim of this Labour Party initiated parliamentary manoeuvre 
was to attempt to form a Labour-led government without having to resort to 
attempting to win a new mandate from the electorate. Such moves are not 
uncommon in countries which are ruled by coalition government. However, in Israel 
there was an added sense of importance attached to this manoeuvre because of 
the significance of its outcome to the future development of the peace process. 
In examining the events surrounding the Labour Party's attempt to form a new 
government it is necessary to stress the desperate nature of this action. The party 
had failed to secure a return to power after four consecutive elections and had seen 
its dominant status be transformed into a non-dominant party which at best had 
secured a share of power in 1984 and 1988. By 1990 there was a feeling within key 
parts of the party that the only way to return to power was to alter the strength of 
blocks by attracting the religious parties away from the Likud-block. 
The Dirty Exercise (a phrase coined by Mr. Rabin) represented the master 
plan of Mr. Peres to end the NUG and then replace it with a coalition based on the 
Labour Party and one or more of the religious parties with himself as Prime Minister. 
The key personalities in this new coalition were to be Rabbi Deri of Shas and Mr. 
Peres. However, such a coalition was problematic from the outset and eventually 
proved to be impossible to create. Shas with its Sephardim, poor, and religious 
constituencies could not be seen to do anything publicly to support the formation of 
a Labour-led government. Had it done so then its supporters would have severely 
punished it at the next opportunity. Therefore, Rabbi Deri and Shas could only join a 
Labour-led coalition when one seemed inevitable and not before. This difficulty 
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meant that Mr. Peres needed to secure enough support from one of the other 
religious parties in order to have a winning coalition.61 
Before attempting to build such a coalition Mr. Peres had two difficult 
obstacles to clear. He had to avoid the call for new elections by reneging on the 
coalition agreement of 1988 which called for new elections in the event of the 
collapse of the NUG. Following this he needed to secure a mandate from the 
President to try to form a government. The avoidance of elections was easier in that 
Mr. Peres simply broke the electoral agreement with the Likud arguing that progress 
in the peace process was above and beyond everything62. This obstacle proved 
more difficult when after consultations with members of the Knesset the President 
found that the relative strength of the blocks was now 60:60. Shas now had publicly 
rejoined the Likud block for fear of being seen to actively bring about the advent of 
a Labour-led government. However on 21st March 1990 President Herzog awarded 
the 21 day mandate for Mr. Peres to form a government for the following reasons. 
The Labour Party was now the single largest party in the Knesset ( on the day of the 
vote of confidence Mr. Moda'i and his four Liberal colleagues had been accepted as 
an independent parliamentary faction thus leaving the Likud with only 35 seats). 
Also the Labour Party had been successful in the vote of confidence and finally that 
Mr. Peres had the best prospects of forming a new government. 
61 Shas' constituency was contained the very people that the Labour Party had 
been trying to court since it lost power in 1977, the Sephardim and the poor. 
Therefore the strategy of Mr. Peres was to build a coalition with Shas similar to that 
the Labour Party had with the NRP in the first 26 years of the state. This would have 
meant a long-term electoral alliance backed with generous distributions of portfolios 
to Shas in a Labour led government and to a degree the exclusion of other religious 
parties from the government. Such a strategy was persuaded by Mr. Rabin in the 
coalition bargaining process after the party's victory in the 1992 election. The period 
of Mr. Rabin's government from 1992 onwards reveals the extent to which Mr. Rabin 
saw the need to maintain Shas in the government at almost all cost. 
62 Interestingly, the Likud had foreseen this the previous year and had tried 
unsuccessfully to make the NUG agreement state law. 
197 
The key to Mr. Peres's immediate prospects proved to be not Shas but Agudat 
Israel, the ultra orthodox religious party with whom Mr. Peres had originally 
attempted to form his narrow based coalition with in 1988. Since then Agudat Israel 
had undergone significant changes and had withdrawn from the NUG in November 
1989 after a period of deteriorating relations with Mr. Shamir. At the same time Mr. 
Peres in his role of Finance Minister had increased the allocation of state funds to 
Agudat in order to attract it to the Labour Party block. Agudat did vote with the 
Labour Party in the vote of confidence in the NUG but for the negative reason of 
teaching Mr. Shamir a lesson for what they saw as his failure to keep promises he 
had made with it63. 
However, when Mr. Peres was about to present his winning (61 member) 
coalition to the Knesset it became clear that two members of Agudat would refuse 
to support a Labour led coalition This despite having publicly signed a deal that they 
would do so live on Israeli television at the Dan Hotel in Tel Aviv. Clearly, Mr. Peres 
had not calculated for the intervention of non-parliamentary Rabbi's in influencing 
religious partie~ Knesset members. Both Shas and Degal Hatora parties were 
prevented from helping form any Labour-led coalition by the intervention of their 
supreme mentor Rabbi Schach( even Rabbi Yossef the spiritual leader of Shas 
deferred to him). The extent of Mr. Peres desperation was illustrated by the 
unprecedented offers he made to Agudat and various so-called rebels whom he 
approached to support the coalition64. Such offers led to a heated debate about the 
very nature of the Israeli electoral and political systems as well as widespread public 
condemnation and protest. 
63 Spectrum, March 1990, p9. 
64 For complete details of the deals see Appendix 9 which contains previously 
unpublished material. Mr. Peres tried in vain to convince many different groups 
including members of the new Liberal faction led by the "shackle minister'' Mr. 
Moda'i. 
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After Mr. Peres's failure, Mr. Shamir was given a mandate to form a 
government by President Herzog 27th April1990 and on 11th June Mr. Shamir's 
narrow-based government took office. The delay in forming the government was 
caused by the reluctance of Mr. Shamir to form such a government and pay the 
price to the smaller parties that Mr. Peres had previously offered them. Again Mr. 
Shamir's intra-party considerations influenced his motivations in making another 
attempt at an NUG but eventually he agreed to form a narrow based government in 
which his intra-party rivals received leading portfolios. 
At this stage neither Mr. Peres or Mr. Rabin had ruled out the formation of a 
new NUG. Mr. Rabin was keen to return to the Defence Ministry and Mr. Peres once 
more feared a challenge to his leadership if the Labour Party returned to the 
opposition benches. At a meeting of the ex-Labour Ministers (3rd May 1990), Mr. 
Rabin, Mr Gur and Mr. Tsur all supported the party joining a new NUG along with 
Mr. Peres (who insisted on the Likud giving a positive response to the Baker 
compromise). The leading dove Mr. Weizman along with Mr. Ramon (participating in 
his role as leader of the Knesset faction) opposed the idea of a new NUG in any 
form65. Mr. Rabin in an interview on Israeli television (3rd May 1990) spelt out his 
terms for participation in a new NUG. These included the same division of portfolios 
as before. The possibility of progress on the peace process and legislation to 
prevent a repeat of the "Dirty Exercise" by introducing a bill to clearly make the 
holding of new elections mandatory if the proposed NUG collapsed66. 
For Mr. Shamir it was clear that there was little support from within the Likud 
for such a government and the risk to his own position from the "Shackle Ministers" 
would have been greater had he formed another NUG. With regard to the demands 
65 Party Protocols, Meeting of ex-Labour Ministers, 3rd May 1990, Beit Berl 
Archives. 
66 Interview with Mr. Rabin, Israeli Education Television, 3rd May 1990. 
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of the religious parties Mr. Shamir decided to lie by agreeing to their demands and 
having little intention of keeping his promise to them67. Mr. Shamir's decision meant 
that after six years of participating in the NUG the Labour Party returned to the 
status of a non-dominant party without power operating in a competitive party 
system. In addition Mr. Peres's reputation and authority had been severely 
damaged by the exercise. Moreover Israeli commentators agree that the public's 
confidence in Israeli democracy was damaged. Subsequently the "Dirty exercise" 
increased public support for constitutional reforms such as a change in the electoral 
system. 
Conclusion. 
The Labour Party's non-dominant position with a share of power in the 
competitive party system underwent two modifications between 1988-1990. After 
the 1988 election defeat the party saw its share of power decrease from the 
previous NUG and in 1990 after the party left the NUG its status changed once 
more to a non-dominant party without power. 
The election defeat for the Labour Party in 1988 was particularly damaging in 
that even after the successful Labour-led period of the N UG 1984-86 the party lost 
its position as the single largest party and with it any realistic chance of forming a 
Labour-led coalition. Consequently, the party joined the NUG from a position of 
weakness with the Likud holding both the position of Prime Minister and Foreign 
Minister thus ensuring their control over the peace proce_ss. The formation of the 
NUG illustrated once more the importance of intra-party politics not only in the 
Labour Party but within the Likud as well, with Mr. Shamir opting for the NUG when 
67 Interview with Dr. Yossi Ben Aharon, Director of Mr. Shamir's Prime Ministers 
Bureau, Jerusalem, 18th September 1994. He adds that Mr. Shamir stated that 
when the religious parties came for their cheques Mr. Shamir simply said that he 
could not deliver in the national interest. 
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he had the clear possibility of forming a Likud-led coalition with the religious parties. 
The NUG survived for two years for similar intra-party reasons in that its 
continuation suited Mr. Rabin and Mr. Shamir. The NUG only collapsed when it 
became clear to Mr. Rabin that Mr. Shamir was more interested in maintaining unity 
in the Likud over making progress in the peace process with Rabin-Shamir Peace 
Plan. The attempt of the Labour Party to form a government in 1990 with the 
religious parties illustrated the continuing weakness of the party at inter-block level 
and the strength of the Likud. However, it represented the first attempt by the party 
to alter the inter-block situation and this was developed further in the 1992 election. 
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CHAPTER 8 
INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE LABOUR PARTY DURING THE NUG 1988-
1990. 
The party's election defeat in the 1988 election had a number of important 
consequences for the internal development of the party. Mr. Peres's position, after 
four consecutive elections defeats, came under greater threat. There was an 
increase in generational conflict within the party which this time was directly linked 
to calls for ideological change and a shift to a more dovish position on the peace 
process and security issues. In addition, the process of internal democratisation, 
after the success of the 1988 Central Committee primaries, was developed further 
to include the party membership in selecting candidates for the party positions. 
Such changes did in part represent an attempt by elements in the party (notably the 
young reformers) to move more towards setting the agenda on the peace process 
and not merely responding to external developments. However, they were primarily 
motivated by what the party perceived it needed to do in order to return to power as 
a non-dominant party in a competitive party (block) system. 
8.1: The Lass Report into the 1988 Knesset Election and 1989 Municipal 
Election Failings. 
The decision to commission a report into the problems of the Labour Party 
organisation, membership and election failures marked an important shift in the 
thinking of the party. It illustrated the maturing of the Labour Party as a non-
dominant party which realised that it needed to learn from past mistakes and devise 
a clear electoral strategy to return to power. The Lass Report was the first formal 
major investigation into the failings of the party (there was no formal investigation 
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into the party's perfonnance in the 1977, 1981 or 1984 elections). Its findings 
proved be extremely significant in detennining internal developments within the 
Labour Party and in particular the position of Mr. Peres. 
Mr. Peres's declining intra-party standing after the failure of the "dirty exercise" 
was further damaged by the publication of the Lass Report which dealt specifically 
with the party's poor showing in the 1988 Knesset and 1989 Municipal elections. 
The Committee, chaired by ProfessorYoram Lass, had interviewed some 250 
senior party figures and party members at all levels and its conclusions marked the 
start of the end of Mr. Peres's leadership of the party. The background in which the 
report was published was as important as the report itself. Mr. Peres, as the 
instigator of the "dirty exercise", was still at the centre of public attention and 
criticism at the time of publication of the report. Mr. Moshe Shahal, a fonner close 
ally of Mr. Peres and member of the NUG Cabinet, had stated his intention to run 
for the leadership on 14th Aprii19901. More importantly Mr. Rabin, on the day 
President Herzog awarded the coalition mandate to Mr. Shamir, announced that he 
would contest the party leadership (27th April 1990). In addition, at meeting of the 
party Bureau (14th May 1990) he stated that such a contest should be based on 
primaries using the existing party census as its basis2 
1 Interview with Mr. Shahal, Jerusalem Post, 14th April1990. 
In the interview Mr. Shahal describes his platfonn which was remarkably similar to 
that of Mr. Peres with the exception of Mr. Shahal's call for direct elections for Prime 
Minister. One of Mr. Shahal's strongest selling points was his Sephardim origin and 
his ability to attract voters from this group. 
2 Party protocols, Labour Party Archives, Beit Berl near Tel Aviv, 14th May 1990. 
Mr. Rabin's call for the present party census to be used as the basis for primaries 
was itself contentious. The last party census had been held in 1986 and therefore 
no members who had registered since then would be entitled to vote in the contest. 
Secretary General Harish also pointed out that there was also the problem that the 
census was considered partially fictitious. This was illustrated in the 1988 Knesset 
elections where in certain locations the registered membership exceeded the 
number of votes the party received in the elections. 
Interview with Mr. Harish, Spectrum, June 1990. 
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The content of the report therefore came into an already hostile environment 
for Mr. Peres. There was a growing awareness among senior party figures that Mr. 
Peres would need to be replaced as party leader if the Labour Party was to have a 
chance of victory at the next Knesset elections3. The report, published on 27th May 
1990, had two major findings: Mr. Peres was personally blamed for the failings of 
the 1988 Knesset election campaign and regular party members could not identify 
with the party due the lack of opportunity for them to participate in the selection of 
candidates4. The report's two conclusions were that Mr. Peres, despite his 
popularity within the party was unelectable in the country as a whole and that there 
was a need to rejuvenate the party through having open primaries where each party 
member had a voteS. 
The report claimed that the major failing of the 1988 campaign had been the 
decision to put Mr. Peres forward as the major electoral asset of the party. This had 
been done on evidence from the internal party pollster company, Decimal, that Mr. 
Peres was extremely popular with the electorate. However, the report challenged 
such findings arguing that there was a methodological weakness in the whole 
polling area. This had been caused by the party's use of the same company, 
Decimal, to write, collect, conduct the analysis and report on the results to Mr. 
Interestingly the figure of approximately 300,000 members in the 1986 census was 
reduced to 120,000 in the 1991 census even after a strong party membership drive. 
However, this issue became politicised with Mr. Rabin preferring a contest sooner 
rather than later and Mr. Peres favouring a later contest when perhaps the political 
climate would prove more supportive to him. 
3 Kreimerman, "Peres Accepts Blame, But Won't Step Down", Jerusalem Post, 28th 
May 1990. 
41nterview with Professor Lass, The Knesset, Jerusalem, 17th October 1994. 
5 Members had complained during interviews for the report that their membership 
was nothing more than symbolic and that they had no power, no participation in 
policy formation and felt abandoned by the party. 
Professor Lass, Report in to the 1988 Knesset and 1989 Municipal Elections, 
Labour Party Headquarters, Tel Aviv (in Hebrew). 
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Peres's election team. Clearly there was some vested interest for the company to 
concentrate on the good news and ignore the bad. 6 Mr. Peres, the report charged, 
should have used separate companies to set and assess the data. Had he done so 
it would have become apparent that his relationship with the electorate was not so 
favourable and that it was a major error to base the campaign around his personal 
image7. 
The report was discussed at a frantic meeting of Labour's Central Committee 
on 27th May 1990 in which Mr. Peres's control of the Central Committee manifested 
itself in the Central Committee's hostility towards the report in general and Professor 
Lass in particulars. The proposal for primaries was welcomed by Mr. Rabin who saw 
it as his best opportunity to replace Mr. Peres at the head of the party9. Mr. Peres, 
6 The Labour Party and Mr. Peres in particular had not learnt their lesson from the 
1984 campaign when the Campaign Manager Mr. Gur would take a pair of scissors 
and remove the bad news from the internal polls before Mr. Peres could view it . 
This distorted the picture of the last week of the campaign when things started 
going against the party. 
Interview with Professor Diskin, Director of Labour Party polling 1984 election, 
Hebrew University Jerusalem, 14th November 1994. 
?Ibid. 
8 Professor Lass had in fact resigned as Chairman of the Committee the previous 
week after mistakenly leaking details of the report to the press before the 
publication date. At the end of his speech to the Central Committee he stated that: 
"I have made a mistake and have resigned. Perhaps others should do likewise, Mr. 
Peres!". At this point the meeting ended in uproar with Mr. Peres's supporters 
vocally backing their leader. In another twist to the report three of the original 
authors of the report refused to sign the report stating that it did not go far enough 
and that Mr. Peres's supporters had interfered to water down its findings. They 
published a document which proved to be more critical of Mr. Peres. 
Interviews with Chaim Asa, Mr. Rabin's Senior Election Strategist and co-author of 
the Report, Hertzila, 16th October 1994. 
Professor Lass, 18th October 1994. 
9 Mr. Rabin knew that Mr. Peres's control of the Central Committee was such that 
even with Mr. Peres's reputation tarnished by the failure of the "dirty exercise", that 
his best chance of regaining the leadership lay with the party members. They were 
not reliant on Mr. Peres's patronage and were likely to vote for the candidate with 
the best chance of winning the next Knesset election. Mr. Rabin was by the middle 
of 1990 not only the favourite Labour leader but the most popular national leader 
with the Israeli electorate. Mr. Peres popularity rating had consistently been lower 
than Mr. Rabin 's or the leading Likud candidates. 
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whose position was based on his control of the party organs, was more ambivalent 
towards the proposition. However, the seeming logic of it together with his relative 
weakened position meant that he had little choice but to accept what had now 
become an extremely popular move both within the party and the Israeli electorate. 
Mr. Peres's control over the Central Committee was again illustrated by the decision 
on 12th July to postpone any leadership contest until the party's 5th Congress in 
November 199110. This success presented Mr. Peres with a breathing space but it 
did not alter his substantially weakened intra-party position. 
8.2: Ideological Change, Generational Challenge and Internal 
Democratisation within the Labour Party 1988-90. 
The changes which started to take place within the Labour Party from 1988 
onwards concerned ideological change, generational challenge and internal 
democratisation. These changes were inter-related and motivated by the principle 
aim of returning the party to power. This process, which started while the party was 
still in the NUG, gathered momentum in the period following its return to opposition 
in 1990. Illustration 5 summarises the related nature of these changes. 
10 The result was viewed as a major surprise. Mr. Rabin had proposed holding a 
leadership election using the existing constitution on 29th July 1990. Such a 
strategy represented a gamble by Mr. Rabin given Mr. Peres's still apparent strong 
position within the party organs. Mr. Rabin's in accepting the contest be decided in 
the Central Committee was clearly confident that Mr. Peres's standing was so low 
that enough members of the Committee would transfer their allegiance from Mr. 
Peres to himself. Mr. Rabin won a 60-40 percent majority in the party Bureau 
meeting of 12th July 1990 to bring forward the contest. This together with the 
opinion polls showing him to be the most popular Labour Party leader with the 
electorate led commentators to believe that the Central Committee would approve 
the Bureau's decision. However, Mr. Peres at the Central Committee meeting on 
22nd July 1990 appealed directly to the members that he did not oppose such a 
contest but that the timing of it made it appear like impeachment. In the subsequent 
vote Mr. Peres won a 54 to 46 percent victory on the issue of postponement. 
Party Protocols, Labour Party Archives, Beit Berl, Near Tel Aviv. 
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5: Internal Dynamics of the Labour Party 1988 Onwards. 
Ideological Change. Generational Conflict Democratisation 
Pressure for Change Pressure for Change 
I I '\V Young Guard (Gang of Eight) 
External Domestic 
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~II' ,1/ '\16~ 
Aim: Progress 
in Peace Process 
Aim: To Return to Power 
(not a share of power) 
'~ Populist Appeal 
Lines idicate the links between the various dynamics and pressures for change. 
The centrality of the Young Guard and in particular the "Gang of Eighf' should be noted. 
In assessing the ideological shift in the Labour Party's position on the peace 
process towards a more dovish position which was made apparent in the decisions 
taken at the 5th Party Congress in November 1991 it is necessary to examine the 
transformation within a framework of internal and external pressures for change. 
Naturally these are inter-related and inter-dependent with the evidence indicating 
that the change did not originate from the top-tier or second-tier leadership but 
rather from the bottom up. Both Mr. Peres and Mr. Rabin are viewed as being highly 
pragmatic in terms of ideology and thus they adapted to changing conditions rather 
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than setting the agenda11 . However, it is important to remember the manipulative 
tools available to the leadership before asserting that it was not to some degree 
involved in the development of the party ideology. In addition, Mr. Peres was himself 
closely associated with many of the party members calling for an ideological shift. 
From within the party the "reformers" tended to be the young guard of the party, 
many of whom were first time Knesset members (having been elected in the party's 
1988 Central Committee primaries). 
The external factors can be divided into national and international pressures. 
From within the Israeli political system the presence after the 1988 Knesset 
elections of two Zionist parties, Mapam and Ratz who accepted the idea of 
negotiating with the PLO as well as the right of the Palestinians to full self-
determination gave legitimacy to this central debate on the need for Israel to 
negotiate with the PLQ12. International pressure came in two directions: the 
continued efforts of the new American administration to move Israel towards a 
solution to the Palestinian problem and in particular Mr. Rabin and Mr. Peres. Also 
the increasingly active role of the Socialist International (of which both the Labour 
Party and Mapam were members) in the peace process through both its General 
Forum and Middle East Committee. 
11 Interview with Mr. Eliav, Tel Aviv, 25th July 1994. 
It is important to stress that both Mr. Rabin and Mr. Peres did become more dovish 
during this period. Mr. Rabin with the continuation of the Intifada saw the need to 
find a partner for negotiations and Mr. Peres was forced with the failure of the 
Jordanian option to look for suitable Palestinian partners. However, both these 
central figures and Mr. Rabin in particular were extremely cautious about ideological 
change because of concern over the electoral positioning strategy of the Labour 
Party. 
12 Ratz won 5 seats and Mapam 3 seats in the 1988 election. Neither of these 
parties were new but for Mapam in particular this was the first campaign after their 
decision that the PLO represented a legitimate partner for negotiations. At the time, 
contacts with the PLO were still illegal, but despite this Mapam and Ratz had held 
semi-formal meetings with PLO representatives. Mapam had been a partner in the 
Labour Alignment from 1969 to 1984. 
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8.2.1: Internal Pressure and Generational challenge - The Role of the 
NUG. 
The degree to which these changes and challenges were related to the 
leaderships participation in the NUG of 1988-90 is difficult to measure. Mr. Lova 
Eliav maintains that there was a direct linkage between the shift to a more dovish 
platform and the challenge of the young guard of the party to the older leadership 
and the party's participation in the NUG13. The NUG, as the 1984-88 NUG had done 
before it, presented the Knesset faction with the opportunity to air its views without 
damaging the party in such a way that a narrow based coalition would not have 
permitted14. The 1988 new intake to the Knesset included such figures as Mr. Burg, 
Mr. Merom, and Dr. Beilin who joined Mr. Ramon in an extremely capable and 
ambitious young grouping all of whom opposed the Labour Party's participation in 
the NUG15. It was this generational group which, in contrast to the challenge of Rafi 
in the early 1960's, sought not only political power but ideological change in all 
areas of the party platform1s. Many of them were close to Mr. Peres with the 
exception of Mr. Ramon who was viewed as being closer to Mr. Rabin. Despite their 
attachment to one or other of the party patrons they were more independently 
13 Interview with Mr. Eliav, 25th July 1994. Mr. Eliav is a former Secretary General 
of the Labour Party and a leading dove. He is viewed as "the Godfather'' of the 
young guard who are now in their mid-40's. 
14 Dr. Beilin adds that both NUG's had a positive side for individuals in that they 
(Labour Party Knesset members) could do what they wanted as there was such a 
large majority. This led to a break down of party discipline as Labour Party MK's 
didn't support the party in all the votes in the Knesset. 
Interview with Dr. Beilin, The Foreign Ministry, Jerusalem, 29th August 1994. 
15 Mr. Merom describes one of the groups biggest attributes at the time was their 
ability to deal with the media and particularly the television. With the Likud Princes 
being much more telegenic than their Labour cabinet colleagues such skills were 
greatly needed in the Labour Party. 
Interview with Mr. Merom MK, United Kibbutz Movement Headquarters, Tel Aviv, 
20th October 1994. 
16 The challenge of Rafi is seen as more generational rather than ideological. For a 
detailed account of the Rafi challenge see Chapter 1. 
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minded than the generation above them who at the time were in their mid 50's and 
many of whom served in the NUG Cabinet. The group soon became formally 
organised and expanded to 8 members adopting the name in English of the "Gang 
of Eight". 
The group started to articulate their views in a series of interviews, articles and 
television appearances. Mr. Burg for example, publicly stated (September 1989) 
that Israel had nothing to fear from a Palestinian state in whatever finalised form it 
took. Such comments varied greatly from the leadership's position and the party 
platform which stated clearly, "no" to a Palestinian state 17. Dr. Beilin despite being 
the Deputy Finance Minister constantly pushed forward a dovish agenda with regard 
to the peace process. Mr. Ramon sought reform of the Histadrut and Mr. Merom 
dealt with internal party organisation issues such as further internal democratisation. 
This group was joined at times by Mr. Uzi Baram who resigned his post as Secretary 
General of the party in January 1989 in protest at the party's participation in the 
NUG18• 
In seeking power this generational group viewed the generation above them in 
the hierarchy as failures who had not challenged the leadership, merely accepting 
their patronage in the form of cabinet portfolios and other senior positions within the 
party19. They compared themselves to the Likud "Princes", four of whom occupied 
important Government positions in contrast to only Dr. Beilin holding a Deputy 
17 Article by Mr. Burg, Spectrum, September 1989, p10-12. 
18 Mr. Baram resigned in January 1989 and was replaced by Mr. Harish, the 
candidate he had originally defeated for the post. Mr. Harish was Mr. Peres's 
favoured candidate. Mr. Baram was of the generation who were in their mid-50's 
and his socialist ideology had not always made relations easy with the more 
pragmatic Mr. Peres. 
Financial Times, 17th January 1989. 
19 Mr. Burg asserts that the Labour Party has only two effective generations, the 
mid 70's one of Mr. Peres and Mr. Rabin and the mid-40's age group and nothing 
else. 
Interview with Mr. Burg, The Knesset, Jerusalem, 13th September 1994. 
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Minister's jobs in the NUG20. Clearly, therefore in this case it is impossible to 
separate the issues of generational challenge and ideological change from each 
other with regard to this group (see Illustration 5). 
This struggle within the Labour Party needs also to be viewed in part as the 
start of the battle to succeed Mr. Peres and Mr. Rabin. Between 1988-90 it was still 
apparent that the leadership of the party rested between these two veterans with 
their control over the Central Committee and other party organs. Mr. Shahal, Mrs 
Namir and after an impressive showing in the Histadrut elections of 1990 the 
Histadrut Secretary General Mr. Kessar, emerged as the challengers from the mid-
SO's generational group. However, none of the three had sufficient support within 
the party to mount a serious challenge to the leadership. Although, had both Mr. 
Peres and Mr. Rabin agreed to step down at this time then it would have been likely 
that the new leader would have come from this trio. Consequently, the longer that 
one of the generation in their early-70's retained the leadership the more likely it 
became that the eventual successor would come form the younger generation who 
were in their mid-40's21. 
20 Mr. Ramon held the position of head of the party faction in the Knesset which is 
viewed as a stepping stone to a Cabinet portfolio. 
21 The Likud example provides evidence for such a scenario. When Mr. Shamir 
stood down after defeat in the Knessef elections of 1992 then the generation below 
him was ignored as the party opted for Mr. Netanyahu who at the time was in his 
mid-forties. Although, had the Defence Minister Dr. Arens who was in his 60's not 
retired from politics then he would have been the likely candidate. Of the three main 
candidates in the Likud leadership two were in their mid-forties. 
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8.2.2: External Pressures for Ideological Change: The Transformation of 
the Left in Israel. 
The 1988 Knesset elections results, in strengthening the position of the 
parties to the left of the Labour Party, had two major consequences for the Labour 
Party. They represented a vehicle for the ideologists who felt that the Labour Party 
with its participation in the NUG of 1984-88 had become no more than a reflection 
of the Likud. In addition they offered an alternative opportunity to the generation of 
the Labour Party who were seeking ideological change and political power22. 
In influencing the internal ideological debate the developments in the Israeli 
left presented two alternatives to the Labour Party leadership. They could have 
used and encouraged the left wing parties to illustrate the fact that Labour 
represented the a centre party which could appeal to the more moderate elements 
of the Sephardi constituency. Second, and more problematic was the growing need 
to give the young guard what they wanted (a change to a more dovish platform) in 
order to prevent them from defecting to the one of these left wing parties23. 
Even before the 1988 election there had been clear signs that Ratz, Mapam 
and the liberal Shinui party were planning some form of doser co-operation or 
merger into one party24_ Such moves were between 1988-90 already a reality in the 
Knesset with Ms. Aloni of Ratz, Mr. Rubenstein of Shinui and Mr. Tzaban of Mapam 
22 Although Mapam's number of mandates actually fell to 3 in the 1988 election 
this was considered a victory. In the months leading up to the election opinion polls 
had indicated that the party would not pass the electoral threshold. This was the first 
time that the party had run as an independent party for 15 years and because of its 
~articipation in the Alignment with the Labour Party. 
3 Professor. Doren, Mr. Rabin's Electoral Positioning Strategist, adopted the first of 
these in the 1992 Campaign. He was critical of the left for not attacking the Labour 
Party more and had asked them in the during the campaign to do so. 
Interview with Professor. Doren, Tel Aviv, 12th October 1994. 
In response Mr. Temkin Mk (Secretary General of Ratz in 1992) said that it was 
difficult to co-ordinate such electoral positioning activities with the Labour Party as 
in places the parties were competing for the same vote. 
Interview with Mr. Temkin, Tel Aviv, 24th November 1994. 
24tnterviewwith Mr. Gazit, Mapam Spokesman 1994, Tel Aviv 17th August 1994. 
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as party leaders co-ordinating their actions25. These moves were in part prompted 
by the expectation that the electoral threshold would be raised at the next election. 
The resultant co-ordination of the activities of the three parties further increased 
their influence in the Knesset as together they became the third largest list26. As a 
group they also attempted to court the left of the Labour Party and in particular the 
"Gang of Eight" Labour Mk's whose ideological views on the peace process were 
closer to theirs than to the leadership of the Labour Party's. 
This period marked the beginning of the debate within the Labour Party as to 
its future ideological direction after the failures of the 1988 election. This discussion 
became indivisible from the future participation of the mid-forties generational 
leaders inside or outside the party. Those on the right of the party called for them to 
accept party policy or leave. However, the left wing of the party saw them as vital to 
affecting the ideological and structural changes to the party that were essential if it 
was to regain power. The tone of the debate within the party organs became more . 
bitter as the ideological gap between the groups became more apparent. This was 
also due to its indivisibility from intra-party power politics and generational 
replacement. The differences were clearly shown at the meeting of the Central 
Committee (17th April1989) in which Mr. Ramon, Dr. Beilin, Mr. Baram and Mr. 
25 Shinui in the traditional sense of the meaning cannot be described as a left wing 
party. It's socio-economic programme is based on privatisation and economic 
liberalisation. However, on the peace process it was extremely dovish and gave this 
priority thus positioning itself in the camp of the left on the dominant issue of the 
era. 
Interview with Mr. Poraz, Shinui MK, Tel Aviv, 24th August 1994. 
26 It had also become apparent that Mapam and Ratz were competing for the same 
constituency mainly in the large urban areas such as Tel Aviv and that such 
competition was causing votes to be wasted as remainders in the party list electoral 
system. Mr. Temkin views this electoral competition as the main reason that 
relations between the two parties had been so poor previously. This had made co-
operation difficult, despite their similar ideological outlooks. 
Interview with Mr. Temkin MK. Tel Aviv, 24th November 1994. 
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Weizman called on the party to remove the taboo on talks with the PLO. Mr. Ramon 
argued: 
Not one of the party leaders believes that we can make progress towards 
peace without negotiations, direct or indirect, with the PLO, but they never 
declare this out in the open. And we wonder why the public rejects our 
message; we don't fight for it27. 
At the same meeting prominent hawks such as Mr. Tsur and Mr. Gur strongly 
opposed such ideas and Mr. Tsur was also critical of the leadership's American 
influences stating: 
Since Jordan is not a partner anymore and with the PLO we can only discuss 
an independent Palestinian state, which we cannot accept, we have to look for 
local Palestinian interlocutors. The party is mistaken in devoting exclusive 
attention to the peace process at the expense of the social message. There are 
two streams now in the party, one is truly associated with the workers and the 
other that breathes from America28. 
The development of a united left wing party added to the polarisation of the 
ideological debate within the Labour Party itself by providing a viable alternative 
political party to which disillusioned doves could transfer their allegiance. 
Supplemented by Mapam, Ratz and Shinui this group would have represented a 
considerable challenge to the Labour Party's left-of-centre vote. This issue also 
became unavoidably linked to the leadership struggle between Mr. Peres and Mr. 
Rabin. Mr. Peres worked hard at preventing the above scenario for if this group left 
the party then his intra-party standing would have suffered as many members of the 
group were personally dose to him and required for the struggle against Mr. 
Rabin29. Conversely, Mr. Rabin's supporters in the party, with their traditionally more 
27 Mr. Ramon, Address to Labour Party Central Committee, 17th April1989. Labour 
Party protocols, Labour Party Archives, Beit Bert. 
28 Mr. Tsur, Address to Labour Party Central Committee, 17th April1989. Ibid. 
29 Mr. Peres agreed privately with most of the ideological platform of this group, 
including the need to talk to the PLO which he had stated in private since 1980. 
However, he also said that the first Israeli leader to do so would pay a heavy 
political price. 
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hawkish views, were the natural adversaries of the group and the most vocal in 
calling for the group to leave the party. 
8.2.3: Pressures from the International Arena. 
The period between 1988-90 was marked by a deterioration in relations 
between the Israel Labour Party and the Socialist International. Both annual 
conferences of the Sl, Stockholm (1989) and Cairo (1990) attempted to put 
pressure on the Labour Party to talk to the PLO and to accept the right of the 
Palestinians to full self-determination. In Stockholm the PLO had been invited to 
attend and given observer status which led to the Labour Party boycotting the main 
forum but still participating in the Middle East Committee. Mr. Gat argues that the 
fundamental problem was that the Sl sided with the underdog. It did not make the 
PLO pay the political price for the status it was awarded by way of changing the 
parts of their charter which referred to the destruction of lsrael3>. Palestinians had 
previously attended Sl meetings but as journalists in the mid 1980's and Mr. Gat, 
through this channel, had held meetings with senior figures in the PLO. The aim of 
such unofficial contacts was to air ideas and build up some kind of trust between 
the participants31. 
In 1989 the Sl wanted the Israel Labour Party to meet the PLO Chairman Mr. 
Arafat in Tunis. An elaborate research trip was planned for members of the Sl 
Interview with Dr. Beilin, 29th August 1994. 
After the election failures of 1988 and 1989 Mr. Peres's probably felt that his 
~olitical position was not strong enough to pay such a price. 
0 Interview with Mr. Gat, Labour Party Headquarters, Tel Aviv, 11th August 1994. 
Mr. Gat is Chairman of the International Department of the Labour Party and the 
party delegate to Sl meetings. He was sometimes joined by the party leader Mr. 
Peres (Stockholm 1989 and Cairo 1990). 
311bid. 
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(including both the Israel Labour Party and Mapam) to visit Syria, Jordan, Tunis, 
Egypt and then Israel. Mr. Peres at first gave his approval to Mr. Gat to participate, 
the latter subsequently attending the preparatory meetings in Bonn along with Mr. 
Jaffee, the representative from Mapam. However, at the last minute Mr. Peres 
telephoned Mr. Gat in the middle of the night and instructed him not to go. Mr. Peres 
had become concerned that such an historical change in Labour Party policy at this 
time and in this way would have damaged his intra-party standing. In addition there 
was concern over Mr. Shamir's reaction and the damage to the party and the NUG 
that such attacks from Likud would have caused. At the time the Rabin-Shamir plan 
was still alive and Mr. Rabin would not have wanted to further jeopardise its already 
difficult path. In short, Mr. Peres did not feel confident enough of his own position or 
the party's to make such a gesture with no guarantee of some reciprocal measure 
from the PLO. Mr. Gat suggested a compromise formula in which he would have 
carried on with his trip but stated publicly that there had been a communication 
breakdown with Mr. Peres who had not given his support. Mr. Peres rejected such a 
formula and therefore the trip was postponed and eventually abandonecf32. 
The Middle East resolutions of the Stockholm and Cairo meetings illustrated 
the growing pressure that the Sl was putting on the Labour Party. The 1989 
resolution states: 
There must be a peaceful political solution. This solution must be based on the 
right of Israel to exist within secure and recognised boundaries and the right to 
32 The events surrounding the proposed meeting were explained to the author by 
the following: 
Interview with Mr. Gat, Ibid. 
Interview with Mr. Jaffee, Former Leader of Mapam and Delegate to Sl., Kibbutz 
Hakum, 28th August 1994. 
Interview with Ms. Pollak, Director of the International Department Mapam 1994, 
Mapam Party headquarters, Tel Aviv, 4th July 1994. 
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self determination of the Palestinians. The obvious goal should be the mutual 
recognition of each other by Israelis and Palestinians33. 
However, the resolution of 1990 was the first to mention a Palestinian state, a 
concept which was directly at odds with Labour Party policy: 
The Socialist International will not falter in its efforts to assist peace in the 
Middle East. In doing so it is guided by the following principles: A political 
solution on the basis of UN Resolutions 242 and 338 which excludes the use of 
force. The secure existence of the state of Israel and the right to self 
determination of the Palestinian people, the outcome being whatever 
constitutional fonn they choose, not excluding a state or other possible 
arrangements34. 
Such statements from the Sl led the Labour Party to debate its continued 
participation in the organisation at a joint meeting of the party Bureau and 
leadership where there were calls from the right of the party for the Labour Party to 
leave the Sl. Secretary General Harish argued that the Sl needed to be viewed as 
an organisation which was basically friendly to Israel and one with which the Labour 
Party had enjoyed a long and productive relationship. He cited the crisis as having 
origins in the meeting between Mr. Brandt, Mr. Kreisky and Mr. Arafat (July 1979) 
which was held without Israel's knowledge and which the Israelis claimed broke the 
rules of the membership35. It was at this meeting that the Sl had their first contact 
with what then was a much more radical organisation. At the end of the debate the 
Bureau decided not to take a decision on whether to leave the Sl but its concern 
was illustrated in Article (c) of the resolution adopted: 
The Political Council (leadership) and Party Bureau, in their joint meeting, 
express their concern over the fact that at a meeting of the Sl held in Cairo in 
May 1990, a resolution was passed which was not co-ordinated in advance with 
the Israel Labour Party, contrary to the custom regarding resolutions adapted in 
33 Extract from, Middle East Resolution of the Socialist International, Stockholm, 
June 1989. 
34 Extract from, Middle East Resolution of the Socialist International, Cairo, May 
1990. 
35 Mr. Harish, Speech to Party Bureau, Party Protocols, Labour Party Archives, 
Beit Berl, near Tel Aviv. 
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the Sl, and which included elements which were contrary to the original 
proposal sent out, thus damaging the status of the party and the principles of 
solidarity which are the basis of membership in the 5136. 
One of the causes of the growing alienation between the Israel Labour Party 
and the Sl was the participation in the Sl of Mapam37. Mapam's position being much 
closer to that of the Sl regarding the issue of Palestinian self-determination meant 
that their position was often used as the opening Israeli position in negotiations. 
This was in preference to the generally more rigid Labour Party position. In recent 
years both Mapam and the Labour Party had learnt to co-ordinate their positions on 
issues before attending Sl Congress's in an attempt to present a united Israeli front. 
However, on the fundamental issue of a Palestinian state this proved impossible 
with the Labour Party objecting to such a solution. 
8.3: Democratisation in the Labour Party 1988 Onwards. 
The decision of the Central Committee (18th October 1990) to accept the 
idea of paid membership to the Labour Party and the introduction of American style 
primaries for selection to the Knesset list marked the next logical step in the process 
of democratisation within the party. In accordance with the Central Committee 
decision the paid up members would be able to be elected to party institutions, vote 
in all party elections and participate in referenda on the party's platform and 
ideology38. The rationale behind the introduction of a paid membership was that it 
would provide the party with an accurate census of membership which could 
36 Extract from the Resolution from the Party Bureau and Council Meeting of the 
Labour Party concerning relations with the Sl. 
Party Protocols. 
37 Israel is the only country which has two separate parties in the Sl. Many senior 
figures in the Labour Party suspect that Mapam was allowed to join (against the 
wishes of the Labour Party) in order to punish the Labour Party over its support of 
the initial stages of the Lebanon war in 1982. 
Interview with Mr. Gat, Ibid. 
38 Party Protocols, Central Committee Meeting, 18th October 1990. 
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subsequently be used as the basis for internal party primaries. In short, it aimed to 
give something more than the previously symbolic meaning to party membership by 
way of the granting of voting rights in exchange for a membership fee. However, it is 
impossible to divorce the introduction and timing of these party reforms form either 
the intra-party conflict involving the contest for the leadership or the ideological 
debate and the inter-party conflict with the Likud39. 
There were four related motivations for the introduction of primaries: the 
populist appeal of such a move, the response to the introduction of primaries in the 
Likud, the fact that many in the party viewed them as the best chance of replacing 
Mr. Peres with Mr. Rabin and the notion that their introduction represented the 
culmination of the process to open up the process of selection. These reasons were 
related by their aim that of winning the next Knesset elections in 1992. Support for 
the introduction of primaries was almost unanimous. However, this unanimity 
obscured the lack of any real debate within the party on the long-term 
consequences of primaries to the party and the Israeli political system40. 
It is clear that after the "dirty exercise"(1990) the Labour Party needed to 
purify itself and attempt to gain the confidence of the electorate. Primaries provided 
the party with the opportunity to introduce reforms which in theory made the party 
more accountable to its membership41 . This populist appeal tended to overshadow 
all other rationale in a party which was becoming increasingly driven by the sole 
goal of returning to power (in its own right) for the first time since it had lost its 
dominant party status. Such arguments were illustrated by the comments of Mr. 
Sneh, one of the rising stars of the party: 
39 The idea of paid membership was not supported by Mr. Peres who stated that it 
could result in a closing of the party to the masses. In reality, Mr. Peres's initial 
opposition was more motivated by intra-party considerations of trying to postpone a 
vital decision which would pave the way to the primaries which he did not want. 
40 Interview with Mr. Zvilli, 5th September 1994. 
41 Interview with Dr. Beilin, 29th August 1994. 
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The party's only chance to regain its hegemony in the country is if a broader 
strata of the population identifies with the party, and if the party will have a 
large group of activists with influence over their surroundings. The current 
system does not allow this to happen, and does not necessarily raise the right 
people to leadership positions. The only way his can be changed is by means 
of the party being opened up and democratised42. 
The popularity of primaries with the electorate had been shown by the 
success of the Likud's primaries for the Histadrut elections (1990). The Likud 
decided to introduce American style primaries to select their candidates for the 
Histadrut's workers committees (1st August 1989)43. In all200 candidates stood in 
30 voting districts utilising some 150 polling stations in which some 40,000 people 
voted. Although the number of voters was inflated by the Likud, the system was 
viewed as a major success by people across the political spectrum. Many people in 
the Labour Party accept that the party only introduced primaries in response to the 
success of Likud's primaries and the fear that Likud would subsequently use this 
method of selection for their next Knesset list-44. 
The additional requirement that many people in the party viewed as necessary 
for returning the party to power was the replacement of Mr Peres with Mr. Rabin. 
Mr. Peres was highly popular with the party but unpopular with the electorate while 
Mr. Rabin was not as popular within the party but consistently enjoyed a higher 
popularity rating in opinion polls than any leader from either Labour or the Likud. 
Because of this situation some of Mr. Rabin supporters preferred "open primaries" in 
which everyone who signed a pledge of support would have the right to vote. 
However, "closed primaries" were chosen as the method of selection to establish a 
42 Mr. Sneh, Address to a meeting of pro-democratisation supporters, December 
1989. 
43 Likud Central Committee Meeting, 1st August 1989, Party Protocols. 
44 Interview with Dr. Beilin, 29th August 1994. 
Mr. Burg describes Labour's decision as the squash court effect with the Labour 
Party simply reacting to Likud's previous shot. 
Interview with Mr. Burg, 13th September 1994. 
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direct relationship between membership and voting rights. In addition there was also 
the fear that in "open primaries" supporters from the Likud and other parties would 
vote thus distorting the result. This could have taken the form of Likud voters voting 
for Mr. Peres knowing that he would not present such a threat as Mr. Rabin to the 
Likud in national elections. 
The Labour Party's motivations were apparent in the lack of any real debate 
within the party on the adoption of primaries45. As previously stated it is impossible 
to separate the internal democratisation issue from the debate surrounding the 
leadership and the strategy needed to win elections. As a result of this there was 
little discussion on the longer term consequences of primaries for the party. Mr. 
Libai, the Head of the party Constitutional Committee, was a notable exception 
summarising the changes as follows: 
Primaries will reduce the dependence of the elected official on Central 
Committee members and diminish the control of party bureaucrats, who get 
their people on to the Central Committee. The larger the electing body, the 
harder to bribe or control the individual votes. Instead of a restricted body, 
thousands will elect their representatives for the Knesset, local authority and 
labour councils. You cannot bribe that many people. Only the political stance 
and efforts of the candidate will determine his or her success, not how many 
weddings or bar mitzvahs attendecf46. 
However, such statements do not reveal the extent of the changes to all 
aspects of the party that the primaries caused. These can be divided into the 
following, the quality and background of the elected candidates, party discipline, the 
changing role of the party organs and branches, the role of the media, the 
45 In all interviews with Labour Party leaders conducted by the researcher every 
interviewee confirmed this assumption of the lack of debate. The majority of them 
did not view this as a serious problem, arguing that at the time the populist appeal 
oft the party was the priority. For example, 
Interview with Mr. Saguy, Mk, Head of the Tel Aviv Party Branch, The Knesset, 
Jerusalem, 25th July 1994. 
46 Interview with Mr. Libai, Minister of Justice 1992, Jerusalem Post, 27th July 
1990. 
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importance of finance and the patron-client relationship between the leadership and 
the party. 
In terms of background and quality of the elected candidates primaries were 
perceived of as increasing the quality and the number of candidates from the 
periphery. In a Knesset where the Labour Party MK's had been selected by the 
primary system there was clearly going to be a problem with asserting parliamentary 
party discipline. There would be a increased tendency for the individual member to 
vote against the party whip at some time safe in the knowledge that party members 
and not the leadership now had the power of re-selection. The power of the party 
organs and branches power decreases as the central focus moves from the Central 
Committee and party branches to the party membership as the body of reference. 
Connected to this is the heightened role of the media, and in particular television, in 
providing the candidates with access to the membership. In 1989, Israel had only 
one TV channel but by 1992 it had 2 domestic channels and cable TV which 
included another home channel47. Such an increase in the potential air time 
available for politicians meant greater opportunities for the candidates to address 
the party membership not through party organs but rather from the mass media48. 
The Israeli press, with its 6 serious daily newspapers, offered the opportunity to 
prospective candidates to write articles and at the time of the primary elections use 
such space for what in reality was their personal manifesto. In the Labour Party the 
"Gang of Eight" in particular used this medium to articulate their positions. 
The question of ensuring a financial level playing field proved problematic. 
The party did try to deal with this issue by awarding each candidate an equal budget 
47 The domestic cable channel became the first Israeli channel to broadcast live and 
full coverage of the Knesset proceedings. 
48 Mr. A vraham Burg, while accepting that the advent of new television channels 
gave more opportunities to MK's, also stresses that people have more choice to tum 
off the channel when there is a greater number of channels available. 
Interview with Mr. Burg, 13th September 1994. 
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and attempting to exclude private contributions. As the party rules decreed that -
each candidate: 
will not receive any contribution and I or participation in financing, whether in 
the form of cash or cash equivalent, either directly or indirectly by any person or 
body ... Candidates will not spend on their campaign more than the ceiling limit 
determined by the elections committee for each type of candidate. Candidates 
will sign a declaration regarding their commitment to a fair contest, and will 
undertake to enable examination of his or her sources of finance if asked to do 
by the elections supervision institution49. 
Unfortunately, despite the good intentions the primaries were not viewed as 
equally fair with candidates spending vastly different amounts in their effort to get 
elected to a realistic place on the list&>. 
The issue of patron-client ties tended to be overshadowed by the contest for 
the leadership in which it was in the interest on one of the two major patrons to 
adopt the primary system. Put simply Mr. Rabin's initial reluctance and fear of the 
unknown were soon replaced by a more positive attitude when it became clear that 
the primary system represented his best opportunity to defeat Mr. Peres. Such 
strong intra-party motivations for Mr. Rabin overshadowed any longer term fear of 
damage to his power base. The eventual practical implications of these changes are 
dealt with in the conclusion, but these at the time theoretical implications of 
primaries were not debated within the party in any detail. The dual pressure of the 
need to introduce populist measures and the role of primaries in settling the 
leadership struggle proved too seductive over real political debate on the issue and 
its longer term consequences. 
49 Extract from, Labour's System of Primaries: The Rules, Party Headquarters, Tel 
Aviv. 
50 Based on interviews with Labour MK's serving in the 13th Knesset. 
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Conclusion. 
The Labour party between 1988-90 witnessed the start of a programme of 
change both in terms of internal organisation and to a degree ideology with the 
principle aim of both being to return the party to power in its own right at the next 
Knesset elections in 1992. The debate within the party organs on these issues was 
dominated by continuing intra-party tensions and divisions, not only between the 
hawks and doves but also now between generations. The young guard and in 
particular the "Gang of Eight" started mounting a serious campaign for both 
increased power for themselves, but also importantly to change the organisation 
and ideology of the party. This was in direct contrast to the problems the "Tse'irim" 
had in the early 1960's with the party machine (Gush) when the generational conflict 
had been based on power. The "Gang of Eight" were an ambitious group which did 
not stray from the patron-client means of political advancement. However, they were 
of a far more independent nature that the generation directly below Mr. Peres and 
Mr. Rabin many of whom had served in the NUG. Their arrival on the national stage 
coincided with the media revolution in Israeli politics where their sharp media skills 
were quickly employed by the party which did not have many media friendly stars in 
contrast to the highly effective "Likud Princes" such as Mr. Netanyahu, Mr. Meridor 
and Dr. Begin. 
By 1990 it was clear that the balance of power within the leadership was 
shifting away from Mr. Peres and towards Mr. Rabin as Mr. Peres was being seen 
by an increasing number of people as unelectable in a Knesset election. However, 
Mr. Peres's control of the party organs made it extremely difficult to replace him 
especially as Mr. Rabin was still very much an outsider in the Mr. Peres controlled 
party machine. Consequently, Mr. Peres had been able to postpone the leadership 
election when it appeared likely that his leadership would not survive his failure to 
form a Labour led government in 1990 (the "Dirty Exercise''). However, it was clear 
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that there would be a contest for the position of leader before the 1992 election and 
that the importance of Mr. Peres's control of the party organs would be substantially 
reduced as the contest was to be opened up to include all party members. 
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CHAPTER 9 
THE ROAD FROM OPPOSITION TO GOVERNMENT, THE ISRAEL LABOUR 
PARTY 1990-92. 
Between the collapse of the NUG (1990) and the Knesset election in 1992, 
the Labour Party acted mainly as a non-dominant party without power operating in a 
competitive party (block) system. The changes in the party's position up to 1992 are 
summarised in Illustration Six. 
6: Development of the Labour Party 1948-1990. 
1948-1977: Dominant party with power 
1977-1981: Dominant party without power 
1981-1984: Non-Dominant party without power 
1984-1990: Non-Dominant party with a share of power 
1990-1992: Non-Dominant party without power 
However, the actions of the leadership were at times directly linked to the 
party's past dominant position within the Israeli political system and specifically the 
continued "conditioning effects" of this dominance. This was most apparent in intra-
party relationships and the need of Mr. Peres to achieve at least a share in power 
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so as to be able to deliver on patronage promises to his clients and to leadership 
rivals. 
As with any political party not in power within a competitive party system, the 
Labour Party experienced a great deal of frustration during this period as Mr. 
Shamir's Likud-led government and events in the Middle East at times appeared to 
hijack the on-going debate on the key security and peace issue within the Labour 
Party. Put simply, the failure of the "Dirty Exercise" gave the Likud and-Mr. Shamir 
in particular-along with his extreme right wing and religious coalition partners, the 
opportunity to set the Israeli political agenda and to formulate the national response 
to international and regional events. During this period the inter-related concerns 
were the security issue incorporating the peace process, and in particular the 
Madrid Peace Conference, the settlements issue and the future status of the 
territories, the worsening of relations with the United States and the arrival of the 
Aliyah of ex-Soviet Jews. 
However, the return to opposition presented the Labour Party with two 
opportunities: to conduct an internal debate on the peace and security issue, and to 
implement internal party reforms, free from the constraints of a NUG. In addition, it 
provided the party with an opportunity to charge the Likud with the cost of its 
settlement polices, free from the complexity of the Labour Party's involvement in 
approving such programmes within the framework of the NUG's (1984-90). More 
specifically the party hoped to illustrate the cost of the these settlement policies to 
both the Israeli economy, especially to the traditional Likud constituency of the lower 
income groups (predominantly Sephardim) and newly arriving Aliyah from the Soviet 
Union, as well as to Israel's standing in the international community. These factors 
became further intertwined with the decision of the American administration to 
directly link the granting of $10 billion of loan guarantees to Israel (1992}, needed 
for the successful absorption of the Soviet Aliyah, to progress in the peace process 
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and specifically the freezing of the settlement programme in the West Bank. Such 
actions helped focus the distinctive Zionist priorities of both the Labour Party which 
favoured people over land and the Likud which gave priority to land (Greater Israel) 
over immigrants (the Soviet Aliyah). Illustration 7 shows the inter-related nature of 
the above. 
7: The Likud and Labour's Zionist Priorities and the Consequences. 
Zionist Priority 
Likud Labour 
r----i Security 1990-92 1---..., 
US-- Loan Guarantees - Peace Process 
Relations 
Territories Immigrant Absorption (Soviet Aliyah) 
Lines indicate the related nature of the major issues of the day. 
In simple terms the Labour party aimed to show that the Likud's settlement 
drive in the territories was damaging the prospects for the Soviet Aliyah. 
Before examining the internal dynamics of the Labour Party between 1990 
and 1992 it is necessary to first examine the effects of Mr. Shamir's government had 
in redefining the political agenda. Despite being the most radical government in 
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Israel's history the Likud-led government in effect legitimised the Labour Party's 
peace agenda with the decision of the Mr. Shamir to attend the Madrid Peace 
Conference in 1991. In addition to this, the responses of the Likud to the Persian 
Gulf war, the government's difficult relationship with the American administration 
and the arrival of the Soviet Aliyah, combined to shift the 'political goal posts' in 
Israel. Consequently, it is necessary to understand the significance of these 
changes and where they left the Labour Party. 
9.1: The Composition, Performance and Consequences of Mr. Shamir's 
Ultra-Right Wing Government 1988-90. 
The collapse of the NUG was not only a defeat for Mr. Peres and the Labour 
Party but also marked the decline of the pragmatic right. Mr. Shamir was forced to 
rely on the seven votes of the radical right wing parties, Tsomet (Crossroad), Tehiya 
(Renaissance), and Moledet (Homeland)1, as well as the religious parties, to secure 
1 Tehiya received 3 seats in the 1988 Knesset elections after a split with a faction 
which went on to become Tsomet. Tehiya's Chairman Mr. Ne'eman assumed the 
post of Energy and Infrastructure and founder Mrs. Cohen was made deputy 
Minister of Science and Technology. Mrs Cohen resigned from the government in 
November 1991 and Mr. Ne'eman in February 1992 over the peace process. The 
party refused to join a joint list with Moledet in 1992 and failed to cross the electoral 
threshold of 1.5 percent. 
Tsomet was formed in 1987 by the ex Chief of Staff Mr. Eitan and won two seats in 
the 1988 Knesset Elections. Tsomet unlike the other two extreme right wing parties 
concentrated at the time on constitutional reform and the campaign for a change in 
the electoral system to a direct election for Prime Minister and also against religious 
coercion. Its attachment to Greater Israel was based on security reasons and not 
biblical or emotional ties which characterised the other right wing parties including 
the Likud. Tsometjoined Mr. Shamir's government in June 1990 with Mr. Eitan 
serving as Minister of Agriculture. However, the party left in December 1991 
because of Mr. Shamir's opposition to direct elections for the post of Prime Minister. 
Moledet was founded on the eve of the 1988 Knesset elections by Mr. Ze'evi and 
ran on the single issue of the voluntary transfer of Arabs from the territories. It won 
two seats in the subsequent election and joined the government in February 1991 
leaving together with Tehiya in January 1992 in protest over the autonomy plan for 
the Palestinians which came out of the peace talks following the Madrid Peace 
Conference. Its leader, Mr. Ze'evi served as Mr. Rabin's advisor on terrorism from 
.1974-77. Both his military and political careers have been surrounded by 
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a 61 seat winning coalition and, moreover, to give key Cabinet portfolios to his 
radical intra-party rivals, Mr. Sharon (Construction and Immigration), Mr. Levy 
(Foreign Affairs) and Mr. Moda~i (Fin~nce)2.The cp~sequence of this was that the f?- . ,. ~· ; ·:;· 
new government was dominated by the radical right's ultra nationalistic policies of 
increased settlement leading to a de facto annexation of the West Bank. Mr. 
Shamir's intra-party standing was weakened by Mr. Sharon, who served as the 
"King maker'', persuading the radical right parties tojoin the coalition as well as 
enjoying the support of the growing number of Likud radicals. Within the Cabinet 
itself Mr. Sharon, together with the "Shackle Ministers" and I or the leaders of the 
three radical right parties, created a powerful alliance3. Despite this, had Mr. Shamir 
in alliance with Defence Minister Arens decided to challenge this new powerful axis 
then they would have probably prevailed at intra-party level but subsequently would 
have been unable at inter party level to form a new administration without the 
support of the Labour Party4. 
controversy and his participation in the government was initially opposed by Dr. 
Arens, David Levy and many of the Likud Princes. However, only Dr. Begin voted 
against his appointment in the Knesset debate. 
2 Sprinzak, "The Radical Right", in Kyle and Peters (ed), Wither Israel: The 
Domestic Challenges, I. B. Tauris, London 1993, p117. 
3 The fundamental difference in defining the radical and moderate or pragmatic right 
was in simplistic terms over Greater Israel. The pragmatic right accepted the 
constraints of political reality and understood that Israel must take into account 
external influences while the radical right tended to ignore this political reality and 
the nations ability to take on the outside world. While the moderates concentrate on 
diplomacy the radicals view the territories as the single most important issue. 
4 Dr. Ben Aharon argues that Mr. Shamir and Dr. Arens should have taken on the 
"Shackle Ministers" at this time instead of trying to humour them. He believes that 
they would have undoubtedly emerged victorious within the Likud. However, by this 
stage it was apparent that Mr. Shamir was grooming Dr. Arens as his successor and 
this intra party conflict marked the start of the battle to succeed Mr. Shamir. 
Interview with Dr. Ben Aharon, Director of Mr. Shamir's Prime Ministers Bureau, 
Jerusalem, 18th September 1994. 
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9.1.1: The Persian Gulf War and the Consequences for the Likud and the 
Labour Party. 
The inevitable clash between Mr. Shamir's government and the international 
community, in particular the United States, was postponed by the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait (2nd August 1990), an event which diverted world attention away from the 
Palestinian issue. Even two such divisive events as the killing of 19 Palestinians by 
Israeli Border Guards at Mount Temple in Jerusalem (8th October 1990) and the 
assassination of the Kach leader Rabbi Kahane (November 1990) did little to divert 
the attention of the world away from the impending war in the Persian Gulf. Thus 
when, on the second night of the war, Israel was attacked by Iraqi Scud missiles, 
the differences between the American Administration and the Israeli government 
were pushed aside as the Americans attempted to keep Israel out of the war. Mr. 
Shamir's decision not to retaliate to the 39 Scud missile attacks on Israel during the 
war proved to be vital to the American administration's attempts at keeping the 
Arab-Western war coalition together6. Consequently Mr. Shamir, for the duration 
and in the immediate aftermath of the war, was in a strong position to dictate to the 
Americans such items as the maintenance of Israel's qualitative edge over the 
Arabs in the military sphere as well as compensation for the estimated $3 billion the 
war cost Israel in damage to property and loss of earnings due to economic close-
downs. 
5 Mr. Shamir's decision not to retaliate also proved extremely popular with the Israeli 
electorate of which 7 4 percent supported the policy of non retaliation. This figure did 
not reflect Israeli fears that the IDF could not defeat Iraq as 92 percent stated that 
the IDF would win such a conflict. 
Source; Peretz, "The Impact of the Gulf War on Israeli and Palestinian Political 
Attitudes", Journal of Palestine Studies, Autumn 1991, p21. 
6 This figure is based on official government estimates but Peretz, Ibid., argues that 
the figure is somewhat of an over estimation and that the Gulf war did not do any 
major damage to the Israeli economy. 
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The war had important consequences for both the Labour Party and the left in 
general. The Lebanon war (1982) had proved to be an extremely divisive war for 
Israeli society, with the far left and eventually the Labour Party itself opposing the 
conflict, whereas there was almost total support in Israel for the war against Iraq. 
The most vocal key peaceniks of the left and critics of the Lebanon war, such as Mr. 
Yossi Sarid and the writer Mr. Amos Oz, supported the Persian Gulf war as did the 
vast majority of Peace Now which viewed the conflict as a just struggle against a 
tyrant7. Mapam was more cautious, issuing a statement condemning the Iraqi 
aggression but at the same time criticising the intransigence of the Israeli 
government in not accepting the right of the Palestinians to full self-determination 
and refusing to talk to the PLOS. The major concern of both the Labour Party and 
the Likud was to ensure that the outcome of the Gulf crisis was not linked to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, by the international community, and in particular the Israeli 
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Mr. Rabin summed up the Labour 
Party strategy at a forum for Foreign Diplomats in Tel Aviv (6th December 1990): 
At the moment one of the greatest dangers from Israel's point of view is the 
inclination in certain circles to link the solution to the Gulf Crisis to the Arab-
Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian conflict, to pay Saddam Hussein with Israeli 
currency.9 
Mr. Rabin repeated the position in the Knesset debate, some 36 hours before 
the first missile was fired at Israel and also articulated the Labour Party policy of first 
allowing the Americans the opportunity of dealing with the Iraqis. Mr. Peres made 
similar suggestions, but surprised some party members by stressing his vision of the 
future Middle East based on a regional common market at the above meeting as 
7 Peace Now actually became known as War Now, a phrase used by Labour MK, 
Ms. Dayan during the first week of the war. 
a Mapam, "The War in the Gulf', Party Position Paper, Tel Aviv, 1991. 
9 Mr. Rabin, Address to Foreign Diplomats, Tel Aviv, 6th December 1990. Party 
Protocols, Beit Berl, near Tel Aviv. 
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well as in the Israeli media1o. Consequently, unlike the Lebanon war, the Labour 
Party remained relatively homogeneous on the need to first remain out of the 
conflict as long as possible and second, on the need for Iraqi military power to be 
destroyed. This unity was a reflection of the unity of Israeli society as a whole, with 
the only conflict originating from the right wing parties over whether and how the IDF 
should respond to the missile attacks11. 
There were two major consequences of the war for the Labour Party and the 
left in general: the credibility problem of the doves who wanted to deal with the PLO, 
and a decline in its opinion poll ratings. The first was caused by the Palestinian 
support for Iraq during the conflict, by Mr. Arafat and the PLO leadership and by the 
Palestinian inhabitants of the Occupied Territories. Second, the popularity of Mr. 
Shamir increased with the Israeli electorate, due to his handling of the crisis12. Both 
of these proved to be extremely damaging to the Labour Party, in the short run. 
Internally, at the time of the outbreak of the war, the party was divided on the 
issue of a negotiating partner for the Palestinian question into three groupings: 
those who still favoured some form of the Jordanian option, those who preferred 
direct negotiations with the inhabitants of the Occupied Territories and the "Gang of 
Eight", and their allies who favoured direct talks with the PLO. Within the leadership 
Mr. Peres still favoured some kind of resurrection of the Jordanian formula, whereas 
Mr. Rabin preferred the second option, but both remained publicly against direct 
talks with the PL013_ 
1o Spectrum, January, February 1991. 
11 Both the Defence Minister Dr. Arens and the ex-Defence Minister Mr. Sharon 
favoured an IDF response to the attacks. 
12 Mr Shamirs restraint during the war was highly praised by members of the Labour 
Party including Secretary General Harish who stated that Mr. Shamir's passive 
temperament was an asset. 
Interview with Mr. Harish, Spectrum, February 1991. 
13 Mr. Peres favoured a Jordanian-Palestinian federation worked out under the 
auspices of an International Peace Conference. The doves in the Labour Party (the 
third category) criticised the proposal because it did not accept the notion of full 
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It is clear that the position of those, within the party, who favoured direct talks 
with the PLO was weakened by the Palestinian support for Iraq. Arian (1991) puts 
the level of Israeli public support for entering into talks with the PLO, under certain 
conditions, at 29 percent, compared with 58 percent in March 198914. An additional 
reason for this decline was the continuing Intifada which, after a brief reduction in its 
intensity, had taken on a more brutal form with the highly published killing of 
Palestinian "collaborators"15. Such actions, when combined with the arrival of the 
Soviet immigrants, led to a modified national consensus summarised as follows: the 
Arabs had not really changed, and major territorial concessions in the peace 
process were not possible in the immediate future. The arrival of the Soviet 
immigrants and their successful absorption was presently the priority on the political 
agenda. The polarisation of opinion on the final status of the territories remained, 
but there was now a consensus that the time was not right because of the arrival of 
the Soviet Aliyah to take major steps in the peace process16. 
Consequently, just at the time that the Labour Party was showing signs, 
through its internal party debate, of making profound changes to its platform on the 
peace issue, and especially concerning Palestinian self-determination, events 
hijacked the national consensus and moved it in the opposite direction. 
Undoubtedly the war and the change in the Intifada damaged not only the position 
I 
I 
Palestinian self determination. The hawks in the party argued that an international 
Conference w~s not in Israel's best interest. 
I 
Source; Katz, ('New Battles on the Horizon, Cracks in the National Government", 
Israel Scene, April 1991, p3. 
14 Arian, "Natibnal Security and Political Attitudes: The Impact of the Gulf War", 
JCSS Memor~ndum, Tel Aviv University, 1991. 
15 Dr. Arens, i..ikud's Minister of Defence had achieved some success with his policy 
of disengagetnent of the IDF from certain situations. However, this made such 
executions e~sier to carry out. Arens argues that his methods in dealing with the 
Intifada prov~d more successful than Mr. Rabin's and saved lives. 
Interview wit~ Dr. Arens, 26th September 1994. 




of the doves within the Labour Party but the standing of the left wing parties who 
had already accepted the right of the Palestinians to full self-determination17. 
Conversely, Mr. Shamir and the Likud were in electoral terms unbeatable after the 
ending of the war. In personal popularity Mr. Shamir led Mr. Rabin by 13 percent 
and Mr. Peres by 14 percent, and Likud candidates for Prime Minister led their 
Labour counterparts by 23 percent1B. On the international arena Mr. Shamir saw, in 
the short term, his popularity rise as his self-restraint during the war was praised by 
world leaders. 
9.1.2: The Madrid Peace Conference 1991. 
Mr. Shamir's popularity with the Israeli electorate peaked at the start of the 
Madrid Peace Conference {October 1991 ). He was perceived as having 
successfully neutralised the Conference before agreeing to attend19. Mr. Shamir 
had removed the East Jerusalem representation {one of the reasons for the break 
up of the NUG in 1990) and had effectively sidelined the PLO, only allowing 
Palestinian participation as part of a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation. 
Crucially, the results of the conference were not binding and it was only to serve as 
a preamble to bilateral talks to take place in Washington some five weeks later. Mr. 
Shamir unsurprisingly, described the Conference as an historic achievement, 
arguing that: 
It was the first time that Israel met together with representatives of all its 
neighbours without any pre-conditions. This was an achievement in itself even if · 
17 One prominent dove from Ratz, Mr. Sarid, accepted the damage and told the 
Palestinians, "don't call us we will call you", after Palestinian support for Iraq 
became clear. 
18 The complete results were as follows for choice for Prime Minister. Form the 
Likud, Mr. Shamir 28%, Mr. Arens 11%, Mr. Sharon, 11%, Mr. Levy 5%. From the 
Labour Party, Mr. Rabin 15%, Mr. Peres 14%, Mr. Gur 2%, Mr. Shahal1o/o. 
19 Interview with Dr. Gold, Advisor to Mr. Shamir in Madrid and Director of the Israel-
America study Group, JCSS, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, 2nd October 1994. 
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you do not take into account the results of it. It was important for us (Israel), it 
gave us more standing and prestige. It was clear that we would have to get 
peace with negotiations one day, also it was very clear according to the Camp 
David agreements that we would have to find a solution for the unresolved 
questions20 
The Labour leadership was placed in a difficult situation for two reasons. First, 
traditionally at such crucial moments in Israeli history the opposition and 
government adopt some form of consensus so as not to weaken Israel's negotiating 
hand. Had the Labour leadership attacked Mr. Shamir at this time, Likud would have 
charged them with near-treason. Second, Mr. Shamir was widely perceived to have 
conducted the negotiations which led to the Conference extremely prudently. There 
could be no repeat of the charge made against Mr. Begin after he agreed to return 
the entire Sinai to Egypt21. According to opinion polls conducted in November 1991, 
Mr. Shamir and the Likud would have won 44 seats compared to only 29 for the 
Labour Party. At block level the Likud-block led the Labour-block by 70 to 50 
Knesset seats if an election had been called22. 
The fact that the Madrid Conference did not produce the major breakthrough 
that its sponsors had hoped for did not detract from the fact that for the first time 
Israel had sat down with all the Arab states (except Iraq) and that a process of 
negotiation had begun. Mr. Shamir's speech at the opening session, although not 
popular with his hosts, reflected the Israeli national consensus of steady 
unspectacular progress in the peace process. The Labour Party's one consolation 
was that by attending Mr. Shamir had given legitimacy to their peace polices and 
20 Interview with Mr. Shamir, Tel Aviv, 17th August 1994. 
21 Mr. Shamir defined the major reasons for the timing of the Peace Conference as 
the fact that Israel's position was relatively good, the demise of the Soviet Union 
and the ending of the Cold War, assurances of continuing good relations with the 
United States as well as the immigration from the former Soviet Union which would 
help the demographic process. The major aim of the process was to solve the 
conflict and get international legitimacy. 
Interview with Mr. Shamir, 17th August 1994. 
22 Source, Mabbat, 19th November 1991. 
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had seemingly rejected the extreme right's call for immediate annexation of the 
West Bank. The sad irony for Mr. Peres and the Labour Party was that the 
International Conference, in both its organisation and role, resembled that of the 
one agreed jointly by King Hussein and Mr. Peres in the London agreement 
(December 1987), and which Mr. Shamir's objections had prevented from 
happening. 
9.2: The Confrontation between the Likud and the United States. The Role 
of the Soviet Aliyah and the Decline of the Likud. 
Much has been written about the demise of the Likud and the rise of the 
Labour Party from this point up to and including the Knesset elections (June 1992). 
Writers such as Hadar, Smooha and Peretz correctly place the blame on a number 
of issues ranging from cases of internal corruption becoming public, the settlements 
issue, the Jack of progress in the post Madrid peace process, the deteriorating 
relationship with the United States and the problem of the Soviet Aliyah23. However, 
the central issue, around which all others revolved, was the last the failure of the 
Likud to deal successfully with the absorption of the new immigrants from the Soviet 
Union. 
The request of the Israeli government for the loan guarantees from the Bush 
administration, which became vital for the successful absorption of the new 
immigrants, gave the Americans an extremely large stick with which to beat the 
Likud24. Had there not been the need for the $10 billion guarantees, then Secretary 
23 See for example, Hadar, "The 1992 Electoral Earthquake and the Fall of the 
Second Israeli Public", Middle East Journal, 4-46, Autumn 1992. 
Smooha and Peretz, "Israel's 1992 Knesset Elections; Are the Critical ?", Middle 
East Journal, 3-47, Summer 1993. 
24 As it transpired the Joan guarantees when granted to the Labour administration 
from June 1992 onwards proved extremely expensive and Mr. Shochat, the Finance 
Minister questioned the rationale behind using them for his reason. 
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of State Baker and President Bush would not have been able to give Mr. Rabin and 
the Labour Party a financial carrot to hold out to the Israeli public at the Knesset 
election in 199225. Mr. Shamir was aware that the political risks he took with 
America were large, but he felt that had the Likud won the election, then America 
would have given in and granted the Joan guarantees26. In terms of the deteriorating 
relationship with America, he saw it as the first serious violation of the special 
relationship between the two countries but considered it a temporary dispute, 
believing that the Americans would soon return to the status quo of non-interference 
in Israeli internal politics27. Traditionally such interference had annoyed the Israeli 
electorate, which had subsequently supported and closed ranks around the Israeli 
government. However, this instance was different because again the Americans 
had forced the Likud to show its true ideological colours and make in simplistic 
terms a choice between their ideology and the immigrants. 
The American administration was clearly concerned about the Likud 
government's 2010 plan which aimed at increasing the Jewish population in the 
Occupied Territories by 2.6 million, involving the construction of some 700,000 
25 With regards to the Loan guarantees the timing was vital as elections in Israel 
were originally scheduled for October 1992 it would have been difficult for President 
Bush not to give them with Mr. Clinton saying he would do so if he were elected in 
November in America. The power of the Jewish lobby groups, although in decline 
was still such that both candidates in the American Presidential race had to be 
careful not to alienate the American Jewish vote. With the retiming of the Israeli 
election to June 1992 President Bush was able to give Mr. Rabin and the Labour 
Party a financial bonus to hold out to the Israeli electorate in exchange for the 
freezing of the settlement programme in the West Bank. The Labour Party had 
already indicated its willingness to make such a concession by stopping all 
settlements that were not vital to Israeli security needs. As the Americans were to 
discover in the period following the 1992 Labour victory Mr. Rabin and the Labour 
Party seemed to be somewhat vague in the definition of security settlements. 
The events surrounding the loan guarantees debate were relayed to the author in 
interviews with; 
Mr. Shamir, Dr. Gold, Dr. Ben Aharon and key Labour Party leaders. 
26 Interview with Mr. Shamir, 17th August 1994. 
27 Jbid. 
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building units and 170 settlements at a cost of between $140 to $195 billion (at 
1992 rates). Such a scheme, if fully implemented, would have altered the 
demographic balance in the territories so that the population of the West Bank 
would have been 40 percent Jewish and the Gaza Strip 5 percent Jewish2B. 
However, such grandiose plans put forward by Mr. Sharon and accepted by Mr. 
Shamir and the Cabinet did not reflect the reality of the situation. It is true that 
between 1990 and 1992 seven new settlements were built and that the Jewish 
population increased from 91,000 in 1990 to 107,000 in 1992, but such increases 
had also taken place during the period of the NUG (1984-1990). Table 9.1 reveals 
the true extent of the increase in the Jewish population and numbers of settlements 
under the respective governments between 1977-92. It is clear from the table that a 
large proportion of the settlement programme took place either under a Labour 
government or an NUG (53%) and similarly 52 Settlements were constructed with 
Labour Party involvement. 
28 Statistics from Jewish Settlement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip: Profile 1992, 
p29, The International Centre for Peace in the Middle East, Tel Aviv. 
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Table 9.1: Jewish Population Growth in the Occupied Territories by Israeli 
Governments in Power 1967-1992. 
Government % of Population Growth 
Labour-Alignment until 1977 4 (20) 
Likud 1977-1981 9 (35) 
Likud 1981-1984 14 (43) 
NUG 1984-1988 38 (27) 
NUG 1988-1990 11 (5) 
Likud 1990-1992 24 (7) 
The figures in brackets represent the increase in number of settlements 
in absolute terms. 
Source: Jewish Settlement in the West Bank and Gaza, Profile 1992, The 
International Centre For Peace in the Middle East. 
The increase in 1990-92, while in part reflecting the drive of Mr. Sharon, was 
also a result of the slowing down between 1988-90 due to the uncertainty caused 
by the outbreak of the Intifada. The reality of the situation was that the Likud were 
investing heavily in the territories but not at a rate which matched the level of Mr. 
Sharon's 2010 plans29. The charge from the Labour Party, that the Likud was 
putting investment in Greater Israel over the absorption of the Aliyah (immigrants), 
was therefore correct, and struck a nerve over a period of time with the Israeli 
electorate, in particular the new immigrants themselves. However, the extent of the 
29 The Statistics for the West Bank, Benvenisti, West Bank Atlas and for the Gaza 
Strip, The Central Bureau of Statistics. The figures for Jewish population also come 
from the Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel, Various Editions. 
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investment in the territories was only problematical because of the presence of the 
new immigrants. Consequently, had there been no Soviet Aliyah, the level of 
investment in the West Bank would not have proved so divisive an issue. The 
Labour Party would therefore have found it more difficult to convince the Israeli 
electorate of the cost to Israel as a whole of the Likud's political priorities in the 
Territories. 
The Israeli economy as a whole was not growing at a level that could sustain 
both the settlement policy and the absorption of the Soviet immigrants. 
Unemployment was running nationally at around 11.5 percent, but immigrant 
unemployment was considerably higher. Economic liberalisation, vital for attracting 
foreign investment in to Israel, was being implemented too slowly, and the 
anticipated financial windfall following the Gulf War did not materialise to cushion 
the absorption of the immigrants. Importantly the economic problems were 
particularly bad for the traditional Likud constituencies in the development towns in 
the periphery. The process of the Sephardim moving away from the Likud had 
started with the 1988 election, but it was clear that the Likud government was not 
delivering to its key constituency group as well as to the ex-Soviet immigrants and 
would consequently suffer at the next election. 
It was into this background that the Likud suffered two self-inflicted wounds 
namely the battle over the Knesset selection list and the corruption which was 
highlighted by the report of the State Comptroller, Mrs. Ben-Porat, in 1992. From the 
summer of 1992, when Mr. Shamir supported Mr. Sharon's Settlement plans, it 
became clear that Mr. Shamir, for intra-party motivations, was building a powerful 
axis with Mr. Sharon in order to defeat the Foreign Minister Mr. Levy. Mr. Levy, in his 
time at the Foreign Ministry had surprised some with his flexibility in negotiations, 
although on matters of substance there was little difference between himself and 
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either Mr. Shamir or Mr. Sharon~. The culmination of this new alliance was in the 
selection of the Likud Knesset list by the party's 3300 member Central Committee in 
which Mr. Sharon and Mr. Shamir effectively sewed up the list for their supporters 
with their alliance.31 Many of Mr. Levy's supporters were either demoted or failed to 
obtain a realistic place on the list. Unsurprisingly, a bloody public battle followed 
which culminated in Mr. Levy's threat to resign and an eventual compromise 
between himself and Mr. Shamir32. Mr. Levy was viewed as the leading Sephardim 
politician, the dispute was perceived of as an attack by the Ashkenazi elite in Likud 
on the Sephardim which consequently further alienated this key traditional Likud 
constituency. 
The State Comptrollers report charged Mr. Sharon's Ministry of Housing with 
the misuse of funds which at the time appeared much more serious than the ones 
which afflicted the Labour Party in 197733. The Labour Party, by not being in the 
government was able to exploit such scandals before and during the 1992 election 
campaign. As important as the wounds themselves was their timing, coming just 
prior to the elections which had been brought forward after Mr. Shamir, with the 
resignation of the ultra-right wing parties, had lost his overall majority in the 
~ Of particular interest were the appointments Mr. Levy made to the Foreign 
Ministry staff which included Mr. Uri Savir who was considered to be closer to the 
Labour Party. When Mr. Peres became Foreign Minister in 1992 he promoted Mr. 
Savir to Director General of the Foreign Ministry, and Mr. Savir subsequently 
became one of the principle players in the Oslo channels with the PLO. 
31 Sprinzak, The Israeli Right, op. cit., p136. 
32 Mr. Shamir stresses that the intra-party disputes were conducted at a time that 
everyone in the Likud was convinced that they were going to win the election. In 
short, everyone was trying to strengthen their own personal positions rather than 
fight the Labour Party. He blames the public battle on Mr. Levy and accepts that it 
was one of the major reasons that the Likud support declined in the election. 
Interview with Mr. Shamir, 17th August 1994. 
33 At the time the corruption appeared to be much worse than in 1977, but presently 
(1995) there have only been a few prosecutions. Dr. Asa (Director of Mr. Rabin's 
election team) argues that the cases of corruption were not very dramatic but were 
exploited by the Labour Party at the time of the election. 
Interview with Dr. Chaim Asa, Hertzila, 16th October 1994. 
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Knesset. Consequently, the date of the election was moved from October to June 
1992 which in terms of the key issue of the loan guarantees gave a substantial 
advantage to the Labour Party. 
9.3: Continuity and Change: The Internal Dynamics of the Labour Party 
1990-92. 
The period of opposition from 1990-92 was crucial to a Labour Party which 
needed to introduce wide-ranging reforms to both its socio-economic and security 
platforms, its party organs and methods of selection, in a relatively short period of 
time and against a rapidly changing international and domestic agenda. Its 
fundamental criteria was to make itself electable in 1992 and these populist 
motivations, to a large extent, dictated the decisions taken34. The party's thirst for 
power, its past dominance and belief that it was the natural party of government 
meant that it would never be an effective opposition party. However after four 
election failures it was clear that, at the very least, these two years would have to be 
used at intra-party level to introduce the substantial reform which was required if the 
party was to expand it increasingly narrow political base. The fact that the changes 
which did take place during this time reflected the Labour Party traditions of 
pragmatic compromise and the priority of party unity, meant that the changes in 
many aspects were in reality little more than cosmetic. 
Within the leadership of the party this period was marked by a strong sense of 
frustration at the acclaim given to Mr. Shamir's decision to attend a Middle East 
Peace Conference. This was something that many people in the Labour Party, and 
especially Mr. Peres, had worked hard for, and had come close to achieving with 
34 Confirmation of the fundamental aim of the changes was to make the party 
electable in 1992 was given to the researcher in interviews for example, 
Interview with Nissim Zvilli MK, Secretary General of the Labour Party 1994, The 
Knesset, Jerusalem, 5th September 1994. 
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the London Agreement (December 1987), which Mr. Shamir had personally 
vetoed35. There were obvious comparisons with the visit of President Sadat (1977) 
when Mr. Begin accepted the praise for the culmination of a process started by the 
Labour government of Mr. Rabin. This frustration was compounded by the lack of a 
breakthrough at Madrid and the realisation that Mr. Shamir was more intent on 
keeping a dialogue going, while attempting to construct demographic realities in the 
Territories, rather than achieving any substantial breakthrough in the peace 
process. For the second consecutive time the Labour Party was out of office during 
a time of national crisis (the Persian Gulf war) and was relegated to complementing 
the Likud and particular1y Mr. Shamir on his handling of the war. This was especially 
hard to take for a party which during its period of dominance had led Israel through 
its war of independence and three subsequent wars. The outcome of this war, 
unlike the Lebanon war (1982-85), enhanced Mr. Shamir's reputation and political 
standing and in the short term awarded him a considerable political advantage over 
the Labour Party. 
As a result of such feelings of frustration, Mr. Peres sought to bring down the 
government in the Knesset and bring the elections forward36. However, by April 
1991 it was clear that there were divisions within the leadership between Mr Peres 
and Secretary General Mr. Harish over this strategy. Mr. Harish, in addressing the 
Party Bureau, summarised the rationale behind this strategy: 
Peres's approach as well as that of the Chairman of the party's Knesset faction, 
Chaim Ramon, who also favours ear1y elections, seems a little schematic. They 
say, the government is no good, so we must fight it in order to bring it down and 
go to elections. My approach is a little more strategic on this issue. I believe 
that one must take a look at the process which could break the political draw 
35 This feeling of frustration over Mr. Shamir's rejection of the London Agreement is 
sill apparent today even after a peace treaty with Jordan has been concluded. 
Interview with Dr. Beilin, 29th August 1994. 
36 Mr. Peres stated that he preferred ear1y elections in and interview on Israeli 
Television News, 24th April1991. 
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between us and the Likud, which at the last elections was tipped slightly in 
favour of the Likud. At least three things are necessary for this. First of all, since 
the Gulf War ended only two months ago, we must give the public some time to 
readjust and grasp that the political processes are as we perceive them, in the 
way the government does. Secondly, the public is slowly realising that the Likud 
is a catastrophe from the economic point of view. And thirdly changes are 
taking place within the Labour Party, and they too need time to ripen37. 
Mr. Harish's remarks indicated an acceptance that the party's previous 
strategies since 1977 had failed to bring about the desired result of a Labour-led 
government. In addition it reflected an acceptance of the Likud's relatively strong 
position in the short-term but in the long-term the Likud he felt was sitting on a time 
bomb. Mr. Harish went on to warn the party about concentrating exclusively on the 
peace and security issues which had cost the party dearly in the 1988 elections, 
and the need for the party to provide answers to the everyday problems of 
unemployment, housing etc. In reality, the debate was superseded by the coalition 
problems of Mr. Shamir who was eventually forced to bring forward the election 
when the ultra right wing parties left the government. However, it reveals the level of 
frustration and the emphasis on power politics of Mr. Peres and the longer term 
view of Mr. Harish. Put another way, Mr. Peres's priority was to return to government 
while Mr. Harish wanted to break the electoral stalemate which had existed between 
the Likud and Labour since 1984. 
Mr. Peres's motives were twofold; a genuine fear that the peace process 
would collapse with Mr. Shamir and his ultra-right wing coalition in power, and his 
pressing intra-party need to return to government and thus be in a position to deliver 
key positions to both his supporters and to his rival Mr. Rabin 38. Mr. Rabin, now his 
party was in opposition concentrated on his challenge to Mr. Peres's leadership and 
37 Mr. Harish, An open letter to Mr. Peres, Presented at the meeting of the Labour 
Party Bureau, 25th April 1991. 
38 Supporters of Mr. Peres emphasises the first of these motivations: the fear of the 
peace process breaking down. 
Interview with Mr. Yoram Martizano, Political advisor to Mr. Peres, The Foreign 
Ministry, Jerusalem, 8th September 1994. 
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made it publicly known that he was bitter at having lost his Cabinet job with the 
failure of the "'Dirty Exercise". Hence Mr. Peres desperately needed to be in a 
position to offer Mr. Rabin the Defence Ministry once more in the hope that he 
would accept the post and withdraw his challenge39. The importance of these 
motivations were illustrated by Mr. Peres's willingness to take a major risk by 
adopting the parliamentary strategy of attempting to bring down the government and 
force new elections at a time when the Labour Party's position was comparitively 
weak to that of the Likud. This in tum indicates a fundamental divergence from the 
traditional behaviour of an opposition party by Mr. Peres, whose actions were not 
primarily governed by attempting to force new elections at an optimum time for the 
Labour Party, but predominantly by his intra-party needs. Mr. Harish's behaviour in 
arguing that the party should adopt a more patient approach and wait for better 
times represented a more typical response of a non-dominant party without power. 
9.3.1: The 5th Labour Party Congress, 19th November and 26th 
December 1991. 
The Congress took place amidst the threat by the Gang of Eight leading 
doves to leave the party and join what eventually became the new united left wing 
party Meretz40. The group saw three possibilities for the future direction of the party 
and themselves. The first option was for the Labour Party to join the emerging block 
of left wing parties in a new Alignment which would have its common goal the 
exchange of land for peace. The second option was that the centre left should run 
two lists, the Labour Party list and a more radical left wing list. The third option was 
similar to the second but with the Gang of Eight remaining as part of the Labour 
39 1nterview with Dr. Kom, Tel Aviv, 13th September 1994. 
40 The threat was real before the Congress the group had debated the issue and 
were split 50:50 on future participation in the party. 
Interview with Mr. Merom, Tel Aviv, 20th October 1994. 
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Party. Despite some discussion in the Party Bureau (June 91), after a formal 
approach by Mapam these radical alternatives were never seriously considered by 
the party as a whole. 
Mr. Peres did not wish to see the group leave for intra-party considerations, in 
that most of the group were associated with himself and in interviews at the time he 
applied pressure on the group to remain within the party41. In his opening address to 
the Congress Mr. Peres concentrated on the theme of party unity amid the fears of 
the impending break up of the Labour Party. However, the Congress, was 
dominated by the "Gang of Eight" who, realising the significance of it, had prepared 
to act as one group in a concentrated methodological way in which each of the 
group dealt with a particular area. Although the decisions of the Congress reflected 
the need to balance their aspirations with those of the more hawkish elements 
within the party they were seen as the "stars of the Congress"42. The party platform 
which emerged naturally reflected these compromises but overall the Foreign Affairs 
and Security Platform was more dovish without accepting a Palestinian state: 
Israel will promote negotiations towards a peace agreement based on 
compromise with Jordan and the Palestinians. The agreement must be based 
on the assurance of Israel's security needs, Security Council resolutions 242 
and 338, and on the recognition of the rights of Palestinians, including their 
national rights, and on the basis of their participation in determining their 
future ... In these negotiations the permanent borders, the political and security 
agreements in the territories which Israel will vacate, and the extent of the co-
operation with Israel, will be determined. The political reality in the region, the 
need to resolve the refugee problem and the security needs of Israel 
necessitate an agreement on a Jordanian-Palestinian political framework, which 
will be willing to engage in extensive co-operation with Israel, and not a 
separate Palestinian state west of the River Jordan43. 
41 Interview with Mr. Peres, Spectrum, September 1991, p9. 
42 This feeling was confirmed by the performance of the individuals in the party 
primaries in 1992. 
43 Extract from the Labour Party Platform on Foreign Affairs and Security, adopted 
by the Fifth Congress of the party in 1991, Labour Party Headquarters, Tel Aviv. 
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The above declares a land-for-peace formula and mentions Palestinian 
national rights but is distinctive from the platform of Meretz which accepted full 
Palestinian self-determination and the right to statehood. 
A second example of the compromise formula employed by the leadership 
was the apparent contradiction with regards to peace with Syria. Article 2 states: 
The peace agreement with Syria will be based on Security resolutions 242 and 
338, whose meaning is the principle of territorial compromise within the 
framework of full and viable peace, in which the security needs of Israel will be 
provided44. 
However, after pressure from the Golan settlers an amendment was added 
after the Congress by the leadership stating: 
Israel views the Golan Heights as an area of great importance to its security, its 
welfare and to secure its water resources in peacetime as well. In any 
agreement with Syria and in the security arrangements, Israel's presence and 
control, both settlement and military, in the Golan Heights, to which Israeli law, 
jurisdiction and administration have been applied, will continue ... The efforts will 
continue to strengthen the existing Israeli settlements in the Golan Heights45. 
As well as the settlers there were many senior figures in the party who 
opposed any withdrawal from the Golan Heights and thus such a formula as above, 
although clearly unworkable, achieved two aims, the maintenance of party unity and 
some appeal to the more hawkish elements of the electorate. 
On socio-economic issues there were contradictions apparent in the party's 
desire to speed up the implementation of programmes of economic liberalisation, 
and in particular the deregulation of the capital markets and the privatisation of 
government-owned companies, and the need to, in the short term, increase the 
level of state intervention in the economy to facilitate the successful absorption of 
the Soviet Aliyah. The heavily overburdened Labour economy and the Histadrut was 




However, the collective power of the Histadrut and Mr. Peres prevented the reforms 
from being passed. This was, however, only the opening shot in what was to 
become an extremely bitter personal and ideological dispute. 
Mr. Avraham Burg, the son of the former leader of the NRP, initiated a change 
in the party's platform regarding religious rights in which politics and religion were to 
be separated46. His proposal was passed on the last day of the Congress when 
many of the delegates had already left. The leadership, afraid of the potential 
damage such a proposal might do to the Labour Party's relations with the religious 
parties, nullified it at a second Congress. Although not winning a total victory, Mr. 
Burg and his colleagues had won significant changes to the platform and thus the 
question of their leaving the party was, for the time being, placed in the background. 
The impressive performance of the "Gang of Eight" in the Labour Party primaries in 
which they were all elected to realistic places on the list further diminished their 
desire to break their links with the party. 
9.3.2: The Continuing Leadership Struggle and the Labour Party 
Primaries. 
One of the decisions taken at the Party Congress was the confirmation that 
the leadership contest and the Knesset list would be based on primaries involving 
the 160,00 due-paying members of the party. Unlike the previous contests between 
Mr. Rabin and Mr. Peres in 1992 there were two additional candidates, Mr. Kessar 
(Secretary General of the Histadrut) and Mrs. Namir (the only female candidate)47_ 
46 His initial proposal had been to separate the state and church but Mr. Ramon had 
persuaded him to withdraw this as it went to far to question the Jewish nature of the 
state of Israel. 
Interview with Mr. Burg. The Knesset, Jerusalem, 13th September 1994. 
47 Four candidates who had previously declared their intention to contest the 
election withdrew and declared their support for either Mr. Rabin or Mr. Peres. Mr. 
Gur, Mr. Yaacobi and Mr. Baram supported Mr. Rabin while Mr. Shahal endorsed 
Mr. Peres. 
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There were no ideological differences between the four candidates with the only 
differences being in the emphasis placed on issues, personality and style48. The key 
to the campaign was the answer to the question, "who had the best chance of 
winning the election on 23rd June 1992 and of becoming the next Labour Prime 
Minister of Israel?". From an early stage in the campaign it became clear that 
although there were four candidates only Mr. Peres and Mr. Rabin had a realistic 
chance of winning with the other two candidates relegated to the role of spoilers. 
Mr. Rabin' s winning strategy was to argue that he was the most likely 
candidate to attract disillusioned Likud voters and win the Knesset election. Mr. 
Peres argued that Mr. Rabin was popular among Likud voters who would not 
transfer their votes to the Labour Party even with Mr. Rabin as its leader. Mr. 
Peres's supporters published polls which claimed he was more popular than Mr. 
Rabin among the new immigrants, the first younger generation and the Arabs. The 
Peres team emphasised that he had been one of the best Israeli Prime Ministers 
and stressed the issue of party loyalty to its leader. Mr Rabin's supporters stated 
that Mr. Peres was the only Labour leader to lose an election and he had now lost 
four consecutive times, as well as the failure of the "Dirty Exercise" (1990) and 
therefore it was time for a change. The campaign, given its historical bitterness and 
its nature as a simple struggle for power, was relatively undivisive and clearfl9. 
On 19th February 1992, 108,347 votes out of a possible 152,000 were cast 
and the result was as follows; 
Mr. Rabin ............................................. 40.59 percent. 
Mr. Peres ............................................. 34.80 percent. 
Mr. Kessar ............................................ 18. 77 percent. 
Mrs. Namir .............................................. 5.44 percent. so 
48 Spectrum, March 1992, p5. 
49 Mr. Gutmann describes the Peres-Rabin struggle as a personal vendetta over the 
struggle for power. 
Gutmann, "The Israeli Left", in Kyle and Peters (ed), Wither Israel: The Domestic 
Challenges, 1.8. Tauris, London, 1993. 
50 Results from Labour Party Headquarters, Tel Aviv. 
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Mr. Rabin crossed the 40 percent threshold needed for victory by some 400 
votes and was thus elected as the Labour Party candidate for Prime Minister. The 
narrowness of the result was compounded by the fact that had Mr. Rabin been 
forced into a second ballot play off with Mr. Peres it is unlikely he would have worf51. 
Mr. Kessar's surprising good performance had taken votes away from Mr. Peres's 
constituencies, notably from the Histadrut and Arab sectors, which would have gone 
directly to Mr. Peres in a second ballot. Two conclusions can be drawn from the 
result: Mr. Peres was still extremely popular within the party, and that many of his 
supporters had crossed to Mr. Rabin, not because they thought that Mr. Rabin was 
a better leader, but that he presented the party with the best opportunity of 
defeating the Likud. In interviews conducted with former supporters of Mr. Peres 
who had supported Mr. Rabin in 1992, it was made clear that this was the sole 
motive for their change52. Mr. Peres the following day resigned his post as 
Chairman of the party, thus allowing Mr. Rabin to become the party's candidate for 
Prime Minister and the formal head of the party53. 
Confirmation of Mr. Peres's continued strength within the party came with the 
results of the Labour Party primaries on March 31st. Some 106,000 members of the 
party or around 70 percent voted in the poll to elect the Knesset list for the election 
in June 1992 in which the clear winners were Mr. Peres and his supporters54. Near1y 
51 Interview with Dr. Asa, Director of Mr, Rabin's Election Team, 16th October 1994. 
52 Mr Lova. Eliav was one such example, a leading dove in the party he was viewed 
as closer to Mr. Peres but supported Mr. Rabin in 1992. 
Interview with Mr. Eliav, 25th July 1994. 
53 There was no formal constitutional obligation for Mr. Peres to do this. The election 
concerned the selection of the party candidate for Prime Minister and thus Mr. 
Peres could have caused a constitutional problem had he decided not to resign. 
Labour Party Constitution, Labour Party Headquarters, Tel Aviv. 
54 The party adopted the following method to conduct the primaries: the first position 
was elected in a separate ballot (the leadership contest) which Mr. Rabin had 
already won. The remaining realistic positions on the list 2 to 45 were filled by two 
electorates: at national level (all paying members of the party voting) and secondly, 
at district level . The latter was sub-divided in to five territorial areas: three urban, 
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all Mr. Peres's close supporters were selected to relatively high places on the list. 
The major surprise was the selection of Mr. Burg at number three on the list, a sign 
that his polices on the relationship between state, politics and religion were popular 
with the party as a whole. All the members of the younger generation of the "Gang 
of Eight" did well, confirming their status as the next generation of leaders. 
Concerns were expressed that Dr. Yossi Beilin, because of his close association 
with Mr. Peres and his out spoken dovish views, would not be selected, but he 
easily achieved a relatively high position in the national poll. Mr. Rabin did not fare 
so well, many of his close supporters were not selected, including a leading hawk 
Mr. Tsur, but this can be viewed in part as a generational change in that many of 
Mr. Rabin's supporters in the party tended to come from the older generations55. 
Part of this generational turnover was confirmed by the poor performance of many 
of the Labour Party Ministers from the NUG's (1984-90). With the exception of Mr. 
Peres and Mr. Rabin there were no-ex Ministers in the first 20 places, three failed to 
be selected and another three did not run56. The primaries were not free from 
controversy. There were claims that some candidates had enrolled people into the 
the Kibbutzim, Moshavim and the Minorities. Positions 1 to 11 on the list were 
selected from the national poll. Positions from 11 onwards were based on two 
candidates from the district poll and one candidate from the national poll until parity 
between the two lists was reached. After that point the candidates were selected 
alternately from each of the lists. The only reserved places were at number 20 for 
an Arab and at number 30 for a Druze. 
Interview with Mr. Merom, Head of the Labour Party's Primaries Committee, Tel 
Aviv, 20th October 1994. 
55 Interestingly, Mr. Rabin still included Mr. Tsur in his Cabinet despite not being a 
member of the Knesset. 
ss Spectrum, April 1992, p2. 
The three who effectively retired were the ex President Mr. Navon, Mr Weizman, 
(Israel's current President, 1994) and Mr. Bar-Lev (who became Israel's 
Ambassador to Russia in 1992 and died in 1994). All three had been senior figures 
within the party and of the same generation of Mr. Peres and Mr. Rabin who 
therefore remained the sole representatives of their generation in the leadership. 
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party simply in order to vote for them in the primary elections. Also there were deals 
struck but not to same degree as in the Central Committee Primaries of 1988 (see 
6.6). However, overall the process was viewed as extremely successful, especially 
in contrast to the Likud's Central Committee primaries, and produced a list which 
was slightly more dovish than in 1988, but also contained six former senior 
commanders in the IDF57. The primaries confirmed that the relative balance of 
power within the party, in favour of Mr. Peres, had not been radically altered by his 
defeat in the leadership contest. Mr. Peres's graceful acceptance of his defeat did 
much to maintain the relative public facade of unity and this contrasted favourably 
with the aftermath of Likud's leadership struggle between Mr. Shamir and Mr. Levy. 
9.4: Pre-Election Campaign Strategy and Electoral ~eforms. 
The Labour Party under Mr. Rabin was relatively unchanged in its strategy, 
which concentrated on the socio-economic failings of the Likud government and in 
particular the problems of the absorption of the Soviet Aliyah. The claim that the 
Likud was investing in the territories at the expense of Israel as a whole served the 
dual purpose of appealing to the Soviet Aliyah and to the poor in the development 
towns. Mr. Rabin importantly made the distinction between what he termed as 
security settlements and political settlements, the first of which the Labour Party 
supported, but the latter of which the party charged the Likud with diverting the 
limited national resources in to. 58 Mr. Rabin, with his reputation as "Mr. Security" 
57 The list contained 17 new candidates, around 50 percent were of non Ashkenazi 
origin, more than 50 percent were in their 30's and 40's and 4 were women. 
58 Mr. Rabin remained deliberately vague on the exact definitions of these 
categories and which settlements fell in to each one. However, it struck an 
extremely popular accord with the Israeli public and especially the Labour target 
groups of the poor and the Sephardim. At around the same time the result of a 
ground breaking poll by Katz were released which seemed to break the myth that a 
vote for the Likud was automatically a vote for Greater Israel. The results revealed 
that 35 percent of Likud supporters were termed as security hawks and did not 
therefore support the greater Israel ideology. The central plank of the Labour Party 
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with the Israeli electorate, was able to deal far more successfully with the Likud 
counterattacks on this question than Mr. Peres who had a security image problem 
with the Israeli electorate59. Put simply, Mr. Rabin's "trust me" argument was 
successful in both convincing key target areas of the electorate and in allowing the 
definitions of security and political settlements to be somewhat vague. Mr. Rabin 
was assisted in this message by such notable ex-generals on the Knesset list as Mr. 
Or, Mr. Ben Eliser, Mr Sneh and Mr. Khalini. 
The process of electoral reform reached the point of stalemate with the refusal 
of the Likud to implement direct elections for Prime Minister until the 1996 
election&>. Eventually it was agreed that there would be only one significant change 
to the electoral system, the raising of the electoral threshold from 1 percent to 1.5 
percent. Such a change, although small, was important within the highly fragmented 
Israeli party system with its high number of small parties. The formation of Meretz, 
consisting of the Ratz, Shinui and Mapam was taken in direct response to this 
change. From the Likud led block Moledet, Tsomet and Tehiya failed to reach a 
similar deal which proved to vital to the outcome of the 1992 election. 
strategy was therefore to convince the public that many of the settlements served 
no useful security purpose. 
59 Interview with Dr. Joseph Alpher, Director of the Jaffee Centre for Strategic 
Studies, Tel Aviv University, 4th December 1994. 
ro Mr. Shamir clearly did not want a direct contest with the popular Mr. Rabin but the 
Likud in principle supported the change in the system. 
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Conclusion. 
Overall the changes which took place within the Labour Party from 1990-92 
were fundamentally motivated by the need for the party to win power in 1992. The 
party in general understood that it was operating as a non-dominant party within a 
competitive block system in which there was a state of near parity between the 
Labour and Likud-led blocks. Consequently, in understanding this reality the party 
was motivated to make changes to both its platfonn and to the position of leader in 
order to try to achieve a clear cut inter-party victory over the Likud. In addition there 
was a realisation that such a victory would be the only way to secure a Labour-Jed 
government as it was apparent to the party that the religious parties preferred to join 
a Likud-Jed coalition. This allowed the Likud-block a near certain blocking majority if 
the two major parties continued to win approximately the same number of Knesset 
seats. 
The Labour Party platform, while including to a certain degree the changes 
that the "Gang of Eight" in particular had called for, still reflected a self-perceived 
need to unite the shifting wide spectrum of factions within the party. These various 
factions had been incorporated into the party during the 1960's in order to help 
maintain Mapai's hegemony within the labour movement and thus maintain its 
dominant position within the Israeli political system. However, at that time the full 
impact of the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip had not opened up the 
divisive debates on the future of Zionism (see 3.3.3). By 1991 the maintenance of 
party unity was far more difficult as the future status of the Occupied Tenitories 
came to be more divisive with·the threat of the "Gang of Eight" to leave the party. 
The replacement of Mr. Peres with Mr. Rabin by such a narrow margin 
illustrated the conservative tendencies of the party and the still strong support that 
Mr. Peres enjoyed within the party organs. However, it also indicated an acceptance 
by the party membership that if the party was to break the electoral deadlock then it 
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had to go into the election with its most popular leader with the electorate as a 
whole as the party's candidate for Prime Minister. The decision to put Mr. Rabin 
forward marked a change in the behaviour of the party from previous elections, and 
thus an indication that it was acting more as a non-dominant party seeking to win 
back power. Mr. Rabin had at the time of the 1984 and 1988 elections also been the 
more popular than Mr. Peres with the electorate, and yet the party on those 
occasions had not turned to him. 
The primaries, although very popular with the Israeli electorate, did little else 
other than confirm the generational replacement of the mid-50's upwards with those 
who were then in their 30 and 40's without necessarily encouraging a better quality 
of candidate. It also marked the confirmation of the failure of the mid-50's upwards 
generation to challenge the leadership of Mr. Peres and Mr. Rabin. The younger 
generation were too inexperienced to mount a serious challenge to the leadership in 
1992, many of them were either new to the Knesset in 1988 or in the case of Ms. 
Dayan had just been selected for the first Knesset list. Such inexperience was 
compounded by their attachment to one or other of the patrons of the party thus 
indicating that in spite of the new primary system the patron-client ties which had 
characterised past intra-party relationships had not completely been cut. However, 
such changes within the party did reflect the start of the process of making the party 
and its leadership more accountable and appealing to a wider section of Israeli 
society. 
By the start of the 1992 campaign the political agenda which had worked 
against the Labour Party from 1990 to the end of 1991 was now damaging the 
Likud with the growing economic hardship of the Soviet Aliyah and the lower income 
groups dominating the agenda. The Labour Party had made it clear that they 
accepted the terms of Mr. Baker's conditions for the granting of the Loan 
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Guarantees and were thus able to stress the contrast between its Zionist priorities 
and subsequent policiSs with the Likud's on the peace and security issue. 
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CHAPTER10 
THE 1992 KNESSET ELECTION AND THE LABOUR PARTY'S RETURN TO 
POWER 
The 1992 election and the Labour Party's narrow victory marked the return of 
the party to power for the first time since it lost its dominant party status in 1977. 
8: Development of the Labour Party 1948-1988. 
1948-1977: Dominant party with power 
1977-1981: Dominant party without power 
1981-1984: Non-Dominant party without power 
1984-1990: Non-Dominant party with a share of power 
1990-1992: Non-Dominant party without power 
1992: Non-Dominant party with power 
Illustration Eight summarises the development of the Labour Party up to and 
including 1992. This Chapter will attempt to illustrate that this victory did not signify 
a return to its pre-1977 dominant position, but rather confirmed the maturing of the 
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Israeli post-1977 competitive party system. In arguing that the status of the Labour 
Party following the election became that of a non-dominant party with power it is 
necessary to illustrate why the party could not be considered to have returned to its 
pre-1977 status as a dominant party with power. In arguing this case use has been 
made of the following factors: the closeness of the result, the near total 
concentration on Mr. Rabin at the expense of the Labour Party itself during the 
campaign and the increasing importance of inter-block politics in determining the 
outcome of elections, all of which indicated that the Labour Party scored only a 
technical victory in 1992. 
In addition to these factors it should be remembered that in 1992, in contrast 
to 1977 (see 4.1), the Labour Party no longer controlled many of the areas which 
had, in part, allowed the party to be previously perceived as a dominant party (prior 
to 1977 with power and between 1977 and 1981 without power). The party no 
longer controlled the majority of municipal governments, the civil service (after 15 
years of predominantly Likud appointees) or exercised indirect control of the media. 
Regarding the latter, the development of both television and newspapers made it 
more difficult in 1992 for any single agent to exercise control over them. As 
previously discussed, the number of television channels increased from only one in 
1977 to three domestic channels in 1992 as well as a number of private cable 
channels. Newspapers which had once been strong supporters of the labour 
movement diversified as some of them were taken over by international companies 
whose views did not correspond with the Labour Party (e.g.; The Jerusalem Post in 
1989). Finally, the Histadrut which was once the flagship of the labour movement 
had seen its influence decline due to its financial difficulties, and thus its use to the 
Labour Party was much less in 1992 than in 1977. 
Consequently, the election cannot be seen as having transformed the party's 
non-dominant party position, but rather it allowed it to win power for the first time 
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within the existing competitive party system. This chapter concentrates on the 
electoral evidence which suggested that the Labour Party still remained a non-
dominant party. 
10.1: Background and Campaign For the 1992 Knesset Election. 
In spite of the Likud's rejection of direct elections for the post of Prime 
Minister, Mr. Rabin treated the 1992 elections as if such a system had already been 
introduced. Much of the still Peres controlled Labour Party was deliberately hidden 
from the public during the campaign, which was centred around and controlled by 
Mr. Rabin and his strategic election team (which had control over all areas of the 
campaign). Mr. Rabin's team was recruited from outside the Labour Party with the 
exception of Mr. Ramon and the party Campaign Manager Mr. Ben Eliezer1. Such a 
team was a radical departure from the previous campaign of 1988, which as the 
Lass Report (1990) had chronicled was riddled with mistakes2. Mr. Rabin's team 
charged Mr. Peres 1988 team with having made the fundamental mistake of 
concentrating on the issue over which the Labour Party had a relative disadvantage 
compared with the Likud (the future of the territories) and not enough on other 
issues over which the Labour Party enjoyed a relative advantage (e.g.; 
management of the economy). In short, the need to develop the latter and not 
concentrate on responding to attacks on the firsf3. 
1 Both Mr. Ramon and Mr. Ben Eliezer were close to Mr. Rabin. Mr. Ben Eliezer 
born in Iraq was, like Mr. Rabin, a military man who had gone in to politics after a 
successful career in the IDF. Importantly he was a founder member of the 
predominantly Sephardim party Tami (1984) and was well respected by the 
Sephardim community. Mr. Ramon, of all the young guard was the closest to Mr. 
Rabin. 
2 Mr. Rabin's reasoning for recruiting from outside the party was that he felt the 
Labour Party bureaucrats were simply not up to the job of competing against the 
highly effective Likud team. 
Interview with Dr. Chaim Asa, Director of Mr. Rabin's Strategic Election Team, 
Hertzila, 16th October 1994. 
3 Interviews with Dr. Asa and Professor Doron. 
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Unlike the Labour Party's previous "catch all tactics" the strategy in 1992 was 
to attract specific key target groups of the new immigrants and the group of 
approximately 100,000 "soft" Likud voters. Of the latter some 60 percent were of 
Sephardim origin and were generally considered to be conservative. Mr. Rabin and 
the Labour Party's strategy was based on winning an extra 3 seats from the Likud, 
and fragmenting the rest of the disillusioned Likud voters towards other smaller right 
wing parties. This strategy was crucial in the decision to concentrate on the issue of 
corruption after the publication of the State Comptroller's report and thus help build 
a campaign for Tsomet and its leader Mr. Eitan (who had a reputation as being 
politically clean, and therefore stood to directly gain from corruption charges against 
the Likud)4. The tactic of moving votes to the right of the Likud proved vital to the 
Labour Party in that not all the right wing parties crossed the electoral threshold 
(1.5%). In pure statistical terms this shift gave the Labour Party its victory in the 
election, with a far higher number of wasted votes from the Likud-led-block in 
contrast to the Labour left block with its united Meretz party. Illustration Nine 
indicates the aims of the Labour Party positioning strategy on the two key issues of 
the day: the peace process (including security) and secular versus religious rights. 
4 Mr. Rabin's team involvement in the planning of Tsomet's campaign is difficult to 
measure but there is evidence to suggest that members of Mr. Rabin's team in the 
very least were involved in the positioning strategy of Tsomet. In interviews with key 
members of both teams it is clear that the building up of Tsomet was an essential 
part in Mr. Rabin's election planning. 
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Likud Block Tsomet 







Based on interviews with Dr. Asa and Professor Doron from Mr. Rabin's Election Team. 
The Lines indicate how the Labour party aimed to win votes from the Likud 
and fragment the Likud vote to other parties in the Likud-led block. 
Of Key importance was the position of Tsomet which had shifted from a position 
near Tehiya in 1988 to a new more secular position. 
The relatively new positions of Tsomet and Shas at inter-block level also 
made them the most likely parties from Likud's block to join a Labour-led coalition. 
The decision to concentrate on Mr. Rabin was based on the attempt to make 
the election a direct election between Mr. Rabin and Mr. Shamir and bypass the 
secondary leadership of both parties. The Likud was seen to have a far more 
attractive second tier leadership with the Likud "young princes" being far more 
experienced and popular with the target constituencies than their Labour 
counterparts. Mr. Rabin's team also took the decision to hide Mr. Peres during the 
national campaign with the more hawkish Mr. Ben Eliezer acting as Mr. Rabin's 
deputy during the campaign. In positioning strategy, Mr. Rabin aimed to blur the 
differences between Mr. Shamir and himself on the peace and security issue and 
concentrate on what he termed as a "reordering of national priorities". During the 
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campaign he was careful to remain vague on what exactly this reordering involved, 
but it is clear that in basic terms it meant redistributing resources from the 
settlements to within the Green Line. Mr. Rabin portrayed himself as tough on 
security but pragmatic in terms of the peace negotiations while Mr. Shamir, ignoring 
the advice of his campaign Manager Mr. Ronni Milo to offer something approaching 
the Gaza option, portrayed himself as the ideological keeper of Greater lsrael5. On 
social and economic issues Mr. Rabin made full use of the cost of Likud's Zionist 
priority of Greater Israel to Israel and in particular the new Soviet Aliyah and the 
lower income groups as well as charging the Likud for the failure to modernise the 
economy. 
While Mr. Rabin's team prepared a strategy relatively free from intra-party 
constraints, Mr. Shamir and the Likud experienced a series of organisational 
problems which were related to the battle to succeed Mr. Shamir. Mr. Milo, the 
Campaign Manager (with his own future leadership ambitions), did not wish to see 
Mr. Netanyahu star in the campaign as he had done in 19886. Consequently, after 
an initial appearance on the opening night of the television campaign Mr, 
Netanyahu disappeared from the campaign. The Likud decided to use Dr. Ze'ev 
(Benni) Begin as their central personality along with Mr. Shamir, a move which 
appeared to confirm their hawkish intents (Dr. Begin being considered a strong 
hawk in contrast to some of the other Likud princes). 
5 The Gaza option was the return of the Gaza strip to Palestinian control which had 
some support within the Likud in 1992. 
6 Mr. Netanyahu was regarded by Mr. Rabin's team as the Likud's strongest 
weapon, particularly during the television campaign. 
Interview with Dr. Asa, 16th October 1994. 
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10.2: The 1992 Knesset Campaign. 
There were two crucial points in the campaign for Mr. Rabin and the Labour 
Party: three months before the election, and at the start of the television election 
campaign three weeks before polling. The State Comptroller's report, although not 
published until the last week of April1992, was clearly going to be bad for the Likud 
so the Labour Party started the campaign early with two simple messages that 
Israel was waiting for Mr. Rabin and that the Likud was rotten7. Each day they 
played on a variation on this theme with great success since internal polling 
suggested that the party in this period was between 1 0 and 15 seats ahead of the 
Likuds. The aim of Mr. Rabin's strategists at this time was to build a large lead early 
enough in the campaign which, if the Likud succeeded in closing as they had in the 
previous four elections, would still leave time for the Labour Party to respond. In 
previous campaigns, and especially in 1988, the Likud had closed the gap on the 
Labour Party very late in the campaign without allowing any chance for the Labour 
Party to reassert itself. Because of this fear of a Likud revival the Labour Party 
launched its national campaign well in advance of the Likud's. The latter started on 
5th May 19929. The intra-party problems within the Likud were carried over in to the 
campaign with Dr. Moshe Arens refusing to appear on the same stage as Mr. David 
7 The Likud had tried unsuccessfully to prevent the State Comptroller's report 
becoming public before the date of the election hence the delay until the end of 
April. 
8 The term "Israel is waiting on Rabin" was a deliberate play on the term which 
became famous in Israel on the eve of the Six Day War that Nasser is waiting for 
Rabin. The use of such a term had two meanings firstly that Mr. Rabin was a the in 
charge Of the IDF during its success and second the idea of Mr. Rabin being a 
father of the nation, much in the same way as Mr. Begin had been portrayed during 
the 1981 campaign. 
9 The start of the Likud campaign was postponed from 27th April 1992 publicly 
because Dr. Arens was out of the country at this time but interestingly on the new 
date 5th May Mr. Levy was out of the country. 
Israel Yearbook 1992, Government Publishing House, Israel, 1993. 
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Levy and with many of the Likud local branches not functioning properly because of 
the personal rivalries within the leadership1D. 
The second crucial point for Mr. Rabin was the television campaign during the 
first two days of which the Likud closed the gap to near parity11 . Mr. Rabin, never at 
his best in set piece television parts, perfonned badly against highly effective Likud 
productions attacking the Labour Party on its security policy and the role of the 
Histadrut as well as the problems of health funds from the labour sector of the 
economy. In organisational tenns a decision was taken at this point to use Mr. Ben 
Eliezer to front a large degree of the television campaign and to put forward simple 
messages in easy rather unsophisticated ways. Mr. Ben Eliezer had a reputation for 
straight talking which appealed to the predominantly Sephardim target group and 
his role became vital at this stage of the campaign in reasserting the Labour Party's 
messages and responding to the attacks from the Likud. 
At local level the Labour Party itself played the dominant role throughout the 
campaign, but the Labour Party machine still sold the party as Labour under Rabin 
and achieved some success in previous Likud strongholds. Such an improvement 
was illustrated by a visit by Mr. Rabin himself to the northern development town of 
Kiryat Shemona (16th June 1992) where he was greeted as a hero and in his 
speech stated that they (the residents) hadn't left the Likud but that the Likud had 
left them12. In his speech Mr. Rabin mentioned the name of Mr. Begin three times, a 
clear indication of his attempt to portray himself as the father of the nation13. The 
Labour Party used its more hawkish members to tour the Likud strongholds such as 
10 Ibid. 
11 Source, Labour Party internal party polling which suggested that after the first two 
days of the campaign that the Likud had regained nearly all the ground that it had 
lost in the previous two months. 
12 Mr. Rabin, Address to Election Rally, Kiryat Shemona, 16th June 1992. 
13 1bid. 
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Mr. Avigdor Khalani and Mr. Shimon Shitreet to attempt to combat the Likud's 
charges that the Labour Party was soft on the security issue. 
The murder during the campaign in Bat Yam (South of Tel Aviv) of 15 year old 
Helena Rapp (24th May 1992) by a Palestinian from Gaza, did not benefit the right 
in the same way that the attack in Jerico during the 1988 campaign had. The rioting 
which followed the killing in Bat Yam was characterised by three chants, "Kahane, 
Kahane"; "Death to the Arabs" and "Rabin Rabin"1 4. Such chants illustrated the 
failure of the Likud to deal with the internal security situation and the effect such 
failings had on its standing in one of its traditional strong holds. The Labour Party 
charged the Likud with not dealing effectively with the security situation and in 
addition, that their policies actively contributed to such attacks. The effect of this 
was that the 1992 campaign saw the neutralisation of one of the central planks of 
Likud's appeal, namely their perceived ability to deal with internal or personal 
security better than the Labour Party under Mr. Rabin. 
The Likud adopted two lines of attack against the Labour Party during the 
campaign, both of which were aimed at personalities, seeming to confirm the lack of 
real ideological debate which took place during the campaign between the parties. 
In the first place the Likud asserted that Mr. Rabin would be controlled by the dovish 
majority in the Labour Party and the left in general. As Mr. Milo put it: 
Behind Rabin is Peres, behind Peres is Beilin, behind Beilin is Sarid (Meretz), 
behind Sarid is Miari (PLP), and behind Miari is Arafat15_ 
The Likud strategy here was to charge the Labour Party of attempting a grand 
deception of using Mr. Rabin as a figurehead in order to mask its true dovish 
colours and intentions in the peace process16. Second, when it became clear that 
14fsrael Yearbook 1992. 
15 Mr. Milo, Likud Election Press Release June 1992. 
16 1nterview with Ms. Sarah Honig, Political Correspondent of the Jerusalem Post, 
13th November 1994. 
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the first strategy was not wholly successful, the Ukud tumed to personal attacks on 
Mr. Rabin. This proved difficult as Mr. Rabin had largely been built up by the Ukud 
in the eighties to help neutralise the threat of Mr. Peres17_ The Ukud attacked Mr. 
Rabin on two accounts, his so called nervous breakdown on the eve of the Six Day 
War and his failure to retum home from Washington at the outbreak of the 
lntifada1s. Such attacks, especially the first (which was somewhat more emotive) 
proved extremely unpopular with both the Israeli electorate and within the Ukud 
itself, to the extent that Dr. Arens, Dr. Begin. Mr. Netanyahu and Mr. Levy refused to 
have anything to do with such statements. As well as the Likud Mr. Eitan and Mr. 
Ze'evi both former comrades of Mr. Rabin in the IDF (now leaders of the uHra-right 
wing parties Tsomet and Moledet) refused to use such methods. 
After an initial reluctance from the Likud team, a television debate took place 
between Mr. Rabin and Mr. Shamir on 16th June 199219. Mr. Rabin used the term 
"political settlements" three times in the debate, the loan guarantees twice as well 
as being the only one to mention the recently deceased Mr. Begin20. Overall the 
debate did not play a significant role in the campaign with neither of the candidates 
making any major mistakes but M. Rabin again took the opportunity to reject a 
Palestinian state, and rule out the possibility of the Arab parties joining a future led 
Rabin coalition as well as the non-negotiable position of Jerusalem in future peace 
talks. As he concluded at the end of the debate: 
171bid. 
18 The story of Mr. Rabin's so called breakdown is well chronicled see for example, 
Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs, Steimatzky, Bnei Brak, 1994. 
19 The Likud were concerned that such a debate would enhance Mr. Rabin more 
than Mr. Shamir but after several attempts to postpone the debate the Likud 
eventually concluded that the damage done would be more if the Likud did not 
agree to such a debate than any damage the non telegenic Mr. Rabin could inflict 
on Mr. Shamir. 
20 Transcript of the Rabin- Shamir Television Debate, Israeli Television Channel 
One, 16th June 1992. 
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Labour has a more appropriate scale of national priorities. The Likud has made 
a mess in every area. Our first step will be to establish autonomy; we will 
mobilise financial resources from the Arab wor1d and see fewer Gazan's in our 
streets. The Syrians should be left to the end of the peace process. Eight years 
ago, the Likud government brought about 400% inflation, a budget deficit and a 
terrible situation. We established an NUG and wiped out inflation. I reject the 
idea of a Palestinian state between Israel and Jordan, but neither do I want 1.7 
Million Palestinians to be citizens of Israel. There are three points upon which I 
stand firm: no to a Palestinian state, no return to 1967 borders and a united 
Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty21. 
In general, Mr. Rabin, his strategic election team and the Labour Party, 
conducted a highly effective campaign in which they avoided the problems which 
had befallen the 1988 campaign. They did not respond to the attacks the Likud 
made and in simple terms tried to develop the areas in which they felt they enjoyed 
an advantage over the Likud. The fact that the Labour Party was in opposition in 
1992 prevented any serious electoral damage to the party during the campaign from 
security incidents. In 1992 such incidents actively harmed the Likud's chances. 
21 Ibid. 
268 
10.3: Statistical Analysis of the 1992 Knesset Elections. 
The elections were held on 23rd June 1992 and produced the following 
results: 
Table 10.1: Number of Seats Each Party Won and Totals of the 
Respective Blocks in 1992. 














Source; Central Bureau of Statistics, Results of the 13th Knesset 
Elections, Jerusalem. 
Table 10.2: Voting by Geographical Districts in the 1992 Knesset 
Elections. 
It is difficult to use the same voting districts as previously used because of the 
demographic changes in these areas caused by the arrival of the Soviet Aliyah and 
their distribution mainly into the development towns. This made for profound 
changes in the voting patterns in some of these districts. Therefore, the still 
predominantly Ashkenazi Givatayim, the mainly Sephardim Ramie and the religious 
area Bnei Brak have been supplemented with votes from the settlements in the 
Occupied Territories and in the Kibbutzim. 
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Alignment CILP) percentage of Valid Votes. 
Area ILP vote 1988 ILP vote 1992 Difference 
Givatayim 45 50 +5.0 
Ramie 21 27 +6.0 
Bnei Brak 10 11 +1.0 
Settlements 15 15 0 
Kibbutzim 55 54 -1.0 
Likud percentage of Valid Votes. 
Area Likud vote 1988 Likud Vote 1992 Difference 
Givatayim 27 19 -8.0 
Ramie 46 41 -5.0 
Bnei Brak 18 13 -5.0 
Settlements 32 28 -4.0 
Kibbutzim 2 3 +1.0 
Source: Adapted from Diskin, The Israeli General election of 1992 and 
The results of the 13th Knesset Elections, Central Bureau of Statistics, 
Jerusalem. 
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Table 10.3: The Arab Vote in the 1992 Knesset Election for Zionist 
Parties. 
Percentage of Valid Arab Votes 1988 1992 Difference 
Alignment (ILP) 17 21 +4 
Meretz 11 10 -1 
Likud 7 8 +1 
NRP 3 5 +2 
Shas 1 5 +4 
Tsomet 0 1 +1 
It should be noted that the percentages have been rounded up or down to the 
nearest percentage point. The Meretz vote for 1988 was calculated by adding 
together the total votes of Ratz, Mapam and Shinui in the Arab sector. 
Table 10.4: The IOF Vote in the 1988 and 1992 Knesset Elections. 
Party % of Votes in 1988 % of Votes in 1992 Difference 
Labour Led Block. 
Alignment (ILP) 29 31 +2 
Meretz 11 15 +4 
Likud Led Block. 
Likud 35 24 -11 
Tsomet 5 16 +11 
Moledet 2 4 +2 
Tehiya 9 2 -7 
Religious parties 7 7 0 
Source; Results to the 13th Knesset Elections, Central Bureau of 
Statistics, Jerusalem. 
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Out of a possible 3,409,015 voters some 2,616,841 persons voted. The 
turnout, although the second lowest since 1951, was still high compared with other 
democracies. The new electoral threshold meant that 1.5 percent of the votes was 
needed by a party (in theory 39,253 votes) to win a seat in the Knesset. Two parties 
represented in the 12th Knesset, Tehiya and the Progressive List for Peace, failed 
to cross the threshold along with another 13 lists . In total only 10 out of the 25 lists 
crossed the threshold, down from 12 parties in the 1988 election (1 percent 
threshold)22. Of the 2,616,841 votes some 130,989 were lost because the 
respective Jist failed to cross the threshold. Crucial to the outcome of the election 
was that out of this figure four failed Labour-led-block lists received 37,447 and five 
pro-Likud-block lists wasted a total of 68,935 votes (the other 24,607 votes were 
wasted on lists which were not identified with either block)23. The number of votes 
lost by pro-Likud block lists was twice that of the pro-Labour lists and it was this fact 
that as Table 10.1 reveals gave the Labour-led-block its one seat victory over the 
Likud-Jed-block. 
The Labour Party scored a double victory in the election. First, it increased its 
number of seats from 39 in 1988 to 44 in 1992. Second, its respective block 
increased its number from 55 in 1988 to 61 in 1992 (See Table 10.1). 
Consequently, the Labour block had secured a narrow blocking majority against the 
Likud and thus was in the dominant position in the post-election coalition 
bargaining. The 44 seats won by the Labour Party marked the return to its position 
in 1984 but it still held three seats less than in 1981. In both instances the party had 
failed to form a government from its block because the Likud-led-block was 
22 Voting Numbers from Central Elections Committee, The Knesset Library, 
Jerusalem. 
23 Smooha and Peretz, "Israel's 1992 Knesset Elections: Are they Crucial ?", Middle 
East Journal, 47, 3, Summer 1993, p456. 
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stronger24. Therefore what was importantly different in 1992 was not so much the 
performance of the Labour Party, but rather that its respective block had (for the 
first time since it lost power in 1977) provided the party with a blocking majority to 
prevent the Likud from forming a government. 
Conversely, the major loser was the Likud which experienced a double defeat 
at party and- block level with it's number of seats declining from 40 in 1988 to 32 in 
1992. Table 10.2 illustrates the scale of the Likud defeat with the party losing 
ground in all sectors of the electorate with the interesting exception of the Kibbutzim 
and the Arab sector (Table 10.3). The Likud losses in Ramie, with its predominantly 
Sephardim population were mirrored in other Sephardim areas with the voters either 
moving to the right (Tsomet) or continuing the trend towards Shas or switching 
blocks and voting for the Labour Party. Many of the disillusioned Likud voters simply 
did not bother to vote at all, contributing to the low turnout figure. The Likud's 
performance in the IDF vote was particular1y bad (See Table 10.4) with its support 
dropping 11 percent from 1988 to 24 percent in 1992. Among the Soviet 
immigrants, who now accounted for around 9 percent of the total electorate, the 
Likud won only 18 percent of the vote compared to 47 percent for the Labour Party 
thus making a considerable contribution to Likud's double defeat25. 
The other major loser from the Likud block was Tehiya, which failed to pass 
the electoral threshold and gain a single seat in the Knesset. The major reason for 
this decline was not a rejection of their hawkish ideology but rather a failure to 
present a united coherent front prior to and during the campaign to its traditional 
constituencies in the settlements and the IDF, who switched their votes mainly to 
24 1n 1981 the Likud led block won 66 seats compared to 54 for the Labour led 
block. In 1984 the Likud led block won 61 seats to 59 for the Labour led block. 
25 The figures are based on an exit poll conducted by the Israeli Broadcasting 
Authority on 23rd June 1992. 
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another ultra-right wing party Tsomet26. The presence of two ultra-hawkish lists 
headed by Rabbis Levinger and Mizrahi further added to the fragmentation of the 
Likud-led-block and specifically to the failure of Tehiya to cross the threshoJd27. 
T ehiya's loss was vital to the Labour Party as without it there would have been 60 -
60 parity between the two blocks, allowing the Likud a blocking majority against a 
narrow based Labour government. The consequence of such a result would have 
been to make another NUG a more likely prospect or at the very least it would have 
made the coalition bargaining process much more difficult for Mr. Rabin, allowing 
the smaller parties more influence and leverage in the negotiations28. 
The other major winners in the election were the two mainly secular parties, 
Tsomet and Meretz, which originate from opposite ends of the political spectrum but 
share a common thread in their opposition to religious coercion. Tsomet saw its 
number of seats rise from 2 to 8, the single biggest increase of all the parties and 
Meretz increased from 10 in 1988 to 12 in 1992. The increase in support for these 
parties can be viewed as a reflection of the rejection by parts of Israeli society of the 
power and influence that the religious parties had enjoyed, well beyond their 
numerical strength, in the 1980's which had culminated in their role in the "Dirty 
Exercise". Support for both these parties was strong among first time voters and 
within the I DF vote where their reputations of being "politically clean" were a 
dominant factor in their popularity (See Table 10.4). Tsomet's vote also increased in 
the settlements from 3 to 10 percent as well as picking up the disillusioned Likud 
voters in mainly the lower income urban areas. Meretz drew support from the 
26 Capitanchik, "The Stalemate is Broken: The 19921sraeli General Election", 
Institute of Jewish Affairs Research Report, London, 1992, p10. 
27 The combined total votes of these two ultra hawkish parties was nearly 17,000 
votes, clearly enough to have ensured a seat for Tehiya and the Likud led block. 
28 The likelihood of another NUG if the block result was 60:60 was confirmed to the 
author by many of the leaders of the Labour Party and the Likud. 
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traditional bases of its three component parties, in middle class urban areas, the 
Kibbutz Artzi movement as well as the increase in its share of the first time voters. 
The religious parties lost 2 seats from their 1988 position and voting patterns 
took place along ethnic lines with Shas now seen as the party of the Sephardim. It 
retained 6 seats despite its detachment form its spiritual mentor Rabbi. Shach. The 
NRP (Mafdal) now had become more hawkish, notably regarding the settlement 
movement, and consequently drew support from the settlements as well as its 
traditional religious base within the Green Line. The United Torah Jewry list, formed 
to compete with Shas by Rabbi Shach, won 4 seats despite the controversy 
surrounding Rabbi Shach's anti-Sephardim comments during the campaign29 
29 For an account of these developments in Shas and the ultra orthodox see Willis, 
"Shas- The Sephardic Torah Guardians: Religious Movement and Political Power'', 
in Arian and Shamir (ed), The Elections in lsrael1992, State University of New York, 
1994. 
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1 0.3.1: Analysis of the Labour Performance in the Election. 
In assessing the performance of the Labour Party it is necessary to first 
illustrate that this election, unlike the 1977 election, was not an "earthquake" but 
more probably marked a maturation in Israeli democracy and a natural development 
of a competitive party system. In short, the Labour Party, which prior to 1977 had 
been a dominant party, in 1992 came to power for the first time within the post 1977 
competitive party system. This maturing of the Israeli party system meant that the 
Labour party had come full circle form being a dominant party in power (pre-1977), 
to a dominant party without power (1977-1981), then a non-dominant party without 
power, or at best only a share of power(1984-90), and finally after its election 
victory in 1992 a non-dominant party in power. 
Some critics such as Hadar argued that this election did represent such an 
"earthquake" and that the Labour Party, in a new alliance of its traditional 
constituency of Ashkenazi liberal Jews and the secular Soviet immigrants, would 
come to be the dominant force in Israeli politics once more30. Such arguments put 
forward by Hadar, although somewhat seductive with their neat division of Israel into 
three republics, the pre-1977 Labour dominated years, followed by the Likud-
religious nationalist "Greater Israel" years (1977 -92) and now the new more 
I 
westemised-secular view of Zionism, are problematic. They ignore three difficult 
realities for the Labour Party, which when combined confirm that the Likud and its 
block lost the election rather than any profound constituency realignment behind the 
Labour Party. 
First, the Labour Party scored only a technical victory, caused by the 
fragmentation of the Likud-Jed-block and the unity of the corresponding Labour-led-
30 Hadar, "The 1992 Electoral Earthquake and the Fall of The Second Israeli 
Republic", Middle East Journal, 46-4 1992. 
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block31. The narrowness of victory for the Labour block is confirmed not only by the 
fact that it won by only one seat (61 to 59), but that when all the votes are added 
together the Likud block actually won more votes. Taking first the Jewish vote only, 
the Likud-led-block won 1 ,290,226 votes against the total for the Labour block of 
1,157,447 votes32. Even when the Arab vote is added to the Labour-led-block, the 
total vote (1 ,284,962) is still less than the Likud-led-block. Thus it was the failure of. 
the Likud-led-block to unite in the wake of changes to the electoral threshold which 
gave the Labour Party its actual victory. 
Second, as Mr. Rabin confirmed during the campaign debate with Mr. Shamir 
the Arab parties would not be permitted to join a Labour-Jed coalition and therefore 
they could only play a blocking role preventing a Likud-led administration. This 
meant that in active coalition bargaining the Labour block had only 56 seats, five 
seats short of a majority, while the Likud block had 59 seats. Although, there was no 
chance of Meretz crossing to the Likud block this simple arithmetic meant that the 
Labour Party would always have to rely on attracting a party out of the Likud block 
to have a 61 seat winning coalition33. The difficulties of such a move, and the 
31 In interviews with the leaders of the Likud they all stress this fragmentation of the 
Likud led block vote as the principle reason for the electoral defeat along with the 
problem with Mr. Levy. Mr. Netanyahu stated that the voters rejected the Likud but 
not the Likud's position on the issues. Mr. Shamir argued that the Likud block 
received relatively the same number of votes as before, therefore it was a simple 
matter of arithmetic, and cited the arrogance of some members of the Likud who 
were convinced that they would win the election and concentrated on strengthening 
their intra party positions. He is particularly critical of Mr. Levy who he feels 
damaged him (Mr. Shamir) and the Likud prior to the election. Other Likud leaders 
such as Mr. Meridor and Dr. Begin offer more complex explanations centred around 
the corruption issue. 
Interviews with the Above. 
32 The Likud led block vote was calculated adding the votes of the Likud, Tsomet, 
Tehiya, Moledet, New Liberal, Geulat Israel, Torah and Land, Shas, NRP and 
United Torah Jewry. 
The Labour led block equals the total vote of the Labour Party and Meretz. 
33 During the campaign Meretz had given a clear statement of intent to join a Labour 
led coalition and would under no circumstances join an administration which 
included the Likud. 
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maintenance of support for a Labour·led coalition from this third party, have been 
illustrated by the problems which Mr. Rabin has experienced with Shas in the 
coalition and its eventual resignation from the government (1994). 
Third, the Labour Party won a plurality of the Soviet immigrant vote but this 
was a vote against the Likud for the failure of the government to successfully 
absorb them in to Israel. The probable short tenn nature of this support can be 
illustrated by two factors. First, that opinion polls indicated that in the period prior to 
the 1992 election a majority of Soviet immigrants supported either the Likud or a 
hypothetical Soviet ethnic list, and ideologically had hawkish tendencies regarding 
the Arabs and the future of the territories34. Second, the vote was very much a 
protest vote against the way that the Likud had handled their absorption and not 
predominantly a vote in favour of the Labour. The Labour Party benefited by being 
in opposition and free from the complexity of direct involvement in their absorption, 
and were thus able to charge the Likud with putting investment in Greater Israel 
before the welfare of the new immigrants. However, in the long tenn, with the 
Labour Party returned to government and now perceived by this group as the party 
responsible for their probable continuing hardships , then it is difficult to see in 
future elections the Soviet immigrants supporting the Labour Party in such 
numbers35. 
Casting aside the numerical narrowness of its victory, the Labour Party under 
Mr. Rabin performed much better than previously among its key target groups. It 
benefited to a degree from the growing alienation of the Sephardim from the Likud 
34 See, Arian and Shamir (ed), The Elections in lsrael1992, for details of the polls 
and also Reich, Dropkin and Wunnser, "Soviet Jewish Immigration and the 1992 
Israeli Knesset Elections", Middle East Journal, 47·3 1993, p467. 
35 The role of the Soviet vote in Labour's victory is universally accepted by the 
leadership. Most also accept that this vote is at best unstable as Dr. Beilin 
confirmed "they voted for us because we were in opposition not because they love 
us which is very dangerous for us in the future". 
Interview with Dr. Beilin, The Foreign Ministry, Jerusalem, 26th August 1994. 
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due to the Likud's failure over a period of time to economically deliver to this group 
and compounded by intra-party ethnic tensions involving Mr. Levy prior to and 
during the campaign36. 
Table 10.5 provides an analysis of which issues did or did not affect selected 
groups voting choices and in particular Likud voters (1988) who transferred their 
votes to Labour and to the right (1992). This reveals that the fact that Mr. Rabin was 
head of the list influenced the decision of 80 percent of the first voter group. Voters 
who moved to the right were more influenced by security-related matters such as 
the Intifada and less so by relations with the United States37_ 
Table 10.51nfluence on the Vote For Selected Groups 1992 (in%). 
Issue- Total Likud 1988 Likud 1988 
related Influence Population Labour1992 Right 1992 
1192 44 40 
Intifada 86 96 94 
Corruption 74 91 61 
likud 72 84 72 
Settlement Policy 
Relations 62 63 39 
with USA 
Shamir head 48 48 48 
of likud 
Rabin head 47 80 23 
of Labour 
36 For details of the move of the Sephardim away from Likud to the Labour Party or 
to other parties of the right see, Arian and Shamir, ''Two Reversals in Israeli Politics: 
Why 1992 Was Not 1977", Electoral Studies, 12-4, 1993, p 326-329. 
37 Source for Table 10.5, Arian and Shamir, op. cit., p41. 
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Table 10.6 helps confirm the success of Mr. Rabin's strategy of a reordering 
of national priorities away from the settlements to within the Green Line in attracting 
voters away from the Likud. 
Table 10.6: Differences between Spend More and Spend Less For Voters 
Who Moved From Likud to Labour in 1992. 
Total Number= 1,192 44 227 
Issue Likud 88 Labour 92 Likud 88 Likud 92 
New Jobs 96 88 
Education 82 75 
Health 84 76 
Security 73 70 
Immigrant absorption 34 21 
Unemployment 36 41 
Settlements -59 16 
Religious Institutions -84 -44 
Question; For each of the following, Should the state spend more or less 
of about the same as now?. The numbers listed above were calculated by 
subtracting the percent saying spend more from the percent saying spend 
less. 
Source: Election Studies; Arian and Shamir, 1992, conducted by Dahaf 
Research Institute. 
The key constituency for the Labour Party, Likud voters in 1988 who 
transferred to Labour in 1992, wanted to see more spending within the Green Line 
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in areas such as providing more jobs or improving the education and welfare 
systems at the expense of investment in the settlements. The Likud voters in 1988 
who stayed with the Likud in 1992 also wanted increased spending on these areas 
but importantly the majority of them did not want such an increase in spending at 
the expense of investment in the settlements. 
Overall, despite the close nature of the result at block level, the Labour Party 
did make some inroads into Likud strongholds notably in the development towns. 
However, there was a clear refusal by many disillusioned Likud voters to cross over 
to the Labour Party and this group either moved to another right wing party or did 
not bother to vote at all. Mr. Rabin's strategists were well aware of the reluctance of 
many of these voters to support the Labour Party, even under Mr. Rabin, so had 
planned and executed a relatively successful campaign at block level and not simply 
at inter-party level. Consequently, although the Labour Party scored a narrow 
double victory its longer term prospects remained uncertain as key constituencies 
voted for it in order to punish the Likud rather than out of strong preference for the 
Labour Party. 
10.4: Internal Labour Party Response to the Election. 
Even in the immediate aftermath of its election victory there were renewed 
signs of intra-party tensions between Mr. Rabin and Mr. Peres which were visible at 
the Labour Party post election party. Rumours of a coup by Mr. Peres and his 
supporters were quickly cut short by Mr. Rabin's victory speech in which he stressed 
that he alone would be responsible for conducting all coalition negotiations and 
appointing the Labour Party members of the cabinef38. His speech contained two 
other important aspects: Mr. Rabin made a great deal of use of the first person 
38 Mr. Rabin, Address to Post Election party, Dan Hotel, Tel Aviv 23rd June 1994, 
Labour Party Headquarters, Ha'arkon Street, Tel Aviv. 
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pronoun, a clear indication that he felt he had won a direct election for the post of 
Prime Minister, and he attempted to avoid mentioning Mr. Peres by name-'39. Such 
tensions receded when it became clear that Mr. Peres would serve as a relatively 
loyal number two to Mr. Rabin in the new cabinet thus avoiding the return to the 
problems of Mr. Rabin's first Cabinet (1974-77)40. Mr. Peres in his memoirs stresses 
the point that his loyalty was first and foremost to the peace process and thus he 
accepted the post of Foreign Minister41. 
The coalition bargaining process, although in theory the most straight forward 
in recent elections, had important ramifications for the longer term future of Mr. 
Rabin, the Labour Party and the peace process. With a blocking majority of 61 
seats Mr. Rabin did not have the option of·resorting to an NUG with the Likud which 
would have suited his intra-party position, in limiting the portfolios and influence of 
Mr. Peres and his supporters. Mr. Rabin's strategy was to quickly get Meretz to sign 
an agreement at a relatively low price, Meretz had stated during the campaign that 
their aim was to join a Labour-led government, and thus with this basic coalition in 
position, reduce the "pay-off" to a third party joining later. The need of this third 
party was caused by the reluctance of Mr. Rabin to allow the Arab parties to act as 
anything more than a blocking majority and therefore he had to attract one or more 
of the parties away from the Likud block. As in 1990 the key party was the ultra 
39 The Israeli daily newspaper Ha'aretz in its end of the year summary of the 100 
most embarrassing moments of the previous year voted Mr. Rabin's non mentioning 
of Mr. Peres as the number one most embarrassing moment. Mr. Rabin has used 
this method many times on Mr. Peres not least at the signing of the Israel-Jordan 
peace agreement in 1994. 
40 One of the major reasons for the renewed tension between Mr. Rabin and Mr. 
Peres was the feeling of the latter that he had been under used during the election 
campaign. Mr. Peres appeared only once during the television campaign to talk 
about his vision for the new Middle East, in which he was flanked by two close 
associates of Mr. Rabin. As previously outlined this hiding of parts of the Labour 
Party was a key strategy of Mr. Rabin's team in their quest to win votes from the 
Likud. 
41 Peres, Battling for Peace. Memoirs, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1994, 
p314. 
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orthodox Sephardim party, Shas, which during the campaign had promised to 
support a Likud-led government. However, the narrow Labour-led-block victory had 
meant that the Likud was not in a position to form a coalition so Shas joined a 
Labour-led government arguing that it was impossible to marry a dead body {the 
Likud)42_ Therefore when the Knesset convened on 13th July 1993, Mr Rabin was 
able to present his new government comprising of 13 Ministers from the Labour 
Party, 3 from Meretz and 1 from Shas, and win a clear vote of confidence in his 
government(67- 53). 
In providing an understanding of the inter-party developments in the Labour 
Party at the time and subsequently, it is vital to understand why firstly, other 
religious parties did not join the coalition and secondly, why Tsomet, despite much 
speculation, was kept out of the coalition. Mr. Ramon who conducted the 
negotiations on Mr. Rabin's behalf maximised the "pay-off' to Shas at the expense 
of bringing in other religious parties to the coalition43. This was in part caused by Mr. 
Rabin's rush to present his government but also by the desire of Mr. Ramon, who 
was friendly with the parliamentary leader of Shas, Rabbi Deri, to develop his own 
intra-party position for the battle to succeed Mr. Rabin. The evidence of such moves 
was not apparent until the Histadrut campaign in 1994 when Mr. Ramon, running 
independently of the Labour Party and in alliance with Shas and Meretz, took 
control away from the Labour Party for the first time in the Histadrut's history. As 
discussed in Chapter 8, Shas are vital to the future prospects of the Labour Party in 
that they can help deliver the Sephardim and religious votes to the party. Therefore 
42 As in 1990 Shas, and in particular its parliamentary leader Rabbi Deri had to be 
careful not to alienate their constituency and therefore the Labour led block's narrow 
majority was vital to their being able to join the coalition. Had there been any 
possibility of the Likud forming a government then Shas would have had to honour 
their election promise to support a Likud led government. 
43 1nterview with Mr. Eli Dayan, Labour Party Coalition Chairman 1992-94, The 
Knesset, Jerusalem, 8th November 1994. 
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the individual who can deliver Shas to the Labour Party sees his intra-party standing 
substantially increase, this link becoming even more profound with the advent of 
direct elections for Prime Minister in 1996, where Shas can deliver key votes to one 
of the candidates. Mr. Rabin himself kept two portfolios, the Ministry of Religious 
affairs (traditionally held by the NRP) and Social Affairs and Welfare in order to try 
to persuade one of the religious parties to join the coalition at a later date. 
The possibility of Tsomet joining the coalition was opposed by both Meretz 
and many doves in the Labour Party who viewed their hawkish position as an 
obstacle to moving the peace process forward. Mr. Eitan, the leader of Tsomet, 
asked for and was refused the Education portfolio and it was on this issue that the 
negotiations broke down44. Tsomet's failure to join the government was an indicator 
of the growing power of the Meretz and the doves.within the Labour Party and still 
relative intra-party weakness of Mr. Rabin who favoured bringing in Tsomet to the 
government. Mr. Rabin made subsequent attempts to court Tsomet in 1993 and 
1994 but both times the Labour Party vetoed such moves. These attempts became 
more difficult with time because with Tsomet in opposition its positions became 
more radical as it courted its predominantly hawkish constituency, and as the peace 
process moved forward so the gap between the to parties broadened. Eventually in 
1994 a break away faction of Tsomet Yi'ud did join the Labour coalition and this 
faction eventually merged with the Labour Party. 
In selection of Labour Party members of the cabinet Mr. Rabin included the 
hawkish Mr. Shitreet, Mr. Tsur (despite the fact that he was no longer a member of 
44 In meetings of Tsomet held at the time it was clear that Mr. Eitan fully expected 
Tsomet to join the coalition and that it would have done so at almost any price. 
However, Mr. Eitan felt personally insulted by the refusal to appoint him Minister of 
Education (this originated mainly from Meretz who claimed that as the third largest 
party they should be awarded this important portfolio), and consequently he became 
disillusioned with the coalition process. 
Interview with Mr. Martin Sherman, Secretary General ofTsomet 1992, Tel Aviv, 1st 
December 1994. 
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the Knesset) and Mr. Ben Eliezer as well as the defeated minor candidates from the 
leadership election, Mrs. Namir and Mr. Kessar. The decision to keep the Defence 
portfolio for himself illustrated both Mr. Rabin's preference for the Ministry and his 
desire to be in sole charge of security policy. Mr. Rabin reluctantly appointed Mr. 
Peres Foreign Minister, which said more about the continuing intra-party influence 
of Mr. Peres than Mr. Rabin's personal preference. Overall the Labour Party list of 
Ministers reflected a balance between hawks and doves, but added to this were the 
three Meretz Ministers, Mrs Aloni, Mr. Rubinstein and Mr. Tsaban which gave the 
Cabinet as a whole a more dovish composition. Of those not selected Mr. Burg (the 
only figure from the top nine of the list not to be awarded a portfolio) was 
considered too inexperienced and close to Mr. Peres. Mr. Gur a former contender 
for the leadership was made Deputy Minister of Defence, a rank as important as 
many Ministry portfolios. 
The period immediately following the election therefore witnessed two inter-
related developments. First, Mr. Rabin used the election victory to attempt to 
develop an intra-party advantage by way of conducting the coalition process and 
the appointment of Labour Party Ministers himself. However, this relative advantage 
was counter balanced by the presence of Meretz in the coalition which increased 
the large minority of doves in the Labour Party to an overall majority in the coalition. 
Even at intra-party level Mr. Rabin did not enjoy supremacy which was confirmed by 
the election of Mr. Zvilli, a close associate of Mr. Peres to the position of Secretary 
General of the party (October 1992) over Mr. Rabin's preferred candidate. It soon 
became apparent that in the Knesset, in elections for the Chairs of the Knesset 
Committees, supporters of Mr. Peres would defeat Mr. Rabin's candidates in a 
straight one-to-one contest. 
This suggests that, despite Mr. Rabin's electoral success, Mr. Peres still 
enjoyed control over the majority of the party machine illustrating the deep rooted 
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nature of the influence of Mr. Peres on the institutions which he himself had largely 
reconstructed between 1977-92. The importance of controlling the "party machine" 
can be traced back to the time of the period of dominance that the Labour Party 
enjoyed prior to 1977. As described in Chapter Two the control over appointments 
to Knesset lists and party positions were used by the leadership as an effective tool 
of protecting their respective intra-party positions. As Mr. Peres failed to win 
elections so he moved to strengthen his control over the post 1977 "party machine" 
in order to protect his position from actual and potential leadership challenges. Thus 
the greater the number of election failures Mr. Peres experienced (1977,81, 84 and 
88) so the more he moved to strengthen his control of the party45. The degree of his 
control was so strong that it survived even after Mr. Peres had narrowly been 
disposed as leader making life difficult for Mr. Rabin. 
The period also saw the start of the succession battle to Mr. Rabin with the 
moves of Mr. Ramon in the coalition bargaining process to enhance his position via 
Shas. With Mr. Rabin's electoral victory it was assumed that his successor would 
come from the younger generation who were in their late forties, including Mr. 
Chaim Ramon, Dr. Yossi Beilin and from outside the Labour Party Chief of Staff 
Ehud Barak or from Meretz Mr. Yossi Sarid. The succession battle came to be one 
of the most important issues in Israeli politics especially with the proposed advent of 
direct elections in 1996 for Prime Minister-46. 
Finally, although the elections did not represent an earthquake as the 1977 
had proved to be, in terms of the consequences for the peace process they proved 
45 Mr. Peres in general increased his control of the party with the appointment or 
election of his supporters into the various party organs. Since 1977 there has been 
an in-built majority of Mr. Peres supporters in these organs which made it relatively 
easy to vote on additional like minded party activists. 
46 1n July 1995 Mr. Barak (retired Chief of Staff December 1994) and Dr. Yossi Beilin 
both became members of the Cabinet. Mr. Barak was appointed as Interior Minister 
and Dr. Beilin as Minister of Economics and Planning. 
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to be critical. The Oslo agreement (1993) could not have come about if there had 
been an NUG of a narrow based Likud led government. In attempting to understand 
the events surrounding and following the Oslo agreement it is important to 
remember the significance of the closeness of the block victory for the Labour Party 
an the fact that the majority of the electorate did not reject Ukud's Zionist ideology 
of Greater Israel. Such limitations have been compounded for Mr. Rabin by the 
problems of maintaining Shas in the coalition and their eventual resignation in 1994 
leaving Mr. Rabin as head of a narrow based minority government. In short, without 
the fragmentation of the Likud led block it is difficult to see that the developments in 
the peace process from 1992 onwards would have taken place. 
Conclusion. 
The 1992 election while resulting in the formation of the first Labour-led 
government within a competitive party system still illustrated that the party has some 
problems with key constituency groups in the electorate. This represents a normal 
situation for a non-dominant party (without access to all strata of society) operating 
within a competitive party system. For example, in England the Conservatives do 
not perform well in Scotland nor likewise the Labour Party in Southern England. 
However, worryingly for the party the constituencies that the Israeli Labour Party 
continued to perform badly in are the very constituencies which are becoming 
demographically more important in the dynamic developing Israeli society. Hence 
there was little evidence in the results of the 1992 to indicate a major electoral 
realignment that could be viewed as the start of a return to the Labour Party's pre-
1977 position of dominance. In addition to the above evidence such as the 
closeness of the result, the concentration on Mr. Rabin during the campaign and the 
importance to Labour of the fragmentation of the Likud-led-block, indicated that the 
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party's status simply changed from a non-dominant party without power to one with 
power. 
To some degree the confirmation of the Labour Party's status and the maturity 
of the competitive party system will come in the 1996 Knesset elections where, 
based on the arguments listed in this Chapter, there is a distinct possibility of the 
Likud returning to power. The advent of direct elections for Prime Minister which will 
separate the elections for the Knesset and the Prime Minister will make it impossible 
for a party to place so much emphasis on the personality of its leader as the Labour 
Party did in 1992. Consequently, the results of the 1996 elections may lead to a 
situation of 'cohabitation' with for example, a Labour Prime Minister in charge of a 
Likud-led-govemment or vice-versa. This will in tum further complicate the definition 
of when a political party in Israel is said to have power or not have it. 
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CONCLUSION. 
The decline of the Labour Party and its eventual loss of dominant party status 
was described as being due in part to the decline in its ideological fervour and a 
reduction in the material or economic dependence ties between the population and 
the party (see 2.1). In developing this theme it became clear in the post-1977 era, 
with the shift from a dominant party system to a competitive party system, that the 
reasons for this decline not only applied to the Labour Party but to the other major 
political parties in Israel. 
The original pioneering ideological fervour has declined in Israel since the 
1950's and has been largely replaced by the divisive debate over the future status 
of the territories. This debate has led to internal divisions in both of the major parties 
and forced them to adopt a series of pragmatic positions on this central issue in an 
attempt to maintain party unity. These pragmatic compromises have tended to 
further blur the differences between the Likud and the Labour Party as they 
compete in a maturing competitive party system for the floating voters of the centre 
ground. Consequently, election campaigns have been characterised by an almost 
total absence of ideological discussion47_ 
The reduction of the material or economic dependency ties of the population 
on the Labour Party was caused by two factors: the natural development of society 
(including the building of a strong private sector) as the immigrants developed their 
own constituency interest groups , and the Labour Party's failure to deliver the 
goods to key sectors of the population. The continuation of the decline in these ties 
in the post-1977 era was illustrated by the shift away from the Likud in the 1992 
election which was primarily caused by its failure to deliver economically to its key 
47 Even the during the 1981 campaign when there were major divisions between the 
Likud and the Labour Party Mr. Begin did not attempt to stress these ideological 
differences but rather concentrated on what he termed as the ethnic discrimination 
against the Sephardim. 
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constituency of predominantly low income Sephardim as well as the newly arriving 
Soviet Aliyah. 
As the role and usefulness of political parties has declined, so personality 
politics have become more important. This has been apparent since the demise of 
leadership of the Second and Third Aliyah and was of primary importance in 
determining the effectiveness of the various NUG's in the 1980's. It's significance 
was further illustrated with the presidential style of the 1992 election campaign and 
the Labour Party's use of the name 'Labour under Rabin' on ballot papers. 
Consequently, Israel's competitive party system has been characterised by a deep-
rooted concentration on the personal popularity of national party leaders. The 
significance of this was confirmed by the decision of the Labour Party to replace Mr. 
Peres with Mr. Rabin for the 1992 election on the sole basis of the latter's higher 
national popularity rating (see 9.3.2). 
The 1992 election saw the Labour Party return to power for the first time as a 
non-dominant party operating in a competitive party (block) system, but its election 
victory did little to reverse the longer term decline of the role of the party. Since the 
1992 election the Labour Party's position has been further weakened by the 
following factors: the realisation of the effects of primaries on the party, its loss of 
control of the Histadrut, Mr. Rabin's continued indifference towards the party he 
leads and the decision to hold direct elections for Prime Minister in 1996. The long 
term effects of these factors on the party all merit separate future studies in their 
own right as they will play a significant part in defining the future position of the 
Labour Party in the competitive party system. 
The use of primaries has altered but not revolutionised the Labour Party. It 
has weakened the ability of the leadership to manage the party, with candidates 
now using the media and in particular television as their prime sponsor and not the 
traditional patron-client channels. This has led to a radicalisation of the Knesset 
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faction as Labour Mk's attempt to attract media attention by taking stands against 
the Labour-led government. However, this has yet to transferred into Labour 
members voting against the govemment48. Party organs such as the Central 
Committee now play a reduced role with the Labour MK's and prospective 
candidates for party positions appealing over the heads of the Committee to the 
national media, where they have direct access a larger percentage of the 150,000 
voting members of the party. 
The Labour Party in its various forms had controlled the Histadrut since 1920 
but in the 1994 Histadrut elections the party was defeated by a coalition of a new 
party RAM (led by Mr. Chaim Ramon, a former Labour Cabinet Minister), Meretz and 
Shas. A future study of the importance of this defeat to the Labour Party could 
choose to interpret it in two ways: the ending of the party's association with an 
outdated, inefficient bankrupt institution; or the loss of the flag ship of the labour 
movement. Such a study would need to examine both tl:le financial implications to 
the Labour Party of such a loss as well as the organisational role of the Histadrut in 
national politics49. 
Mr. Rabin's presidential style of rule bares a remarkable similarity to his first 
premiership between 197 4 and 1977 where he largely chose to ignore the party 
(see 1.4). Some 20 years later Mr. Rabin remains extremely suspicious of the party 
which is still largely controlled by Mr. Peres and relies on a small brand of personal 
advisors to direct policy. Mr. Rabin's relationship with the parliamentary Labour 
Party has at times deteriorated to the point of his exchanging public insults with 
48 An exception to this has been the Golan Heights Bill where two Labour MK's Mr. 
Khalani and Mr. Zissman voted against the government. 
49 The short-term consequence of the loss of control of the Histadrut was that it led 
to a financial crisis in the Labour Party which for years had been dependent on 
money from the Histadrut (political levy's) to finance party activities. As a result of 
this crisis the Party Headquarters in Tel Aviv had to be closed for two months during 
the summer of 1994 to save money and the party magazine 'Spectrum' ceased to 
exist. 
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Labour MK's. A comparison between the first and second periods of office of Mr. 
Rabin would produce interesting results, confirming how little Mr. Rabin's style of 
government has changed. 
Finally the introduction of direct elections for Prime Minister will lead to 
changes in the Israeli competitive party system. It is clear that it will lead to a greater 
Americanisation of the party system marking a further reduction in the role of both 
the major parties and an increase in the concentration on personality politics. The 
1996 Prime Minister and Knesset elections promise to be among the most important 
political developments in Israel's history due to the significance of the outcome for 
the peace process, and therefore the future of not only Israel but of the Middle East 
region. 
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Appendix 1: Knesset Elections Results 1949-1992. 
1st Knesset Elected on 25th January 1949. 

































2nd Knesset Elected on 30th July 1951 

















Farm and Develop. 

















































3rd Knesset Elected on 26th July 1955 













Farm and Develop. 














4th Knesset Elected on 3rd November 1959 


































































5th Knesset elected on 15th August 1961. 































6th Knesset Elected on 2nd November 1965. 









Agudat Israel 4 
Rakah 3 
Po'alei Agudat 2 
Progress and 2 
Develop. 
Co-op and 2 
Fraternity 





Arab- Jewish 0 
Frantern. 
Israeli Druze 0 
Total120 Seats 

































7th Knesset Elected on 28th October 1969. 
Party Seats After Seats at End of 
Election Term 
Alignment 56 57 
Gahal 26 26 
NRP 12 11 
Agudat Israel 4 4 
Independent 4 4 
Liberals 
State List 4 3 
Rakah 3 3 
Progress and 2 2 
Develop. 
Po'alei-Agudat 2 2 
Co-op and 2 2 
Fraternity 
Ha'alom- 2 0 
Ko'Hadash 
Hamerkaz 2 2 
Hahofshi 
Maki 1 1 
Independents 0 2 
Meri 0 1 
Total120 Seats 
8th Knesset Elected on 31st December 1973. 
Party Seats After Seats at End of 
Election Term 
Alignment 51 49 
Likud 39 39 
NRP 10 10 
Religious Torah 5 0 
Independent 4 3 
Liberals 
Rakah (Hadash) 4 4 
Ratz 3 2 
Progress and 2 0 
Develop. 
Moked 1 1 
Bedouin and Arab 1 0 
Vii. 
United Arab 0 3 
Social Democratic 0 2 
Independents 0 2 
Agudat Israel 0 3 
Po'alei Agudat 0 2 
Total120 Seats 
9th Knesset Elected on 17th May 1977. 















































10th Knesset Elected on 30th June 1981. 




































































11th Knesset Elected on 23rd July 1984. 




























































12th Knesset Elected on 1st November 1988 













































13th Knesset elected on 23rd June 1992. 











































Seats at End of 
Term 
Appendix 2: Governments of the State of Israel 1948-1992. 
First Knesset. 
1. Prime Minister: Mr. David Ben-Gurion 
Coalition Members: 
Mapai, United Religious Front, Progressives, Sephardim, Minority Lists. 
7th March 1949 to 30th October 1950. 
2. Prime Minister: Mr. David Ben-Gurion 
Coalition Members: . 
Mapai, United Religious Front, Progressives, Sephardim, Minority Lists. 
3oth October 1950 to 8th October 1951. 
Second Knesset. 
3. Prime Minister: Mr. David Ben-Gurion 
Coalition Members: 
Mapai, Hamizrahi, Hapo'el Hamizrahi, Agudat Israel, Po'alei Agudat 
8th October 1951 to 23rd December 1952. 
4. Prime Minister: Mr. David Ben-Gurion 
Coalition Members: 
Mapai, General Zionists, Hamizrahi, Hapo'el Hamizrahi, Progressives, Minority 
Lists. 
23rd December 1952 to 26th January 1954. 
5. Prime Minister: Mr. Moshe Sharett 
Coalition Members: 
As above. 
26th January 1954 to 29th June 1955. 
6. Prime Minister: Mr. Moshe Sharett 
Coalition Members: 
As above minus the General Zionists. 
29th June 1955 to 3rd November 1955. 
Third Knesset. 
7. Prime Minister: Mr. David Ben-Gurion 
Coalition Members: 
Mapai, Hamizrahi, Hapo-el Hamizrahi, Mapam, Ahdut Ha'avoda, Progressives, 
Minority Lists. 
3rd November 1955 to 7th January 1958. 
8. Prime Minister: Mr. David Ben-Gurion 
Coalition Members: 
Mapai, NRP, Mapam, Ahdut Ha'avoda, Progressives, Minority Lists. 
7th January 1958 to 17th December 1959. 
Fourth Knesset. 
9. Prime Minister: Mr David Ben-Gurion 
Coalition Members: 
Mapai, NRP, Ahdut Ha'avoda, Mapam, Progressives, Minority Usts, One 
Independent. 
17th December 1959 to 2nd November 1961. 
Fifth Knesset. 
10. Prime Minister: Mr. David Ben-Gurion 
Coalition Members: 
Mapai, Ahdut Ha'avoda, NRP, Po'alei Agudat, Minority Lists. 
2nd November 1961 to 26th June 1963. 
11. Prime Minister: Mr. Levi Eshkol 
Coalition Members: 
As Above. 
26th June 1963 to 23rd December 1964. 
12. Prime Minister: Mr. Levi Eshkol 
Coalition Members: 
As Above. 
23rd December 1964 to 12th January 1966. 
Sixth Knesset. 
13. Prime Minister: Mr. Levi Eshkol 
Coalition Members: Alignment, NRP, Mapam, Independent Liberals, Po'alei 
Agudat, Minority Lists. 
The government was expanded on 5th June 1967 to include Gahal (Herut) and 
Rafi. It was there after known as a National Unity Government (NUG1). 
12th January 1966 to 17th March 1969. 
14. Prime Minister: Mrs. Golda Meir 
Coalition Members: Alignment, Gahal, NRP, Independent Liberals, Minority 
Lists. 
17th March 1969 to 15th December 1969. 
Seventh Knesset. 
15. Prime Minister: Mrs. Golda Meir 
Coalition Members: 
As above. Gahal resigned on 6th August 1970. 
15th December 1969 to 1Oth March 197 4. 
Eighth Knesset. 
16. Prime Minister: Mrs Golda Meir 
Coalition Members: 
Alignment, NRP, Independent Liberals. 
1Oth March 197 4 to 3rd June 197 4. 
17. Prime Minister: Mr. Yitzhak Rabin 
Coalition Members: 
Alignment, Independent Liberals, Minority Lists, Ratz (left in October 197 4 by 
the NRP). 
3rd June 1974 to 20th June 1977. 
The Government resigned on 22nd December 1976 when the NRP Ministers 
were dismissed but continued as a caretaker Government. 
Ninth Knesset. 
18. Prime Minister Mr. Menachem Begin 
Coalition Members: 
Likud, NRP, Agudat Israel. On 24th October 1977 Dash joined the coalition. 
20th June 1977 to 5th August 1981. 
Tenth Knesset. 
19. Prime Minster: Mr. Menachem Begin 
Coalition Members: 
Likud, NRP, Agudat Israel, Tami, Telem. Tehiya joined the coalition in 
September 1982. 
5th August 1981 to 10th October 1983. 
20. Prime Minister: Mr. Yitzhak Shamir 
Coalition Members: As Above. 
10th October 1983 to 13th September 1984. 
Eleventh Knesset. 
21. Prime Minister: Mr. Shimon Peres 
Coalition members: 
Alignment, Yahad, Likud, NRP, Agudat Israel, Shas, Morasha, Shinui, Ometz. 
13th September 1984 to 20th October 1986. 
22. Prime Minister: Mr. Yitzhak Shamir 
Coalition Members: 
As Above. 
20th October 1986 to 22nd December 1988. 
Twelfth Knesset. 
23. Prime Minister: Mr. Yitzhak Shamir 
Coalition Members: 
Likud, Alignment, NRP, Shas, Agudat Israel, Degel Hatorah. 
22nd December 1988 to 11th June 1990. 
24. Prime Minister: Mr. Yitzhak Shamir 
Coalition Members: 
Likud, NRP, Shas, Degel Hatorah, Advancing Zionist Idea, Tehiya, Tsomet, and 
two independents. Moledet joined the coalition on 5th February 1991 and 
Agudat Israel joined on 16th November 1990. 
11th June 1990 to 13th July 1992. 
Thirteenth Knesset. 
25. Prime Minister: Mr. Yitzhak Rabin 
Coalition Members: 
Labour party, Meretz, Shas. 
13th July 1992- 1994. 
Appendix 3(a): The 1984 National Unity Government Coalition Agreement 
between the Alignment and the Likud. 
1. The Government. 
1.1: A National Unity Government (henceforth the Government) will be 
formed, with the participation of the Alignment and the Likud factions, and 
any other factions which choose to join the coalition in accordance with this 
agreement. 
1.2: The Government will be founded on the follpwing principles: 
a) Equality between the Alignment and the Likud in the number of 
Ministries and Ministers. 
b) The addition of other factions will be done in such a way that the 
balance between the two sides will be maintained. However, in addition of 
the NRP would not be at the expense of either side and would not be 
regarded as a violation of the inter block balance. 
c) Should a Minister cease to serve as a member of the government for 
any reason, his party will choose the Minister to replace him. 
1.3: The Government and its Ministers will act in accordance with the basic 
Guidelines attached to this agreement, which are an integral part of it, and in 
accordance with Cabinet decisions. 
1.4: The Government will serve for the entire full term of the 11th Knesset, 
until November 1988. 
1.5: In the first 25 months the Government will be headed by Mr. Peres and 
Mr. Shamir will be his Deputy and Minister of Foreign Affairs, and during the 
next 25 months Mr. Shamir will be Prime Minister and Mr. Peres will be his 
Deputy and Minister o Foreign Affairs. To firmly base this provision changes 
will be introduced to the Basic law: the Government, to define the status and 
authority of the Deputy Premier. 
1.6: Should Mr. Peres of Mr. Peres or Mr. Shamir be unable to fulfil their 
duties, for whatever reasons, their party would provide a replacement with 
the consultation and consent of the other side. 
1. 7: Article 1.6 notwithstanding, all other Ministers will serve in their positions 
for the entire Government's term of office. 
1.8: Throughout the entire period of the Government's term of office, the 
Prime Minister will not wield his authority (under Section 21 a of the Basic 
Law, The Government) to dismiss a Minister from his position, except with 
the consent of the Deputy Premier. Such consent will not be required, 
however, to dismiss a Minister who belongs to the faction headed by the 
Prime Minister. The Prime Minister will wield this authority with regard to a 
Minister belonging to the faction of the Deputy Premier, should the latter 
request it. 
1.9: In order to implement the change of premiers stipulated in article 1.5, 
Mr. Peres will resign towards the end of the first 25 months of the 
Government's term of office, and the Alignment and the Likud will jointly 
recommend to the President of the state to nominate Mr. Shamir as the 
designate Prime Minister. The new government will be formed by the end of 
the first 25 months. 
1. 1 0: Mr. Shamir agrees to form his Government along the principles set 
forth in this agreement. 
1. 11 : This agreement will also apply to the Government formed by Mr. 
Shamir. 
1.12: Twenty five Ministers will serve in the Government, twelve from each 
side and one from the NRP. 
1.13: The division of the Ministries, apart from the Prime Minister and the 
Deputy Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs will be as follows: 
Alignment 
1) Ministry of Defence 
2) Ministry of Education and Communication 
3) Ministry of Agriculture 
4) Ministry of Health 
5) Ministry of Immigrants Absorption 
6) Ministry of Police 
7) Ministry of Communication 
8) Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure 
9) Ministry of Economics and Planning 
Likud 
1) Ministry of Finance 
2) Ministry of Justice 
3) Ministry of Labour and Welfare 
4) Ministry of Housing and Construction 
5) Ministry of Industry and Trade 
6) Ministry of Police 
7) Ministry of Tourism 
8) Ministry of Science and Development 
9) To be decided 
The NRP and Shas factions will be represented in the Government by a single 
Minister without portfolio each until the Prime Minister and his Deputy will 
decide on how to divide the Ministries of the Interior and Religious Affairs 
among them. 
1.14: A Ministerial Committee, called the Inner Cabinet, will be established. It will 
have 10 members, five from each side. 
1.15: The Inner Cabinet is empowered to deliberate and decide on the following 
issues; 
a) Issues within the jurisdiction of the Ministerial Defence Committee under 
the government operational procedures {the Inner Cabinet will also serve as 
the Ministerial Defence Team). 
b) The policy and defence issues incorporated in the basic aims. 
c) Any issue, including those issues stipulated by the basic guidelines, 
which the Prime Minister and the Deputy Premier seek to bring for 
deliberation and decision in the Inner Cabinet. 
1.16: The decisions of the Inner cabinet will have the same force as decisions of 
the Ministerial Defence Committee, but in Paragraph 41 c of the government 
operational procedures, the consent of the Deputy Premier will also be 
required, in addition to that of the Prime Minister. In Paragraph 42 of the 
government operational procedures, the Prime Minister will be entitled to 
bring an issue for deliberation by the Inner Cabinet only with the Deputy 
Premier's consent. Should disagreements arise, and the Inner cabinet does 
not reach a decision on a certain issue, the matter will not be brought before 
the government plenum without the joint agreement of the Prime Minister 
and Deputy Premier. Should an issue be brought for deliberation in the 
government plenum, and the Prime Minister or the Deputy Premier 
determine that it should be discussed in the Inner Cabinet, the issue will be 
discussed in the Inner Cabinet. 
1.17: A Ministerial Committee for economic affairs will be established, to be 
chaired by the Finance Minister. His Deputy will be an Alignment 
representative. 
1.18: A coalition Committee will e established to look in to ways of changing the 
electoral system and amending electoral laws. The Committee will be 
chaired by and Alignment representative. Changes in the electoral system 
as well as in the election laws will not be carried out without the consent of 
both parties. 
1. 19: A Ministerial Committee will be established to determine in which Ministry 
to place the Land Authority. 
1.20: A Ministerial Committee will be established to look in to areas of activities 
and responsibilities of the Ministry of Economics and Planning. 
1.21: Decisions by the Ministerial Committees stipulated in the above will be 
regarded as recommendations only. 
1.22: A Deputy Minister from the Likud will serve in the Ministry of Defence. The 
definition of those civilian matters to be handled by him will be determined 
by the Minister, after consultation with him. 
1.23: A Deputy Minister from the Alignment will serve in the Ministry of Finance. 
The definition of those matters to be handled by him will be determined by 
the Minister, after consultation with him. 
1.24: The Ministry of Police will be re-established. 
1.25: The principle of continuity of government decisions will be maintained. The 
opinion of the Attorney General on the matter will be considered. 
2: The Knesset. 
The Knesset coalition members will act in accordance with the coalition 
procedures as follows; 
The Coalition Executive 
2.1: The Coalition Executive will not make a decision on any issue brought 
before the Knesset or one of its committees, if either of the two factions 
(Alignment or Likud) objects. 
2.2: The Coalition executive will comprise of six members from the Likud faction 
and six members from the Alignment faction, as well ~s one representative 
from every other faction participating in the coalition. In the first 25 months, 
the Coalition Executive will be chaired by a Likud representative, and 
Alignment representative will serve as his Deputy. In the ensuing 25 months, 
an Alignment representative will serve as the Chairman, and a Likud 
representative will serve as his Deputy. The decisions reached at Coalition 
Executive meetings will be placed on the record. The Coalition Executive 
chairman will convey these decisions to the Coalition faction leaders. 
2.3: Motions to the Agenda and Private Members Bills. 
a) A member of the coalition who wishes to submit a motion to the Agenda 
will first submit it to the Coalition Executive chairman. The chairman will 
clarify the position of the relevant Minister. If neither the chairman nor the 
Minister objects to the motion, it will be submitted to the Knesset Speaker. 
b) A member of the coalition who wishes to submit a private members bill, 
will first submit the bill to the Coalition Executive for deliberations. The 
Coalition Executive will bring the bill to the attention of the relevant Minister, 
who will state his position within a month. Should the Minister not state his 
position within a month, the bill will be submitted to the Knesset Speaker. 
Should the relevant Minister deClare his opposition to the bill, he of his 
representative will be summoned to a discussion by the Coalition Executive, 
which will decide on the matter. 
2.4: Amending or Altering a Section of a Law in Committee. 
a) A member of the coalition who wishes to amend or alter a section of a bill 
will notify the Committee chairman, or the Coalition co-ordinator, if the 
Committee chairman is not a coalition. The chairman or co-ordinator must 
delay the vote on the section in question. The committee's coalition 
members will meet to decide on the proposal after the committee meeting is 
concluded. If the issue under discussion is a section of a particular 
importance, the faction of the member proposing to amend or alter the 
section of the law is entitled to demand that the matter be decided by the 
Coalition Executive, with the participation of the relevant Minister. 
b) Members of the coalition must vote in favour of bills submitted by the 
Govemment, and are prohibited from abstaining from voting on any of the 
three readings of bills submitted to the Knesset by the Govemment. 
c) On issues on which the coalition factions have been granted a free vote 
or the right to abstain, under the Transition Law (Amendment) of 1961, the 
Coalition Executive will conduct a dialogue conceming the matter if any one 
of its factions so demands. 
2.5: a) On the issues enumerated below, action will be taken as follows: 
1) A bill for a Basic Law submitted by a Knesset member will be regarded 
as a private member bill. 
2) Basic law proposed by the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee of 
the Knesset will be acted upon with the consent of both parties. 
b) The right to abstain issues of conscience or religious conscience will be 
upheld after clarification in the Govemment or the Coalition Executive, 
except for issues conceming the preservation of the religious status quo. 
3: General 
3.1: The inclusion of additional factions in the coalition, and I or the inclusion of 
their representatives in the Government after it has been approved by the 
Knesset, will be carried out jointly and with the consent of the parties to this 
agreement. 
3.2: The preservation of the status quo on religious maters will be ensured, and 
the right to submit private members bills on religious matters will be upheld. 
The date for raising these bills, if submitted, for a debate in the Knesset, and 
the manner of voting on them, will be determined in consultations between 
the Prime Minister and Deputy Premier. 
3.3: The real level of funding for state and state-religious education, schools, 
infrastructure of higher learning, various yeshivas, Torah institutes and 
education and cultural institutions will be maintained, and discrimination 
against any one of these streams of education will be prevented. If a budget 
cut is made, it will be proportional. 
3.4: A suitable allocation will be guaranteed to settlement movements and youth 
movements. 
3.5: An agreement between a party to this agreement and any other faction will 
not be binding upon the other party to this agreement. 
The agreement was signed on 13th September 1984 by Mr. Peres and Mr. 
Shamir. 
Appendix 3(b): The 1988 National Unity Government Agreement between the 
Likud and the Alignment. 
The 1988 agreement mirrored the 1984 agreement with the following major 
differences. 
1. Article 1.4: The Government will be headed by Mr. Shamir and Mr. Peres will 
serve as Deputy Premier. There will be no Prime Ministerial rotation, and all 
Articles relating to it were omitted. 
2. Article 1.6: Twenty six Ministers will serve in the Government. The parity 
between the Likud and Labour blocks ceased to exist. If in the previous 
agreement additional parties were included at the expense of either major 
party, now they came in outside the major parties quotas. 
3. Article 1.8: the Inner Cabinet will have 12 members, six from each party. 
4. Article 1.20 on electoral reform (Artide 1.17 in the 1984 agreement), the 
Committee will look as well in to changes in the government system. Also 
should the two parties not reach an agreement within a year, each party will 
be entitled to initiate legislation in the Knesset as it sees fit. 
5. Article 1.22: Should the Knesset pass a vote of no-confidence against the 
Government, no other Government will be established in its place. Within 
seven days of the vote of no-confidence, the two parties will submit a bill for 
dissolving the Knesset and for the holding of new elections no later than 1 00 
days from the day on which the bill is approved by the Knesset. The two 
parties will ensure a majority to approve this bill, within 30 days of the day in 
which the bill is tabled in the Knesset. They will act firmly to base this 
provision in the appropriate legislation 
This article was inserted because, unlike the agreement in 1984, the 1988 
agreement did not determine the duration of the government's term of office. 
Appendix 4(a): The National Unity Government Cabinet 
The 1984-1986 NUG, 13th September 1984 to 21st October 1986. 
Ministers. 
Simon Peres (Labour}, Prime Minister 
Yitzhak Shamir (Likud), Deputy Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Yitzhak Rabin (Labour}, Minister of Defence 
Yitzhak Navon (Labour), Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Education and 
Culture 
David Levy (Likud), Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Housing and 
Construction 
Moshe Arens (Likud), Minister without Portfolio 
Yosef Burg (NRP}, Minister of Religious Affairs 
Chaim Bar-Lev (Labour), Minister of Police 
Chaim Corfu (Likud}, Minister of Transport 
Mordechi Gur (Labour), Minister of Health 
Yigal Hurwitz (Ometz}, Minister without Portfolio 
Moshe Katsav (Likud), Minister of Labour and Social Affairs 
Yitzhak Mod'ai (Likud), Minister of Finance 
Aryeh Nechamkin (Labour}, Minister of Argriculture 
Moshe Nissim (Likud), Minister of Justice 
Gideon Patt (Likud), Minister of Science and Development 
Yitzhak Peretz (Shas}, Minister of the Interior 
Ammon Rubinstein (Shinui), Minister of Communication 
Moshe Shahal (Labour), Minister of Energy and Infrastructure 
Yosef Shapira (Morasha), Minister without Portfolio 
Avraham Sharir (Likud}, Minister of Tourism 
Ariel Sharon (Likud), Minister of Industry and Tourism 
Ya'acov Tsur (Labour), Minister of Immigrant Absorption 
Ezer Weizman (Yahad), Minister without Portfolio 
Gad Ya'acobi (Labour}, Minister of Economics and Planning 
Deputy Ministers. 
Adiel Amorai (Labour), Deputy Minister of Finance 
Shoshana Arbeli-Aimozlino (Labour), Deputy Minister· of Health 
Avraham Katz Oz (Labour), Deputy Minister of Agriculture 
Ronni Milo (Likud}, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Menachem Porush (Agudat), Deputy Minister of Labour and Social Affairs 
Appendix 4{b): The National Unity Government Cabinet. 
The 1986 to 1988 NUG, 21st October 1986 to 22nd December 1988. 
The membership of the Cabinet was identical to the previous Cabinet with the 
following changes; 
Yitzhak Shamir (Likud), Prime Minister 
Shimon Peres (Labour), Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Shoshana Arbeli-Aimozlino (Labour), Minister of Health in place of Mordechi Gur 
who did not join the government until 18th April 1988 when he became Minister 
without Portfolio 
Moshe Nissim (Likud); Minister of Finance from 16th April1986 
Yitzhak Mod'ai (Likud), Minister without Portfolio. from 16th April 1986 to 23rd 
August 1986, Minister of Justice. After his resignation the Justice Ministry was 
assigned to Mr. Sharir (Likud). 
Moshe Arens (Likud) resigned on 2nd September 1987 and returned on 18th 
April 1988 as Minister without Portfolio 
Yitzhak Peretz (Shas), resigned on 4th January 1987 and returned as Minister 
without Portfolio on 25th May 1987 
Ammon Rubinstein (Shinui), reigned on 26th May 1987 and his portfolio was 
assigned to Gad Ya'acobi (Labour). 
Yosef Burg (NRP), resigned on 5th October 1986 and Zevulum Hammer (NRP) 
replaced him. 
Appendix 4(c): The National Unity Government Cabinet 
The 1988-1990 NUG, 22nd December 1988 to 15th March 1990. 
Ministers 
Yitzhak Shamir (Likud), Prime Minister and Minister of Labour and Social Affairs 
Shimon Peres (Labour), Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance 
Yitzhak Rabin (Labour), Minister of Defence 
David Levy (Likud), Vice Premier and Minister of Housing and Construction 
Yitzhak Navon (Labour), Vice Premier and Minister of Education and Culture 
Moshe Arens (Likud), Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Chaim Bar-Lev (Labour), Minister of Police 
Aryeh Deri (Shas), Minister of Interior 
Rafael Edri (Labour), Minister without Portfolio 
Mordechi Gur (Labour), Minister without Portfolio 
Zevulum Hammer (NRP), Minister of Religious Affairs 
Avraham Katz-Oz (Labour), Minister of Agriculture 
Moshe Katsav (Likud), Minister of Transport 
Dan Meridor (Likud), Minister of Justice 
Ronni Milo (Likud), Minister of the Environment 
Yitzhak Mod'ai (Likud), Minister of Economics and Planning 
Moshe Nissim (Likud), Minister without Portfolio 
Ehud Olmert (Likud), Minister without Portfolio 
Gideon Patt (Likud), Minister of Tourism 
Yitzhak Peretz (Shas), Minister of immigrants Absorption 
Moshe Shahal (Labour), Minister of Health and Infrastructure 
Avner Shaki (NRP), Minister without Portfolio 
Ariel Sharon (Likud), Ministry of Industry and Trade 
Ya'acov Tsur (Labour), Minister of Health 
Ezer Weizman (Labour), Minister of Science and technology 
Gad Ya'acobi (Labour), Minister of Communication 
Deputy Ministers. 
Yossi Beilin (Labour), Deputy Minister of Finance 
Bibi Netanyahu (Likud), Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Moshe Zeev Feldman (Agudat Israel), Deputy Minister of Labour and Social 
Affairs 
Appendix 4(d): The 1992 Labour Led Government Cabinet. 
Government fonned in July 1992 and reshuffled in December 1992 and May 
1993. 
Yitzhak Rabin (Labour), Prime Minister, Minister of Defence and acting Minister 
of Religious Affairs 
Shimon Peres (Labour}, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Avraham Shochat (Labour), Minister of Finance 
Binyamin Ben-Eiiezer (Labour), Minister of Housing and Construction 
Aryeh Deri (Shas), Ministry of Interior 
Amnon Rubinstein (Meretz), Minister of Education 
Yisrael Kessar (Labour}, Minister of Transport 
David Libai (Labour), Minister of Justice 
Yair Tsaban (Meretz), Minister of Immigrant Absorption 
Micha Harish (Labour}, Minister of Industry and Trade 
Moshe Shahal (Labour), Ministry of Police and Energy 
Chaim Ramon (Labour), Minister of Health 
Ya'acov Tsur (Labour), Minister of Agriculture 
Shulamit Aloni (Meretz), Minister of Communications, Science and Technology 
Ora Namir (Labour), Minister of Labour and Social Affairs 
Yossi Sarid (Meretz), Minister of the Environment 
Shimon Shetreet (Labour}, Minister of Economics and Planning 
Uzi Baram (Labour}, Minister of Tourism 
Following the resignations of Mr. Ramon and Rabbi Deri, Mr. Rabin held the 
additional portfolios of Minister of Interior and Minister of Health until appointing 
the following; 
Ephraim Sneh (Labour), Minister of Health from 1994 
Uzi Baram (Labour), Minister of Interior, Temporary from 1995 
Shimon Shetreet (Labour}, Minister of Religious Affairs, Temporary from 1995 
In July 1995 two additional Ministers were added to the Cabinet. 
Yossi Beilin (Labour), Minister of Economics and Planning 
Ehud Barak (Labour), Minister of Interior. 
Appendix 5: The London Agreement, 11th April1987. 
Mr. Peres and King Hussein 
A three part understanding between Jordan and Israel. 
A: Invitation by UN Secretary General. 
8: Resolutions of the International Conference. 
C: The modalities agreed upon by Jordan-Israel. 
A: The Secretary General will issu~ invitations to the five members of the 
Security Council and the parties involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict in order to 
negotiate a peaceful settlement based on Resolutions 242 and 338, with the 
objects of bringing a comprehensive peace to the area, security to its states, 
and to respond to the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. 
8: The participants in the conference agree that the purpose of the negotiations 
is the peaceful solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict based on Resolutions 242 
and 338 and a peaceful solution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. 
The conference invites the parties to form geographical bilateral committees to 
negotiate mutual issues. 
C: Jordan and Israel have agreed that: 
1: The International Conference will not impose any solution or veto any 
agreement arrived at between the parties. 
2: The negotiations will be conducted in bilateral committees directly. 
3: The Palestinian issue will be dealt with within the committee of the Jordanian-
Palestinian Committee and Israeli delegations. 
4: The Palestinians representatives will be included in the joint Palestinian-
Jordanian delegation. 
5: Participation in the conference will be based on the parties acceptance of 
Resolutions 242 and 338 and the renunciation of violence and terrorism. 
6: Each committee will negotiate independently. 
7: Other issues will be decided by mutual agreement between Jordan and 
Israel. 
The above understanding is subject to the approval of the respective 
governments of Israel and Jordan. 
The text of this paper will be shown as suggested to the USA. 
Appendix 6: A Peace Initiative by the Government of Israel, 14th May 1989 
The Rabin-Shamir Plan. 
General. 
1. This document presents the principles of a political initiative of the 
Government of Israel which deals with the continuation of the peace 
process; the termination of the state of war with the Arab states; a solution 
for the Arabs of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district; peace with Jordan; 
and a resolution of the problem of the residents of the refugee camps in 
Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district. 
2. The document includes: 
a) The principles upon which the initiative is based. 
b) Details of the processes of its implementation. 
c) Reference to the subject of elections under consideration. Further details 
relating to the elections as well as other subjects of the initiative will be dealt 
with separately. 
Basic Premises. 
3. The initiative is founded upon the assumption that there is a national 
consensus for it on the basis of the basic guidelines of the Government of 
Israel, including the following points: · 
a) Israel yearns for peace and the continuation o the political process by 
means of direct negotiation based of the principles of the Camp David 
Accords. 
b) Israel opposes the establishment of an additional Palestinian state in the 
Gaza district and in the area between Jordan and Israel. 
c) Israel will not conduct negotiations with the PLO. 
d) There will be no change in the status of Judea, Samaria and Gaza other 
than in accordance with the basic guidelines of the Government. 
Subjects to be dealt with in the Peace Process. 
4. a) Israel views as important that the peace process between Israel and 
Egypt based on the Camp David Accords, will serve as the cornerstone for 
enlarging the circle of peace in the region, and calls for a common 
endeavour for the strengthening of the peace and its extension, through 
continued consultation. 
b) Israel calls for the establishment of peaceful relations between it and 
those Arab states which still maintain a state of war with it for the purpose of 
promoting a comprehensive settlement for the Arab-Israeli conflict, including 
recognition, direct negotiations, ending the boycott, diplomatic relations, 
cessation of hostile activity in international institutions or forums and 
regional and bilateral co-operation. 
c) Israel calls for an international endeavour to resolve the problem of the 
residents of the Arab refugee camps in Judea, Samaria and Gaza in order to 
improve their living conditions and to rehabilitate them. Israel is prepared to 
be a partner in this endeavour. 
d) In order to advance the political negotiation process leading to peace, 
Israel proposes free and democratic elections among the Palestinian 
inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District in an atmosphere 
devoid of violence, threats and terror. In these elections a representation will 
be chosen to conduct negotiations for a transitional period of self-rule. This 
period will constitute a test for coexistence and co-operation. At a later 
stage, negotiations will be conducted for a permanent solution during which 
all the proposed options for an agreed settlement will be examined, and the 
peace between Israel and Jordan ill be achieved. 
e) All the above mentioned steps should be dealt with simultaneously. 
f) The details of what has been mentioned in d) will be given below. 
The Principles Constituting the Initiative Stages. 
5. The initiative is based on two stages; 
a) Stage A - A transitional period for and interim agreement. 
b) Stage B- Permanent Solution. 
6. The interlock between the stages is a timetable on which the plan is built; 
the peace process delineated by the initiative is based on Resolutions 242 
and 338 upon which the Camp David Accords are founded. 
Timetable. 
7. The transitional period will continue for 5 years. 
8. As soon as possible, but not later than the third year after the beginning of 
the transitional period, negotiations for achieving a permanent solution will 
begin. 
Parties Participating in the Negotiations in Both Stages. 
9. The parties participating in the negotiations for the first stage (the interim 
agreement) shall include Israel and the elected representation of the 
Palestinian Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and Gaza District. Jordan 
and Egypt will be invited to participate in the negotiations if they so desire. 
10. The parties participating in the negotiations for the second stage (permanent 
solution) shall include Israel and the elected representation of the 
Palestinian Arabs inhabitants of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, as well as 
Jordan; furthermore, Egypt may participate in these negotiations. In 
negotiations between Israel and Jordan, in which the elected representation 
of the Palestinian Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and Gaza will 
participate, the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan will be concluded. 
Substance of Transitional Period. 
11. During the transitional period the Palestinian Arab inhabitants of Judea, 
Samaria and Gaza will be accorded self rule by means of which they will, 
themselves, conduct their affairs of daily life. Israel will continue to be 
responsible for security, foreign affairs and all matters concerning Israeli 
citizens in Judea, Samaria and Gaza district. Topics involving the 
implementation of the plan for self rule will be considered and decided within 
the framework of the negotiations for an interim agreement. 
Substance of Permanent Solution. 
12. In the negotiations for a permanent solution every party shall be entitled to 
present for discussion all the subjects it may wish to raise. 
13. The aim of the negotiations should be: 
a) The achievement of a, permanent solution acceptable to the negotiating 
parties. ~ · ; · :; 
b) The arrangements for peace and borders between Israel and Jordan. 
Details of the Process for Implementation of the Initiative. 
14. First and foremost dialogue and basic agreement by the Palestinian Arab 
inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and Gaza, as well as Egypt and Jordan if 
they wish to take part, as above mentioned, in the negotiations, on the 
principles constituting the initiative. 
15. a) Immediately afterwards will follow the stage of preparations and 
implementation of the election process in which a representation of 
Palestinian Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and Gaza will be elected. 
This representation: 
I) Shall be a partner to the conduct of negotiations for the transitional 
period. 
II) Shall constitute the self-governing authority in the course of the 
transitional period. 
Ill) Shall be the central Palestinian component, subject to agreement after 
three years, in the negotiations for a permanent solution. 
In the period of preparation and implementation there shall be a calming of the 
violence in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district. 
16. As to the substance of the elections, it is recommended that a proposal of 
regional elections be adopted, the details of which shall be determined in 
future discussions. 
17. Every Palestinian Arab residing in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, who shall be 
elected by the inhabitants to represent them, after having submitted his 
candidacy in accordance with the detailed document which shall determine 
the subject of the elections, may be a legitimate participant in the conduct of 
negotiations with Israel. 
18. The elections shall be free, democratic and secret. 
19. Immediately after the election of the Palestinian representation negotiations 
shall be conducted with it on an interim agreement for a transitional period 
which shall continue for 5 years, as mentioned above. In these negotiations 
the parties shall determine all the subjects relating to the substance of self 
rule and the arrangements necessary for its implementation. 
20. As soon as possible, but not later than the third year after the establishment 
of the self-rule, negotiations for a permanent solution shall begin. During the 
whole period of these negotiations until the signing of the agreement for a 
permanent solution, the self-rule shall continue in effect as determined in the 
negotiations for an interim agreement. 
Appendix 7: The Egyptian Ten Point Proposal, 4th September 1989. 
1: The necessity of participation of all citizens of the West Bank and Gaza 
(including the residents of East Jerusalem) in the elections, both in the 
voting and in the right to stand as a candidate for any person who has not 
been convicted (denounced) by the court of committing a crime. This is 
meant to permit the participation of those under administrative detention. 
2: The freedom of political mobilisation before and during the elections. 
3: Acceptance of international supervision of the election process. 
4: Prior commitment of the Government of Israel that it will accept the results 
of the elections. 
5: Commitment of the Government of Israel that the elections will be part of 
the efforts which will lead not only to a temporary stage, but also to a final 
solution, and that all efforts from he beginning to end (should) depend on 
the basis of the solution which are in the American concept: Resolutions 
242 and 338, Territory for peace, protection of the security of Israel and the 
countries of the region, Palestinian political rights. 
6: Withdrawal of the Israeli army during the elections process at least one 
kilometre outside the perimeters of the polling stations. 
7: Prohibition of Israeli from entering the West Bank an Gaza on election day 
with permission to enter only to those who work in these regions and the 
residents of the settlements. 
8: The preparatory period for these elections should last no longer than two 
months and these preparations should be accompanied by means of a 
joint Israeli-Palestinian committee (The USA and Egypt may assist in 
forming this committee). 
9: Guarantee of the USA of all the above points by means of a prior 
announcement on the part of the Government of Israel. 
· 10: Prevention of settlement in the Occupied Territories (a halt to the 
construction of new settlements). 
Appendix 8: The United States Five Point Proposal, 14th October 1989. 
1 : The United States understands that because Egypt and Israel have been 
working hard on the peace process, there is agreement that an Israeli 
delegation should conduct a dialogue with a Palestinian delegation in Cairo. 
2: The United States understands that Egypt cannot substitute itself for the 
Palestinians and Egypt will consult with the Palestinians on all aspects of 
that dialogue. Egypt will also consult with Israel and the United States. 
3: The United States understands that Israel will attend the dialogue only after a 
satisfactory list of Palestinians has been worked out. 
4: The United States understands that the Government of Israel will come to the 
dialogue on the basis of the Israeli Govemmenrs 14th May initiative. The 
United States further understands that the Palestinians will come to the 
dialogue prepared to discuss elections and the negotiating process in 
accordance with Israel's initiative. The United States understands, therefore, 
that the Palestinians would be free to raise issues that relate to their 
opinions on how to make elections and the negotiating process succeed. 
5: In order to facilitate this process, the US. proposes that the Foreign Ministers 
of Israel, Egypt, and the US. meet in Washington within two weeks. 
Appendix 9: The Labour Party Agreements During the "Dirty Exercise", 1990. 
General. 
The agreements were signed with ex Hadash MK. Mr. Biton, renegade Likud 
MK. Mr. Sharir (who subsequently returned to the Likud after the failure of the 
Labour party to form a government), Agudat Israel, Ratz, Shinui and Mapam. In 
addition to these agreements the Labour party drew up a letter which 
summarised its understandings with Hadash. 
Agreement with Mr. Biton. . 
The agreement signed on 14th March 1990 promised Mr. Biton the following 
from the Labour party; 
1. To appoint four members of the Black Panther organisation to key positions 
within the civil service. 
2. To assign two members of the Black Panther organisation to the boards of 
directors of large government companies and two more to lesser positions in 
the same companies. 
3. To pay NIS 200,000 to cover the debts of the Black Panther organisation. 
4. To recognise Mr. Biton as an independent Knesset faction and fund for the 
rest of the Knesset and the subsequent election campaign if the Knesset 
refused to do so. 
5. To allocate one of its seats on the Knesset Finance Committee to Mr. Biton. 
6. Three weeks later when the formal coalition agreement was signed the 
Labour party further promised to set up a slum neighbourhood authority in 
the Prime Minister's office. The head of the authority would only be chosen 
after consultation with Mr. Bitan. 
In return Mr. Bitan agreed to vote for a government led by Mr. Peres and to join 
his coalition. 
Agreement with Mr. Sharir. 
The agreement signed between the Labour party and Mr. Sharir, using the 
name of General Zionists, promised the following from the Labour party; 
1. To appoint Mr. Sharir Minister of Transport and Tourism in the new 
government. 
2. To guarantee him a Cabinet position in the 13th Knesset (next) if the Labour 
party was part of the government. 
3. The Labour party promised not to join any government in this Knesset or the 
next unless Mr. Sharir was given a Senior Economic Cabinet post. 
4. To recognise him (The General Zionists) as a one man faction in the 
Knesset and that he received party funding from either the Knesset or other 
source. 
5. To appoint a representative of the General Zionists to the executive of the 
Israeli Broadcasting Authority, and to appoint General Zionists to the boards 
of directors of government companies and other offidal bodies. 
In return Mr. Sharir promised to support a Labour led government, however, he 
was given the right to vote according to his conscience on religious and 
diplomatic matters. 
Agreement with Agudat Israel. 
The coalition agreement between Agudat Israel and the Labour party was 
signed in the Dan Hotel, Tel Aviv on 2nd April1990 and promised the 
following to Agudat Israel; 
1. To secure the Human rights bill and secure the passage of Pork Law within 
six months. 
2. To establish a Committee to examine ways of limiting Sabbath violations. 
and the dissemination of literature defined by Agudat Israel as pornographic. 
3. To appoint a member of Agudat Israel as the Prime Minister's representative 
on the Ministerial Committee dealing with local religious councils. 
4. To establish a radio channel to broadcast religious programmes. 
5. To appoint members of Agudat Israel to head the Ministries of Housing and 
Construction as well as the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. 
6. To consult with Agudat on the appointment of the Justice and Finance 
Ministers. 
7. Any change in the electoral system would not raise the electoral threshold 
above 2 percent. 
8. To supply land for housing for young couples sponsored by Agudat Israel in 
Ashdod, Beit Shemesh, Jerusalem and Rosh Ha'ayin. 
9. To give Agudat Israel and extra NIS 5 Million in development grants, NIS 15 
million in special funding, and NIS 750,000 in funding for Agudat's Israel's 
women's organisations. 
10. To increase the funding of Yeshiva students (religious) by 75 percent over 
the next two years. 
Agudat Israel promised to support a Labour led government but its Knesset 
representatives were granted the right to vote according to their 
consciences, or more precisely, the wishes of the Council of Torah sages 
(spiritual leaders) on political matters involving the West Bank and Gaza. 
Agreement with Hadash. 
The two parties did not sign a formal deal but the Labour party wrote a letter 
summarising the understandings between with the Labour party promising 
the following; 
1. To equalise the standards of the Jewish and Arab sectors by a series of 
measures including, debt rescheduling, allocating NIS 40 million in the first 
year for a comprehensive sewerage programme and examining the prospect 
of opening a university in Nazareth. 
2. Establishing an Inter Ministerial Committee to examine the key problems in 
the Arab sector. 
3. To continue its peace programme. 
The agreements with Mapam, Ratz and Shinui all took the form of basic 
progress on the peace process and did not contain the same financial 
inducements as the above deals. 
Source: Labour party Headquarters, Ha'arkon street, Tel Aviv and the 
archive department of the Jerusalem Post, Jerusalem. 
INTERVIEWS. 
Interviews were conducted with the leaders of the Labour Party and the members of 
the Israeli Cabinet. Because these Ministers are still serving in the government 
these interviews were conducted on the basis of their being non-attributable. In 
addition, extended formal interviews were conducted with the following in the 
second half of 1994 and ear1y 1995: 
Ms. Nava Arad, Former Deputy Secretary General of the Histadrut, Currently 
advisor to Mr. Rabin on Women's issues, Tel Aviv, 27th July 1994. 
Mr. Joseph Alpher, Director of the Jaffe Centre for Strategic Studies {1994), Tel 
Aviv University, 4th December 1994. 
Dr. Moshe Arens, Likud Minister of Defence (1983-84 and 1990-92), Minister 
without Portfolio {1984-88), Foreign Minister {1988-90), Tel Aviv, 26th September 
1994. 
Dr. Chaim Asa, Director of Mr. Rabin's Election Strategy Team, Hertzila, 16th 
October 1994. 
Dr. Raffel Barkan-Benkler, International Department of the Histadrut, Tel Aviv, 20th 
July 1994. 
Dr. Benni (Zeev) Begin, Son of Mr. Menahem Begin and Likud MK, The Knesset, 
Jerusalem, 8th November 1994. 
Dr. Yossi Beilin, Cabinet Secretary to Mr. Peres {1984-86), Director General of the 
Foreign Ministry {1986-88), Deputy Finance Minister (1988-90}, Deputy Foreign 
Minister 1992-1995. Currently Minister of Economics and Planning (1995}, The 
Foreign Ministry, Jerusalem, 29th August 1994. 
Mr. Yitzhak Ben-Aharon, Former Secretary General of the Labour Party, Former 
Secretary of the Histadrut, Leader of Ahdut Ha'avoda faction, Givat Hayim, 8th 
August 1994. 
Dr. Yossi Ben-Aharon, Director of Mr. Shamir's Prime Minister's Bureau (1983-84 
and 1986-92), Senior Israeli Negotiator with Syria (1991-92}, Jerusalem, 18th 
September 1994. 
Mr. Offer Bronstein, Director of the International Centre for Peace in the Middle 
East, Tel Aviv, 9th August 1994. 
Mr. Avraham Burg, Labour MK, Peace Activist, currently Director of the Jewish 
Agency (1995), The Knesset, Jerusalem, 13th September 1994. 
Mr. Hanan Crystal, Political Correspondent of Hadashot and Israel Radio, Tel Aviv, 
4th September 1994. 
Mr. Eli Dayan, Former Mayor of Ashkelon, Head of the Labour Party Knesset 
Faction (1992-94), Coalition Chairman (1992-94), Currently Deputy Foreign Minister 
(1995), The Knesset, Jerusalem, 8th November 1994. 
Ms. Yael Dayan, Labour MK and Daughter of Mr. Moshe Dayan, The Knesset, 
Jerusalem, 21st November 1994. 
Professor Avraham Diskin, Labour Pollster 1984, Israel Radio Pollster (1988 and 
1992) and Senior Lecturer in Political Science at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 
14th November 1994. 
Mr. Lativ Dori, Member of Mapam Leadership and the First Israeli Politician to 
openly meet Mr Arafat, Mapam Headquarters, Tel Aviv, 23rd August 1994. 
Professor Gideon Doron, Member of Mr. Rabin's Strategic Election Team, 1992, 
Lecturer in Political Science, Tel Aviv University, 12th October 1994. 
Mr. Amiram Efranti, Secretary General of the Kibbutz Artzi Movement, Tel Aviv, 
29th August 1994. 
Mr. Lova Eliav, Former Secretary General of the Labour Party, Tel Aviv, 25th July 
1994. 
Mr. Israel Gat, Chairman of the International Department of the Labour Party and 
delegate to Socialist International, Party Headquarters, Tel Aviv, 11th August 1994. 
Mr. Yossi Gazit, Mapam Spokesman, Mapam Headquarters, Tel Aviv, 27th July 
1994. 
Mr. Ilion Gilon, Director of the Young Guard in Meretz, Tel Aviv 25th August 1994. 
Dr. Dore Gold, Director of American-Israeli Studies Programme, Jaffe Centre for 
Strategic Studies, Advisor to Mr. Shamir at Madrid Peace Conference and currently 
an Advisor to Mr. Netanyahu, Tel Aviv University, 2nd October 1994. 
Mr. Avraham Hatzharmi, Director of the International Department of the Labour 
Party, Tel Aviv, 29th November 1994. 
Mrs Ester Herlitz, Former Labour MK and Ambassador, Tel Aviv, 15th August 
1994. 
Mr. Shlomo Hillel, Former Labour Party Minister of Police and Speaker of the 
Knesset 1984-88, Jerusalem, 25th July 1994. 
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Ms. Sarah Honig, Political Correspondent of the Jerusalem Post, Tel Aviv, 13th 
November 1994. 
Mr. David Horowitz, Editor of The Jerusalem Report, Jerusalem, 25th July 1994. 
Mr. Gideon Ben-Israel, Co-founder of Rafi in 1965, former Head of the Labour 
Party Histadrut faction, Former Deputy General of the Histadrut, Tel Aviv, 21st 
October 1994. 
Ms. Dalia ltzik, Former Deputy Mayor of Jerusalem and currently Labour MK, The 
Knesset, Jerusalem, 25th October 1994. 
Mr. Aryieh Jaffe, Former Leader of Mapam, Kibbutz Hakum, 28th August 1994. 
Mr. Avner Kobliner, Secretary of Hashomer Hatzair Movement, Tel Aviv, 25th 
September 1994. 
Dr. Danny Kom, Former Advisor to Mr. Allon and Lecturer in Political Science at Tel 
Aviv University, 13th September 1994. 
ProfessorYoram Lass, Labour MK, The Knesset, Jerusalem, 17th October 1994. 
Mr. Yoram Martziano, Political Advisor to Mr. Peres, The Foreign Ministry, 
Jerusalem, 8th September 1994. 
Mr. ldris Mawasi, Arab Representative in Histadrut leadership, Tel Aviv, 24th 
August 1994. 
Mr. Peter Medding, Lecturer in Political Science Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 
14th November 1994. 
Mr. Dan Meridor, Mr. Begin's Cabinet Secretary, Minister of Justice 1988-92, 
currently Likud MK, 17th October 1994 and 8th November 1994, The Knesset, 
Jerusalem 
Mr. Haggai Merom, Labour Party MK and Chairman of the Labour's Internal Party 
Affairs Committee, Tel Aviv, 20th October 1990. 
Dr. Robbie Nathanson, Senior Economist in the Histadrut, Director of the Institute 
of Economic and Social Research of the Histadrut, Tel Aviv, 29th July 1994. 
Mr. Ori Or, Labour MK and Chairman of the Foreign Affairs and Defence 
Committee in the Knesset, Jerusalem, 21st November 1994. 
Dr. Yoram Peri, Editor of Davar and former Spokesman for the Labour Party, Tel 
Aviv, 1st August 1994. 
Mr. Yoram Peri, Spokesman for the Labour Party 1994, Tel Aviv, 31st October 
1994. 
325 
Ms. Monica Pollack, Director of the International Department of Mapam, Tel Aviv, 
4th July 1994. 
Mr. Avraham Poraz, Former Shiniu MK and currently Meretz MK, 24th August 
1994. 
Mr. Leslie Rayne, International Department of the Histadrut, Tel Aviv, 20th July 
1994. 
Dr. Susan Hatis-Rolef, Editor of Spectrum (Labour Party magazine) and contributor 
to the Jerusalem Post, Jerusalem, 29 August 1994. 
Mr. Gideon Saguy, Head of Labour Party's Tel Aviv branch and Labour MK, The 
Knesset, Jerusalem, 25th July 1994. 
Mr. Zeev Schiff, Political and Military Correspondent of Ha'aretz, Tel Aviv, 25 
November 1994. 
Dr. Daphna Sharfrnan, Chair of Labour Party's Human Right Committee, Active 
member of Haifa branch of the party, Haifa, 3rd August 1994. 
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